NVMEN

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
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NVMEN

ZUM PROBLEM DES GOTTESBEWEISES IN DER INDISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE

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Das methodische Auslegen des natürlichen Wissens von der eigenen Seinsbedingtheit im Sinne der Existenznotwendigkeit eines Seinsbedingenden ist das Wesen des Gottesbeweises und die kritische Grundlegung dieser auslegenden Methode ist das Problem des Gottesbeweises. Aufgabe dieses Beitrages ist es, dieses Problem in einer seiner historischen Ausformungen zu zeigen, die es im Ringen um eine philosophische Gotteslehre in Indien erhalten hat. Dabei wurde nicht beabsichtigt, eine vollständige genetisch-deskriptive Darstellung der Entwicklung dieses Problems in Indien zu geben — dies hätte den Rahmen dieser Arbeit gesprengt —, sondern das Problem in einer seiner historischen Grundformen, sozusagen als Typus herauszuarbeiten. [1])

Für diese historisch-typologische Darstellung wurde die Gotteslehre der Nyāya-Schule [2]) gewählt, da sie dem Problem des philosophischen Gottesbeweises am meisten Aufmerksamkeit schenkte und die Lösung dieses Problems am stärksten prägte. Das starke Hervortreten der philosophischen Gotteslehre im Denken dieser Schule darf aber nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der Theismus des Nyāya in seiner metaphysischen Struktur von jedem christlichen Theismus unterschieden

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1) Neuere Literatur zur Gotteslehre des Nyāya und des Vaiśeṣika: G. Bhattacharyya: Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism. Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. XIV, Studies No. 5. Calcutta 1961. — G. Chemparathy: Aufkommen und Entwicklung der Lehre von einem höchsten Wesen in Nyāya und Vaiśeṣika. Ungedruckte Dissertation Wien 1963.

2) Diese philosophische Schule beschäftigt sich vor allem mit Problemen der Dialektik (Eristik), Logik und Erkenntnislehre und entlehnt ihre Metaphysik (vor allem die Kategorienlehre) der naturphilosophischen Schule des Vaiśeṣika. Der „alte" Nyāya, dem ein noch allgemeines philosophisches Interesse eigen ist, blüht während des ersten Jahrtausends nach Chr.; er wird durch den „neuen" Nyāya abgelöst, der sich ausschliesslich logischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Fragen zuwendet und bis in die Neuzeit hinein lebendig geblieben ist. In der vorliegenden Arbeit handelt es sich ausschliesslich um den „alten" Nyāya.

ist. Historisch wurde für die Darstellung jener Zeitraum gewählt, in welchem der Gottesbeweis zum ersten Mal kritisch zum Problem gemacht, und in welchem die Lösung dieses Problems im Rahmen der Schule grundsätzlich erreicht wurde, nämlich die Periode von etwa 600-900 n. Chr.

<div align="center">I</div>

Seit seinem ersten Auftreten ist der Gottesbegriff des Nyāya inhaltlich durch den Begriff der „Ursache" (*kāraṇam*) bestimmt. Gott der Herr (*īśvaraḥ*) ist die „Ursache der Welt" [3]), er „unterstützt das Tun des Menschen" und „verleiht der Bemühung des Menschen die Frucht" [4]), wobei „Unterstützen" etc. zunächst und eigentlich in einem natürlich-physischen Sinne verstanden wird. Dieser Gedanke präzisiert sich in der späteren „Scholastik" der Nyāya-Tradition zur Lehre von Gott als der „veranlassenden" Ursache (*nimittakāraṇam*) der Welt. [5])

In dieser Lehre wird eine Begründung des Weltprozesses im Sinne der Kausalitätslehre des Systems gegeben und Gott als „veranlassende Ursache" in das Kausalitätsschema eingeführt. Dies bedeutet aber, dass Gott als Ursache neben anderen Ursachen wie Materialursachen und Instrumentalursachen erscheint. [6]) Diese anderen Ursachen, sowohl die Bauelemente der Welt wie Atome, Äther, Denkorgan, als auch die als „Werkzeuge" wirkenden Realitäten wie Raum, Zeit und Verdienst (*karma*), sind in ihrem Sein und Wesen von Gott unabhängig und werden von ihm lediglich „veranlassend" zum Wirken gebracht. Das Gleiche gilt von den Seelen (*ātmā*), die sozusagen das

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3) NS IV 1, 19.

4) NBh p. 251, 2.

5) „Indem er (Pakṣilasvāmin) sagt, 'weil er dies bewirkt', stimmt er zu, dass Gott der Herr 'veranlassende Ursache' ist. Was die 'veranlassende Ursache' ist, unterstützt die beiden anderen Ursachen, nämlich die inhärierenden Ursachen (= Materialursache) und die nicht inhärierenden Ursachen (= Instrumentalursache, Dativobjekt und Zweck) wie der Webstuhl usw. die Fäden und ihre Verbindung. Wenn nun Gott der Herr 'veranlassende Ursache' der Welt ist, was ist dann die Materialursache? Als solche wird Erde usw. angegeben, d.h. jene überaus feine substanzhafte Entfaltung, die Feinatome genannt ist". NV p. 457, 3-7.

6) Man hat allerdings den Versuch gemacht, das Gesetz des Karma, das ursprünglich mechanistisch den Ablauf der Welt bestimmt hatte, dem Wirken Gottes unterzuordnen. Vgl. NV p. 461, 15-462, 16. Die übrigen Instrumentalursachen und die Materialursachen jedoch wurden niemals in ihrer Existenz von Gott abhängig gemacht.

Finalobjekt der Weltschöpfung sind. Diese Gleichordnung Gottes mit den anderen Ursachen der Welt und die sich daraus ergebenden Konsequenzen werden deutlicher, wenn die Frage nach dem Wesen Gottes beantwortet wird.

„Gott der Herr", schreibt Pakṣilasvāmin im fünften Jahrhundert, „ist eine Seele eigener Art mit besonderen Eigenschaften. Eine andere Vorstellung als jene der Seele ist für ihn nicht möglich und so ist Gott der Herr eine Seele eigener Art, welche durch das Fehlen von Schuld (*adharmaḥ*), falscher Erkenntnis (*mithyājñānam*) und Nachlässigkeit (*pramādaḥ*), sowie durch den Besitz von Verdienst (*dharmaḥ*), Erkenntnis (*jñānam*) und gesammelter Aufmerksamkeit (*samādhiḥ*) bestimmt ist." [7]

Etwa zweihundert Jahre später schreibt Uddyotakara mit Bezug auf diese Worte Pakṣilasvāmins: „Da [im Vorhergehenden] sein [d.h. Gottes] Eigenwesen (*svabhāvaḥ*) nicht bestimmt wurde, ergibt sich der Zweifel, ob Gott der Herr eine Substanz (*dravyam*) ist oder etwas anderes [aus der Gruppe von] Eigenschaft usw. (*guṇādīnām*). [8] — Er ist eine Substanz (*dravyam*), weil er Eigenschaft besitzt, nämlich

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7) NBh p. 252, 1-3. — Zur Interpretation der Termini „*pramādaḥ*" und „*samādhiḥ*", welcher letztere hier offenbar für „*apramādaḥ*" steht, ist man versucht eine Stelle aus dem vielleicht gleichzeitigen Abhidharmakośaḥ Vasabandhu's des Jüngeren heranzuziehen, wo die Begriffe „*apramādaḥ*" und „*pramādaḥ*" erörtert werden: „L'*apramāda*, ou diligence, et la *bhāvanā*, c'est-à-dire la prise de possession et la culture des bons dharmas ... La diligence est l'application (*avahitatā*) aux bons dharmas. On dit par métaphore, qu'elle en est la *bhāvanā*. Par le fait, elle est la cause de la *bhāvanā*. D'après une autre école, la diligence est la garde (*ārakṣā*) de la pensée..." L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu traduit et annoté par L. De la Vallée Poussin. Paris 1923-31. II p. 157. — „Non-diligence, *pramāda*, le contraire de la diligence la non-prise de possession et la non-culture des bons dharmas..." ibid. II p. 161. — Vgl. Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti crit. ed. by Padmanabh S. Jaini. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. 4, p. 71 ff. des Textes. — Ausserdem findet sich auch im śivaitischen Pāśupata-System der Begriff des „*pramādaḥ*", z.B. in der allerdings späteren Gaṇakārikā. Aus diesen Belegen wird jedenfalls deutlich, dass „*pramādaḥ*" und „*apramādaḥ*" (*samādhiḥ* bei Pakṣilasvāmin) bekannte Termini technici sind, welche offenbar einer existenziellen Geistanalyse nach Art des Yoga entstammen. (vgl. Vogabhāṣyam zu YS. I, 30). Dies bestätigt sich insofern als Pakṣilasvāmins Gotteslehre auch noch andere Züge des (sāṃkhistischen) Yoga zeigt.

8) Hiermit sind die restlichen Kategorien gemeint. Die Kategorientafel des Vaiśeṣika und des Nyāya dieser Zeit umfasst nämlich folgende Kategorien (*padārthaḥ*): Substanz (*dravyam*), Eigenschaft (*guṇaḥ*), Bewegung (*karma*), Besonderheit (*viśeṣaḥ*), Gemeinsamkeit (*sāmānyam*) und Inhärenz (*samavāyaḥ*).

Erkennen [usw.], wie jede andere Substanz. — Dann ist er also, da
er Erkennen besitzt, eine Seele besonderer Art? — Nein, er ist keine
Seele besonderer Art, weil hinsichtlich der Eigenschaften ein Unter-
schied besteht (*guṇabhedāt*). Denn wie die [Elemente] Erde usw.
wegen des Unterschiedes hinsichtlich der Eigenschaften keine Seelen
sind, so ist auch dieser aus eben diesem Grunde — Gott der Herr
ist nämlich hinsichtlich der Eigenschaften unterschieden — nicht eine
Seele besonderer Art." [9])

Pakṣilasvāmin ordnet also Gott als „Seele" in die Kategorientafel
ein [10]), während ihn Uddyotakara als Substanz sui generis betrach-
tet [11]). Mit Hilfe dieser doppelten Bestimmung von Gottes Wesen
lässt sich der Gottes Begriff des Nyāya weiter auslegen: Von beiden
Nyāya-Denkern wird zunächst einmal unmissverständlich das „Anders-
sein" Gottes ausgedrückt. Pakṣilasvāmin unterscheidet die Seele „Gott"
von den anderen Seelen, indem er ihr gewisse Eigenschaften zuschreibt
und gewisse Eigenschaften aberkennt. Uddyotakara, der bereits in den
Begriffen der klassischen Metaphysik des Nyāya denkt, zieht aus der
Verschiedenheit der Eigenschaften die logische Konsequenz: Da Gott
Träger von Eigenschaften ist, muss er zur Kategorie der Substanz ge-
hören. Realitäten aber, welche als Substanzen erkannt werden, sind
in ihrem Substanz-Sein lediglich durch den Besitz bestimmter, wesens-
typischer Eigenschaften modifiziert, in sich sind sie nichts anderes als
Substanz, nämlich ein Seiendes, sofern es Träger von Eigenschaften
ist. Wenn daher eine Substanz andere Eigenschaften besitzt, muss
sie auch eine andere Substanz sein. Daher kann Gott, der Eigenschaften
besitzt, welche als solche weder den Seelen, noch den anderen Sub-
stanzen zukommen, nur eine Substanz eigener Art sein. [12])

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9) NV p. 464, 7-11.

10) Dies stimmt mit der Gotteslehre des sāṃkhyistischen Yoga überein, in
der Gott folgend definiert ist: „Gott der Herr ist jene besondere Seele (*puru-
ṣaḥ*), welche unberührt ist von den Befleckungen, den Werken, ihrer Reifung
und den Dispositionen dazu," Yogasutram, I, 24.

11) NV p. 464, 7-11. Vgl. TSP I, p. 40: „Mit 'andere' meint er [nämlich
Śāntarakṣita] die Naiyāyikas. Unter diesen sagen einige, dass die allwissende
Gottheit, die Urheber der ganzen Welt ist, eine Seele besonderer Art ist, welche
besondere Eigenschaften besitzt; andere sagen, dass sie eine andere Substanz
und nicht eine Seele ist, weil sie unterschiedene Eigenschaften besitzt, wird
doch angenommen, dass ihre Erkenntnis ewig, und einheitlich ist und alles zum
Gegenstand hat."

12) Gegenüber der Lehre, dass Gott eine besondere Seele sei, setzt sich diese
Lehre jedoch nicht allgemein durch.

Neben diesem „Anderssein" Gottes steht aber eine radikale Gleichheit Gottes mit anderem Seienden. Wenn nämlich Pakṣilasvāmin Gott als Seele bestimmt, die durch den Besitz bestimmter Eigenschaften von anderen Seelen unterschieden ist, so ist der damit gelehrte Unterschied lediglich ein Unterschied zwischen Seelen. Der Gottesbegriff Pakṣilasvāmins transzendiert den Begriff der Seele in keiner Weise. Für Pakṣilasvāmin gehört Gott zu einer bestimmten Kategorie des Seienden, er ist nur der durch besondere Eigenschaften ausgezeichnete Spezialfall einer Gruppe von Seiendem, nämlich der Seelen. Dass diese Interpretation von Pakṣilasvāmins Gottesbegriff richtig ist, und der Denktradition seiner Schule entsprecht, zeigt die Auffassung Uddyotakaras, welche zweihundert Jahre später und individuell geprägt denselben Typus des Gottesbegriffes erkennen lässt.

Zwar hat Uddyotakara das „Anderssein" Gottes deutlicher formuliert als Pakṣilasvāmin, doch überschreitet auch er trotz dieser Betonung des „Andersseins" nicht den Raum des Seienden, um so dem Gottesbegriff einen Unterschied des Seins zu sichern. Auch für Uddyotakara bleibt Gott letzlich ein durch besondere Eigenschaften ausgezeichneter Spezialfall einer Gruppe von Seiendem, nämlich der Substanzen.

Ist aber durch die Lehre, dass Gott eine Substanz eigener Art ist, die einzig, allwissend und ewig ist, nicht ein derartiger Unterschied zum Seienden aufgedeckt, dass Gott eben doch von jedem weltimmanenten Seienden zu unterscheiden ist, da er weder in eine andere Kategorie als jener der Substanz eingeordnet werden kann, noch auch innerhalb dieser Kategorie etwas seinesgleichen besitzt?

Um diese Frage zu beantworten, ob nicht doch implicite eine Transzendenz Gottes vom Nyāya gelehrt wird, muss untersucht werden, wie sich der hier verwendete Substanzbegriff zum Seinsbegriff verhält. Dazu ist von dem Umstand auszugehen, dass der Nyāya die Existenz ewiger Substanzen kennt, wie etwa die der Atome, der Seele usw., welche von Gott, der „veranlassenden Ursache" zur Erschaffung der Welt gebraucht werden. Diese Substanzen sind, da ihnen jeweils bestimmte typische Eigenschaften, bzw. ein bestimmtes durch diese Eigenschaften unterschiedenes Substanzsein (*dravyatvam*) zukommt [13]), in ihrer Seinsaktualität, so wie jedes Seiende, begrenzt. Da sich bei Ud-

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13) So bestimmt Praśastapāda, ein Vaiśeṣika-Denker der Zeit Uddyotakaras die Charakteristika der Substanz wie folgt: „Den neun [Sustanzen] nämlich

dyotakara keine einzige Stelle findet, die den Gedanken andeuten würde, dass diese Substanzen von Ewigkeit her in ihrem Dasein von Gott erhalten würden und somit in ihrer Existenz von ihm abhingen, und auch sonst der Nyāya eine derartige Auffassung der ewigen Substanzen nicht kennt, muss angenommen werden, dass Uddyotakara diese Substanzen als Seiendes auffasst, das in seiner Seinsaktualität zwar begrenzt ist, dessen Begrenzung aber metaphysisch nicht weiter geklärt, sondern als ewig postuliert wird.

Der von Uddyotakara zur Definition des Wesens Gottes verwendete Substanzbegriff enthält daher den Begriff eines ewigen, aber in sich begrenzten Seinsaktes. Die Substanz wird nicht weiter auf einen Existenzgrund zurückgeführt, indem gefragt würde, wie „Primär-Seiendes" (= die ewigen Substanzen und ihre Eigenschaften) als Seiendes in sich möglich sei, oder warum dieses existiere und nicht eher nicht existiere. Damit lässt sich aber der Begriff einer Seinsstruktur im Sinne etwa von kontigentem Seienden und absolutem Seinsakt (*actus purus*) überhaupt nicht auf den Substanzbegriff des Nyāya anwenden. Uddyotakara kennt letztlich keinen metaphysischen Seinsbegriff, sondern nur den Begriff des Seienden, der gewonnen ist durch Abstrahierung von den unterscheidenden Bestimmungen und somit die verschiedenen Kategorien des Seienden zwar übersteigt, aber trotzdem nicht in den Bereich der Seinstranszendenz vorstösst.

Wenn daher das kategoriale Sein des weltimmanent Seienden nicht mehr in seiner metaphysischen Struktur ausgelegt wird, und auch Gott nicht als Existenzgrund der Welt, sondern als „veranlassende Ursache" des Welt-Verlaufs betrachtet wird, sofern er das Zusammenspiel von Material- und Instrumentalursachen zum Heil der Seelen als Weltprozess veranlasst, muss geschlossen werden, dass Gott trotz des Unterschiedenseins von anderem in der Welt Seienden von Uddyotakara als Substanz im gleichen Sinne aufgefasst ist wie die anderen ewigen Substanzen, und dass sein „Anderssein" lediglich eine innerkategoriale Differenzierung, aber nicht eine echte Transzendenz des Seins be-

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Erde usw. kommt die Verbindung mit dem Substanzsein (*dravyatvam*) zu, das Hervorbringen der Wirkung in sich selbst (*svātmanyārambhakatvam*), das Besitzen von Eigenschaften (*guṇavattvam*), das Sich-nicht-Aufheben-von-Ursache und-Wirkung (*kāryakāraṇāvirodhitvam*) und das Individuell-bestimmt-Sein (*ontyaviśeṣavattvam*)" PDS p. 144.

deutet. Damit wird Gott ein wohl ausgezeichneter, aber doch system-
immanenter Bestandteil des „Weltmechanismus", dessen Aufgabe es
ist, jene unmittelbar veranlassende Ursache zu sein, die Kraft ihrer
Geistigkeit geeignet ist, den willkürlichen und gerichteten Prozess von
Weltentstehen und Weltvergehen zu erklären, dessen andere Ursachen
ungeistig sind. Diese Auffassung zeigt sich deutlich bei dem Gottes-
beweis Uddyotakaras, der für den Nyāya jener Zeit strukturell typisch
ist:

„Durch denselben Beweis (*nyāyaḥ*), durch welchen das Ursachesein
von Gott dem Herrn erwiesen ist, wird auch seine Existenz erwiesen",
schreibt Uddyotakara, „denn eine nicht existierende Ursache gibt es
nicht. — Welches ist nun der Beweis für das Ursachesein von Gott
dem Herrn? — Folgender Beweis wird vorgebracht: Urmaterie, Atome
und Verdienst wirken (*pravartante*), sofern sie vor ihrem Wirken von
einer mit Erkenntnis versehenen Ursache gelenkt sind (*buddhimat-
kāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni*), weil sie ungeistig sind wie eine Axt usw. Wie eine
Axt usw. wegen ihrer Ungeistigkeit nur gelenkt durch einen mit Er-
kenntnis versehenen Zimmermann wirkt, ebenso wirken die ungeistigen
[Prinzipien wie] Urmaterie, Atome und Verdienst. Daher sind auch
diese durch eine mit Erkenntnis versehenen Ursache gelenkt." [14]

Der diesen Beweis einleitende Gedanke bestätigt die vorgetragene
Deutung von Uddyotakaras Gottesbegriff. Für Uddyotakara und mit
ihm für den ganzen Nyāya wird Gott nicht deshalb als Ursache der
Welt erkannt, weil nur er im vollkommensten Sinn des Wortes existiert,
sondern er wird als existent erkannt, weil er als eine Ursache der Welt
nachgewiesen wird.

Der Grundgedanke dieses Beweises lässt sich folgend darlegen: Die
Welt ist ein „Mechanismus" verschiedener Ursachen, so dass es letzt-
lich kein Phänomen gibt, das nicht auf diese Ursachen zurückgeführt
werden könnte. Es ist nun nicht so, dass diese Ursachen ohne Gott
genügten, um die faktische Realität der Welt zu erklären, und Gott
lediglich dieses geschlossene System von Ursachen und Wirkungen in
seiner Gesamtheit im Dasein erhielte, ohne selbst Teil dieses Systems
zu werden, sondern Gott ist hier tatsächlich systemimmanenter Bestand-
teil. Fehlte Gott, so würde dieses System selbst eine Lücke aufweisen
und der empirisch-faktische Weltablauf nicht vor sich gehen, und

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14) NV p. 457, 16-22.

zwar nicht deshalb, weil ihm das Sein fehlte, sondern weil seine Ur-
sachen unvollständig wären. Da der Weltablauf aber real gegeben
ist, müssen die Ursachen dieses Ablaufes alle existieren, somit auch
die veranlassende Ursache, nämlich Gott.

Gnoseologisch bedeutet dies, dass Gott grundsätzlich in der gleichen
Weise wie jedes andere Seiende nachgewiesen werden muss, da wegen
des Fehlens eines den Begriff des Seienden transzendierenden Seins-
begriffes ein metaphysischer Beweis nicht möglich ist. Damit muss
aber die kritische Rechtfertigung des Gottesbeweises den Forderungen
eines „empirischen" Beweises genügen. Unter „empirischem Beweis"
ist hier ein Beweis verstanden, welcher auf Grund von empirisch
Seiendem oder seiner Eigenschaften ein anderes Seiendes oder seine
Eigenschaften erschliessen lässt, ohne eine begriffliche Reduktion
dieses empirisch Seienden auf seine Möglichkeitsgründe als Seiendes
notwendig zu machen. Tatsächlich scheint auch der von Uddyotakara
verwendete Gottesbeweis wenigstens grundsätzlich der Struktur eines
solchen „empirischen" Beweises zu entsprechen. In seiner Schlusslehre
übernimmt nämlich Uddyotakara im wesentlichen die Lehre Dignā-
gas [15]) von den drei Merkmalen des Grundes, durch die Dignāga
den „empirischen" Beweis logisch formalisiert hatte. Dignāga hatte
gelehrt, dass ein logischer Grund nur dann als schlüssig nachgewiesen
sei, wenn dieser drei Merkmale besitze: (a) Der logische Grund
(*hetuḥ*) muss dem zu Beweisenden zukommen (hier „Urmaterie"
usw.), (b) er muss weiters anderen Fällen, welche mit dem zu Be-
weisenden hinsichtlich der zu beweisenden Eigenschaft (hier „von
einer mit Erkenntnis versehenen Ursache gelenkt") gleich sind, zu-
kommen, und (c) er muss in allen Fällen, in welchen die zu beweisende
Eigenschaft fehlt, abwesend sein. [16])

Mit dieser Lehre hatte Dignāga zwar eine Formalisierung des lo-
gischen Grundes erreicht, welche ein verlässliches Schlussfolgern er-

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[15]) Dignāga ca 480-540 n. Chr., einer der bedeutendsten buddhistischen Logiker
und Erkenntnistheoretiker.

[16]) Diese Lehre bietet Dignāga in knappster Formulierung in seinem Nyāya-
mukham: „Die [beweisende] Eigenschaft des Subjektes [der Schlussfolgerung]
ist zweifach je nach dem Vorhandensein und Nichtvorhandensein im Sapakṣa
beziehungsweise Vipakṣa, und wiederum dreifach infolge der doppelten Möglich-
keit von sowohl Vorhandensein wie Nichtvorhandensein in jedem der Fälle."
Dieser Vers wird von Vācaspati Miśra zitiert NVTT p. 289, 16-17. — Vgl. G.
Tucci: The Nyāyamukham of Diṅnāga, Heidelberg 1930. p. 11.

möglichte, doch musste er dafür in Kauf nehmen, dass die Schluss-
folgerung in ihrer Anwendbarkeit beschränkt wurde. Nach der Theo-
rie Dignāgas lässt sich nämlich ein logischer Schluss nur in jenen
Fällen als logisch schlüssig nachweisen, in denen eine begrifflich ver-
mittelte Erkenntnis hinsichtlich eines oder mehrer Fälle einer Klasse
von Seiendem gewinnen werden soll. Unter „Klasse" ist hier jene
Gruppe von Seiendem verstanden, die dadurch zustande kommt, dass
allen in ihr enthaltenen Seienden die in der betreffenden Schluss-
folgerung als beweisende und zu beweisende Eigenschaft verwendete
Eigenschaften zukommen. Wo aber eine solche begrifflich vermittelte
Erkenntnis für die Gesamtklasse oder für einen nicht zu einer solchen
Klasse gehörenden Einzelfall gewonnen werden soll, kann ein logischer
Grund grundsätzlich nicht als schlüssig nachgewiesen werden. Damit
kann aber nach Dignāgas Theorie des logischen Grundes weder eine
Erkenntnis des Seienden in seiner Seinsstruktur noch auch von Rea-
litäten wie Gott, Seele usw. gewonnen werden. Dies haben offenbar
auch Uddyotakara und andere Nyāya-Denker erkannt, denn sie ver-
änderten Dignāgas Formalisierungsschema etwas und versuchten so,
auch metaphysische Schlüsse in ihrer Gültigkeit nachzuweisen. [17]) Da
jedoch die Logik des Nyāya noch nicht genügend entwickelt war,
um eigene Wege zu gehen, musste sie grundsätzlich mit dem Schema
Dignāgas arbeiten.

Auf diese Weise wurde vor allem durch die daran anschliessende
gegnerische Polemik die Problematik des Gottesbeweises zum erstan-
mal Gegenstand der philosophischen Erörterung. Diese Problematik war
im wesentlichen dadurch begründet, dass der Gottesbegriff des Nyāya
im Grunde dem Begriff eines zwar ausgezeichneten, aber letzlich eben
doch nur „gegenständlich" existierenden Seienden entsprach, und
andererseits der Nyāya genötigt war, den Gottesbeweis nach einem
Beweisschema zu führen, das aus der Analyse von Schlüssen ge-
wonnen war, die dem Bereich des faktisch Seienden angehörten.

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17) So lehrt zum Beispiel Uddyotakara selbst, dass ein logischer Grund auch
mit nur zwei Merkmalen logische Gültigkeit besitze. Zur Diskussion dieser
Formen logischer Gründe innerhalb der Nyāya-Schule vgl. den Aufsatz des
Verfassers: On the Sources in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Uddyotakara, WZKSO Bd 6
(1962) p. 121 ff. und E. Steinkellner: Augenblicklichkeitsbeweis und Gottesbeweis
bei Śaṅkarasvāmin. Dissertation Wien 1963, p. 69-72.

II

Im Anschluss an die logischen Arbeiten Dignāgas, der den logischen Nexus (*vyāptih*) in der Schlussfolgerung nicht kritisch durch Rückführung auf Seinszusammenhänge begründet hatte, war Dharmakīrti [18]) gerade diesem Problem nachgegangen und hatte seine Lehre von den drei Arten des logischen Grundes entwickelt.

„Die Schlussfolgerung (*anumānam*) für einen selbst (*svārtham*)", schreibt er in seinem Nyāyabinduh, „ist eine Erkenntnis hinsichtlich eines zu Erschliessenden auf Grund des dreiformigen Merkmals (*trirūpāl liṅgāt*) ... Diese Dreiformigkeit wird bestimmt als 'allein Vorhandensein des Merkmals im zu Erschliessenden', 'Vorhandensein allein im Sapakṣa' und 'allein Nichtvorhandensein im Asapakṣa'. Dabei ist das zu Erschliessende der Eigenschaftsträger (*dharmī*), sofern er mit der Besonderheit versehen ist, die man zu erkennen wünscht. Ein Gegenstand, der infolge der Gemeinsamkeit der zu erschliessenden Eigenschaft gleich ist [mit dem zu Erschliessenden], ist der Sapakṣa. Was nicht Sapakṣa ist, das ist der Asapakṣa ... [Diese] drei Formen gibt es und allein drei [Arten] des Merkmals, die Nichtwahrnehmung (*anupalabdhih*), das Eigenwesen (*svabhāvah*) und die Wirkung (*kāryam*). Dabei ist die Nichtwahrnehmung [als logischer Grund] wie zum Beispiel: An einem bestimmten Platz gibt es nirgends einen Topf, da ein solcher, obwohl er die Merkmale der Wahrnehmbarkeit hätte, nicht wahrgenommen wird. Das Versehensein mit den Merkmalen der Wahrnehmbarkeit besteht in der Vollständigkeit der anderen Erkenntnisursachen sowie in einem individuellen Eigenwesen (*svabhāviśeṣah*). Dieses Eigenwesen ist jenes Eigenwesen, welches beim Vorhandensein der anderen Wahrnehmungsursachen eben durch die Wahrnehmung erkannt wird. — Das Eigenwesen ist logischer Grund, wenn die zu beweisende Eigenschaft durch das blosse Sein [des Grundes] gegeben ist, wie zum Beispiel: Das ist ein Baum, weil es ein Siṃśapā ist. — Die Wirkung ist [logischer Grund] wie zum Beispiel: Dort ist Feuer, weil [dort] Rauch ist. — Von diesen [logischen Gründen] beweisen zwei Reales, [während] einer logischer Grund der Negation ist." [19])

Es ist hier nicht der Platz, Dharmakīrtis Logik darzustellen; worum

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18) Dharmakīrti ca 600-660 n. Chr. ist neben Dignāga der bedeutendste Vertreter der buddhistischen logischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Schule.

19) NB p. 21-29.

es hier geht, ist, den logischen Hintergrund bereit zu stellen, vor dem Dharmakīrtis Kritik der Gottesbeweise verständlich wird. Darum kann die Erörterung der Nichtwahrnehmung als eines logischen Grundes von vorneherein ausscheiden, und ebenso die des Eigenwesens als eines logischen Grundes, welches auf der Seinsidentität von Grund und Folge beruht und daher beim Gottesbeweis nicht verwendet werden kann. Beim Gottesbeweis handelt es sich um die Beziehung zwischen zwei voneinander unterschiedenen Seienden, nämlich Gott und Welt. Die einzige Beziehung dieser Art, auf die man eine logische Notwendigkeit gründen kann, ist die Beziehung des „Wirkung-Ursache-Seins" *(kārya-kāraṇabhāvaḥ)* und daher muss der Gottesbeweis, nach Dharmakīrti, mit der Wirkung als logischem Grund arbeiten. Das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" von zwei Seienden kann aber nicht apriori aus dem Eigenwesen eines der Seienden abgeleitet werden — wenngleich diese Beziehung im Eigenwesen der beiden Seienden grund gelegt ist —, sondern kann nur „empirisch-methodisch" festgestellt werden:

„Im Falle eine Wirkung logischer Grund *(kāryahetuḥ)* ist, ist das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" erwiesen, wie zum Beispiel: Etwas, das die Merkmale der Erkennbarkeit besitzt *(upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam)* und vorher nicht wahrgenommen wurde, wird, wenn etwas [anderes] wahrgenommen wird, wahrgenommen, ist aber beim Fehlen dieses [anderen] nicht vorhanden, obwohl die anderen Ursachen vorhanden sind. Dieses durch Wahrnehmung und Nichtwahrnehmung nachweisbare *(pratyakṣā-nupalambhasādhanaḥ)* „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein", dass nämlich etwas beim Vorhandensein eines anderen existiert und bei dessen eFhlen nicht existiert, ist so erwiesen." [20])

Ist das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" zweier Dinge durch die Methode dieser fünffachen Wahrnehmung und Nichtwahrnehmung [21]) nach-

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20) Der Sanskritwortlaut dieser Stelle aus Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ wird zitiert: anavadyānupamavedacatuṣṭayavidhānavedhaḥ - śrīhemacandragurubhrāt-ṛśrīpradyumnasūricaraṇacaṃćarīkaśrīcandrasenasūrisūtritā svopajñā śrī *utpādā-disiddhiḥ.* Jaina Vijayānand Printing Press. Surat 1936. p. 39, 2-4. (entspricht: Derge, Mdo Ce (95) fol. 239 b 7-240 a 1). Die Kenntnis dieses Zitates verdanke ich E. Steinkellner, der mich darauf freundlicherweise aufmerksam machte. — Vgl. auch PVS p. 22, 2-4: „Bei der Wahrnehmung von welchen [Dingen] etwas derart Bestimmtes *(tallakṣaṇam = upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam)* das [früher] nicht wahrgenommen wurde, wahrgenommen wird, und beim Fehlen eines dieser (Dinge) nicht wahrgenommen wird, das ist dessen Wirkung".

21) Diese Methode lässt sich folgend charakterisieren: Man beobachtet, (1) dass B nicht vorhanden ist, (2) man beobachtet A und (3) beobachtet im An-

gewiesen, dann kann man es in jedem Falle, in dem es sich um das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" der gleichen Dinge handelt, nach Dharma-kīrti zur Grundlage einer Schlussfolgerung machen und aus der Wirkung die Ursache erschliessen. Dies ist möglich, insofern jedes Ding im Erkennenden eine Vorstellung (*kalpanā*) hervorruft. Diese Vorstellung, die zum Unterschied von einem Begriff, den Dharmakīrti eigentlich nicht kennt, keine durch Abstraktion erhaltene Wesens-erkenntnis enthält, verweist als Art geistiges „Zeichen" auf ein Individuum (*svalakṣaṇam*). Wenn nun eine solche Vorstellung in sich keinen Wahrheitsgehalt besitzt, so ist mit ihr doch verbunden jene aus der methodischen Beobachtung gewonnene Erkenntnis von der kausalen Hinordnung des der Vorstellung zugrunde liegenden Dinges auf das als seine Ursache beobachtete Ding, und kann daher die Vorstellung der Ursache im Erkennenden entstehen lassen, die ihrerseits kraft ihrer „Intentionalität" auf das der Ursachenvorstellung zugeord-nete Individuum (*svalakṣaṇam*) verweist. Damit lässt sich aber das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" nur in jenen Fällen zur Grundlage einer Schlussfolgerung machen, in denen bestimmte Dinge durch die fünf-fache Wahrnehmung und Nichtwahrnehmung als Ursachen ihrer Wir-kungen beobachtet wurden, beziehungsweise in jenen Fällen, welche den beobachteten Fällen gleich sind. Soweit Dharmakīrtis Logik der Wirkung als eines logischen Grundes.

Da, wie bereits erwähnt, in den Gottesbeweisen des Nyāya lediglich das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" Rechtfertigung des logischen Nexus sein kann, setzt Dharmakīrtis Kritik in diesem Punkt ein und versucht zu zeigen, dass dieses „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" für den Gottesbeweis grundsätzlich nicht verwendet werden kann, da es sich nicht nach-weisen lässt:

„'Wirken nach einer Zeit der Ruhe', 'Besonderheit der Zusammen-setzung', 'Zweckvolles Wirken' usw. [22]) beweisen entweder Erwünsch-tes, oder sie sind im Beleg unerwiesen und erregen Zweifel.

Erwiesen ist 'Zusammensetzung' usw. [als logischer Grund] für einen derartigen Lenker, von dessen Vorhandensein oder Nichtvor-

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schluss daran B. Man beobachtet, (4) dass A nicht (mehr) vorhanden ist und (5) im Anschluss daran, dass auch B nicht (mehr) vorhanden ist.

[22]) Dies sind logische Gründe, welche von Nyāya-Denkern im Gottesbeweis verwendet wurden.

handensein [diese Zusammensetzung] abhängt. [23]) Was auf Grund
dieser [Zusammensetzung] erschlossen wird, das ist richtig.

Erschliesst man etwas, das im Falle eines bestimmten Dinges (*vas-tubhede*) erkannt ist, vermittels [eines Grundes, der nur] infolge einer
Wortgleichheit ununterschieden ist, so ist dies nicht richtig, wie zum
Beispiel [ein Schluss] auf Grund von etwas Weissem (*paṇḍudravyāt*)
im Falle des Feuers.

Anderenfalls wäre deshalb, weil ein Lehmprodukt, wie zum Beispiel
ein Topf von einem Töpfer gemacht ist, auch erwiesen, dass auch ein
Ameisenhaufen von diesem hervorgebracht ist.

[Wenn der Gegner sagen sollte, dieses Argument sei ein 'Kārya-
sama-Sophisma [24]), dann ist dies falsch.] Denn wenn 'Wirkung'
wegen des festen Gefolgtseins durch das zu Beweisende (*sādhyeno-pāgamāt*) auch allgemein als Grund verwendet wird, und [daraufhin
vom Gegner] wegen des Verschiedenseins der Relationsglieder (*sam-bandhibhedāt*) eine Verschiedenheit [des logischen Grundes) behauptet
wird (*bhedoktidoṣaḥ*), so wird d i e s e r Fehler als 'Kāryasama'-
Sophisma betrachtet.

Hat man etwas hinsichtlich einer bestimmten Gattung (*jātyantare*)
erkannt, und will man dieses [für eine andere Gattung] erschliessen,
weil man eine Gleichheit der Bezeichnung beobachtet, so ist dies un-
richtig, wie zum Beispiel, wenn man das Hörner-Besitzen von Rede
usw. [erschliesst] wegen der Bezeichnung „*gauḥ*" [25]).

Oder wo gäbe es keine Worte, hängen diese doch vom Wunsch zu
sprechen ab. Wäre etwas auf Grund ihres Vorhandenseins erwiesen,
dann würde alles für alles erwiesen sein." [26])

Die hier vorgelegte Argumentation enthält im wesentlichen folgen-
den Gedankengang. Das für den Gottesbeweis des Nyāya notwendige
„Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" von Welt und Gott, das allen logischen

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23) Dharmakīrti wählt offenbar als typischen Fall, den er kritisch zu unter-
suchen wünscht, den logischen Grund, den Aviddhakarṇa in seinem Gottesbeweis
verwendet hatte. Vgl. TSP p. 41, 20.

24) Die vom Gegner vorausgesetzte Auffassung dieses Sophisma findet sich
NS V, 1, 37, wo dieses folgend definiert ist: „Der Einwand des entsprechenden
Produktes (*Kāryasamaḥ*) beruht darauf, dass die Produkte der Anstrengung
verschieden sind. Übers. W. Ruben: Die Nyāyasūtra's. Abh. f. d. Kunde d.
Morgenlandes Bd 18 No. 2. Lpz. 1928.

25) Das Wort „*gauḥ*", das Kuh bedeutet, kann ebenfalls zur Bezeichnung
von „Rede" gebraucht werden.

26) PV I, 12-18.

Gründen dieser Beweise zugrunde liegen müsste, lässt sich grundsätz-
lich nicht nachweisen. Denn die Welt lässt sich niemals empirisch-
methodisch durch die fünffache Wahrnehmung als Wirkung Gottes
nachweisen. Gott ist nämlich überhaupt nicht wahrnehmbar und, selbst
wenn er es wäre, könnte die für die Feststellung des „Wirkung-Ur-
sache-Seins" notwendige Nichtwahrnehmung wegen seiner Ewigkeit
nie vollzogen werden. Es könnte daher lediglich möglich sein, dass das
„Wirkung-Ursache-Sein", welches Gott und Welt zukommt, mit einem
empirisch-methodisch feststellbaren „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" identisch
wäre und daher aus der Tatsache, dass die Welt im selben Sinne Wir-
kung einer Ursache ist wie die festgestellte Wirkung, geschlossen wer-
den könnte, dass sie auch eine Ursache derselben Art besitze, nämlich
eine mit Erkenntnis versehene, ewige etc. Tatsächlich lässt sich aber
kein einziger Fall finden, der mit der Welt identisch und bei dem die
Abhängigkeit des „Wirkung-Ursache-Seins" von Gott empirisch-me-
thodisch feststellbar wäre. [27]

Ein Fall der Erfahrung aber, von dem tatsächlich festgestellt ist,
dass er Wirkung einer mit Erkenntnis versehenen Ursache ist, kann, da
diese Ursache nicht Gott ist, keine beweisende Parallele sein. Denn
„erwiesen ist 'Zusammenhang' etc. [als logischer Grund] für einen
derartigen Lenker, von dessen Vorhandensein oder Nichtvorhanden-
sein [diese Zusammensetzung] abhängt". Man müsste daher, falls die
Parallele mit einem empirischen Fall, zum Beispiel den eines Töpfers
und des von ihm produzierten Topfes, als gültig angenommen wird,
schliessen, dass auch die Welt von einem empirisch feststellbaren Ur-
heber, nämlich einem menschlichen Urheber, hervorgebracht sei, aber
nicht von Gott.

Würde man aber von einem empirisch feststellbaren Fall — etwa
dem des Topfes, der durch den Töpfer hervorgebracht ist — ein „Wir-
kung-Ursache-Sein" abstrahieren, das so allgemein wäre, dass es auch
von Welt und Gott ausgesagt werden könnte, dann würde dieses „Wir-
kung-Ursache-Sein" nichts mehr beweisen, ebensowenig wie der vom
Rauch abstrahierte Begriff „etwas Weisses" Feuer erschliessen lässt
oder der von einem Topf abstrahierte Begriff „Lehmprodukt" einen
Töpfer. Denn dieses derart allgemein gefasste „Wirkung-Ursache-
Sein" ist nicht mehr ein wirkliches „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein' 'realer

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27) PV I, 12 cd.

Dinge, sondern eine leere Vorstellung, die auf kein Individuum mehr eindeutig verweist.

Dies geht daraus hervor, dass immer nur ein bestimmtes Seiendes Ursache eines bestimmten Seienden ist, und dass dieses „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" in dem Sinne konstant ist, dass ein Seiendes nicht durch die Ursache eines anderen Seienden hervorgerufen werden kann. Anderenfalls müssten beide Ursachen identisch sein, oder es müsste alles Ursache von allem sein können:

„Wenn eine Gegebenheit (*dharmaḥ*) gelegentlich auch etwas anderes zur Ursache hätte, dann würde sie auch etwas anderes sein. Denn es ist nicht richtig, dass etwas, welches beim Vorhandensein von etwas nicht vorhanden ist, oder das eine verschiedene Ursache hat, dasselbe Eigenwesen besitzt. Dies ist nämlich der Unterschied unter Seienden — beziehungsweise die Ursache dieses Unterschieds —, dass etwas [anderem] widersprechende Eigenschaften beziehungsweise eine andere Ursache besitzt (*viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca*). Wären diese [beiden Umstände] nicht unterscheidend, dann würde nichts von etwas unterschieden sein; es würde alles ein einziges Ding sein und daher müssten Entstehen und Vergehen gemeinsam [zukommen] und würde alles für alles verwendbar sein." [28]

Damit ist aber eine Verallgemeinerung des „Wirkung-Ursache-Seins", in der von einer Beziehung dieses „Wirkung-Ursache-Seins" auf den beobachteten Fall abgesehen wird, als Grundlage des logischen Nexus in einer Schlussfolgerung unmöglich. Eine Verallgemeinerung wäre nur dann statthaft, wenn das durch fünffache Wahrnehmung und Nichtwahrnehmung für einen bestimmten Fall festgestellte „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" nur von jenen Fällen ausgesagt wird, auf welche die Vorstellung (*kalpanā*) der beobachteten Wirkung beziehungsweise Ursache verweist. In allen diesen Fällen kann das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" auch allgemein, ohne neuerliche Feststellung, zur Grundlage einer Schlussfolgerung gewählt werden, selbst wenn die dadurch erschlossene Wirkung praktisch nie wahrgenommen wird.

Hat man aber das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" in einem bestimmten Fall festgestellt und dieses in der eben erwähnten zulässigen Verallgemeinerung gefasst, somit „etwas hinsichtlich einer bestimmten Gattung erkannt", und will man dieses [für eine andere Gattung] erschlies-

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28) PVS p. 20, 21-24.

sen, dann wendet man das methodisch festgestellte „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" auf Fälle an, welchen ein anderes „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" zukommt. Wenn daher der Sprachgebrauch für die „Gattungen" beider Wirkungen den gleichen Namen gebraucht, so berechtigt dieser Sprachgebrauch in keiner Weise zu einem Schluss auf dieselbe Ursache.

Hat man also das „Eine-mit-Erkenntnis-versehene-Ursache-Besitzen" aus der Tatsache erkannt, dass alle Fälle, die unter die Vorstellung „vom Menschen verfertigte Gegenstände" fallen, eine „Zusammensetzung" sind, und will man nun deshalb, weil die Welt ebenfalls mit dem Wort „Zusammensetzung" bezeichnet werden kann, insofern sie aus Atomen etc. besteht, schliessen, dass die Welt eine „mit Erkenntnis versehene Ursache" besitzt, dann ist dieser Schluss unberechtigt. Es handelt sich bei dem Wort „Zusammensetzung" lediglich um eine Äquivokation, wie wenn man zum Beispiel aus der Tatsache, dass Kuh und Rede mit dem Wort *„gauh"* bezeichnet werden können, schliessen wollte, dass die Rede Hörner besitze.

Nach dieser grundsätzlichen Kritik des Gottesbeweises, in der Dharmakīrti nachzuweisen versuchte, dass die zum Gottesbeweis verwendbaren Gründe in ihrer Schlüssigkeit grundsätzlich nicht nachzuweisen sind, geht er dazu über, die Sinnlosigkeit und Widersprüchlichkeit der Gottesvorstellung zu zeigen, und zu zeigen, dass nicht allein der logische Grund des Gottesbeweises unmöglich ist, sondern ebenso der durch diesen Grund zu beweisende Gegenstand selbst:

„Wenn ein und dasselbe Ding Ursache und ebenso Nichtursache ist, weshalb wird dieses dann als Ursache betrachtet und nicht vielmehr als Nichtursache?

Verwundung und Heilung des Caitra [ergibt sich] auf Grund der Verbindung mit einer Waffe beziehungsweise einer Medizin; warum nimmt man nicht einen Pfosten als Ursache an, der damit in keiner Verbindung steht?

Ohne Veränderung seines Eigenwesens (*svabhāvabhedena vinā*) ist auch sein Wirken (*vyāpāraḥ*) logisch nicht einsichtig. Da er von Ewigem nicht unterschieden ist, ist seine Befähigung dazu schwer zu begreifen.

Wenn man etwas anderes als jene [Gegebenheiten], bei deren Existenz etwas existiert, als dessen Ursache annimmt, dann ergibt sich nirgends ein Festliegen der Ursachen.

Die Erde usw. ist infolge einer Veränderung ihres Eigenwesens

(*svabhāvapariṇāmena*) Ursache für das Entstehen des Keimes, weil man bei ihrer Bearbeitung (*saṃskāra*) an ihm die Besonderheiten [des Wachstums etc.] beobachtet.

Wenn man annimmt, dass dies ebenso [geschieht], wie der Kontakt von Sinneswerkzeug und Objekt Ursache der Erkenntnis ist, [so ist darauf zu antworten:] Nein, weil auch dies auf Grund einer [hinzu-kommenden] Besonderheit geschieht.

[Gegebenheiten,] die für sich genommen unfähig sind, würden auch in ihrer Vereinigung unfähig sein, wenn nicht ein Zuwachs des Eigen-wesens einträte (*svabhavātiśaye*). Daher ist ein solcher Zuwachs er-wiesen.

Daher ergibt sich, dass jene Gegebenheiten, die für sich genommen unfähig sind, in der Vereinigung Ursache sind, falls in ihnen eine [neue] Eigenschaft entsteht, nicht aber Gott der Herr usw., weil er [von Gegebenheiten, die untätig sind], nicht unterschieden ist." [29])

Die wesentliche Frage, der Dharmakīrti in dieser Argumentation nachgeht, betrifft das Verhältnis zwischen der Vorstellung eines ewigen, unabhängigen Gottes und der Aussage, dass dieser Gott Ursache der Welt ist, eine Frage, die eng mit dem Gottesbeweis des Nyāya ver-bunden ist, wenn man etwa an die Worte Uddyotakaras denkt: „Durch denselben Beweis, durch welchen das Ursache-Sein von Gott dem Herrn bewiesen ist, wird auch seine Existenz erwiesen, denn eine nicht existierende Ursache gibt es nicht." [30]) In der vorliegenden Beweisführung dreht Dharmakīrti diesen Satz um und zeigt, dass dieser Gott nicht Ursache der Welt sein kann und daher auch nicht existiert. Zu diesem Zweck wirft Dharmakīrti die Frage auf, warum man von Gott die Aussage macht, dass er Ursache ist, wo er doch ebenso gut nicht Ursache sein könnte. Wie bereits erwähnt, ist das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" der Dinge konstant. Was ist aber der eigent-liche Grund dieser Konstanz? Und wieso kann man daher sagen, dass ein Seiendes Ursache eines anderen ist? Dharmakīrti erörtert dieses Problem an anderer Stelle in einem interessanten Zusammenhang:

„Etwas, das keine Ursache hat", schreibt er im Kapitel über die Schlussfolgerung seines Pramāṇavārttikam, „ist, da es von anderem unabhängig ist, entweder ewig seiend oder überhaupt nicht. Denn das gelegentliche Entstehen der Dinge geschieht in Abhängigkeit." In

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29) PV I, 23-30.
30) Vgl. Anm. 14.

seinem eigenen Kommentar zu diesem Vers geht er der Frage nach,
worin diese Abhängigkeit besteht: „... Dinge, die gelegentlich ent-
stehen, entstehen infolge einer Abhängigkeit, und zwar deshalb, weil
der Zeitpunkt ihrer Entstehung beziehungsweise Nichtentstehung die
Eignung beziehungsweise Nichteignung besitzt, sie hervorzubringen.
Wären nämlich Ort und Zeit in gleicher Weise geeignet beziehungs-
weise nicht geeignet, dann würde die feste Zuordnung dieser beiden,
eine solche [Eignung] zu haben beziehungsweise nicht zu haben, fehlen.
Und was sollte diese Eignung anderes sein als das Ursache-Sein?
Darum wird ein Ding, das unter Vermeidung eines bestimmten Ortes
und einer bestimmten Zeit an einem anderen Ort zu einer anderen
Zeit in Existenz tritt, von diesen abhängig genannt. Darum nämlich:
Allein auf diese Weise ist das Vorhandensein (*vṛttiḥ*) abhängig; denn
etwas, das nicht von einer durch ein anderes bewirkten Unterstützung
abhängt, ist auf dieses andere nicht fest hingeordnet. Wo daher Rauch
auf Grund seiner festen Zuordnung an einem bestimmten Ort und
zu einer bestimmten Zeit einmal beobachtet wurde, beziehungsweise bei
Unvollständigkeit [dieser Umstände] nicht beobachtet wird, wird sein
Eigenwesen dadurch hervorgebracht, da er anderenfalls auch dieses
eine Mal nicht existieren würde. Ist dieser aber darauf [= Feuer]
hingeordnet (*tatpratiniyataḥ*), wie könnte er anderswo sein? Ist er aber
[anderswo], dann dürfte er kein Rauch sein. Denn Rauch ist jenes
besondere Eigenwesen, welches dadurch [= Feuer] hervorgebracht
ist. Ebenso ist seine Ursache jenes Eigenwesen, welches eine derartige
Wirkung [= Rauch] hervorbringt." [31]

Für den vorliegenden Zusammenhang der Erörterung der Vor-
stellung von einem ewigen Schöpfergott ist die Überlegung ent-
scheidend, dass dem Zeitpunkt, in dem die Wirkung entsteht, die
Eignung zukommen muss, diese Wirkung hervorzubringen. In diesem
Gedanken ist das Seiende, sofern es seiend und kontingent ist, grund-
sätzlich gedeutet als ein sukzessives System sich kausal bedingender
Gegebenheiten, welche jeweils in jenem Augenblick verursacht werden,
in dem alle für ihre Entstehung notwendigen Gegebenheiten vollständig
anwesend sind, und welche daher erst in jenem Augenblick entstehen,
in welchem diese bedingenden Gegebenheiten vollständig sind. „Ur-
sache" ist somit lediglich ein „Querschnitt" dieses Systems in einem

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31) PVS p. 22, 20 ff.

bestimmten Zeitpunkt, und zwar so, dass der „Querschitt" dieser kausalbedingten Existenz-Sukzession im Zeitpunkt A die Ursache ist für die durch den „Querschnitt" im Zeitpunkt A + 1 bestimmten Gegebenheiten.

Wenn daher im vorliegenden Falle die Welt in einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt entsteht — auch wenn nach Lehre des Nyāya ihre Bauelemente ewig sind — dann muss den raum-zeitlichen Gegebenheiten im Augenblick ihrer Entstehung die Eignung zukommen, die Welt hervorzubringen. Diese raum-zeitlichen Gegebenheiten sind die „Ursache" der Welt. Wenn sie aber Ursache der Welt sind, dann muss ihr Eigenwesen darauf hingeordnet sein, die Welt hervorzubringen, und die durch sie verursachte Welt muss in ihrem Eigenwesen darauf hingeordnet sein, von diesen hervorgebracht zu werden. Wäre dies nicht so, dann könnte die Welt nur ewig oder überhaupt nicht sein. Denn „etwas, das keine Ursache hat, ist, da es von anderem unabhängig ist, entweder ewig seiend oder überhaupt nicht. Denn das gelegentliche Entstehen der Dinge geschieht in Abhängigkeit". Das „Entstehen in Abhängigkeit" hängt aber von der Eignung gewisser zeitlicher Gegebenheiten ab.

Ist nun Gott jene Gegebenheit, welcher im Zeitpunkt der Weltentstehung diese Eignung zukommt, wie der Nyāya annimmt? „Wenn ein und dasselbe Ding Ursache und ebenso Nicht-Ursache ist", schreibt Dharmakīrti, „weshalb wird dieses dann als Ursache betrachtet und nicht vielmehr als Nicht-Ursache?" Was ist der Grund dafür, dass man Gott als jene Gegebenheit betrachtet, welche die Eignung besitzt, die Welt hervorzubringen? Die Welt entsteht in Abhängigkeit, d.h. in einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt. Wenn Gott jene Gegebenheit wäre, welche diesem Zeitpunkt die Eignung, die Welt hervorzubringen, verleihte, dann müsste die Welt bereits seit Ewigkeit her entstanden sein, weil Gott ewig ist. Wollte man trotzdem annehmen, dass Gott die Welt in einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt hervorbringe, dann wäre dies eine leere Behauptung, wie wenn man sagte, dass die Verwundung des Caitra durch einen Pfosten bewirkt sei, der damit in keiner Beziehung stehe.

Wenn man aber annähme, dass Gottes Eigenwesen vor Erschaffung der Welt die Eignung nicht besass, die Welt hervorzubringen, und er trotzdem in einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt Ursache der Welt sein sollte, dann könnte dies nach Dharmakīrtis Kausalitätsauffassung ledig-

lich dadurch geschehen, dass das Eigenwesen Gottes einen Zuwachs erführe, der es in diesem Zeitpunkt befähigte, Ursache der Welt zu sein. Denn Gegebenheiten, „die für sich genommen unfähig sind, würden auch in ihrer Vereinigung unfähig sein, wenn nicht ein Zuwachs des Eigenwesens einträte …". Selbst wenn also das Wirken Gottes von der Anwesenheit anderer Umstände abhinge, etwa Atomen, Verdienst und Schuld usw., so würde doch die Tatsache bestehen bleibe, dass jede einzelne dieser Ursache für sich genommen unfähig ist, die Welt hervorzubringen. Wenn sich daher bei ihrer Vereinigung im Zeitpunkt des Hervorbringens der Welt nicht eine neue Situation ergäbe, wären sie auch in dieser Vereinigung unfähig. Damit kann aber nur das Neue, das im Zeitpunkt der Weltentstehung die Eignung besitzt, diese hervorzubringen, als Ursache angesprochen werden. Wenn also dieses Neue im Eigenwesen Gottes enthalten sein sollte, was notwendig wäre, um Gott als Ursache der Welt aufzufassen, dann müsste sich Gottes Eigenwesen in irgendeiner Form verändern. Für eine ewige Substanz ist aber eine Veränderung auch in Form eines Zuwachses des Eigenwesens undenkbar.

Durch die Annahme, dass Gott Ursache der Welt sei, würde weiters das Ursache-Sein natürlicher Gegebenheiten, wie das Ursache-Sein Gottes selbst, als erkennbares Faktum aufgehoben werden. Geht man nämlich von der Analyse des Seienden aus, so ergibt sich folgendes. Der „Querschnitt" von Seinsgegebenheiten, der mit dem gegenwärtigen Zustand der Welt identisch ist, ist durch die Seinsgegebenheiten des „Querschnittes" im unmittelbar vorhergehenden Zeitpunkt kausal bedingt usw., es lässt sich in dieser Kausalkette von Seinsgegebenheiten keine Lücke und eigentlich auch kein Ende finden. Mit anderen Worten, es muss sich grundsätzlich für jeden beliebigen Augenblick des Weltprozesses ein „Querschnitt" von Seinsgegebenheiten angeben lassen, durch den dieser kausal bedingt ist. Da nun jeder „Querschnitt" die Eignung besitzen muss, die Seinsgegebenheiten des nächstfolgenden hervorzubringen, und zwar in sich ohne Zutun Gottes, da Gott ja in jedem Augenblick in gleicher Weise anwesend ist. So sind zum Beispiel Erde, Wasser, Licht usw. die empirisch-methodisch feststellbaren Ursachen für das Wachstum des Samens. Wollte man an Stelle dieser Ursachen Gott als Ursache annehmen, dann würde jede Konstanz des Wirkung-Ursache-Seins aufgehoben werden, weil man dann, ein „unverifizierbares" Element den „verifizierbaren" Ursachen substi-

tuierte, und man dann nicht mehr aus einer bestimmten Wirkung ihre
bestimmte Ursache erschliessen könnte, damit aber auch nicht Gott
selbst als Ursache der Welt. Denn „wenn man etwas anderes als jene
[Gegebenheiten], bei deren Existenz etwas existiert, als dessen Ur-
sache annimmt, dann ergibt sich nirgends ein Festliegen der Ursachen."

Dieses Argument trifft die Gottesvorstellung des Nyāya entschei-
dend, insofern der Nyāya Gott als eine seiende Ursache einer Um-
wandlung raumzeitlicher Gegebenheiten auffasst und als solche zu
beweisen sucht, wodurch Gott aber nicht von den „natürlichen" Ur-
sachen der Dinge unterschieden wird.

Zwar scheint der Gedanke, dass Gott die *veranlassende* Ursache der
Welt ist, diesem Einwand die Schärfe zu nehmen, doch bleibt bei Bei-
behaltung des Gottesbegriffs des Nyāya die grundsätzliche Schwierig-
keit bestehen, dass die Annahme Gottes als „seiende" Ursache der
Welt im Sinne der Forderung nach „Verifizierbarkeit" des Kausal-
verhältnisses, eine petitio principii ist. Denn das Wesen der Welt
steht mit dieser in keiner wesensnotwendigen Beziehung, sondern in
einer faktischen, die aber erst nachgewiesen werden müsste. Es scheint
nämlich Wirkungen zu geben, die nicht durch eine erkennende Ursache
hervorgerufen werden, wie zum Beispiel Gräser, Bäume usw., welche alle
ihre spezifischen Ursachen haben, die zu deren Produktion genügend
sind. Um mit Recht Gott als Ursache der Welt anzunehmen, müsste
man wenigstens nachweisen, dass das Begriffssystem der Kausalitäts-
lehre des Nyāya, welches unverkennbar aus der Analyse des freien
Schaffens des Menschen gewonnen ist, notwendig auf jedes Wirkung-
Ursache-Sein anzuwenden ist und daher jede Wirkung einer veran-
lassenden Ursache bedarf. Selbst dann aber würde daraus nicht folgen,
dass diese veranlassende Ursache Gott ist, d.h. ein einziges, ewiges
und allwissendes Wesen, das Herr des Alls sei. [32]) Nähme man ausser-

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32) Dies wendet z.B. der mit Dharmakīrti ungefähr zeitgenössische Maṇḍana
Miśra in seinem Vidhivivekaḥ ein: „Wenn auch erwiesen wäre, dass alles, was
Zusammensetzung etc. besitzt, eine mit Erkenntnis versehene Ursache hat, wo-
durch soll durch 'Zusammensetzung' etc. erwiesen sein, dass es sich um einen
einzigen Urheber handelt?" Vidhivivekaḥ śrīmad-Ācārya-Maṇḍanamiśra-viracitaḥ
pūjyapādaśrīmad-Vācaspatimiśra-nirmitayā Nyāyakaṇikākhyayā samalaṅkṛtaḥ etc.
Kāśyām 1907, p. 210. — Tatsächlich könnte man sich vorstellen, dass die geistigen
Wesen in der Welt durch ihr karma selbst veranlassende Ursache der neuen
Weltperiode wären, oder dass mehrere göttliche Wesen im Sinne des Polytheis-
mus veranlassende Ursache des Weltprozesses wären.

dem an, dass jede Wirkung einer veranlassenden Ursache bedürfe,
so würde daraus ein „naturphilosophischer Okkasionalismus" folgen,
insofern dann jedes „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" im physikalisch-chemi-
schen Bereich Gott als veranlassende Ursache benötigte. Denn es würde
nicht deutlich sein, warum Gott nur am Beginn der Welt als veran-
lassende Ursache nötig wäre, wenn eine solche Ursache bei jeder
Wirkung gegeben sein müsste. Ein solcher Okkasionalismus wurde
vom Nyāya jedoch nie entwickelt, soweit sich aus der spärlich er-
haltenen Literatur des Systems schliessen lässt.

<div align="center">III</div>

Dharmakīrtis Kritik an der logischen Möglichkeit des Gottesbeweises,
über welche die gegnerische Polemik in diesem Punkte nie wesentlich
hinausgekommen ist, beschäftigte den Nyāya noch Jahrhunderte später.
In der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Kritik wendete
sich der Nyāya hauptsächlich dem Problem des Gottesbeweises zu,
während die Rechtfertigung des Begriffes eines ewigen Schöpfergottes
nie zu einer vollentwickelten Theodizee wurde, sondern in gewissen
Ansätzen stecken blieb. [33]) Dies dürfte darauf zurückzuführen sein,
dass die Kritik Dharmakīrtis am Begriff eines Schöpfergottes ihre volle
Schärfe nur unter Voraussetzung seines Kausalitätsbegriffes und der
buddhistischen Lehre vom „Sein" der Dinge als kausal bedingter Suk-
zession vergänglicher Gegebenheiten (*pratītyasamutpādaḥ, kṣaṇabhaṅ-
gavādaḥ*) erhält. Beides wurde aber vom Nyāya abgelehnt.

Ausführlich beschäftigte sich aber der Nyāya mit dem Nachweis
der logischen Möglichkeit des Gottesbeweises. Diese Rechtfertigung
wurde grundsätzlich möglich, indem der Nyāya der Allgemeinvorstel-
lung (*kalpanā*) Dharmakīrtis allgemeine, objektive Seinsstrukturen
(*sāmānyam*) gegenüberstellte, und den logischen Nexus in der Schluss-
folgerung nicht wie Dharmakīrti in einer empirisch-methodisch „veri-
fizierbaren" Beziehung zwischen realen Gegebenheiten sah, sondern
in einer wesensnotwendigen Beziehung dieser objektiven Seinsstruk-
turen. Als dritter Schritt der vorliegenden typologischen Studie soll

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33) So entwickelt noch vor Dharmakīrti Uddyotakara seine Lehre, dass Gott
kraft seiner Natur (*tatsvabhāvyāt*) wirke, und er daher ein Wesen habe, zu
dessen Natur das Wirken gehöre (*pravṛttisvabhāvakam tattattvam*). Gott wirke
nur deshalb nicht ständig, weil er infolge seines Erkennens den Zeitpunkt abwarte,
an dem alle notwendigen Mitursachen gegeben sind. NV p. 492, 17 ff.

daher jene Rechtfertigung des Gottebeweises in der ältesten erhaltenen Form vorgelegt werden, welche mit der im Nyāya vorherrschenden Grundlegung der Schlussfolgerung arbeitet, nämlich die Rechtfertigung des Gottesbeweises, wie sie sich für Trilocana [34]) erschliessen lässt.

Soweit aus den dürftigen Fragmenten von Trilocanas Werk zu erkennen ist, setzt dieser Nyāya-Denker mit einer Neubegründung der Schlussfolgerung ein, welche auch die Rechtfertigung des Gottesbeweises ermöglicht. Das „Wirkung-Sein" als logischer Grund (*kārya-hetuh*), worum es im Zusammenhang des Gottesbeweises allein geht, war so, wie es Dharmakīrti konzipiert hatte, grundsätzlich ungeeignet, nicht-empirische Realitäten und Prinzipien erkennen zu lassen. Dieser Umstand lag nicht in einer logischen Problematik begründet, sondern in einer erkenntnismetaphysischen. Die Allgemeinvorstellung im erkennenden Subjekt (*kalpanā*) besass nach Dharmakīrti einen Wahrheitsgehalt nur sofern und nur soweit, als ihr ein Konkretum *(svalak-ṣaṇam)* entsprach, auf das sie verwies. In sich war sie ohne jeden Wahrheitsgehalt. Damit hatte die Schlussfolgerung, die grundsätzlich mit solchen Allgemeinvorstellungen arbeiten musste, nur in jenem Bereich der menschlichen Erkenntnis Gültigkeit, in welchem die sinnliche Wahrnehmung (*pratyakṣam*) Individuen und ihre Eigenschaften erkennen liess, mit anderen Worten nur im Bereich der Empirie und des praktischen Handelns. Damit war aber weiters die Schlussfolgerung auf Grund von Dharmakīrtis Erkenntnismetaphysik so interpretiert worden, dass sie prinzipiell ungeeignet war, einen Gottesbeweis zu gewährleisten. Dieser konnte daher nur dann logisch gerechtfertigt werden, wenn Dharmakīrtis Grundlegung der Schlussfolgerung neu durchdacht und kritisch untersucht wurde.

Trilocana scheint bei dieser neuen Grundlegung der Schlussfolgerung auf Untersuchungen von Śaṅkarasvāmin [35]) aufgebaut zu haben, der die Notwendigkeit des logischen Nexus auf das „Getrennt-nicht-Vorkommen" (*avinābhāvah*) von zwei Seienden aufgebaut zu haben scheint. Trilocana selbst scheint offenbar im Anschluss an diese Lehre

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34) Trilocana ca um 800 n. Chr. ist mit Śaṅkarasvāmin, Bhāsarvajña und Vācaspatimiśra nach dem Zeugnis Jñānaśrīmitras eine der vier „Säulen" des alten Nyāya. Vgl. J p. 159, 8-9.

35) Vgl. E. Steinkellner: Augenblicklichkeitsbeweis und Gottesbeweis bei Śaṅkarasvāmin. Dissertation Wien 1963, vorallem pp. 82-113, sowie zur Datierung dieses Lehres, ca. 730-790 n. Chr., ibidem p. 115 ff.

seine eigene Lehre von der „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*) entwickelt zu haben.

Was ist unter dem Terminus „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" mit Trilocana zu verstehen? Zunächst und grundsätzlich eine Beziehung zwischen Gemeinsamkeiten (*sāmānyam*) und nicht zwischen individuell Seiendem, wobei unter Gemeinsamkeit eine objektive Seinsstruktur gemeint ist, die zwar an einem bestimmten Seienden erkannt wird, die aber einer Reihe von Individuen gemeinsam ist und dadurch eine Gattung konstituiert. Dieser Gemeinsamkeit kommt daher in Unterschied zur buddhistischen Allgemeinvorstellung ein objektiver Wahrheitsgehalt an sich zu und nicht erst, insofern die Wahrnehmung ein Konkretum vermittelt. Zu dieser Frage findet sich ein hochinteressantes Fragment aus Trilocanas Polemik gegen die buddhistische Auffassung der Schlussfolgerung:

„Da Wahrnehmung und Nichtwahrnehmung nur Besonderes (*viśeṣaḥ*) zum Gegenstand hat, wie kann durch sie eine Verbindung zwischen zwei Gemeinsamkeiten (*sāmānyam*) erkannt werden? — [Gegner]: Lediglich die Verbindung von dem im Nicht-Rauch Fehlenden mit dem im Nicht-Feuer Fehlenden wird erkannt. — [Antwort:] Der Gegenstand welches Erkenntnismittels wäre selbst diese [Verbindung]? Zunächst nicht der Wahrnehmung (*pratyakṣam*), da diese nur das Gegebene (*svalakṣaṇam*) zum Gegenstand hat. Aber auch nicht der Schlussfolgerung (*anumānam*), weil auch diese jene zur Voraussetzung hat; noch kommt dem Fehlen zweier [Gegebenheiten] eine Verbindung zu.

Sollte [schliesslich] eine Vorstellung (*vikalpaḥ*), die auf der Wahrnehmung beruht (*pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvī*), das Nichtunterschiedene begrenzend festlegen (*adhyavasyati*), wenn das Unterschiedene wahrgenommen ist, und wäre eben diese [Vorstellung] die Gemeinsamkeit, so wäre ebenfalls nicht das Reale (*vastu*) Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, sondern dessen Form als Erkenntnisinhalt (*grāhyākāraḥ*). Diese ist aber nicht das Reale. Da nun das Reale diesen [Vorstellungen] transzendent (*parokṣam*) ist, wie soll dadurch dann eine Verbindung erkannt werden?

Für uns aber wird die Verbindung derartiger [Gemeinsamkeiten] durch das Denken (*manas*) erkannt, das durch mehrfache Beobachtung unterstützt ist. Und deshalb verfehlt der Rauch [als logischer Grund] nicht das Feuer. Würde er es aber verfehlen, dann würde er eine Ver-

bindung, die von einer zusätzlichen Bedingung frei ist (*upādhirahi-tah*), überschreiten. Das Erkenntnismittel, welches den Zweifel hinsichtlich des Vorkommens des logischen Grundes im Vipakṣa behebt, ist die „Nichtwahrnehmung" genannte Wahrnehmung. Sie ist der Grund für das Freisein [des logischen Grundes] von einer zusätzlichen Bedingung (*upādhiḥ*), die das Merkmal der Wahrnehmbarkeit erlangt hat. Daher ist die 'Abhängigkeit des Wesens' (*svābhāvikaḥ samban-dhaḥ*) erwiesen." [36])

In diesem Fragment wird deutlich, was die „Abhängigkeit des Wesens", durch die zwei Gemeinsamkeiten logisch verbunden sind, ihrer Natur nach ist. Bemerkenswert ist nämlich die Feststellung, dass diese Abhängigkeit nicht empirisch-methodisch „verifizierbar" ist, sondern durch eine Einsicht denkend erkannt wird. [37]) Es ist nämlich das Denken (*manas*), durch das die „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" erkannt wird, indem es sich auf die Gemeinsamkeiten selbst richtet.

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36) J p. 161, 17-26.

37) Mit „denkerischer Einsicht" u.ä. gebe ich den Begriff des *mānasapratya-kṣam* wieder. Dieser Begriff ist in der Nyāya-Schule nicht ungebräuchlich und ist eigentlich historisch exakt als „Wahrnehmung durch das Denkorgan" zu bestimmen, wobei Wahrnehmung im Sinne des Nyāya ein direktes sinnliches Erkennen meinen dürfte. Dieser Umstand wird durch die hier gegebene Übersetzung als „Denkerische Einsicht" zum Teil verschleiert. Vgl. zur Deutung des *mānasapratyakṣam* B. Gupta: Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjarī. Inauguraldissertation Bonn 1962 pp. 54 ff.

Nun besteht aber kein Zweifel, dass die Wahrnehmung durch das Denkorgan auch für den Nyāya-Denker einen anderen Charakter besitzt als jene vermittels der Sinnesorgane. Dies geht etwa daraus hervor, dass das Denkorgan nicht wie die äusseren Sinnesorgane auf ein bestimmtes Objekt festgelegt ist, sondern dass es alles zum Gegenstand haben kann, ganz analog zum Denken. Gupta ibid. Anmerkung 138. — Ausserdem wird ausdrücklich gelehrt, dass die Wahrnehmung durch das Denkorgan nur im Anschluss an die gewöhnliche sinnliche Erkenntnis Erkenntnisse über Dinge der Aussenwelt vermittelt. Gupta ibid. Anmerkung 143. Allerdings scheint es wahrscheinlich, dass diese Einschränkung noch nicht von Trilocana gemacht wurde. Denn Vācaspatimiśra bringt in seiner Polemik gegen Trilocana's Wahrnehmung durch das Denkorgan als Erkenntnismittel für die „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" (NVTT p. 166, 19 ff) gerade jene Einwände vor, die durch diese Einschränkung vermieden werden. Es ist daher anzunehmen, dass diese erst nach Vācaspatimiśra vorgenommen wurde, um derartige Einwände auszuschalten. Doch der Umstand, dass diese Einschränkung vorgenommen werden konnte und die Wahrnehmung in diesem präziseren Sinn gefasst werden konnte, zeigt, dass diese immer schon von der gewöhnlichen sinnlichen Erkenntnis unterschieden wurde. Es scheint daher gerechtfertigt, die Wahrnehmung durch das Denkorgan im Kontext einer typologischen Studie als „denkerische Einsicht" zu formulieren.

„Einige sagen, dass die Wahrnehmung durch das Denkorgan (*māna-sam pratyakṣam*) den logischen Zusammenhang (*pratibandhaḥ*) erfasst. Wenn man durch Wahrnehmung und Nichtwahrnehmung den Rauch als mit dem Feuer zusammen vorkommend und im Nicht-Feuer fehlend beobachtet hat, wird durch das Denkorgan erkannt, dass der Rauch notwendig mit dem Feuer verbunden ist.

Oder von wem wird nicht zugegeben, dass das Denkorgan, welches alles zum Gegenstand haben kann, auch einen fernen Gegenstand erkennen kann? — Und dazu ist nicht eine Wahrnehmung vonnöten, die sich auf alle in den Klüften der drei Welten verborgenen Individualfälle von Rauch und Feuer richtet, denn das Erkennen der Umfassung (*vyāptiḥ*) hängt von der Gemeinsamkeit ʻFeuertumʼ usw. ab." [38])

Es handelt sich also deutlich um das denkende Erfassen einer Beziehung zwischen „Gemeinsamkeiten", die nahegelegt wird durch die Wahrnehmung des gemeinsamen Vorkommens konkreter Fälle, denen die betreffenden Gemeinsamkeiten inhärieren, beziehungsweise des Nichtvorkommens des einen Falles beim Fehlen des anderen.

Dass es sich bei dieser Beziehung um eine innere, notwendige Abhängigkeit der einen Gemeinsamkeit von der anderen handelt, wird dadurch erkannt, dass ausser den Realitäten, denen die zueinander in Beziehung gesetzten Gemeinsamkeiten inhärieren, keine andere Realität festgestellt werden kann, deren Gemeinsamkeit die ermöglichende Bedingung der in Beziehung zueinander gesetzten Gemeinsamkeiten wäre. Wenn also die Abhängigkeit zwischen diesen Gemeinsamkeiten, durch keinen dritten Umstand bedingt ist, kann diese nur durch die beiden Gemeinsamkeiten selbst bedingt sein. Es kann sich daher nur um eine „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" handeln. Würde eine solche Verbindung aber in gewissen Fällen überschritten werden, so müsste man einerseits annehmen, dass diese Verbindung, da es sich um „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" handelt, durch keine zusätzliche Bedingung hervorgerufen ist, und dass andererseits, da die Verbindung überschritten wird, diese Verbindung im Falle der Nichtüberschreitung durch eine zusätzliche Bedingung hervorgerufen ist. Eine solche Annahme ist, da sie widersprüchlich ist, nicht möglich und daher ist die „Abhängig-

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38) NM I, p. iii, 1-6. Die Übereinstimmung dieser von Jayanta anonym überlieferten Lehre mit dem Fragment Trilocanas ist so, dass man mit Sicherheit annehmen darf, dass Jayanta hier auf die Lehre Trilocanas Bezug nimmt.

keit des Wesens" als innerlich notwendig erwiesen. Allein diese Abhängigkeit ist wegen der inneren Notwendigkeit, die durch denkerische Einsicht von ihr erkannt ist, Grundlage der Schlussfolgerung.

Dieses Schema der inneren Notwendigkeit der „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" hat Trilocana von der Beziehung zwischen zwei Gemeinsamkeiten auf die Beziehung von Gemeinsamkeit und Besonderheit übertragen, indem er nach einer innerlich notwendigen Beziehung zwischen Gemeinsamkeit und Besonderheiten suchte. Eine solche Beziehung fand er in der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen." (*vāstavaḥ pratibandhaḥ*). Er verstand darunter eine Abhängigkeit, welche dadurch gegeben war, dass gewisse Besonderheiten einfach durch das Inhärieren einer Gemeinsamkeit in einem Realen gegeben sein müssen, soll diese Gemeinsamkeit dem bestimmten Fall überhaupt inhärieren können. Diese Abhängigkeit ist, sowie die „Abhängigkeit des Wesens", absolut notwendig, aber nicht wegen einer Wesensstruktur, sondern wegen des faktischen Realisiertseins dieser Wesensstruktur in einem besonderen Falle.

„Jene Besonderheit, mit der diese [Gemeinsamkeit] durch 'Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen' verbunden ist, … muss notwendig erkannt werden, falls die Gemeinsamkeit erkannt wird, da bei deren Negierung, auch die … Gemeinsamkeit negiert werden würde." [39]

Mit der Lehre von diesen zwei notwendigen Beziehungen hatte Trilocana die Grundlage geschaffen, um Dharmakīrtis Kritik des Gottesbeweises den Boden zu entziehen. Er konnte nunmehr zeigen, dass es im Falle des Gottesbeweises gar nicht notwendig war, das „Wirkung-Ursache-Sein" im Sinne von Dharmakīrtis Nominalismus für den speziellen Fall von Welt und Gott zu „verifizieren", bevor man es zur Grundlage des Gottesbeweises machte. Vielmehr genügte es, die „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" zwischen der Gemeinsamkeit „Wirkung" und der Gemeinsamkeit „Einen-geistigen-Urheber-Haben" nachzuweisen, indem man zeigte, dass die Abhängigkeit zwischen diesen Gemeinsamkeiten nicht durch eine zusätzliche Bedingung verursacht war. War diese Abhängigkeit nachgewiesen, dann konnte überall aus der Gemeinsamkeit „Wirkung" ein geistiger Urheber erschlossen werden, auch dort, wo dieser niemals empirisch-methodisch nachzuweisen war.

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39) Vgl. Anm. 43.

„Wodurch erkennt man denn, dass im Falle von Töpfen usw. das 'Entstehen' von dem 'Eine-geistige-Ursache-Haben' [logisch] umfasst ist?" schreibt er in einem Fragment seiner Mañjarī. — „Weil man die Erkenntnis, dass sie gemacht sind, als logischen Grund gebraucht? — Nun denn, dann muss der besondere Umstand genannt werden, welcher im Falle der Elemente etc. nicht gegeben ist, und durch den allein Töpfe usw. die Erkenntnis 'gemacht' entstehen lassen, nicht aber die Elemente. Die Beobachtung der Tätigkeit des Urhebers kann dieser besondere Umstand nicht sein, weil auch jemand, der diese Tätigkeit nicht sieht, zugibt, dass die Erkenntnis 'gemacht' als logischer Grund [Geltung] hat. — Ist die Ausdehnung 'Grösse' dieser besondere Umstand? — Auch diese wird in den Elementen wegen der Besonderheiten wie Vielheit der Ursachen, Grösse und Quantität beobachtet. Das Gemachtsein selbst kann aber nicht als besonderer Umstand angegeben werden, weil auch im Falle von Erde usw. das In-Existenz-Treten eines noch nicht Existenten, welches durch das Einer-Ursache-Inhärieren bestimmt ist, von dem der Töpfe usw. nicht unterschieden ist.

Ein anderer besonderer Umstand als dieser, durch den allein Töpfe usw. die Erkenntnis des Gemachtseins hervorrufen, nicht aber die Erde usw., kann auch durch Śakra [40]) nicht ausgedacht werden." [41])

In diesem Suchen nach einem besonderen Umstand, durch den das Gemachtsein von Erde usw. von dem der Töpfe usw. Unterschieden ist, zeigt sich deutlich das Bestreben, die Beziehung der Gemeinsamkeit 'Gemachtsein' zu der Gemeinsamkeit 'Einen-geistigen-Urheber-Haben" als „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" nachzuweisen, indem gezeigt wird, dass es keine zusätzliche Bestimmung (*upādhiḥ*) gibt, der zufolge im Falle der Töpfe usw. wohl die Gemeinsamkeit „Einen-geistigen-Urheber-Haben" von der Gemeinsamkeit „Gemachtsein" abhängt, im Falle der Erde usw. aber nicht. Wenn es aber keine solche zusätzliche Bedingung gibt, dann muss man in jedem Falle, wo die Gemeinsamkeit „Gemachtsein" (= Wirkungsein) festgestellt wird, schliessen, dass das Reale, dem diese Gemeinsamkeit inhäriert, einen geistigen Urheber hat, welcher Art dieser Urheber auch immer sei. Daher muss auch die Welt einen geistigen Urheber haben. Mit diesem im Unterschied zu Uddyotakaras Gottesbeweis nunmehr kritisch begründeten Beweis

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40) Śakra ist ein Name des Gottes Indra.
41) J p. 236, 16-23.

ist allerdings noch nicht Gott als einzige, allwissende, ewige und all-vermögende Ursache der Welt nachgewiesen, sondern nur das „Eine-geistige-Ursache-Haben" der Welt im allgemeinen. Durch die „Ab-hängigkeit auf Grund des Realen" ist aber notwendig abzuleiten, dass im konkreten Fall der Welt diese Ursache nur allwissend sein kann etc..

Auch zu diesem Problempunkt ist ein Fragment aus Trilocanas Werk erhalten: „Dies (d.h. der vom Gegner vorgebrachte Einwand) ist nicht so, weil wir nicht einen Urheber, sofern ihm Unterschiede zukommen, beweisen wollen, sondern die zu beweisende Gemeinsamkeit. Und jene Besonderheit, mit der diese durch 'Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen' verbunden ist, und die [im Falle Gottes] bestimmt ist als unmittelbare Erkenntnis von Material usw., muss ebenfalls notwendig erkannt wer-den, wenn die zubeweisende Gemeinsamkeit erkannt werden soll. Denn würde man diese negieren, dann müsste man auch die Gemeinsamkeit negieren. Nun kann man aber die zu beweisende Gemeinsamkeit nicht negieren, weil sie den Eigenschaftsträger 'Erde' usw. umfasst. [42])

Dabei ist die Vielheit der Feinatome das Material, das Verdienst, welches die Form der den Seelen inhärierenden Vollkommenheit be-sitzt, sowie Raum und Zeit sind das Instrument. Als Dativobjekt sind die Seelen und als Zweck das Geniessen [des Verdienstes] durch die Seelen bestimmt. Ein Urheber, welcher dies alles und daher das All in allen seinen Teilen unmittelbar erkennt, ist allwissend. Und nicht wird, wie vorher [vom Gegner] angeregt, in einem Beispiel gezeigt, dass dieser [als allwissender] in einer festen positiven Verbindung (*anvayaḥ*) [zum logischen Grund] steht, wodurch eine Reihe von Fehlern, wie zum Beispiel, dass eine solche feste positive Verbindung

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42) Kamalaśīla überliefert ein anonymes Fragment eines Naiyāyika, welches eine interessante Vorstufe dieses Gedankenganges Trilocanas enthält, ohne jedoch dessen Problembewusstsein zu erreichen: „Wenn wir den besonderen [Urheber] zu beweisen wünschten, dann würde das zu Beweisende, wie früher gesagt, im gleichartigen Beispiel unvollkommen sein, [doch nur solange bis] das „Einen-geistigen-Urheber-Haben" im allgemeinen bewiesen wird. Wenn dieses erwiesen ist, ergibt sich [von selbst] auf Grund der Umstände (*sāmārthyāt*), dass Gott der Herr [= besonderer Urheber] Urheber der Bäume etc. ist. Denn ein Töpfer etc. kann nicht wie im Falle der Töpfe etc., Urheber sein, weil dann die Gemeinsamkeit durch eine Besonderheit bestimmt ist und für Bäume etc. kein anderer Urheber möglich ist. Auf Grund der Umstände (*sāmarthyāt*), auch ohne auf die Besonderheit Bezug zu nehmen, ist daher erwiesen, dass allein Gott der Herr ihr Urheber sein kann." TSP p. 51, 18-22. Das hier erscheinende Argument „auf Grund der Umstände" ist deutlich eine Vorstufe zu Trilocanas Lehre von der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen".

[im Beispiel] fehlt, einträte ... ... Der Naiyāyika verwendet nicht
den Nachweis einer Besonderheit, der von einem [besonderen] logi-
schen Grund abhängt, sondern den Nachweis einer Besonderheit, welche
von selbst vermittelt ist (*akṛṣṭaḥ*) durch die Abhängigkeit der zu be-
weisenden Gemeinsamkeit, wie auch der Buddhist, wenn die Augen-
blicklichkeit [der Dinge] bewiesen ist, den Beweis der Nichtexistenz
der Seele durch 'Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen' verwendet. Denn
wenn es eine ewige allgegenwärtige Seele gäbe, könnte man nicht die
Augenblicklichkeit hinsichtlich jedes Realen erschliessen." [43])

Die Leistung Trilocanas in dieser Ableitung besteht nicht im Beweis
für die Allwissendheit Gottes, ein Beweis, der in dieser Form, wenn
auch unkritisch bereits ca. zweihundert Jahre früher von Praśastamati,
einem Vaiśeṣika-Lehrer, geführt wurde, sondern in der kritischen
Grundlegung dieses Beweises mit Hilfe der Ableitung vermittels der
„Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen", und zweitens — dies ist viel-
leicht die entscheidende Leistung Trilocanas — darin, dass mit Hilfe
dieser Ableitung der Gottesbeweis als solcher erst vollständig begründet
wurde.

Mit Hilfe der „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" hatte Trilocana zunächst
den Beweis begründet, dass die Welt ganz allgemein einen geistigen
Urheber haben muss. Aber erst durch die vorliegende Ableitung ver-
mittels der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen" hatte er diesem Be-
weis seine Beweiskraft als Gottesbeweis kritisch gesichert, indem er
durch die Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen jede andere nicht all-
wissende geistige Ursache notwendig ausschloss. Damit hatte Trilo-
cana aber die Kritik Dharmakīrtis beziehungsweise die seiner Nach-
folger endgültig überwunden, indem er zeigte, dass zum Nachweis
des besonderen Urhebers der Welt kein selbständiger Beweis geführt
zu werden brauchte, dessen logischer Nexus, wie Dharmakīrti gefordert
hatte, erst „verifiziert" werden müsste, sondern dass vielmehr der
besondere Urheber der Welt, sobald ein geistiger Urheber für sie im
allgemeinen erwiesen war, durch eine einfache Ableitung — eigent-
lich ein *prasaṅgaḥ* (Rückführung auf eine Unmöglichkeit) — ver-
mittels der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen" notwendig gewonnen
werden konnte.

Um die vorliegende Darstellung von Trilocanas Grundlegung des

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43) J p. 239, 17-240, 18.

Gottesbeweises abzuschliessen sei noch ein kurzer logischer Exkurs angefügt. Man muss sich nämlich fragen, wie sich Trilocanas Lehre von der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen" formallogisch ausdrücken lässt, beziehungsweise ob Trilocana diese formallogische Formulierung seiner Lehre durchgeführt hat. Nun findet sich tatsächlich eine Lehre, die um 800 n. Chr., also etwa zur Zeit Trilocanas, entstanden sein muss [44]) und die Jayanta in seiner Nyāyamañjarī folgend beschreibt [45]):

„Andere nehmen an, dass man die Besonderheit [des geistigen Urhebers] genötigt durch das Dem-[konkreten]-Subjekt-Zukommen (*pakṣadharmatābalāt*) erkennt. Denn eine derartige Welt etc., die sichtbar ist in mannigfaltigen Formen, die unendlich ist und die Vielfalt von Freud und Leid unendlich vieler Wesen bewirkt, kann nicht als Wirkung eines nicht-ausserordentlichen geistigen Wesens entstehen. Ebenso wie man, hat man Sandelholzrauch, der von gewöhnlichem Rauch unterschieden ist, gesehen, schliesst, dass es sich um ein Feuer mit Sandelholz handelt, wird man auf Grund einer unterschiedenen Wirkung auf einen unterschiedenen Urheber schliessen, [oder] wie man auf Grund schöner Kleider [schliesst], dass der Weber [dieser Kleider] ein geschickter Mann gewesen sein muss. — Und wie ein Töpfer, nur sofern er die Entstehungsart der Gesamtheit aller Töpfe etc. sowie ihren Zweck etc. kennt, Urheber dieser gesamten Wirkungen ist, ebenso kann Gott der Herr nur Urheber [der Welt] sein, wenn er die Art von Entstehen und Vergehen, den Zweck und die Mannigfaltigkeit dieser Dreiwelt kennt, welche Mittel für Freud und Leid einer grenzenlosen Zahl von Wesen ist. Darum ist er allwissend." [46])

In diesem Text ist Trilocanas Lehre von der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen" ersetzt durch die Lehre, dass die Besonderheit „genötigt durch das Dem-[konkreten]-Subjekt-Zukommen" (*pakṣadharmatābalāt*) der beweisenden und zu beweisenden Gemeinsamkeit

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44) Soweit sich anhand der Texte feststellen lässt, muss diese Lehre in der Zeit zwischen Kamalaśīla (ca 740-795 n. Chr.), der sie noch nicht kennt, und dem Schüler Trilocanas, Vācaspatimiśra (erste Hälfte des 9. Jh. n. Chr.), der sie bereits in seinem Frühwerk Nyāyakaṇikā behandelt, entstanden sein.

45) Da Vācaspatimiśra in seiner Darstellung Lehren Trilocanas — z.B. die Lehre, dass die „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" durch eine denkerische Einsicht (*mānasapratyakṣam*) festgestellt wird — aufgegeben hat, wähle ich hier die weniger ausführliche Darstellung Jayantas, der offenbar wohl Trilocana, aber nicht Vācaspatimiśra als Quelle verwendet.

46) NM I p. 183, 28-184, 4.

erkannt werde. Betrachtet man diese beiden Lehren näher, dann schei-
nen sie zwei Seiten desselben Sachverhaltes zu betreffen. Die Lehre
von der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen", dass alle jene Be-
sonderheiten notwendig als erwiesen betrachtet werden müssen, die
Möglichkeitsbedingungen dafür sind, dass die für einen realen Fall
erschlossene Gemeinsamkeit diesem Fall tatsächlich inhärieren kann,
scheint die philosophische Begründung zu betreffen, während die Lehre
von der „Nötigung durch das Dem-[konkreten]-Subjekt-Zukommen"
die Formulierung dieses selben Sachverhaltes im Begriffssystem der
formalen Logik des Nyāya darstellt: Deshalb, weil die beweisende
Gemeinsamkeit (= logischer Grund) und die zu beweisende Gemein-
samkeit einem Subjekt zukommen müssen (*pakṣadharmatā*), kann die
zu beweisende Gemeinsamkeit, sofern dieses Subjekt ein konkret Seien-
des ist, im Augenblick da sie erwiesen ist, für diesen konkreten Fall
nur dann als erwiesen gelten, wenn sie durch gewisse Besonderheiten
als Möglichkeitsbedingungen bestimmt ist. Daher sind durch das „Dem-
[konkreten]-Subjekt-Zukommen" der beweisenden Eigenschaft auch
diese Besonderheiten mitbewiesen, ohne dass der logische Nexus der
beweisenden und zubeweisenden Gemeinsamkeit für diesen besonderen
Fall neu begründet oder mit Dharmakīrti „verifiziert" werden müsste.

Da diese Lehre in der Zeit Trilocanas entstanden sein muss, und
vor allem eine grundsätzliche Übereinstimmung dieser Lehre mit Trilo-
canas Lehre von der „Abhängigkeit auf Grund des Realen" gegeben
ist, darf mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit angenommen werden, dass
Trilocana in der Begründung seines Gottesbeweises die logische Lehre
von der „Nötigung durch das Dem-[konkreten]-Subjekt-Zukommen"
geschaffen hat, um seine andere Lehre von der „Abhängigkeit auf
Grund des Realen" im Begriffssystem der Schlussfolgerungslogik aus-
zudrücken. [47])

Die in dieser Arbeit gezeichneten drei Schritte in der Entwicklung
der Problematik des Gottesbeweises des Nyāya — es wurde mit Absicht
nur vom Gottesbeweis und nicht von den Gottesbeweisen des Nyāya
gesprochen — charakterisieren lediglich die typologisch entscheidenden
Aspekte dieser Problematik, ohne die Lehre vom Gottesbeweis in ihrer
vollen historischen Differenziertheit auszulegen. Der Nyāya ist über

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[47]) Die historisch-genetische Darstellung dieser Lehre muss einer anderen
Gelegenheit vorbehalten bleiben.

Trilocana hinausgegangen, und selbst zur Zeit Trilocanas hat es Nyāya-Lehrer gegeben, die gewisse Fragen anders lösten. Betrachtet man aber die Auseinandersetzung hinsichtlich des Problems des Gottesbeweises im allgemeinen, so zeigt sich in dem spärlich erhaltenen Material des älteren Nyāya ein Zentrieren um eine Entwicklungslinie dieser Problematik, die auf der bei Trilocana erstmals sichtbaren Lehre von der „Abhängigkeit des Wesens" (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*) zurückgeht, und die es als berechtigt erscheinen lässt, die davon abweichenden Auffassungen als Nebenentwicklungen zu bestimmen. Diese Entwicklungslinie geht, soweit sich beurteilen lässt, von Trilocana über Vācaspati-miśra und Bhāsarvajña zu Udayana, dem letzten grossen Lehrer des alten Nyāya, und scheint, soweit es den Typus betrifft, die grundsätzlichen Züge, die sie von Trilocana erhalten hat, zu bewahren.

Inwieweit die in dieser Skizze dargelegte Problematik des Gottesbeweises für die spekulative Durchdringung des Problems einen Beitrag leisten kann, entzieht sich dem Urteil des Historikers indischer Philosophie. Doch verdient jedenfalls die Deutlichkeit Beachtung, mit der die Konsequenzen für die Lehre vom Gottesbeweis zum Ausdruck kommen, die sich aus der unkritischen Bestimmung Gottes als „Seiendes" beziehungsweise als „Ursache" ergeben, sowie die Bedeutung, welche einerseits die Erkenntnismetaphysik für die Grundlegung der Logik und andererseits die Grundlegung der Logik für die Möglichkeit des Gottesbeweises hat. Wie das Beispiel der buddhistischen Denker zeigt, ist es möglich, ein System der Logik zu entwerfen, mit dem im Bereich des Seienden einwandfrei gearbeitet werden kann, das aber apriori die Möglichkeit eines Gottesbeweises ausschliesst.

Verwendete Ausgaben und Abkürzungen:

J	Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. 5. Patna 1959.
NB	Nyāyabindhuḥ bauddhācāryaśrīdharmakīrtipraṇītaḥ etc. Kashi Sanskrit Series Vol. 22. Benares 1954.
NBh	Śrī-Gautama-mahāmunipraṇītaṃ Nyāyasūtram Vātsyāyanīyaṃ Nyāya-bhāṣyam etc. Poona Oriental Series No. 58. Poona 1939.
NM	The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Ed. with Notes etc. by Sūrya Nārāyana Śukla. Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 106. Benares 1936.
NS	Nyāyasūtras.
NV	Nyāyavārttikam nyāyadarśanavātsyāyanabhāṣyopavṛmhaṇam paramar-śibhāradvājoddyotakaraviracitam etc. Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 33 Benares 1915-16.
NVTT	Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā by Sri Vachaspati Mishra. Ed. by Rajesh-wara Sastri Dravid. Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 24. Benares 1925.

PDS   Padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ. Zitiert nach der Ausgabe der Vyomavatī:
The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśastadevāchārya, with Commentaries
Sūkti by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra, Setu by Padmanābha Miśra and
Vyomavatī by Vyomaśivāchārya, ed. Gopinath Kavirāj and Ḍhuṇḍirāj
Shāstri. Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series No. 61. Benares 1930.

PV   Pramāṇavārttikam. Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam with a Commen-
tary by Manorathanandin. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Appendix to
JBORS Vol. 24-25. Patna 1938-39.

PVS   The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First chapter with the
autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Ed. Raniero Gnoli. Serie
Orientale Roma Vol. 23. Roma 1960.

R   Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Tibetan Sanskrit Works
Series Vol. 3. Patna 1957.

TSP   Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla.
Ed. Embar Krishnamacharya. Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 30 (Vol.
I), No. 31 (Vol. II). Baroda 1926.

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für Indische Philosophie.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AND THE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE [1])

BY

ISMA'IL RAGI A. AL FARUQI

I. THE NATURE OF HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

History of religions is an academic pursuit composed of three disciplines: Reportage, or the collection of data; Construction of meaning-wholes, or the systematization of data; and Judgement, or Evaluation, of meaning-wholes. [2])

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1) A lecture delivered to the faculty of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, on April 30, 1964, in the course of the author's residence as guest-researcher at the said institution. Professor Bernard E. Meland, Professor of Constructive Theology, and Professor Charles H. Long, Professor of History of Religions, read critical responses. The response of the former appears at the end of this article. That of the latter, consisting largely of notes, appears in footnotes appended to the article where they are relevant.

2) Prof. Long's note: "Dr. Faruqi's portrayal of the history of the discipline of history of religions presupposes that the history of this discipline was carried out along lines which were quite rational. Such was not the case. The history of religions is a child of the enlightenment. This is to recognize that the history of religions had its beginnings in a period in which the Western World was seeking some rational (as over against a religious) understanding of the history of man's religious life. The history of religions during the enlightenment was for the most part rationalistically and moralistically oriented. Prior to this time, the understanding of religion from a religious point of view yielded even less on the level of scientific understanding, for while the medieval theologians were able to see Islam, for example, as a religion and not as an instance of a truncation of reason, it was nevertheless relegated to the level of paganism since it did not meet the standards of the one true revelation. The rationalistic interpretation of history had the value of establishing a criterion other than revelation as the basis of religion. This meant that to a greater degree the data of the non-Christian religions could be taken a bit more seriously. This along with the universalism of the enlightenment and the reports from colonizers and missionaries established a broader if inadequate basis for the understanding of other religions and cultures, though in several instances the final revelation of God in Jesus Christ was transformed into the final apotheosis of reason in the enlightenment civilization of the western world."

1. Reportage or the Collection of Data

History of religions has known two influences which sought to
reduce its jurisdiction by limiting the data which constitute its subject
matter: One was the attempt to redefine the religious datum in a
restricted and narrow manner; and the other was an isolationist
policy observed *vis-à-vis* Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

A. The attempt to limit the jurisdiction of history of religions by
giving the religious datum a narrow definition developed theories
which have tried to isolate the religious element and to identify it in
terms of "the religious," "the holy," "the sacred." The problem these
theories faced was primarily the reductionist's analysis of the religious
phenomenon into something else that lends itself more readily to his
kind of investigation. On the history of religions, this well-intended
movement had the effect of limiting the scope of the investigation. If
the religious is a unique, irreducible and identifiable element in human
life, the religious disciplne should aim at it first and last. The other
elements of which human life is supposedly composed may be the ob-
jects of other disciplines and they may be studied by the history of
religions only as *relata* affecting or affected by the uniquely religious
element. Among historians of religions in the West, where the act of
faith has been held to consist in the confrontation of the person with
God in his most personal moment when everything or almost every-
thing that is non-self has been detached from consciousness, the dis-
covery of "the religious" as a unique element fell on fertile ears and
was taken as a matter of course. 3) Today, fortunately, the relevance

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3) Prof. Long's note: "The definition of religion as 'the Holy' or the sacred
was an attempt to save the religious life of mankind from a reduction to dimensions
of life which were inadequate as interpretative schema for the data which had
been unearthed. The development of methodologies in this direction was directed
against not only the understanding of non-Western religion, but equally at the
rationalistic and moralistic understanding of western religion. It is not therefore
strange that among the leading historians of religion are to be found a Lutheran
archbishop and a German theologian. Participation in the religious life itself
sensitizes one to the availability of the religious reality for all men in all times
and places. Rudolf Otto advised those who thought the religious experience im-
possible to lay aside their books, and Nathan Söderblom stated that he knew there
was a living God, not because he was a Christian, but because all religions
testified to this fact. To be sure, as Dr. Faruqi implies, the work of Otto and
Söderblom restricted the meaning of religion, but only to save it and they were
aware always of the relationship of the holy to the totality of man's life; witness
for example, Otto's schematization which attempted to place all of the important

of God to every aspect and element of space-time is being rediscovered
by Western Christendom, and the repudiation of an isolated unique
religious holy or sacred is being prepared for. In its place, the reli-
giousness of everything is being discovered, a religiousness which does
not consist in the thing's being a mere relatum. For a century the
Christian theologian has been talking of the whole act of the person
as social and not merely of his personal act, as constitutive of the
religious; and more recently, of a Christian "style of living" in an
attempt to sacralize the whole of life. Islam has for centuries been
teaching the religiousness of all space-time, of all life.

Not only the personal act of faith, nor the social act, nor the whole
of space-time and life as relata, but the whole of life and space-time
as such constitute the data of history of religions. History of religions
studies every human act because every act is an integral part of the
religious complexus. Religion itself, however, is not an act (the act
of faith, or encounter with God, or of participation), but a dimension
of every act. It is not a thing; but a perspective with which every thing
is invested. It is the highest and most important dimension; for it
alone takes cognizance of the act as personal, as standing within the
religio-cultural context in which it has taken place, as well as within
the total context of space-time. 4) For it, the act includes all the inner

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dimensions of human life as originating in and deriving their sense of importance
from the obligation of the holy in religious experience.

"This specificity of the holy was paralleled with a specificity of the historical
— religious object — the recognition of the individual, ineffable and unique in
history. This de-rationalizing or in some cases, irrationalizing of history grew
out of their methodological approaches and constituted a critique of the ratio-
nalizing tendency of some of the prevailing philosophies of history — philosophies
stemming from Kant and Hegel. In transforming the data of religion, historically
defined, into rational notions, the rational notions prevailed as the criteria of
supreme validity; the religious basis of evaluation, *i.e.,* revelation, was at most
a provisional step towards a rational view. I submit that what Dr. Faruqi
describes as the Christianizing and misunderstanding of Judaism and Islam
derives from this tendency and not from the *main line* historians of religions.
It should also be noted that the same rationalizing tendency operated in the case
of primitive Hindus and Buddhists.

"The notions of the ineffability, irrationality, and irreducibility of the religious
were designed to make a place for, or to hold open the criterion of validity which
arises out of, the historical-religious data itself. The relationship or re-introduc-
tion to the validity of religion to all of life become the perennial problem of the
discipline."

4) The sense in which it does so will become clear as we discuss the systemati-
zation and judgement functions of history of religions, *infra*, p. 43 ff; p. 50 ff.

determinations of the person as well as all its effects in space-time. And it is this relation of the whole act to the whole space-time that constitutes the religious dimension. Everything then is subject matter for the history of religions. The cultic and dogmatic have too long monopolized without challenge the definition of the religious; and the addition of the scriptural, of the theory of origin and destiny of man and cosmos, of the moral and of the aesthetic, and finally, of "the sacred" or "the holy" is certainly not enough. Every human act is religious in that it involves the inner person, the member of society, and the whole cosmos all at once, and all being, whether the so-called "sacred" or the so-called "profane," is the "religious." It was an impoverishment of the realm of the religious to limit it, as it were, to a unique act of man, to a unique aspect of his life, or to the sacred as opposed to the profane. The first two views are not compatible with our modern field theory of meaning, of value or of causation, where the particular is not a unique element, but a point in space-time at which converge and from which diverge an infinite number of elements in all directions. [5]) The third denies half and more of the realities of the religious experience of mankind.

This restoration to the religious of its universal scope and relevance widens the horizons of the history of religions. Henceforth, it should include every branch of human knowledge and pursuit. For its purposes, mankind may still be divided into Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and other, but the whole history, culture and civilization of the Christians, the Buddhists, the Hindus, the Muslims, etc., should be its object.

B. The history of religions had its jurisdiction further curtailed in another direction. While, theoretically, is was supposed to be history of all religions, it turned out to be in reality, a history of "Asiatic" and "primitive" religions on the one hand, and of the extinct religions of antiquity on the other. By far the overwhelming majority of the literature of the library of history of religions has been devoted to them. Judaism, Christianity and Islam always managed somehow to escape. This is not to plead that one group of materials is better, richer or more important than another. Primitive and ancient religions may

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5) Ushenko, Andrew Paul, *The Field Theory of Meaning,* U. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1958, p. 111 ff.

very well hold for us many great lessons. [6]) But they are far more
impenetrable than the other group because of obstacles of language,
of remoteness of time, of wide difference between their categories
and ours. The truth that cannot be gainsaid here is that the compara-
tivist has so far found the remoteness of primitive and ancient religions
far more reassuring than the explosive character of the living world
religions. Hence, he has been far bolder to collect the data of the
former, to systematize, generalize about and judge them than the latter.
He seems to have shied away, whether in awe or in panic, from hand-
ling the data of the living religions.

i. *The Case of Islam*

Islam had for a long time been engaged with the West in a hot
colonialist war. The Islamic states bore the brunt of most European
expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries. Islam was too "hot" to
handle with a cool presence of mind and was allowed to become a
subject for the missionaries to study in reconnoitering the infidels'
field. With the development of the discipline, Islamics, a fair portion
of this reconnaissance work passed on to secular hands. But these were
more interested in helping the colonial office at home than in the
discovery and establishment of truth. With the decline of the age of
colonialism, an autonomous Islamics discipline came to life and, using

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6) Consider, for a case in point, Professor Mircea Eliade, whose works
(*Images et Symboles,* Gallimard, Paris, 1952; *Mythes, rêves et mystères,* Galli-
mard, Paris, 1957; *Patterns in Comparative Religion,* Sheed and Ward, London,
1958; *Birth and Rebirth,* Harper and Row, New York, 1958; *The Sacred and
the Profane,* Harper and Row, New York, 1959; *Cosmos and History: The
Myth of the Eternal Return,* Harper and Row, New York, 1959; etc.) constitute
the worthiest attempt of the discipline to *"vergegenwärtigen"* the archaic religions.
"We hold," Prof. Eliade writes in the foreword to his interpretive work, *Cosmos
and History,* "that philosophical anthropology would have something to learn
from the valorization that pre-Socratic man — in other words, traditional man
— accorded to the universe. Better yet: that the cardinal problems of meta-
physics could be renewed through a knowledge of archaic ontology." Regardless
of whether or not the book substantiates it, the claim by itself has grave signifi-
cance not only for the discipline of history of religions in whose name it is
made, but for "the philosopher, and... the cultivated man in general... for our
knowledge of man and for man's history itself."

Another recent case in point is Charles H. Long's able argument for the claim
that "as a religious norm, it [monotheism] has always been there — an enduring
structure of the religious experience itself." ("The West African High God,"
History of Religions, Vol. III, No. 2, Winter, 1964, p. 342).

the pioneer works of the previous generations of Islamists and the popularized mastery of the Islamic languages, Western knowledge of Islam developed very rapidly. All these considerations discouraged the serious student of comparative religion from studying Islam. While in the earlier stages the Western comparativist was a missionary, and as such disqualified from the study of the Islamic religio-culture, in the later stage (*viz.,* the stage of the secular Islamics discipline), he has been totally eclipsed by the Goldzihers, Schachts, Gibbs, Arberrys and men of like stature. So little is the Western historian of religions nowadays equipped in Islamics that that discipline, to which he has hardly contributed anything, does not seem to need him. Even today, no historian of religions proper has had anything to say that would catch the attention of the men of knowledge in the Islamics field. At the root of this shortcoming stands the fact hat Islam was never regarded as an integral part of the subject matter of history of religions.

ii. *The Case of Judaism*

While the persistent witness of Judaism against Christ aroused fierce hatred and anti-Semitism, its close parental relation to Christianity accounted not only for the warmest admiration, but for Christianity's self-identification with the Hebrews of antiquity. As a result, the Christian mind was always confused regarding the phenomenon of Judaism as a whole. It sought clarity by dividing that phenomenon into two halves, "Before Christ" and "After Christ." Intellectually, and hence doctrinally, the latter half was a constant source of embarrassment and the ready solution that presented itself was to obliterate it, if not from the world, then from one's own mind. The former half became the object of Old Testament criticism; but this was never regarded as a branch of the comparative study of religion; that is to say, it was never treated independently of the categories of Christianity. Even where, as in Sigmund Mowinckel's *The Psalms in Israel's Worship* (R. A. P. Thomas, tr., Blackwell, Oxford, 1962), the whole purport of the study is, rather than "*Gattungsgeschichte*," the discovery of the *Sitz-im-Leben* in which the psalms — "the *fons et origo* of Christian hymnody" [7] — developed and crystallized as the only way to the understanding of what they could have meant to the Hebrew standing in the *sodh* of the temple, listening to or reciting them, the

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7) Mowinckel, *op. cit.,* Preface, p. xxii.

study is shot-through with Christian meanings and categories which where obviously introduced in order to show the ripeness of Hebrew consciousness to receive the Incarnation, its certain though hazy anticipation of the Christian dispensation, of "He that Cometh" which is the title of another work by that author. [8]) Except where it was pursued as a Semitics discipline, Old Testament study was never an autonomous science, but remained to this day the handmaid of Christian theology. Where Old Testament studies developed as Semitic disciplines, they did achieve such autonomy; but they equally removed themselves from theology, history of religions and indeed the "Divinity Halls" of the universities in every case. Where the study remained within the "Divinity Halls," its highest objective, its *raison d'être,* never went beyond the confirmation of Christian dogma. The Christianist [9]) strategy of thought could ill afford to put the Old Testament under the light of the comparative discipline. Hebrew scripture is, in this view, equally Christian scripture; Hebrew history, Christian history; and Hebrew theology, Christian theology. Hence, Old Testa-

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8) We should not mistake the advocates of *Religionsgeschichteschule* for historians of religions. Those who were not secularists were Old Testament theologians who, having faith in the dogma, interpreted the findings of Ancient Near Eastern history and accomodated them in what they called *Heilsgeschichte.* Herman Gunkel, perhaps the most famous name in that school, is a committed Old Testament theologian who asserts explicitly, in criticism of Frantz Delitzsch's famous lectures *Babel and Bible* (tr. by C. H. W. Johns, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1903) that "in the depth of this development [Israel's history] the eye of *faith* sees God, Who speaks to the soul, and Who reveals Himself to him who seeks Him with a whole heart." It would be utterly misleading to call him a historian of religions or to identify his methodology as "history of religions." Indeed, Gunkel is so committed to his theological ideas that, in the same "critique," (it reads more like a sermon) — he bursts into exclamations: "What sort of a religion is it (the religion of Israel)? *A true miracle of God's among the religions of the ancient orient!* ... He who looks upon this religion with believing eyes will confess with us: To this people God hath disclosed Himself! Here God was more closely and clearly known than anywhere else... until the time of Jesus Christ, our Lord! This is the religion on which we depend, from which we have ever to learn, on whose foundation our whole civilization is built; we are Israelites in religion even as we are Greeks in art... etc., etc." (*Israel and Babylon: A Reply to Delitzsch,* John Jos. McVey, Philadelphia, 1904, p. 48) Evidently we must be very careful in calling men "historians of religions," when "historian of Old Testament" or "historian of Christianity" would be far more appropriate.

9) "Christianism" is the movement which, though older than Nicaea (325 A.C.), emerged from that council as orthodox Christianity, upholding a specific dogma — the Nicene Creed — as exclusively definitive of the faith of Jesus.

ment criticism was confined to showing how Hebrew scripture is a
scripture which, as the saying goes, was written "from faith to faith"
— that is to say, written by people who believed in the divine scheme
as Christianism understands it, for people who equally believe therein.
Actually, another book, *i.e.,* a whole complexus of Christianist ideas,
was pasted onto Hebrew scripture and Old Testament criticism was
assigned the duty of keeping the paste moist and sticky. To this author's
knowledge, no Christian theologian yet has dared to call Old Testament
criticism by the only name it really deserves, namely, a part of the
history of religions; and no historian of religions has yet attempted to
rehabilitate the data of Old Testament criticism as integral to a recon-
structed history of Hebrew and Jewish religion, rather than a *Heilsge-
schichte,* or a history of the Father's manipulation of history as a pre-
lude to the Incarnation.

iii. *The Case of Christianity*

Lastly, Christianity managed to escape from the history of religions
because the greatest number of historians or comparativists held her
above all the religions; indeed, as the standard bearer and judge of
them. The limitation of the religious to the unique and personal act of
faith confirmed this standard-bearing character of Christianity as the
only one which fully realizes the meaning advocated.

History of religions is certainly fortunate in having at its disposal
a very great amount of information collected over a whole century
with great patience and labour. The great explorers and compilers of
primitive religions have left an impressive legacy. The orientalists, Is-
lamicists and students of Asiatic religions, the Old Testament critics,
the Semiticists who developed out of Old Testament criticism autono-
mous Semitic and Ancient Near East disciplines, and the historians
of the Christian Church, of Christian doctrine and of Christian
civilization — all have contributed to present to history of religions
its future subject matter. Undoubtedly, this subject matter is the
greatest mass of human knowledge ever assembled. It would seem as
if the work of history of religions we called reportage is all done and
complete; but the truth is that a great deal more is required. Surely,
sufficient knowledge has been accumulated to enable the history of
religions to make a start in the second stage of systematization. But
the future systematization of this knowledge needs a continuous

activity of data-collection, the more fastidious and scrupulous the more
exacting the work of systematization becomes. One systematization
cannot refute and replace another unless it can marshall new data for
its support or reveal new relations of old data which the first systema-
tization had omitted. Invariably, this requires a mastery of the language
or languages involved and a complete familiarity with the whole range
of materials. The job which we called collection of data is really in-
terminable.

2. Construction of Meaning-Wholes or the Systematization of Data
This great mass of data must be systematized; *i.e.*, ordered in three
different operations:
A. Firstly, it should be classified in a way which answers the
organizational needs of a modern enquiry. Under each heading the
relevant data should be so analyzed and related to one another as to
reveal the nexus of ideas of which they are the embodiment. The
organization of the material must enable the modern researcher to put
under the lucid light of consciousness, quickly and certainly, the whole
field of ideas and all the particular items therein which, in any religion
or aspect of a religion, constitute a single network or system of
meanings. It should be topical as well as historical, and should en-
deavour to lay, at the disposal of the understanding, a comprehensive
picture of all the facts pertinent to all topics, periods or groups within
the religio-culture under examination. In turn, these complexi of data
should be analyzed and related among themselves so as to disclose the
essence of the religio-cuture as a whole.
B. Secondly, the relations of each datum with the whole complexus
of history to which it belongs should be shown and established for
thought. Its origin must be discovered, and its growth and development,
its crystallization, and where necessary, its decay, misunderstanding
and final repudiation must be accurately traced. Developments of ideas,
institutions, of evaluations and discoveries, of human attitudes and
deeds have to be projected against the background of historical facts.
For they did not develop in the abstract but in a given milieu, and a
need for precisely that development must have been felt. The datum
in question must have been meant either to serve or to combat that
development. Equally, every one of these developments must have had
a whole range of effects which must be brought within the field of

vision to be systematized if the understanding of the given data, the
given movement, or the given system of ideas is to be complete. [10]

C. Thirdly, the religious data thus classified and systematized ought
to be distilled for their meanings, and these meanings should be
elucidated and systematized in turn. That is to say, they should be
related as meanings, and not as facts as in the first two steps of
systematization, to the historical complexus so that the civilization
as such becomes both a structured whole of meanings and a whole
with a meaning. Every religious datum, whether it is an expression
of an idea, an attitude or feeling-state, a personal or social act, whether
its object is the subject, society or the cosmos, whether it is a con-
ceptual, discursive statement of the religious idea or act, or it is the
religious idea or act itself, refers to something which is the content
expressed, the meaning intuited or felt, the purpose realized or violated,
or the object of inaction if no action whatever has taken place other
than inaction. This something is a value. It is the meaning to which
the religious datum is the human response, noetic, attitudinal or
actional. As the human response could not become intelligible without
its relation to the complexi of history, it cannot be meaningful without
its relation to value. The former is a planar relation; the latter is a
relation in depth. Unless the plane of historical relations is seen against
the background of and is related to values in a depth relation, the
religious datum may never be grasped for what it really is. [11]

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10) This has been well pointed out by Joseph M. Kitagawa in the opening
essay on "The History of Religions in America" in *The History of Religions:
Essays in Methodology,* ed. Kitagawa, J. M. and Eliade, M., University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959, where he says: "... One must study the historical
development of a religion, in itself and in interaction with the culture and society.
One must try to understand the emotional make-up of the religious community
and its reaction or relation to the outside world... There must be added a
religio-sociological analysis, in our sense of the term, the aim of which is to
analyze the social background, to describe the structure and to ascertain the
sociologically relevant implications of the religious movement and institutions."
(p. 26).

11) To take an example from this author's forthcoming study of Christianity:
'The Fall' or 'Original Sin' is a datum of the Christian religion. We must first
understand what it means discursively, by reading the definition and analyses
of Hebraic and Jewish thinkers for the Old Testament precursors, and of
Christian thinkers from the New Testament to P. Tillich. Having grasped the
doctrinal development of the idea, we then relate it to the historical development
of Christendom, showing how, in every stage, the Fall developed in answer to
certain sociological and doctrinal developments. Thus systematized into a develop-
ing stream of complexi of ideas, each member of which is a network of a number

In the discernment, analysis, and establishment of this depth relation—the relation of 'categorial existent' to 'axiological being' or value—history of religions meets serious perils and grave pitfalls. And it is true that a great number of comparative accounts of religions have failed in this requirement of constructing meaning-wholes out of the given religious data. But this failure is the failure of the investigator's own effort. It is not an argument against the history of religions or its methodology, but against the investigator and his research. Against the pitfalls of *eisagesis*, of reading into a religious datum something that is not there, or perceiving therein no value, or a value other than that which the adherent himself perceives, there is, in most cases, the religious wisdom of the adherents themselves. If a reconstruction meets the requisites of scholarship while at the same time the adherents of the religion in question find it meaningful and accept it as saying something to them about their own faith, surely, it has passed all that can be reasonably required of the comparativist. This was essentially the insight of W. C. Smith. [12] Certainly, the application of the principle presents a number of serious practical difficulties: The consent of which adherents of the faith may be taken as proof, and how may such consent be expressed? Moreover, it must be at least theoretically possible that the adherents of a religion may have gone so far in interpreting their religion that they have missed its primeval essence, that they do not find it any longer meaningful. This is of course tantamount to their acquiring a new religion, despite the fact that the new may still be called by the name of the old; and Smith's criterion cannot therefore be taken as a test of validity in the strict sense. Nonetheless, if we take it as a pedagogic principle, and ask the historian of religions to check his work, as it progresses, against the perspective of the adherents of the religion under investigation, we would have a check and balance technic to safeguard the work against aberration.

A stricter criterion of validity than an enlightened and scholarly application of Smith's pedagogic principle cannot be reasonably de

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of closely-related facts, this complex religious datum is then related in depth to the values which at each stage of the development, the datum was meant to and actually did, serve to realize. This last relation is usually more evident in the general literature of the civilization than in the strictly doctrinal statements.

12) "No statement about a religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's believers." (Smith, W. C., "Comparative Religion: Whither — and Why?", *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology, cit. supra,* p. 42.)

manded. The adherent's naive argument, "Either you study *my* religion
and therefore take into consideration what *I* think, *I* cognize, *I* intuit
and *I* feel, or you study somebody else's," cannot be refuted. And as
long as the reportage is a reportage on *him*, and the construction of
meaning-whole is a systematization of meanings which *he* apprehends
and relates in *his* own peculiar way, there is no escape from the
recognition that the adherent's considered and scholarly judgment is
final. If the historian of religion persists in his dissatisfaction, the
only alternative open to him is to start a new investigation, a new
reportage and a new systematization which he should distinguish from
the first enquiry as he would two different religio-cultures.

The principle governing the work of systematization is therefore
that the categories under which the systematizing works should proceed
must be innate to the pertinent religio-culture investigated, not imposed
thereon from the outside. The divisions constituting the various religio-
cultures must not be interchanged, the data of each must be classified,
analyzed and systematized not under categories alien to that religio-
culture, but under categories derived from it. Those Christian in-
vestigations of non-Christian religions which systematize their ma-
terials under such categories as man's predicament; under ritual, law
or sacrifice as atonement or salvation, etc., and speak of purity as
morality, of the contrast of destiny to history, of redemption as the
end and purpose of religion, betray an obvious governance by Christian
principles which vitiates them. The suspicion that the investigation
in question was carried out in order to show the deficiency of the
non-Christian religion in the same areas where Christianity is claimed
to be superior, can never be removed. [13] It is particularly here that
history of religions shows its purely scientific character. Within the
one religion, the task of organizing the data into a systematic whole,
of relating doctrinal, cultic, institutional, moral and artistic facts to
the history of the civilization concerned as a whole, is a purely scientific
affair, despite the fact that the materials with which the historian of
religions works are unlike those of the natural or social scientist. The
scientific character of an enquiry is not a function of the materials, but
of what is done with them. [14]) The materials may be chemical facts or

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13) See Fazlur Rahman's and this author's reviews of Kenneth Cragg's *Call
of the Minaret* and *Sandals at the Mosque,* in *Kairos,* 3-4, 1961, pp. 225-233.
    14) Prof. Long's note: "I cannot deny that the discipline consists of reportage

religious meanings. An enquiry into either is scientific if it starts from what is historically given and seeks to uncover the relations that govern the existence and actuality of these facts. It is immaterial that in one case the fact are laboratory materials in test tubes and in the other, ideas and facts recorded in books in a library or lived by a living community of men. [15]) Certainly the "whats" in the two cases are different; but the presuppositions of methodology are the same. Just as the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist, the anthropologist apply the term "social science" to their scientific treatment of data other than those which can go into a test tube, we shall invent the term "humanitic science" to describe the history of religions' scientific treatment of materials other than those of the natural and social sciences. It is granted that religious as well as moral and aesthetic meanings are always instantiated in some overt social or personal behaviour and that, except through abstraction, they are really inseparable from their instances.

3. *Judgement or Evaluation of Meaning-wholes*

A. The Necessity of Judgement

However scientific and reliable these two operations may be, a history of religions which has accumulated as many scientific and reli-

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and collection of data, construction of meaning wholes and judgement and evaluation, but these areas of the discipline cannot be separated so neatly; each one implies the other. It is on this basis that I take exception to Dr. Faruqi's statement that, 'The scientific character of an enquiry is not a function of the materials, but of what is done with them.' I should rather emphasize the fact that the scale determines the phenomenon. It is the method which gives us our data and this method represents a complex relationship between the objectivity and the relatedness of the data to the interpreter. This is what lay behind the *Methodenstreit* in Germany in the last century. Are there real differences between the constitution of the data of the human sciences and the natural sciences? Does the scale really determine the data? While I am not satisfied with the bifurcation which represented a resolution of the problem, I appreciate the problem. I would rather restate the problem in a different way. 'Is it possible for us to understand the human mode of awareness which presents reality to us as a totality?' Some forms of process philosophy take this question quite seriously but within the history of religions the analyses of primitive and traditional religions tend to describe the human awareness in these terms. Again, the sacred or the holy becomes an appropriate way of dealing with this issue."

15) It was this consideration that misled Professor Kitagawa to assign to the history of religions a position intermediate between descriptive and normative. (*Op. cit.,* p. 19). He clearly saw the descriptive nature of the discipline when it studies the history of a religion, or when it appropriates the analyses of

able articulations and systematizations as there are religions is a mere
boodle bag in which religio-cultural wholes have just been put one be-
side the other in eternal and cold juxtaposition. The first two steps of
history of religions, therefore, justify the specialized disciplines of
Islamic, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist studies, and so forth; but not the
history of religions as an autonomous discipline. For this, a third
branch of study is necessary, *viz.*, judgement or evaluation. Out of
the meaning-wholes constructed by the first two branches of history
of religions, one meaning-whole should be arrived at, which would
belong to man as such. Like the second, this third operation is also a
systematization, not so much of particular data as of meaning-wholes.
Its task is that of relating the given meaning-wholes to the universal,
the human, and the divine as such. For this, meta-religion, or prin-
ciples belonging to such order of generality as would serve as bases
of comparison and evaluation of the meaning-wholes, is necessary.
Such relating does involve a judgement of the individual meaning-
wholes, an evaluation of their large claims. That this is itself a very
large claim is not denied. Indeed, it sounds quite presumptous to want
to judge the religio-cultures of mankind. But the point is that the
significance of the whole discipline of history of religions will stand
or fall with the establishment or repudiation of this third branch.

    i. First, we have seen that the first two branches can succeed in
putting in front of us a series of internally coherent wholes of
meanings, the constituents of each of which are related to one another
as well as to their respective categorial existents manifest in the
history, life and culture of that religion as well as to their respective
axiological grounds. If the first two operations have been successful,
and the religion in question is neither the Advaita School of Sankara
or the Deuta School of Ramanuja Hinduism where all opinions,

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psychology, anthropology, sociology, philology, etc., and of scriptures, doctrines,
cults and social groupings. But when he came to differentiate history of religions
from the normative disciplines, he wrote: "While *Religionswissenschaft* has to
be faithful to descriptive principles, its inquiry must nevertheless be directed to
the meaning (*sic*) or religious phenomena." (*Ibid.*, p. 21) This concern with
meanings is, in his view, sufficient to remove history of religions from the
ranks of descriptive science. Evidently, he precludes the possibility of a descrip-
tive treatment of normative content such as value-realist philosophy has been
suggesting for a generation. (*cf.* the tradition of Max Scheler, Nikolai Hart-
mann, etc.)

perspectives and judgements have absolutely the same truth-value, every meaning-whole will contain within it the claim not only that it is true, but that it is *the* truth. This claim is in a sense essential to religion. For the religious assertion is not merely one among a multitude of propositions, but necessarily unique and exclusive. It is of its nature to be imperative in addition to being propositive, and no command can issue therefrom if it did not mean to assert that its content is better or truer than the alternative content of another assertion if not the only true and good content *überhaupt*. Imperativeness is always a preference of something to something else; and this always implies that what is commanded in any instance is the best thing commandable in that instance. Where alternative commandments are of identical value, none may be said to be, by itself, commandable. Religious exclusiveness, when it is asserted not on the level of accidentals but on that of the essentials of a religion, can be dispensed with only at the cost of axiological relativism. For me to understand Christianity, for example, according to its own standards, and Christian thought as an autonomous expression of Christian experience is all well and good. But, if I ever omit from this understanding the claim that Christianity is a valid religion for all men, that the Christian faith is not only a true expression of what God may have done for some people but of what He has done or ever will do for the redemption of all men, of man as such, I am certain I would miss the essence and core. The same is of course true of all religions unless the religion is itself a sacralization of relativism, in which case it may not contend our assertion of exclusiveness without contradicting itself. What we then have in the boodle bag of the historian of religions is not a series of meaning-wholes, *simpliciter,* but a juxtaposition of several meaning-wholes each of which claims to be the only autonomous expression of the truth. These wholes do not only vary in detail, nor do they merely vary in the important issues. They diametrically contradict one another in most of the principles which constitute the framework and structure of their house of ideas. How then can the historian of religions, who is above all an academician, stop after the presentation of these wholes? As academician, the historian of religions is above all concerned with the truth. But to present the meaning-wholes of the religions and acquiesce to their pluralism is nothing short of cynicism. There is no alternative to this cynicism except in judging and

evaluating the claimant meaning-wholes. The historian of religions must therefore do much more than steps 1 and 2. [16])

ii. Second, "knowledge" in history of religions does not consist merely of the apprehension of data. In science, a datum is gnoseologically valuable by itself, inasmuch as the natural fact held in conciousness is itself the end of the scientific investigation. In history of religions a datum has little history-of-religions-significance unless it is related to the feeling, propensity, aspiration or value-apprehension of which it is the expression, the affirmation or negation, the satisfaction or denial, the approbation or condemnation, the exaltation or denigration and so forth. But feelings, propensities, aspirations are human, not only Christian or Muslim, and value-apprehension is apprehension of a real value in experience. It is not therefore enough to know that for a certain religion, such and such are held to be facts. Movement from the Christianness or Muslimness of a factum to its human-ness or universal reality is indispensible. Likewise, no meaning-whole is complete unless its insights, claims, *desiderata* and *damnata* are related to their human and therefore real roots, and thence to the real values and disvalues they seek to make real or to eliminate. Knowledge itself demands this relating to man as such, to existential and axiological reality. But to relate the data and meaning-

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16) Prof. Long's note: "This point of Dr. Faruqi is well taken. It has to do with the inter-relationship of meaning wholes. From a study of religions, we now ask, what is religion. I also concur in his criticism of Prof. W. C. Smith's criterion for valid interpretation. I must however question the presuppositions underlying the very constitution of the meaning-wholes. For the historian of religion, such meaning-wholes exist but not simply as geographically and culturally defined units. The historian of religions should not begin his study by setting aside a certain number of religions and taking them in order to study them one after another. He should rather begin with forms of the religious life and an exhaustive study of these forms already leads him out of simply geographically and culturally defined units. The very fact that he supposes that he can understand that which is other leads him to a wide range of religious data. The meaning wholes are for him already inter-related and thus the problem of their relationship is of a different kind. I am one of those historians of religions who does not like to hear the question put as the relationship of Christianity to the non-Christian religions. For me the issue is put more precisely when we ask the meaning of religious forms as valid understanding of man's nature and destiny. Any discussion of this issue leads us to empirical data, but it also implicates us in a discussion which enables us not only to talk about the resources of our peculiar traditions, but also the resources of a common humanity — a common humanity which all living religionists may claim."

wholes in this manner is certainly to judge them. Mutually-contra-
dictory as they are, to relate the data of religions or their meaning-
wholes to the same reality, whether human or valuational, is really to
present an incomplete picture with which the human understanding
can do nothing. Indeed, such relating of them cannot be maintained
in consciousness without coercion. But data which cannot be treated
except coercively, *i.e.,* cannot be related to the universal and the real
without dislodging or being dislodged by other data, cannot be simply
true. Either the dislodging or the dislodged data are wrong, or their
place in the meaning-whole has been wrongly assigned. The conse-
quence, therefore, is that either the construction of the meaning-whole
has been faulty or the meaning-whole as a whole has laid a false claim
to the truth.

B. The Desirability of Judgement

Since the data which the historian of religions collects are universal-
ly related to meanings or values, they are, in contradistinction from
the dead facts of natural science, life-facts. In order to perceive them
as life-facts, an *époché* is necessary in which, as the phenomenologists
have argued, the investigator would put his own presuppositions, reli-
gion and perspective in bracket while he beholds the given religious
datum. This is necessary but insufficient. That the life-fact is en-
dowed with energizing and stirring power implies for epistemology
that to apprehend it is to apprehend its moving power in experience.
Hence, life-fact cognition is life-fact determination, and to perceive
a religious meaning is to suffer determination by that meaning. The
historian of religions must therefore be capable of moving freely from
one context to another while enabling his ethos to be determined by
the data beheld alone. Only thus can he construct the historically given
data into self-coherent meaning-wholes, which is his objective as
historian of religions. But what does this peregrination mean for him
as a human being, as a searcher for wisdom? And consequently, what
does it mean for him to present to his fellowmen these mutually-
repulsive, severally appealing and determining meaning-wholes?

It may be argued that the historian of religions should do no more
than present these meaning-wholes from the highest level of detach-
ment possible. Ivory-tower detachment is not only impressive but
necessary when the subject matter investigated and presented to man

belongs to the realm of nature which we called "dead facts." To apply it in the realm of life-facts, where to cognize is to be determined in discursive thought as well as in feeling and action is to expose men to their energizing power and moving appeal. Now, if the historian of religions takes no more than steps 1 and 2, he is exposing man to galaxies of meaning-wholes which pull him apart in different directions. There can be no doubt that every human being must reach his own personal decision regarding what is finally-meaningful, that the historian of religions is an academician who must remain absolutely aloof from all attempts to influence man's decision-making. But has he, by presenting to man merely the meaning-wholes in cold juxtaposition, *i.e.,* without relating them to the necessarily-universal, the necessary-real, the human, presented him with the whole truth? In this age of ours, when the world community has become conscious of a universal, human identity and is repeatedly calling for a discipline that will think out its spiritual problems as a human world community, has the ivory tower historian of religions, whose training has equipped him best for the job, the right to shy away? Does his shying away cast no doubt on his whole enterprise? By willing to preserve the religions of man frozen as they are, this ivory-tower scholarship detaches itself from the world of man and life that is constantly being made and remade and degenerates into superficiality.

These three considerations — the first two being theoretical, affecting knowledge of religions, and the third practical, questioning the wisdom of avoiding judgement — lead us to think that judgement is both necessary and desirable. There is hence no escape for history of religions from developing a system of principles of meta-religion under which the judgement and evaluation of meaning-wholes may take place. Although there have been many Christian theologies of history of religions, there is, as yet, unfortunately, no critical meta-religion. This shortcoming points further to the unpreparedness of modern Christendom to meet the world-community which is rapidly coming into being. ,

It is not the purview of this paper to elaborate a system of meta-religion. But it would indeed be incomplete if, having striven to establish its necessity and desirability, we omit to discuss its possibility.

C. The Possibility of Judgement

Perhaps the most common genre of meta-religion is that which looks upon the differences among religions as belonging to the surface, and upon their common agreements as belonging to the essence. This view does not always have to assume the superficial form it usually takes in inter-religious conventions where the "lowest common denominator" agreements are emphasized at the cost of all the difference. It can be sophisticated, as when it claims that underlying all differences, there is a real substratum common to all which is easily discoverable upon closer analysis. But it is nonetheless false because it seeks that substratum on the level of the figurizations and conceptualizations of the different religions where no such unity can be found except through selection of the materials investigated or a coercive interpretation of them. The profound differences that separate the religions on the level of teachings here all disappear in order to clear the road for generalization. When hindrances are found to be obstinate, they are subjected to an interpretation capable of bearing the required meaning. Such is the case of the analysis of Friedrich Heiler, who goes to great lengths to prove that all religions teach the same God and the same ethic, and whose conclusions are not even true to the theory of empirical generalization, not to speak of meta-religion whose principles must be apodeictically certain. For him, Yahweh, Ahura Mazdah, Allah, Buddha, Kali, and — presumably, though his enumeration carefully omits him! — Jesus, all are "imagery" in which the one and same "reality is constantly personified." [17]) Moreover, "this reality of the Divine" is identified as "ultimate love which reveals itself to men and in men;" [18]) and "the way of man to God is universally the way of sacrifice." [19]) Obviously this is to see the non-Christian religions with hopelessly Christian eyes, to bend the historically-given so as to accord with a predetermined Christian order.

Despite the fact that this sort of "scholarship" may serve to instil among the rank and file a little sympathy for "the others" who, hitherto, have been regarded as "infidels," "natives," etc., it remains

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17) "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions," *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, p. 142.
18) *Ibid.*, p. 143.
19) *Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

at bottom a gratuitous condescension. As methodology of the history
of religions, it is utterly worthless. [20])

A far more profound and philosophical theory of history of religions
has been briefly laid out in an article by Professor B. E. Meland. [21])
It too regards the religions as fundamentally one, not on the level of
doctrine or figurization, but on that of a deeper lying substratum —
which is true — and seeks to reach, reconcile or judge the pronounce-
ments of the different religions on the figurization level by reference
to that deeper reality which is common to all. It is in the latter aspect
that the theory runs aground. Whereas the unphilosophical theories
fail because they do not seek humanity on the deeper level where it
really is but on the figurizational level where it certainly is not, the
philosophical theory of Professor Meland runs short because it seeks
that reality on the level which properly belongs to it but identifies it
in such a way as to make any knowledge — and hence any methodo-
logical use — of it impossible. Let us see how this is so.

Professor Meland analyzes the nature of man as consisting of three
elements: First, "the primordial ground of the individual person as
actualized event," *i.e.*, the primordial substratum of reality in which
he has his being, his createdness. This deep-lying substrate is onto-
logical and hence it transcends all particularisms; but "in its
actuality ... (it) is concrete." It is "man's life in God." It is "univer-
sal"; hence, "all concretion is ultimately due" to it. All perspectives,
judgements, formulations of or within a religion "partake of this con-
creteness" and are, hence, "relative to it" in the "decisive" sense "that
in this time and place reality has spoken." It "defines the base of our
humanity" and gives man the capacity to understand the humanity of
another. [22]) Second, "the individuated selfhood of each person;" and

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20) Other examples betraying the same shortcoming are Albert Schweitzer's
Christianity and the Religions of the World, Allen and Unwin, London, 1923;
Hendrik Kraemer, *Why Christianity of all Religions?,* Westminster Press, Phi-
ladelphia, 1962; Stephen Neill, *Christian Faith and Other Faiths: The Christian
Dialogue with Other Religions.* Oxford University Press, 1961; A. C. Bouquet,
The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions, James Nisbet and Co., London,
1958; Jacques-Albert Cuttat, *La Rencontre des Religions,* Aubier, Editions
Montaigne, Paris, 1957; R. C. Zaehner, *The Convergent Spirit: Towards a
Dialectics of Religion,* Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963; etc.

21) "Theology and the Historian of Religion," *The Journal of Religion,* Vol.
XLI, No. 4, October, 1961, pp. 263-276.

22) *Ibid.,* p. 265.

third, "the cultural history in which the drama of corporate existence is enacted." [23])

In contrast to the first element which is universal, the second and third are specific and particular, and belong to the level of history and culture. It is true that neither the universal nor the particular is found without the other; but whereas the particular is readily and directly available for knowledge, the universal is never reached except through the particular. Thus the particular, which is a concretization of the universal, is relative thereto in the ontic sense; for it owes to the universal its very being. This may be granted. As to the availability of the universal for knowledge, Professor Meland rules out all hope for the historian of religions ever to attain it outside his own culture and concretization [24]) on the grounds that "the structure of faith [*i.e.*, the particular] is so deeply organic to the individuation of the person in any culture ... [or so] much of this is below the level of conscious awareness ... [25]) [that man's] processes of thought cannot escape or transcend its conditioning, however disciplined they may be." [26])

This reduction of all human knowledge to relativity, to the particular cultural structure of the subject (which Professor Meland calls the "fiduciary framework," borrowing the expression of Michael Polanyi), stems from a mistaking of relationality for relativity. The aforementioned ontic relation between primordial reality and its concrete actualization in space-time, which is the one-directional dependence of the particular to the universal, is here interpreted as epistemological and is turned around so as to become the absolute dependence of the universal to the particular. For this twist, however, no reason is given; and its net purport is the resolution to recognize only the particular as given, thus closing the gate of any reliable knowledge of the universal. But knowledge of the universal, of primordial reality, must be possible if the particular culture or religion, the "fiduciary framework," is not to be final. Passage from the particular to the universal, that is to say,

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23) *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266.
24) *Ibid.*, p. 272.
25) *Ibid.*, p. 261.
26) *Ibid.*, p. 275. Here Professor Meland finds himself in agreement with Michael Polanyi (*Personal Knowledge,* University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 266) who identifies the particular for knowledge as "fiduciary framework" outside of which "no intelligence, however critical or original, can operate." (Meland, *op. cit.*, p. 271).

the search for a meta-religion with which the particular may be properly understood as well as evaluated, is possible because, to parody the words of Kant, although all history of religions begins with the historically given data of the religions, the concrete religious experience of men in history, the given of the particular religions, it is not necessary that it all arise therefrom. Professor Meland too is keen to save this possibility, though he is opposed to any facile dogmatique of the universal. With this in mind, he suggested the method of negotiation of meaning in personal inter-religious encounter, asserting that the impenetrable opaqueness of meaning which the alien religion presents to the investigator could be dissipated by the encounter between him and the adherent of that religion, provided both are aware of their fiduciary frameworks, as well as of the fact that they are, as living concretizations of primordial reality, anchored in that one and the same reality. In such an encounter, Professor Meland holds, it would not be their particularistic dogmatique that carries the religious meaning sought, but the persons' saying such words as they do. [27]   ,

One may ask, however, what does the adherent affirming and denying what he does affirm and deny, mean besides what is affirmed and denied which belongs to the level of the fiduciary framework? That the statement, 'Pete Smith, the American Christian, affirms that all men are sinful,' means more than the affirmation 'all men are sinful' is obvious. But what is not obvious is the meaning or relevance of the addition. Again, that the addition has a new meaning and relevance for the sociologist, the social psychologist, the demographist, the historians of all varieties (politics, economics, Christianity, civilizaton, etc.) studying American society, is obvious. But in all these cases, there is no implication that the fiduciary framework is going to be transcended, not to say that primordial reality, or the universal, is going to be reached. For encounter to serve the purpose Professor Meland has assigned to it, the new addition should have a meaning and a relevance to history of religions, that is to say, to the interest transcending the particular religions of the adherents, under which the latter could be illuminated, understood, evaluated and judged. But what is that meaning and relevance which must be other than what the

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27) *Ibid.*, pp. 274-275.

psychologist, economist, historian and other social scientists are interested in? Professor Meland gave us no indication of it. How then can the desired "negotiation of meaning" be possible? How may that of which the religious figurization or fiduciary framework is the figurization be critically established for knowledge? Indeed, Professor Meland had already laid down that primordial reality is utterly unknowable. In this case, what reliance could be placed on any person's claim that in affirming and denying what he does, he is expressing "primordial reality"? How can the encounterer differentiate between the person communicating a particularized "primordial reality" and one communicating a particularized hallucination? Does any fiduciary framework express, take account of and constitute a concretization of "primordial reality" as well as any other? Are men absolutely free to develop any fiduciary framework they wish? Has not all human wisdom attained anything final at all concerning that primordial reality besides its *Dasein*? If these questions yield only negative results, then negotiated meaning is impossible and encounter is futile. If, on the other hand, the yield is positive, then certainly meta-religion is possible, and the historian of religions should apply himself to the task of elaborating it. In doing so, the historian of religions may not take the stand of skepticism. For to assert God and not to allow Him to be differentiated from a hallucination is idle, as it is for a Muslim to assert the unity of God and not that of truth, or for any rational being to assert reality and then to declare it many or utterly unknowable. To assert with Professors Polanyi and Meland that all we can ever have is a Muslimized or Christianized, Germanized or Russified version of the truth is skepticism — the denial of truth itself, including that of the skeptic's thesis, *à la* Epimenides.

The rock-bottom axiom of this relativism in religious knowledge is the principle that "the roots of man are in the region; or, more precisely, in that matrix of concrete experience, however much he may succeed in venturing beyond these psychic barriers through various efforts at shared experience." [28]) Firstly, this is not self-evident. The contrary, namely, that the root of man is in the human universal rationality in which he partakes by nature, is quite conceivable. Nor can it be made to accord, secondly, with the wisdom of Biblical "J" which expressed

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28) *Ibid.,* p. 264.

men's universal brotherhood in their common descendence from Adam, and attributed their cultural peculiarities to environment. [29]) Thirdly, it stems from an unfortunate fixation in the Western mind that whatever is, is first of all either French or German or English or Christian or Jewish, and is human, universal, real only in second place. This fixation is so chronic that the Western mind not only cannot see reality except as geographically, nationally, culturally or sectarianly determined, but goes on to assume that God created it so. " ...Each [concrete occasion of reality] in its own circumstances, bodies forth its distinctive disclosure as an event of actuality, prehending the creative act of God with its own degree of relevance." [30]) Evidently, that is the end of the road. It is relativism claiming for itself divine sanction.

And yet, if we can purge Professor Meland's theory of this relativist trait, we have left a genuine insight into the problem and a breakthrough to its solution. Certainly, what unites men of different fiduciary frameworks is, as Professor Meland says, their standing as actualizations of primordial reality, their createdness by one and the same Creator. Religiously speaking, the Creator has not only built in man His own image, *i.e.*, a capacity to transcend his creatureliness and recognize the Creator who is his source, but has taken several measures to bring to man a knowledge of Himself. Man therefore knows God, the primordial reality, if not naturally, then by means of revelation. On the other hand, *i.e.*, metaphysically speaking, the level of being at which man stands is differentiated from the lower levels of things, plants and animals, not only by that instrument of the will to live called the understanding, but by spirit, which enables man to cognize and evaluate his standing in Being's multilevelled structure. This is none other than Being's attainment of consciousness of itself. In man, Being judges itself. That it *has* often misjudged itself is the proof that it *can* judge itself, and consequently that it must, can and in fact does know itself. For it is as inconceivable that Being would enable the emergence of a creature that is a judge of Being without endowing it with the faculty to know the object of judgement, which is itself, as it is to find a being on any level that is not accompanied by the development of such cognitive faculties as enable the higher con-

29) Genesis, 11 : 1-9.
30) Meland, *op. cit.,* p. 265.

cretization of Being to fulfill that which distinguishes it from the lower and hence constitutes its *raison d'être*. That is what I gather from Professor Meland's profound insight; and it is a precious harvest indeed.

II. The Significance of History of Religions for Christian Education

Pursued in its three branches, history of religions is the sovereign queen of the humanites. For, in a sense, all the humanities disciplines including the comparative ones are her front-line soldiers whose duties are the collection of data, their analysis, systematization and reconstruction into meaning-wholes. The subject matter of these disciplines is men's ideas and actions in all fields of human endeavour; and all these are, as we have seen, constituents in the religio-cultural wholes which history of religions proper studies as wholes, compares and relates to man and divinity in her attempt to reach the truth of both. The queen's concern is for every battlefield and hence for every individual soldier. But her real care is the headquarters kind of work which tells how and where the ship of humanity is going. History of religions, then, is not a course of study; it is not a department in a divinity school. It is, rather, by itself a college of liberal arts, each department of which is organically related to the center whose job is to make sense out of the infinite diversity of the religio-cultural experience, and thus contribute to the reconstruction of man's knowledge of himself, to his rehabilitation in an apparently alien cosmos, to his realization of value. Inasmuch therefore as history of religions is a collection and systematization of facts about human acts, life and relations, it is a college. Inasmuch as history of religions is an evaluation or judgement of meaning-wholes with the aid of a body of critical meta-religious principles, it is the queen of the humanities.

The fact is, however, that on any university or college campus these disciplines operate on their own in an autonomous manner without recognizing their organic relation to history of religions. This is not undesirable. First, a measure of evaluation and judgement relative to the data under immediate examination is necessary for collection and systematization work which is their duty, as we have seen earlier. Secondly, and in a deeper sense, their attempts at evaluation are desirable inasmuch as intellectual curiosity, or the will to know, is

dependent upon the recognition of the unity of truth; *i.e.*, upon the realization that the discovery of truth is a discovery of a reality which is not divisible into unrelated segments but constitutes a unique and integral whole. Such realization is always a requisite for venturing into the unknown fields of reality. Thirdly, their evaluations and judgements are of inestimable value to the historian of religions, even though they may be biassed or erroneous. They serve as a check and balance to the historian of religions whenever he is inclined to set the facts aside in favour of abstract constructionism. Such evaluation and judgement as the specialist data-reporter and systematizer are likely to make will at least be truer to the facts in question; and this is a need which history of religions can never overemphasize and no historian of religions can oversatisfy. Fourthly, history of religions herself should keep aware of these developments and be ready to evaluate the discoveries attained by these disciplines. Indeed, the task of evaluation is a necessary one and will be made by the discipline in question or by another at any rate. And the real issue is that of the need for and desirability of evaluation on the level of history of religions, that is to say, on the highest, the most comprehensive and critical level of all.

This is the place of history of religions in the university. What is its place in a school of divinity?

We have said earlier that the final purpose of history of religions is the putting under the light of consciousness the progress or move-ment of the ship of humanity towards truth, goodness and beauty. For this purpose, it works on its materials as it finds them historically fallen into the several religio-cultures of man, first by analyzing and systematizing them into autonomous meaning-wholes and then by evaluating their respective contribution to the progress of the ship of humanity towards those ideals. Obviously, Christianity is only one of the religio-cultures of humanity. Its history, with all that it contains, is the history of one of the religio-cultures of man, and, therefore, does not stand on the same level of generality as the history of re-ligions. Nor can it in any way determine the work of the history of religions. The Christian may certainly hope that at the end of the road, Christianity's claims for embodying all truth, goodness and beauty will be confirmed; but he will have to allow it to stand in line with the other religio-cultures of man, in willful submission to the authority of judgement, that such a final vindication of his claim may be arrived

at in a critical manner acceptable to all. A history of religions that is dominated or in any way influenced by Christianity, a history of religions which surreptitiously or openly seeks to vindicate Christian doctrine may be a handmaid of Christian theology, but not history of religions at all. This is so regardless of whether the materials studied are those of an extinct antiquarian religion, of a primitive religion with a handful of isolated adherents, or of a living world religion. Intellectual honesty is here most crucial, and must be satisfied before our loyalty to our religious traditions—indeed even at the cost of this loyalty if such sacrifice is necessary. And unless historians of religions agree on the priority of truth to Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, and Buddhist claims to the truth, then history of religions is doomed. The rules of the academic game, of the business of discovering and arriving at the truth, would be violated; and like the skeptics of latter-day value theory, the historians of religions may only seek to influence, to convert or subvert, but never to convince anybody of the truth. Therefore, the role of history of religions in a faculty of divinity cannot be in the least different from her role in a faculty of Islamic or Hindu studies. What is that role?

The material which history of religion studies is the history of religion; and in a divinity school, of Christianity. The history of Christianity covers a very long span of time and many peoples, and everything is important. But the purpose of history of religions' study of the history of Christianity is to trace the development of ideas, to lay bare for the ready use of reason, the genesis, growth and decay of Christian ideas against the background of social as well as ideological realities in the midst of which the ideational movement had taken place. The divine providential element cannot enter in this tracing as a factor, as a principle of explanation. This is not because history of religions is an atheistic science which does not believe in the presence of such element. On the contrary, the discovery of this element and its establishment for reason is the final purpose of the discipline as a whole. Rather, it is because divine providence never operates in the abstract, but always implies a plenum of real determinations. It is precisely the job of history of religions to discover this plenum, to analyze and expose its contents and relations. To admit the providential element here is *ipso facto* to put an end to the investigation. And since Christianity has not been an immutable and eternal pattern, frozen for

all times and places, which the historian of religions can study once
and for all, but a continuing development—that is to say, Christian
history is not the development of a pattern, but the pattern itself is
this development—the history of religions should find in the history
of Christianity the richest field of ideational development.

To illustrate what I mean, let us take a closer look at the Old Testa-
ment. When the Reformation repudiated the religious authority of the
Church, it vested that authority in the Scripture. When, later, the
Christian mind rebelled against all authority except that of reason,
sought enlightenment and observed a stricter moralism and a wider
social liberalism, the Old Testament appeared inacceptable because of
its running counter to these ideals. And with the Western Christian's
discovery of "the world," the Old Testament's particularism, election,
promise, remnant, and overdrawn political, social, and ideological
history of the Hebrews lost its appeal and became something alien,
whose acceptance depends upon fresh *Vergegenwärtigung*, or a making-
meaningful-in-the-present, of its data. It was a great challenge which
Christian scholars met by developing a critical science of the Old
Testament. Out of this criticism a number of Semitic disciplines
developed which added great contributions to human knowledge. And
yet, there is hardly a Christian book on the Old Testament which does
not try all sorts of *Heilsgeschichte* and allegorical interpretation acro-
batics to reestablish the Old Testament as holy scripture *in toto*, though
not verbatim; *i.e.*, to read into it by means of all kinds of *eisageses*
a confirmation of the articles of Christian dogma.

True, the Old Testament as a record of the history and ideologies
which surrounded, preceded, gave birth to or furnished the space-time
human circumstance of revelation, is necessary. But Christian scholars
do not read the Old Testament in this fashion. For them, it is all one
consistent puppet-drama, operated by God to the end that the Incarna-
tion, Crucifixion and Resurrection—in short, Redemption as Church
dogmatics knows it—may result. To this author's knowledge, no Christ-
ian scholar and no historian of religions has as yet applied the techniques
as well as the dogmafree perspective of history of religions to the Old
Testament *as a whole*. As a result, no Christian thinker fully appreciates
the revolution in religio-culture which Jesus initiated, for Christian dog-
ma binds him to the notion that the Church is a new Israel, new to be
sure, but nonetheless an Israel. The sanctity of the new Israel is thus

extended to the old; and this bars any condemnation of old Israel, thus making it impossible to treat the breakthrough of Jesus as a revolution. For, a revolution is always against something. That something may be the circumstance of revolution, but it can never be good and desirable unless the revolution is bad and undesirable, and never divinely instituted unless the whole of history is equally manipulated by the divine hand. Nor was the revolution of Jesus directed only against one or two features of Hebrew religio-culture. It called for nothing less than a total radical self-transformation. A study of the Old Testament that is true to the discipline of the history of religions should show the genesis and development of that against which the revolution came, as well as the genesis and development of the stream of ideas of which the revolution came as an apex, as a consummation and crystal-lization. 31) That the two streams are present in the later parts of the

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31) By distinguishing "the earthly Jesus" of history from "the heaven-exalted Christ" of dogma and "the Pre-existent Logos" of doctrine, Shirley Jackson Case had an edge on the problem (*Jesus: A New Biography,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1927, pp. 2-5) which he lost in the presentation of the earthly Jesus. Discarding the evidence of the Gospels as projection onto the past of animosities and oppositions pertinent to the Church of the first and second centuries A.C., Case regarded Jesus' task as being merely one of "sum-mon[ing] the Jewish people to a life in more perfect accord with the will of their God" (*Ibid.,* p. 264), of "deliver[ing] ...a message of warning designed to augment righteousness in Israel" (*Ibid.,* p. 342). This task, anticipated and fulfilled by John "calling upon the people of Palestine to reconsecrate them-selves to God in preparation for the Day of Judgment" (*Ibid.,* p. 242), "had first aroused the interest of Jesus" at his baptism and was adopted by him inciden-tally on account of "a heightening of emotion [attending his experience of bap-tism] that impelled him to assume the responsibilities of a new life-work." *(Ibid.,* p. 257). Indeed, Jesus did not even envisage any global mission at all; for "the range of his activities widened [only] when Jesus paid a visit to 'the borders of Tyre and Sidon,' which provided a setting for the story of his generous attitude toward the Syro-phoenician woman." (*Ibid.,* p. 269) The task of Jesus is thus diluted into one of simple reform. It was not a revolution against the moral decadence, tribalism and vacuitous legalism of Judaism evidenced in both the Gospels and the Talmud because, for Case, there was no need for one — "Jesus... [having] more in common with them [Scribes and Pharisees] ... in his sympathies and aims..." (*Ibid.,* pp. 304-305), and "fundamentally, the dif-ference between Jesus and the contemporary religious leaders of Judaism... [being] one of personal and social experience... [merely] a neglect of legal niceties... [and his being a plebeian or] 'Amme ha-aretz' unhabituated to the more meticulous demands of the scribal system." (*Ibid.,* p. 315) Where the Gospel evidence to the contrary is not due to the personal character of Jesus and his being untutored in the Law, Case regards it as "occasional instances of conflict due to personal pique." (*Ibid.,* p. 316) Obviously all this theorizing is

Old Testament is granted. But the sifting of he two streams has never
been done. Dulled by the constant attribution of sanctity to the whole
history of Israel, the Christian mind has so far been unable to put
the facts of this history under the proper perspective, and hence to
distinguish the two streams: The nationalist particularist stream in-
cepted by David, classicized and frozen by Ezra and Nehemiah; and
the monotheic universalist stream of the non-Judah and other tribes —
the Shechemites within Palestine, the Aramaean kingdoms bordering
on Palestine to the South and East, and generally, of the Semitic
peoples migrating from the Arabian Peninsula — a tradition classicized
by the Prophets and brought to the apex of revolution by Jesus. It
takes the dogma-free history of religions to undertake a yet higher
kind of Old Testament criticism, namely, to sift the Old Testament
materials into that which is Hebraic or Judah-ic — which can never be
Christian in any sense — and that which is universal, monotheic, ethical
and Christian.

To take another example: Without a doubt the tradition of ideas
which became the orthodox doctrine of Christianity is at least as old
as St. Paul and probably as old as the Disciples. Equally, there must
be no doubt that there were other traditions of ideas which were not
as fortunate as to become Orthodoxy's dogma, but which were equally
as old. Indeed, some of these other traditions were even prior. Firstly,
they were essentially continuations of the Semitic tradition, whereas
Orthodox Christianity built her ideational edifice primarily as a Hel-
lenic structure. Secondly, if the advocates of the Old Testament have
any point at all, it is certainly this that the divine revelation of Jesus
has come within the space-time circumstance of the Hebrews, *i.e.,* with-
in the Semitic ideological context of the Old Testament, not within
that of Homeric Hellas, or of the Hellenized Near East and Roman
Empire. The truth, therefore, cannot be controverted that the Semitic
character of Ebionite Christianity, of the Arian, Marcionite and

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due to Case's committment to that aspect of Christian dogma which asserts the
holiness of the Jewish people, as well as of their religious principles and practices
as given and recorded in the Old Testament — a holiness which precludes all
significantly original changes, even if God Himself is the author, and Jesus the
instrument of the change. Case's "Life of Jesus" is "a new biography" as far
as the "heaven-exalted Christ and Pre-Existent Logos" are absent from it. But
it is not historical and hence not properly-speaking a work of the history of
religions.

Paulician traditions, for example, stands far beyond question as prior to the Hellenic tradition which became the Orthodox doctrine. Hence the latter must be a "change" or "transformation" of the former. The Orthodoxy has coloured all Christian histories, and the most scholarly treatises still look upon the history of Christianity from the standpoint of the Orthodox dogma. Whereas we grant to the Orthodox historians the liberty to reconstruct their Orthodox tradition according to the categories of that tradition, what is needed is a history of Christianity which will present the various Christian traditions as autonomous meaning-wholes and then relate them to the Orthodox tradition in a way revealing as well as explaining the differences. Only such a history would be truly instructive concerning the formative period of Christianity — the first seven centuries. Only it will be concerned to tell the whole story of this development against the historical background of the social and ideological realities of the Near East and Roman Empire. The Orthodox evaluation of these traditions is valuable for the light it sheds on itself, not on the traditions it condemns. It is unfortunate but challenging that no scholar has as yet used the source materials of the history of Christian ideas in the first seven centuries in order to bring to light the genesis and development of these diverse Christian traditions connecting them with the Semitic consciousness, the Hellenic consciousness or the mixed-up Semitico-Hellenic consciousness of the Near East (which all Christian historians confusedly call "Eastern Christianity," "Eastern Churches" and the like). That remains the task of the historian of religions in the field of Christian history. For it is he who, while rightly expected to read the Orthodox tradition under categories furnished by that tradition alone, is equally rightly expected to read the history of the other Christian traditions under their own categories, and then judge them all under the principles of meta-religion.

(To be continued)

NOTE ON BARUKH BEN NERIAH AND ZOROASTER

BY

JACOB NEUSNER

Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin recently stated [1]:

> Plus tard, les Juifs, pour résister intellectuellement à la domination perse, ont forgé des généalogies spirituelles, allant qusqu'à identifier Zoroastre à Baruch, le scribe de Jérémie. Ainsi, toute la sagesse des Iraniens découlait de Palestine.

His only reference is to A. V. W. Jackson, *Zoroaster, The Prophet of Ancient Iran* (London, 1899), p. 166. There, however, Jackson merely cites Richard J. H. Gottheil, "References to Zoroaster in Syriac and Arabic Literature", in *Classical Studies in Honour of Henry Drisler* (N.Y. 1894) pp. 24-51). In order to evaluate the above allegation, therefore, we must turn to Gottheil's article.

If the Jews actually tried to show that Zoroaster and Barukh b. Neriah were one and the same, that fact would have substantial conseqences. We know that Jews did try to demonstrate the Jewish origin of men they admired and respected among gentile nations, or to show, at the very least, the basis in Judaism of all that was important in their teaching. This was the case, for example, with the Spartans, who were held by the Maccabees to be children of Abraham. The Persians were likewise alleged to be children of Abraham and Keturah in both Jewish and Armenian-Christian sources. [2] If, therefore, it could be shown that some Jews believed Barukh and Zoroaster to have been the same man, one might infer serious Jewish consideration of Zoroaster's doctrines, and considerable Zoroastrian, or at least Iranian, influence on Judaism. Much is said about Iranian influence on Judaism at various periods, from II Isaiah to the Arab conquest though most especially on the first century B.C. and A.D. sects. The

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1) *La Religion de L'Iran Ancien* (Paris, 1962), p. 26. See also pp. 257-64.

2) See my "Jews in Pagan Armenia", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (Henceforward: JAOS), in press for Volume LXXXIV.

specific problem before us provides an opportunity to assess one such assertion.

Duchesne-Guillemin's allegation is completely without foundation. The evidence cited by Gottheil is from late Christian-Syriac sources. Gottheil cites [3]) Bar Bahlul, *Lexica* (Ca. 832 A.D.), who refers to "Zardosht, whom people say is Baruch the scribe." Likewise, 'Ishodad of Hadatha (Ca. 852 A.D.) in his commentary on Matthew 2: 1 states:

> It has been asked whence did the Magi receive [information] that when a certain star should appear, the King of Kings was born. The truth of the matter is that it had been predicted by Zaradosht, the head of their sect, either because he was constrained by divine power... or because he was of the people of Israel and a student of the Scriptures... Some say that he is the same as Baruch the pupil of Eramya [Jeremiah] and that because the gift of prophecy was denied him, as had been his wish, and because of the bitter exile and the sack of Jerusalem and the Temple, he became offended... and went among other nations, learned twelve languages, and in them wrote that vomit of Satan, i.e. their book which is called Abhasta...

The same tradition is repeated in the Book of the Bee, by Solomon of Ḥilāt (1222 A.D.), "This Zaradosht is Baruch the scribe." Gottheil cites de Sacy (p. 30 n. 2) who offered an explanation of the connection of Jeremiah with Zoroaster, but offers no explanation of the identification of Baruch with Zoroaster. Gottheil does note, however, that Tabari says that Zoroaster was of Palestinian origin, and was a servant to one of the disciples of Jeremiah.

What then do we know for certain? Merely that certain 9th century Christian-Syriac writers regarded Zoroaster as identical with Barukh, and that these writers were cited later on by Arabic historians.

On such a basis, one can hardly assert that the Jews forged a spiritual genealogy which went so far as to assert that Zoroaster was identical with Barukh.

The fact is that so far as we know, it was the Christians who did so, and not the Jews. Furthermore, the earliest appearance of such a spurious genealogy was in the 9th century A.D., according to the sources available to us. If one may venture a guess on the etiology of

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3) p. 28.

4) For discussion of 9th century Zoroastrian polemical literature, see H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books* (Oxford, 1943), *passim*. An example of Zoroastrian criticism of Christianity and Judaism will be found in *Skand Gumanik Vicar*, ed. by J. de Menasce (Fribourg in Switzerland, 1945). My translation of the critique of Judaism appeared in JAOS, LXXXIII, 3, pp. 283-294.

the Barukh = Zoroaster legend, it may be that the Christians, particu-
larly in the 9th century when Zoroastrianism was thriving in competi-
tion with other religions [4]), were anxious to show that their messiah
had been predicted by the prophet of ancient Iran, who himself was
identical with an ancient Israelite scribe. Thus both Judaism and
Zoroastrianism were precursers of Christianity. Perhaps the legend
arose as part of the exegetical tradition on Matthew, as the sources
actually would suggest. But whether the genealogy is of historical, or
exegetical origin, it certainly cannot be ascribed on the basis of evidence
now before us to other than Christian theologians.

In fact, the Jews' "spiritual genealogy" for Zoroaster had no
relationship whatever to Barukh b. Neriah. It was based on the Tower
of Babylon legend. Zoroaster was originally known as Nimrod, or
identified with Ham, according to Professor Louis Ginzberg. [5]) This
Jewish view was, moreover, found among the Church Fathers as
well, according to Ginzberg. Thus the 9th century Christian genealogy
differed from the earlier patristic tradition, as well as from that
found in Jewish agadah.

Ginzberg offers a highly implausible explanation of how Zoroaster
came to be identified by Jews with Barukh b. Neriah. [6]) I do not
understand why he found it necessary to offer such an explanation,
since in no place does he cite, nor have I found cited, a Jewish *source*
which identifies Barukh with Zoroaster. Nonetheless, his explanation
is as follows: a Jewish tradition identified Barukh with Ebed-Melekh,
an Ethiopian (Jer. 38 : 7f.) Ginzberg says that the Jewish tradition is
undoubtedly connected with the Christian-Arabic legend about Baruch
and Zoroaster. The connection is by no means clear, for as I have said,
Jewish tradition contains absolutely no hint of such an identification,
while it is at the heart of the Syriac-Christian and later Arabic
traditions. In any case, Ginzberg argues that in the Clementine
Recognitions (4.27) Zoroaster was believed to be descended from Ham.
According to Gen. 10.6, the Ethiopians were likewise descended from

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5) *Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia 1947) V, 150-1, n. 54, and 200-1, n. 83.
6) "Baruch — In Arabic-Christian Legend", *Jewish Encyclopedia* II, 549.
Ginzberg there cites Gottheil and Jackson. But in his article "Baruch — In
Rabbinical Literature" (*ibid.*) Ginzberg cites no Jewish source which identifies
Barukh with Zoroaster. I therefore fail to understand why he found it *at all*
necessary to relate the Jewish tradition which identifies Barukh with Ebed-
Melekh with that Christian-Arabic tradition identifying him with Zoroaster.

Ham. Therefore, we are supposed to conclude that

$$Barukh = Ebed\text{-}Melekh, \text{ a son of Ham}$$
$$Zoroaster = A \text{ son of Ham}$$

Therefore   Barukh = Zoroaster.

Such reasoning is on the face of it rather difficult. Ginzberg adds that the Persians believed that Zoroaster was translated into heaven, and Jews believed that Ebed-Melekh was translated into heaven. We are apparently expected to conclude that Zoroaster therefore is one and the same as Ebed-Melekh, who elsewhere is identified as Barukh, and therefore Barukh and Zoroaster were believed to have been one and the same.

So far, as we know, however, the Jews never identified Zoroaster with Barukh b. Neriah, and no Jewish source reveals such an identification. Zoroaster was believed, as I said above, to have been identical with Nimrod, or with Ham.

IN MEMORIAM OF
PROF. HIDEO KISHIMOTO[1])

In the evening of 25th January 1964, I hastened to the Tokyo
University Hospital, but when I arrived, it was just after you had
passed away. I was led to the death bed to say final "Farewell" to you.
Your countenance was serene, beautiful and thoroughly peaceful, which
strongly impressed me. I somehow remembered the phrase which
Prof. M. Anezaki, our teacher and your father-in-law, repeated at the
time of his retirement from the University of Tokyo, i.e. "Katam
karanium" .This phrase echoed in my ear, and I could not leave your
bedside.

You were really active, and carried out many important works. Your
activities for the last ten years since you had the fatal disease, in
particular, were beyond human power, and they exactly made even the
demons beat retreat. Scholastically, you made many research studies,
and published them. Your activities covered academic field, religious
circles and also broad cultural and communication fields where you
always played a leading role. The sphere of your work was not
restrained in Japan alone ,but extended overseas, and every year you
made a trip abroad once or twice, to promote cultural exchange of the

world. In fact, the fatal change in your condition which was directly connected with your passing away, took place last October while you were in Washington D.C. attending the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.

In the last four years of your life you also accomplished a great and difficult job of reconstructing the Tokyo University Library as the Head Librarian. You put forth all of your energy in modernizing the Library, and were never afraid of shortening your life because of this hard work. On 9th November 1963 the Library celebrated the completion of the reconstruction work, and presented its remodeled features to the public ,but it turned out to be the last occasion on which you were formally present.

You often used such radical words as "to stake my life on", "to clash with the work ,or person)" or "to win the victory over the work", etc. There may be some who felt it rather unnatural to hear you use such words, and some might even have taken them cynically. You never were a radical person. It was after you got the disease that you began to say, "I would like to be a man who can fight," "I will fight!" This well shows your amiable and affable personality. In spite of your such gentle personality, you kept on using radical expressions, and it was because you had firm determined will and attitude towards life and work.

Indeed, we watched you, in utter anxiety and worries, coming from the operating room with white bandage oozed with blood, and going direct to the University or to various meetings. However it was repeated every now and then until our worries became rather paralyzed.

You told me, however, that you were always threatened by the thought of your life terminated, and dealt with each case everyday thinking that "the end might come today." Deep should have been your inner pain. I remember you once told me that you were consoled and cheered by your wife, and your suffering was pacified by her.

Kishimoto, you have really done it well. With a great inner pain which would have beaten anybody down, you accomplished such a lot. Great indeed is our respect when we think of your strenuous efforts and wil power.

After your graduation you stayed with the University of Tokyo to continue your studies, and helped arrange the 25th Anniversary of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Tokyo. The

Japanese Association for Religious Studies was established on that
occasion in 1930. The Association now has the history of 33 years,
during which period you were eleceted as its President twice, and
vigorously worked to strengthen the foundation, to develop its scheme,
and to improve the research set-up. The remarkable progress of the
Association, of which we can rightly be proud not only in Japan but
to the whole world, should be largely attributed to your efforts. What
I should especially mention here is the Ninth International Congress for
the History of Religions which was held in Tokyo under the auspices of
the Japanese Association for Religious Studies. You were the General
Secretary of this event, and but in its preparatory period and during
the Congress, you presided over all the plans and procedures, and led
it to a great success.

This International Congress proved to be the occasion to draw the
interest of Western scholars to the Orient and to religions in the Orient,
and the Japanese Association of Religious Studies were entrusted with
the task of guiding religious studies in the Oriental countries and
also to promote them. The Afro-Asian Group of the International
Association for the History of Religions was established on this same
occasion of the Ninth International Congress in Tokyo in 1958 as an
organization to steadily carry out this mission. The Afro-Asian Group
directly belonged to the Headquarters of the I.A.H.R., and you were
asked to be the Chairman of this newly born A. A. Group. In 1962, at
the request of the Headquarters of the I.A.H.R., you, as the Chairman
of the A. A. Group, made a research trip to Southeast Asian countries,
and brought back many invaluable reports on the actual situations in
these areas.

On behalf of the Japanese Association of Religious Studies, and also
on behalf of the International Association of History of Religions, if
I may be allowed to represent the latter, I herewith beg to offer our
inmost condolence and express our deepest appreciation for the great
work you have done for us.

The religious studies in Japan were initiated by Prof. M. Anezaki
who established the chair of religious studies in the University of
Tokyo. Since then the tradition of liberal scientific studies without
prejudice and conventionalism has well been observed. You inherited
this principle, and further systematized religious studies and developed
them. Your primary interest was in the field of psychology, but later

the sphere of your studies was extended to include such subjects as religious functions or shapes in cultural field at large. The research of the mountain worship was among many of the highly recognized field studies which you undertook with your students.

It may be true that you have not completed all of your studies, but they may be succeeded by your prominent disciples. It may also be true that the projects you planned, the library remodeling being one of them, have not been fully accomplished yet. But the fresh air you instilled has already started to give great influence to everywhere around.

As the Director of the Institute of Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University, and the International Institute for the Study of Religions, you worked out the means of enhancing international cultural exchange. You placed them on the beam, and they are now making steady development in the right direction. Other projects you contemplated for the international research and cultural exchange will also be carried out by your successors.

Mrs. Miyo Kishimoto, your beloved wife whom you respected so much, is well, and two fine sons of yours are proceeding on their own ways respectively.

Kishimoto, you may consider your-life work has just been half-completed, but what you have done shall ever be alive among us. We, and the cultural history of Japan too, shall long remember you, together with your noble personality, so pure and bright like a gem.

Teruji Ishizu

President of Japanese Association
for Religious Studies
President of Tohoku University

IN MEMORIAM OF

KÁROLY MARÓT 1885-1963

Am 27. October 1963. ist in Budapest der bekannte ungarische Religionshistoriker, K. Marót, ordentliches Mitglied der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, emeritierter Professor der alten Geschichte an der Universität Budapest, Präsident der ungarischen Gesellschaft für Altertumskunde, Mitglied des Exekutivkomitees von I.A.H.R. in seinem 79. Lebensjahre gestorben. Sein Ableben bedeutet einen schwer ersetzbaren Verlust, sein reger Forschersinn und seine liebenswürdige Gestalt aber hinterliess einen tiefen, unverwischbaren Eindruck in allen, die ihn persönlich oder auch nur durch seine immer anregenden, gedankvollen Arbeiten kennenzulernen die Gelegenheit hatten.

K. Marót war eigentlich klassischer Philologe, besonders ein Homerforscher, und zwar einer der besten seiner Zeit. Er hat aber die Religionsgeschichte bei weitem nicht als einen Nebenzweig seiner vielseitigen Tätigkeit angesehen. Im Gegenteil, die religionsgeschichtliche Betrachtungsweise hat alle seine Werke mit einer inneren Notwendigkeit durchdrungen. Als er im Jahre 1948 seine Homerforschungen in einem bündigen Büchlein zusammenfasste, hat er selbst mit vollem Recht festgestellt: „Vor vierzig Jahren habe ich meine Laufbahn mit Homer angefangen, und wenn ich inzwischen scheinbar auf entlegene, fremde Gegende herumschweifte, hat dennoch mich immer Homer angespornt, zu ihm habe ich alles getragen, was ich anderswo gelernt habe." Wir können dieselbe Behauptung auf seine letzten 15 Jahre ausdehnen, und besonders auf sein Hauptwerk „Die Anfänge der griechischen Literatur", worin er im Jahre 1956 den kühnen Versuch die Voraussetzungen, sogar die Vorläufer der homerischen Dichtung aufzuhellen wagte, und dessen erster Teil seit 1960 auch in erweiterter deutschen Bearbeitung zur Verfügung steht.

„Was ich anderswo gelernt habe" — das gilt eben nicht in der letzten Linie der Religionsgeschichte. Es hat kaum ein anderer so vieles aus den Aufschlüssen der vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte zur Erklärung Homers brauchbar gemacht. Man muss aber gleich hinzufügen, dass auch wenige so wertvolles aus Homer herausgehend zur griechischen und allgemeinen Religionsgeschichte beigetragen haben, wie er. Diesbezüglich kommen vor allem die vergleichenden Studien in Betracht, die er unter dem Titel „Homerus Comparatus" von 1913 an

mit ihren zahlreichen „Addenda ad Homerum Comparatum" zusammen Jahrzehnte lang in der ungarischen Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Philologie veröffentlicht hat und die — immer je eine homerische Stelle beleuchtend — auf Grund eines fleissig zusammengestellten ethnographischen Materials solche interessante Fragen behandeln, wie z.B. die rituelle Nacktheit, die bei dem Essen zu bewahrende Stille, die Vorstellung, die die Eroberung einer befestigten Stadt mit der Erwerbung einer Jungfrau gleichstellt; Reichtum und Methode dieser Beobachtungen ist aus dem in deutscher Fassung vorliegenden Aufsatze „Der Eid als Tat" (1924) ersichtlich, der ausdrücklich als ein Kapitel des „Homerus Comparatus" gemeint ist und vielleicht zu den am häufigsten angeführten Schriften des Verfassers zählt. Eine Homer-Stelle bildet den Ausgangspunkt zum „Kronos und die Titanen" (1932), wo Vorhomerisches in Religion und Dichtung aufgezeigt wird (weitergeführt, auch die orientalischen Parallelen berücksichtigend, in „Die Trennung von Himmel und Erde", 1951). Wie sich die epische Poesie — sie zum Teil ablehnend, bzw. verfeinernd — zu religiösen Vorstellungen ihrer Vor- und Umwelt verhält, wird prinzipiell in der Zusammenfassung „Zur religionsgeschichtlichen Wertung Homers" (1925) klargestellt (ergänzt in „Homerus expurgans", 1959).

Es versteht sich aber von selbst, dass dieser Nachruf nicht alle Ergebnisse der unermüdlichen Tätigkeit des Hingeschiedenen aufzählen kann; seine Bibliographie umfasst ja etwa 300 Titel kleinerer oder grösserer, aber immer seinen originellen Geist beweisender Aufsätze oder Diskussionsbeiträge. Es ist vielleicht mehr angebracht, kurz noch darauf hinzuweisen, wie sich bei ihm die ganze homerische Frage ins Religionsgeschichtliche umsetzte. Er hat die Ansicht vertreten, dass die epische Dichtung — wie die Poesie überhaupt — tief im Magischen wurzelt, in diesem Sinne werden Erzählungszauber, magischer Katalog, mythische Gestalten wie Musen, Sirenen, Chariten, sogar die Entstehungsgeschichte des homerischen Versbaus im allgemeinen, insbesondere mancher gereimten Formel usw. bewertet. Dies alles mag einem, der mehr das bewusst Künstlerische in Ilias und Odyssee zu bewundern geneigt ist, manchmal schon etwas überbetont zu erscheinen, dass aber seine Ausführungen wenn auch nicht immer beruhigend, dennoch — was noch mehr — zur weiteren Forschung auffordern wirken, wird niemand bestreiten, der einmal im Banne seiner ungeheuren Gelehrsamkeit stand.　　　Imre Trencsényi-Waldapfel

BULLETIN

STUDY CONFERENCE OF THE I.A.H.R. STRASBOURG (FRANCE) SEPTEMBER 1964

The Study Conference itself was preceded by a semi-official meeting of the Executive Board of the I.A.H.R. in the University of Strasbourg on September 17th 1964. Although this meeting could not take official measures, certain decisions had to be taken. First of all the I.A.H.R. had to replace the Honorary Treasurer, Dr. W. A. Rijk (Netherlands). During the gathering of the Executive Board Dr. Rijk received an official document, in which the Association's gratitude for his work during the last fifteen years was expressed. During the next meeting of the Executive Board Dr. H. J. van Lier (Netherlands) will be appointed to the treasurership. Secondly the Executive Board approved of Professor Bleeker's proposal to promote Dr. L. J. R. Ort (up to now Assistant to the Secretary General) to Deputy Secretary General of the I.A.H.R. in order to enable him to deal with certain questions on his own responsibility.

In the third place two new national groups were provisionally affiliated to the I.A.H.R.: the Austrian and the Finnish Association for the History of Religions. The representatives of these two groups will take their seats in the Executive Board during the next official meeting.

Moreover the Executive Board discussed the publications of the I.A.H.R., viz. NUMEN, supplements to NUMEN, and the Bibliography. Attention was paid to the future Congresses (particularly to the next Congress of the I.A.H.R. in Claremont, California, 1965) and to our relation to UNESCO.

Finally the Executive Board provisionally affiliated a non-national group, viz. the Anthropos-Institut, Switzerland.

The Study Conference was attended by 72 scholars. The intention of this Conference was formulated during the Marburg Congress in 1960: to enable European scholars to meet each other in Europe between 1960 and 1970, as the Congress in 1965 will most likely not be attended by many historians of religion from Europe. This meant that the Strasbourg Study Conference was more or less an experimental undertaking. The list of participants proved, however, that the experiment was going to be successful. Entries came from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, England, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.S.A.

Another most important characteristic of the Study Conference was the intention to reach a certain scientific level. In order to secure this level the Secretariat of the I.A.H.R. invited the scholars who were to read a paper during the Study Conference. As a result of this effort 28 lectures on the general theme "The Rites of Initiation" were delivered.

Here we should also touch upon the fruitful cooperation between the Secretariat in Amsterdam and the Strasbourg Organizing Comittee. Especially the continuous activities of Professor Dr. M. Simon and his secretary, Mrs. Bockel, should be recorded. Thanks to these mutual efforts the Study Conference of the I.A.H.R. was successfully opened in the evening of September 17th 1964.

The Opening Ceremony took place in the Salle Pasteur of the University of Strasbourg. The participants were welcomed by Professor Simon, who also spoke on behalf of the Mayor of the City of Strasbourg, and of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Strasbourg. The President of the I.A.H.R., Professor Dr. G. Widengren, officially opened the Study Conference. He expressed his sincere wishes for the success of the Conference. Next Professor Bleeker was called upon to speak. His talk replaced the general lecture by Professor Dr. M. Eliade (U.S.A.), who was unfortunately prevented from coming by an unexpected illness. Professor Bleeker dealt with the general theme, about which he made a number of introductory remarks. He handled the subject in a phenomenological way, and also gave certain examples of rites of initiation. At the end of the Opening Ceremony Dr. Ort announced some alterations in the programme.

During the following reception the advantages of a rather limited number of participants became manifest. It was a very good opportunity to meet each other. Thus, from the very beginning contacts between the participants were very lively. Under these circumstances the scholars from sixteen countries were able to discuss their common points of interest.

On Friday September 18th the Conference met in two sections in the morning. Section I discussed three papers. Dr. M. Vereno (Austria) read his paper about "Einweihung und spirituelle Nachfolge". Dr. M. Mehauden (Belgium) dealt with "Le secret central de l'initiation aux mystères d'Eleusis". Dr. E. M. Mendelsohn (England) called attention to "Initiation and the paradox of power: a sociological interpretation". This section was presided by Professor Dr. K. Kerényi (Switzerland). Section II also heard three lectures. Prof. Dr. S. G. F. Brandon (England) described "The time factor in Primitive Christian Baptism". Dr. R. A. Barclay (England) attempted to answer the question "New Testament Baptism — an external or internal rite?". Prof. Dr. L. E. Keck (U.S.A.) reviewed "Christian gnostic interpretations of John the Baptist". Prof. Dr. M. Simon (France) was in the chair.

In the afternoon the Sections I and II were combined. The discussions were presided by Prof. Dr. H. Ludin Jansen (Norway). Prof. Dr. A. Brelich (Italy) carefully considered "Questioni terminologiche nel campo dello studio dei fenomeni 'iniziatici' ". Prof. Dr. U. Bianchi (Italy) digressed on "Initiation, mystère et gnose".

Friday evening all participants of the Conference were the guests of the Strasbourg Corporation during a reception given in the historical townhall. Prof. Dr. G. Widengren expressed the gratitude of all scholars present.

On Saturday September 19th two sections were formed again. Prof. Dr. J. Duchesne Guillemin (Belgium) presided Section I. Prof. Dr. A. Antweiler (Germany) lectured about "Religion als Einweihung". Dr. A. Basu (England) explained the ceremonies of "Dīkśā". This subject was treated in a special way by Prof. Dr. D. J. Hoens (Netherlands) in his paper "Dīkśā in tantric Hinduism". Section II listened to Prof. Dr. D. Flusser (Israel), who described "Die Berufung der Zwölf und eine Rolle vom Toten Meer". Next Prof. Dr. K. Czegledy (Hungary) spoke about "Das sakrale Königtum bei den Steppenvölkern". Finally Prof. Dr. H. Ludin Jansen (Norway) examined "Die Hochzeitsriten im Tobitbuche". Chairman of this section was Prof. Dr. G. Scholem (Israel). In the afternoon a combined session of the Sections I and II was presided by Prof. Dr. Annemarie Schimmel (Germany). Two aspects of Islam with relation to the general theme came up for discussion: Prof. Dr. W. Montgomery Watt (Great Britain) reviewed "Conditions of membership of the Islamic community". Prof. Dr. H. Ringgren (Finland) described "The initiation ceremony of the Bektashi".

On Sunday September 20th a very interesting excursion was planned The participants left Strasbourg by bus early in the morning. The first stop was the beautifully located hill of St. Odile with its ancient church. Lunches were served in a restaurant in the small village of St. Hippolyte. After a magnificent drive the party visited the castle Haut Koenigsbourg. Finally the trip was successfully concluded by a visit to Colmar. There the famous Museum was admired. In the evening the participants returned to Strasbourg after a day full of interest and pleasure.

In the morning of Monday September 21st Section I met to discuss a paper by Dr. P. Gerlitz (Germany) about "Das Fasten als Initiationsritus". Dr. E. Cold (Germany) sketched "Der Weg zur Vollkommenheit nach den Bildern der Mysterienvilla zu Pompeji". This section was presided by Dr. G. Lanczkowski (Germany). Section II met with Dr. M. Vereno (Austria) in the chair. Prof Dr. E. Rochedieu (Switzerland) examined "The psychological meaning of Esoterism". Prof. Dr. H. Hoffmann (Germany) described "Initiation in late Buddhism". Finally Dr. Carmen Blacker (England) explained "Initiation rites in

Japanese Shugendo" with the help of the projection of colourslides. In
the afternoon a combined session of the two sections paid attention
to two religions of the Ancient Near East: Prof. Dr. C. J. Bleeker
(Netherlands) gave some reflections on "Initiation in Ancient Egypt",
and Prof. Dr. J. Duchesne Guillemin (Belgium) illustrated the "Sym-
bolisme de l'initiation dans le Mazdéisme". This meeting was presided
over by Prof. Dr. R. C. Zaehner (England).

The evening of Monday September 21st was devoted to a reception
given by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Strasbourg. This
ceremony took place in the Hôtel du Rectorat. Prof. Dr. J. Duchesne
Guillemin (Belgium) gave an address of thanks on behalf of the parti-
cipants.

During the last day of the Conference all lectures were attended by
the Sections I and II. In the morning Prof. Dr. H. Ringgren (Fin-
land) was in the chair. The first lecture was held by Prof. Dr. K.
Kerényi (Switzerland) about "Die Voraussetzungen der Einweihung
in Eleusis". Next Dr. H. H. Presler (India) dealt with "Hindu-
Moslim participation in common rituals of informal initiation". This
lecture was illustrated by a film. Finally Prof. Dr. D. Zahan (France)
reviewed the "Terminologie Bambara concernant l'initiation". The dis-
cussions in the afternoon were presided by Prof. Dr. K. A. H. Hid-
ding (Netherlands). Dr. G. Lanczkowski (Germany) called attention
to "Die Sprache von Zuiva als Initiationsmittel". The last paper of
the Conference was read by Prof. Dr. M. Philonenko (France) about
"Initiation et mystère dans 'Joseph et Asèneth' ".

On Tuesday September 22nd the Study Conference was officially
closed in the Salle Pasteur in the University of Strasbourg. The Secre-
tary General of the I.A.H.R., Prof. Dr. C. J. Bleeker, read his report
on the activities of the Association during the years 1960-1964. In this
report the Secretary General honoured the memory of two officers of
the I.A.H.R.. On January 25th 1964 Prof. Dr. H. Kishimoto passed
away. In him the Association possessed a very devoted chairman of
the I.A.H.R. Afro-Asian Group Secretariate. On October 28th 1963
Prof. Dr. K. Marót died. This distinguished scholar represented
Hungary in the Executive Board of the I.A.H.R.. Professor Bleeker
also dealt with the following points in his report: Executive Board;
the I.A.H.R. Afro-Asian Group Secretariate; Finances; Congresses;
Publications; Extension; Unesco; and the I.A.H.R. Secretariat. The
President of the I.A.H.R., Prof. Dr. G. Widengren, gave a survey of
the Study Conference. He mentioned some lectures, which were given,
and attempted to draw certain conclusions from the work of this Con-
ference. It was evident (from the papers) that many aspects of the
theme "Rites of Initiation" attracted our attention. Moreover, certain
general elements of the subject were dealt with. Methodological, pheno-
menological, sociological, and psychological aspects were under discus-

sion thanks to several eminent papers. Moreover, an impressive series of lectures shed light on the rites of initiation in many religions. Successively the following religions were reviewed: Ancient Greece; Christianity; Gnosticism; Hinduism; Judaism; Islam; Buddhism; Ancient Egypt; Ancient Iran; Ancient Maya Religion; and Primitive Religions. Nevertheless certain elements and subjects did not receive attention, e.g. Manichaeism and the meaning of the circumcision. Apart from these small gaps, it can be stated that this Study Conference dealt with its general theme in a most profound way. The Conference was a complete success. The participants were able to compare their opinions during the discussions after the lectures. The thoroughness of these exchanges of views was considerably stimulated by the rather small number of participants. In all probability our Association will continue to organize similar Study Conferences in the future.

At the end of the Closing Ceremony Prof. Dr. U. Bianchi voiced the feelings of gratitude among the participants. He mentioned the preparations made by the Secretariat in Amsterdam and by the Local Committee in Strasbourg. Moreover, he was grateful for the opportunities offered to the participants to get in touch with each other.

Dr. L. J. R. ORT
Deputy Secretary General
of the I.A.H.R.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS: ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AND THE MUSLIM-CHISTIAN DIALOGUE

BY

ISMA'IL RAGI A. AL FARUQI

(Continuation)

III. The Significance of History of Religions for the Christian-Muslim Dialogue

These two illustrations have not been picked up at random. Together, they constitute not only the common grounds between the three world religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but equally the most important fields of contention between them. And of the three religions, Christianity and Islam are here perhaps the most involved. The work that awaits the historian of religions in these two areas will contribute decisively towards constructive dialogue between these religions in addition to re-establishing a very important segment of the religious history of the majority of mankind.

The Old Testament is not only Hebrew scripture (or the divine law revealed to Moses and the nationalist history of an extremely particularist people) nor only Christian scripture (or, according to the dominant *Heilsgeschichte* school, the inspired record of God's saving acts in history culminating in the Incarnation). It is also Islamic scripture, inasmuch as it is the partial record of the history of prophecy, and hence of divine revelation. [32]) Indubitably, every one of these religions can point to something in the Old Testament substantiating its claim. But the whole truth cannot be on the side of any. Furthermore no religion is, by definition, equipped to transcend its own categories so as to establish the historical truth of the whole which, as a religion, it interprets in its own way in order to suit its own purpose. Only the historian of religions measures to the task who would relate

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32) Faruqi, I. R. al, "A Comparison of the Islamic and Christian Approaches to Hebrew Scripture," *The Journal of Bible and Religion,* Vol. XXXI, October, 1963, No. 4, pp. 283-293.

the ideas of the Old Testament to the history of the Hebrews as an-
cient history has been able to reconstruct it, holding in *époché* both
the Christian and the Islamic understanding of Hebrew scripture. But
we may not make total abstraction of the Hebrew understanding be-
cause the Old Testament is, after all, a Hebrew scripture written in
Hebrew by the Hebrews and for the Hebrews. The contents however
are not strictly speaking all Hebrew materials. The ideological over-
tones of the scripture, namely, those set in the books of Genesis and
Exodus, are Hebrew versions of Semitic themes which belong to all
Semites. Islam is a Semitic religion whose formative years were spent
in Arabia, the cradle of all things Semitic. It is natural that the Islamic
version of these themes is another version of ideas which are much
older than "J". The Islamic claim may not therefore be brushed aside
as external to the matter in question. For just as Christianity is "a new
Israel," Islam is "an other Israel" legitimately giving a version of
Semitic origins which are as much, if not more, its own as that of the
Hebrews.

Secondly, the examination by history of religions of the formative
centuries of Christianity is equally involving for Islam. Islam is not
a foreigner here. Islam is Christianity inasmuch as it is a moment in
the developing Semitic consciousness of which the Hebrew, Judaic
and Christian religions were other moments. That is why Islam re-
jected neither the Hebrew Prophets nor Jesus but, recognizing the
divine status of their missions, reacted to the assertions of Jews and
Christians regarding them. Although the Prophet Muhammad and his
first Muslim followers were personally neither Jews nor Christians,
yet their ideas were in every respect internal to the Jewish and
Christian traditions, affirming, denying and in some cases transcend-
ing what Jews and Christians have held to be or not to be the faith
of Adam, of Abraham, of Noah, of Jacob, of Moses and of Jesus. The
"Christianity" which Islam is, therefore, is an alternative to Orthodox
Christianity; but it is as much Christianity as Orthodox Christianity
is. Neither is Islam's Christianity an alternative posed *in abstracto*, as
a discursive contradiction or variation, but *in concreto*, a historical
alternative. Islam too did not come about except "in the fulness of
time" but this fulness consisted in the attempt by Orthodox Christianity
to wipe out the Christian alternatives to itself. In the first century of
Islam, the greatest majority of its adherents had been Christians in dis-

agreement with Orthodox Christianity concerning what is and what is not the revelation and religion of Jesus Christ. Islam is certainly a Christian revolution with as much connection to Jesus as Orthodox Christianity can claim. We should not be misled by the fact that the Islamic revolution within Christianity reached farther than what it had originally set out to accomplish. The fact is that Islam was no more new than the religion of Jesus was in respect to the religion of the Jews. The continuity of Jesus' prophetic thought with the spiritualizing and internalizing thought of Jeremiah and the pietism of Amos and Micah is recognized and confirmed by Islam. Jesus' ethic of intent is, in Islam, the *sine qua non* of morality. Jesus' notions of the unity of the Father, of His fatherhood to all men, and of his love-of-neighbour — in short, his ethical universalism, is not only honoured by Islam but rediscovered as essence of that Semitic consciousness which chose to migrate from Ur as well as from Egypt. [33]) On the other hand, the opposition of Jesus to Judaic particularism is universalized in Islam as the opposition of the universal brotherhood under the moral law to all particularisms except the Arabic Qur'an which is the expression of this opposition. Therefore, there can be no doubt that Semitic Christianity had itself developed into Islam, and that the latter's contention with Orthodox Christianity is only a backward look within the same stream from a point further down its course — in short, a domestic recoupment within the one and same Semitic consciousness itself.

Despite this domestic nature of the contention between Islam and Christianity, neither Christianity nor Islam is really capable of going over its categories in the examination of the historical facts involved. Oly a complete suspension of the categories of both, such as history of religions is capable of, holds any promise. The historical truth involved must be discovered and established. If, when that is done, either Christianity or Islam continues to hold to its old versions and views, it would do so only dogmatically, not critically. And we may hope that under the impact of such reestablishment of the formative history of Semitic consciousness in its Judaic, Christian and Islamic moments, the road would be paved for some dogma-free spirits, loyal to that consciousness, to prepare the larger segment of mankind for meeting

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33) For a detailed analysis of the circumstances of these two migrations, see this author's *On Arabism: Vol. I, 'Urubah and Religion,* Djambatan, Amsterdam, 1962, pp. 18-28.

the challenge of the world-community. So too, such reestablishment
of the history of Semitic consciousness makes possible a new recon-
struction of Christian religious thought which does not suffer from
dependence upon epistemology. From the days of Albert the Great,
attempts at reconstruction have been made on the basis of the philoso-
phy that is currently in vogue. That is why every systematic theology,
or reconstruction, fell down with the fall of the epistemological theory
on which it was based. That is why the current systematic theologies
will also fall as soon as a new epistemology rises and establishes a
reputation for itself. What is needed is a reconstruction "supra-
philosophies," which does its work within the Orthodox doctrine with-
out external aids, by reinvestigating its formative period. This doctrine,
as the Orthodoxy itself holds, is largely the work of men, of Christians,
of majority-resolutions or otherwise of synods and councils, whose
"inspired" status ought to be once more investigated. A reconstruction
that does not reopen the questions resolved at the Pre-Nicene Synods,
at Nicaea (325), at Constantinople (381), at Ephesus (431), and at
Chalcedon (451) will not answer the demands that have been made by
Muslim converts from Christianity and are now beginning to be heard
from the more recent Christian converts in Asia and Africa. It is not
surprising that voices like that of the Rev. U. Ba Hmyin made itself
heard at the last Assembly of the World Council of Churches at New
Delhi calling for a reconstruction of Christian doctrine as radical as
the Hellenic transvaluation was of Semitic Palestinian Christianity. [34]
What is surprising is the fact that the World Council never responded

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34) "When Christian witnesses moved out of the world of Jewish thought and
understanding into the wider world of Greek language, thought and life, it was
one of the most profound changes and crises of the Church. Greek thought,
forms, language and modes of apprehension were taken over, and have since
become part of the very life of the Church. These have become such a part of
Christian theology, that it is easy to see why some Asian people think that the
Christian Gospel is intimately related to Western man. But now the Gospel has
taken root in Asia. The question before us is: Is it possible to make the radical
break from purely Western ways of thought, to do in Asia what first-century
Christians did in the Greek world? It is possible to utilize structures, ways of
thought and life which are Asian even as Greek expressions have been used?
This is not a simple question. It is often asked, if this was not a corruption of
the Christian message as expressed in its Hebrew forms. But some such use was
both possible and necessary for the Church to go about its missionary task. Such
an effort seems both possible and necessary today. And it might well prove to be
the greatest challenge that the Church has faced since the transition from Jewish
soil to Greek soil was made. If theology is to be ecumenical it must be able to

to this formidable challenge. [35]) The greater trouble, however, is not
the impending doctrinal separation of Afro-Asian Christianity from
Western Christianity, but the increasing impatience with or lethargy
to this Western doctrine on the part of lay Western Christians. The
soul of the modern Christian is unmoved by the doctrinaire assertions
of *Heilsgeschichte,* of the fallenness of man, of the trinitarian concep-
tion of divinity, of vicarious suffering, of ontic Redemption, of the
elected and exclusivist status of the Church. What is needed is a gen-
uinely new rebirth. And it is a rebirth which must begin by saying
a resolute "No!" to Irenaeus's claim that " ... Those who wish to
discern the truth ... [must do so in] the tradition and creed of the
greatest, the most ancient church, the church known to all men, which
was founded and set up at Rome by the two most glorious apostles,
Peter and Paul. For with this church, because of its position of leader-
ship and authority, must needs agree every church, that is, the faith-

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utilize and confront systems and ways of thought and life other than those
known as Western. No theology will deserve to be called ecumenical in the
coming days which ignores Asian structures. It may use the term ecumenical, but
it will really be parochial and Western only." (Assembly Documents, No. 1,
November 19, 1961, New Delhi) It is noteworthy that this Christian Asian
leader regards the Roman-Hellenic interpretation of Palestinian Christianity "a
profound change" as well as "a corruption of the [original] Christian message."

35) As far as this author could gather, whether from the papers of the World
Council of Churches Third Assembly at Delhi or from his interviews with a
number of delegates to the Assembly, Rev. Hmyin's message passed "like water
on the back of a duck." And in the report of the East Asian Section of the
Theological Commissions to the Fourth World Conference on Faith and Order
(Montreal, 1963) the formidable issue of Rev. Hmyin was neither discussed nor
given statement in the findings. Indeed, the whole field of "Christian Thought
and Theology" was merely listed as one of the "areas calling for a greater effort
towards indigenization," as well as put under the express condition that such
indigenization would not involve "diminution of Catholic truth." A statement of
this "catholic truth" (obviously written by the secretary of the East Asian Sec-
tion, Rev. J. R. Fleming, a Western Christian, for his East Asian colleagues) was
entered in the Findings of the Montreal, 1963 meeting, in which we read:
"Christian worship is the glad response of the people of God to the gracious
redemptive activity of God the Father, and Christ the Son, through the Holy
Spirit. Christian Worship therefore is both Christological and Trinitarian. To
say it is Christological means that the central act in Christian worship is the
proclamation of the good news of God's redemption and re-creation of humanity
in Christ ... This Christological worship is both individual and corporate, but
the primary emphasis is on the corporate, since God's purpose in Christ is to
create a new body of people, Christ's body. In Christian worship, therefore,
man ... becomes a part of the new humanity in whom God's purposes in creation

ful everywhere . . ." [36]) What the Christian participant in the Semitic stream of consciousness needs is to outgrow the unchristian fixation of Irenaeus which asserts: "There is now no need to seek among others the truth which we can easily obtain from the church [of Rome]. For the Apostles have lodged all that there is of the truth with her, as with a rich bank, holding back nothing . . . All the rest are thieves and robbers . . . The rest . . . we must regard with suspicion, either as heretics and evil-minded; or as schismatics, puffed up and complacent; or again as hypocrites, acting thus for the sake of gain and vain glory."[37]) For this, history of religions must teach the Christian anew, against the wisdom of Tertullian, [38]) that Apostolic Succession — even if its historicity is granted — can be an argument only if the heirloom is biological or a thing that can be given and taken without suffering change; that since the "heirloom" is ideational, and in the absence of a Jesus-Qur'an frozen verbatim with the categories under which it can be understood as it must have been by its mouthpiece, the decisions of the Church of Rome stand on a par with the pronouncements of a Priscilla-Miximilla team, and those of Irenaeus on a par with those of a Cerinthus.

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are being fulfilled. His life is defined now in relation to God in Christ, and in terms of *leitourgia* and *latreia* . . . To say Christian worship is Trinitarian means that it is offered to God in the light of this revelation of himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Because God is known in Christ, He is known as creator, for whose gracious purposes in creation men are now reclaimed and redeemed . . ." etc. (*Faith and Order Findings,* Montreal, 1963, SCM Press, Ltd., London, 1963, Report of the Theological Commission, pp. 32, 39) Obviously this is a report of 1963 Western Christian thought which the Asian representatives have been "buffaloed" into countersigning. Or, if the voice of Rev. Hmyin is representative, however little, of Asian-African thought, the foregoing is a report of what the parent Western churches of 1963 had wished the Asian churches to regard as "Catholic truth."

36) Irenaeus, *Against Heresies,* III, iii, 1.

37) *Ibid.,* III, iii, 1; IV, xxvi, 2.

38) Tertullian, *De praescriptione Haereticorum,* xx-xxi.

IN RESPONSE TO DR. FARUQI

BY

BERNARD E. MELAND

Let me say at the outset that I share the concern which I detect be-
hind the statements in Dr. Faruqi's paper. One senses here a crying
out for truth and integrity in religious faith, for instruments of
scholarship that will enable discerning men of faith to attain such
integrity, and the hope that all religions, but particularly those of the
Semitic strand, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, might be brought into
a closer bond on the basis of such scholarly inquiry.

At times it seems that all Dr. Faruqi means to plead for is an over-
arching fund of tested historical facts about the history of each of the
several religions which will stand over against every biased, dogmatic
tradition that would color, distort or ignore these facts in order to
concur with its vested interests. This was precisely the aim of the
religionsgeschichtliche Schule of Christian historians in which the early
Chicago School participated, or emulated, and to which they made
significant contributions. Many of the facts which Dr. Faruqi men-
tions in his two illustrations toward the end of his paper are explicitly
noted in these writings, *e.g.,* "The genesis and development of that
against which the revolution (of Jesus) came, as well as the genesis
and development of the stream of ideas of which the revolution came
as an apex, as a consummation and crystallization"; "the sifting of the
two streams," distinguishing between nationalistic particularistic und
universal stream; "the relation of Jesus' personal outlook and faith to
Jewish antecedents," particularly that of the Hebrew prophets.

The citing and tracing of these origins and developments, antece-
dents and relationships was the burden of some of those early hand-
books such as J. M. P. Smith's *The Prophet and His Problem, The
Prophets and Their Times,* and S. J. Case's several works, especially
his *Jesus — A New Biography, Social Origins of Christianity* and
The Evolution of Early Christianity, to mention some early studies of
this school. Cf. also Cadbury, H. J., "Jesus and the Prophets." *Journal
of Religion,* Nov., 1925.

Since their time, however, the problem of faith and history has become more acute and troublesome. On the one hand it is not clear just how this fund of historical fact is to be used in correcting the vision of faith, and whether it reaches the level of the faith response at all. Furthermore, and perhaps more important critically, it is not clear to contemporary Christian scholars that *facts,* such as these earlier historians presumed to be disclosing, are really facts of history, and whether in fact, explicit sources or resources exist that will enable the scholar to get at such facts. History, so it seems, strangely and ironically rests back upon documents which turn out to be the reports of faith. And what was taken to be historical data, pure and simple, thus looms as a mirage that may not be taken at face value. This is the haunting spectre which has dominated the horizon of biblical scholarship since Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus,* and the Form Criticism of subsequent years. Some present-days scholars appear to be wriggling out of the dilemmas which these issues have created; but I, for one, have yet to be convinced that this roadblock to historical data has actually been cleared away.

Thus, while I yearn to have the clear-sighted view of historical data that would yield access to the undisputed facts of history which could then serve as a guide or norm for judging the accuracy of all claims of faith, I am by no means as assured as Dr. Faruqi seems to be that such undisputed facts are available to us.

Even so, I would press for pursuing such historical inquiry despite its uphill nature. This I think, is the spirit of disciplined inquiry — a pursuit of truth and fact against all odds; but I would have to do so with more modest aims than the ones to which Dr. Faruqi aspires — not with the messianic hope of a meta-religion, but with a dogged and dedicated concern to wrest from this complexity, some clarity of vision that will enlighten the witness of faith.

But there are indications to suggest that, in saying that "the historian of religions is above all concerned with truth," Dr. Faruqi is pressing for something deeper and more basic than a norm provided by historical facts. Here he does me the honor of suggesting that what I have set forth as man's primordial ground, opens the way for providing a meta-religion, capable of summoning all religions to the truth that underlies and unites them. But at the very point that I appear helpful, I fail the historian of religion, because, while I "seek that reality on

the level which properly belongs to it," I "Identify it in such a way
as to make any knowledge — and hence any methodological use of it
— impossible." What is that way of identifying this underlying reality,
which leads me to failure? It is my reversal of the conventional state-
ment of the ontic relation between primordial reality and its concrete
actualization, thus "becoming the absolute dependence of the universal
to the particular. For this twist," says Faruqi, "no reason is given;
and its net purport is the resolution to recognize only the particular
as given, thus closing the gate to any reliable knowledge of the uni-
versal." (p. 54-55)

Let me try to offer some explanation of this twist:

Why is the primordial universal dependent on the particular? Be-
cause the primordial as given in our life in God conveys the relational
ground of all that exists, but it assumes concrete existence only through
the cultural and individuated structures available to creative events in
any time or place. What I have called primordial, as being the universal
ground in which all men share, and out of which all men have come,
as created events, is a depth of reality in which history is lived, in
which individuated and culturally shaped human lives find their ulti-
macy as a referent beyond each particularization of their cultural
history. In this sense, all men have a primordial sense of their unity
and oneness as children of the living God, which stands in judgment
of their particularizations, as reality stands over against reason, ulti-
macy over immediacies; but this universal ground is not in itself
available to our calculations, or judgments, which can be lifted up and
formulated as a universal measure of all concrete faiths.

Knowledge *of* this universal we do have as lived experience. Know-
ledge *about* it we can have only in the form of an ontological vision of
all men's existence, in so far as we can attribute each such concrete
existence to the creative act of God. This vision, of all men's existence
then follows from a presupposition that all men, regardless of faith or
culture, have their lives in God, and with varying degrees of prehen-
sion, in relation with other men.

Now if Dr. Faruqi means by "meta-religion," simply this kind of
ontological vision issuing from an understanding of the creative act by
which all men came to be, which will serve to express in a structured
and cognitive way what is daily experienced in the history that is lived
within any culture, I should gladly concur. My own abstract under-

standing of man as man in relation to his communal ground, affords
me such a cognitive reminder in giving universality to my under-
standing of the Christian image of man, and of its relation to all other
historic images of man.

But if by meta-religion, Dr. Faruqi means to establish on this basis
a universal religious norm, presumably speaking out of a more authen-
tic and comprehensive grasp of what is implied in all religions, thereby
enabling the comparative historian of religions to distill from each
concrete faith, its universal component, I must demur. For this seems
but to relapse into Enlightenment habits of thought wherein universal
judgments were sought in a rational abstraction, leaving concrete and
historical realities but pale accidents of contingents conditions.

But however this is to be understood, let me see if I can grasp what
Dr. Faruqi means to convey in his suggestive statements where he
undertakes to purge my theory of its "relativist trait."

This reduction of all human knowledge to relativity, to the particular
cultural structure of the subject, says Dr. Faruqi, stems from a "mis-
taking of relationality for relativity."

I would qualify this statement in certain respects: I have not meant
to imply that all human knowledge is relative in the sense that no
universal judgments on any subject can be achieved. All knowledge
does initially arise within a cultural orbit of meaning; and for some
human beings, this cultural enclosure is never dispelled. In so far as
data which the mind concerns itself is sufficiently public and commu-
nicable, a high degree of universal exchange of experience and judg-
ment is possible. The physical sciences have achieved almost univer-
sality in their areas of inquiry and communication. Scientific thinking
as a mode of inquiry has not been universally accepted — East and
West still differ in their responses to it; but wherever scientific
thinking occurs and is accepted, universal judgments are achievable.

However, to the degree that data and the human response to data
involves internal awareness, feeling tone, as well as bodily feelings
that reach to a level of response that escapes conscious awareness, dis-
course about it as well as inquiry into it confronts an almost im-
penetrable barrier. Thus the data of art and religion have been less
amenable to universal judgments than the sciences.

Now to speak of a science of religion or of art is to speak of a
special mode of response to these human creativities. At the outset it

must mean a selective response, concerned only with publicly available data. It is quite possible to achieve a high degree of reliable scientific opinion in this area of inquiry that can serve limited goals — *e.g.,* strategy of dealing with various cultures during war time, or even in times of peace. This provides a kind of functional truth about religions that is useful for ulterior purposes. And it can be quite useful — both for good and for evil ends.

In so far as the historian of religion aspires, as scientific historian, to go beyond the attainment of such functional truth (*i.e.,* knowledge about the public concerns and behaviors of specific religious people which is demonstrably true) he encounters difficulties that stem from the ambiguities that go deep into the texture of existence itself, not to speak of cultural relationships and the relativities they impose.

Now I would be willing to argue for a considerable amount of refinement and discipline in the approach of one human being to another, and of one religious group to another. And I would be willing to hold out for considerable improvement in sensitivity and rapport between discerning, inquiring minds from various religious cultures as they probe the meaning of the religious response in these various concrete situations. And the degree of mutual understanding, sympathetic insight and possible inter-relationship between peoples of different faiths made possible by such explorations would in itself justify the effort to make it. Thus my statements are not to be taken to imply a cynicism about pursuing such a task, or a dogmatic rejection of the effort at the outset. My concern is to avoid the kind of oversimplification, and self-deception, which lay back of Enlightenment efforts at universality in religion, and the kind of universalist dogmatism that characterized men like Voltaire, and which have continued to characterize devotees of a world faith ever since, leaving the mystery and depth of concrete religious faiths wholly uncalculated.

It does not follow that one is forever limited to the fixations of one's cultural nurture, once one is committed to enter upon a negotiation of meanings with a person of another culture. Despite the opaqueness of meaning which each one shares, and the persisting occasions of impasse that periodically arise, any interrelation of various orbits of meaning must give rise to trans-cultural understanding of a sort — that is, a fund of negotiated meanings which stand simultaneously in a relation of fulfilment and judgment toward each of the participating

faiths — fulfilment in the sense that the revelatory insight or affirmation of one's faith, seen in another context of historic experiences, or in relation to comparable revelatory insights under different circumstances, takes on new proportions of meaning and applicability; judgment, in the sense that candid confrontation with the witness of faith from other historical experiences conceivably can shock one into realizing the limited or doctrinaire resolutions or interpretations given to such revelations within experience and history.

The conviction that the realities of faith, consonant with our life in God, underlie, and continually stand in judgment of the meanings we ascribe to such revelatory experiences, implies that truth is always marginally apprehended in any witness of faith. Among disciplined minds participating in such marginal apprehensions a critical exchange of apprehensions and meanings can hopefully yield some degree of clarification or understanding that will stand in judgment of both witnesses of faith. If it is a true negotiation of meaning bent on as full a degree of the truth of actuality as possible, (and not just a grudging compromise of understanding) that which arises out of the exchange will be a new emergent, a new occasion of human understanding transcending the cultural orbits of meaning. I would still recoil from calling it *the truth,* as if to equate this human knowledge with reality itself; but it would be an advance upon culturally and individually limited knowledge, such as each one in his separate enclosures is bound to exemplify.

But now, can we say that our primordial unity is conveyed to us through the structure of our humanity — *i.e.,* through the structural character of ourselves as human beings? This can be conveyed with or without intruding any specific cultural or individuated characteristics. I thought Karl Barth was getting at this in designating our humanity under four aspects: 1) "Openess to another as a human being. 2) Talking and listening to another. 3) Being there for another. 4) Doing all this joyfully."

Now this borders on being a poetic way of speaking of a kind of responsiveness that is peculiarly human and is in contrast to the responsiveness of other structures in nature. Each of these aspects is expressive of the notion of encounter, and presupposes and underlying communal ground — or, if this is too ontological, a propensity toward acting in communal ways.

There may be various ways of presenting this primordial, structural dimension of our humanity. A Christian way of saying it is to speak of our life in God. Perhaps this is suitable for Judaic-Christian-Muslim imagery — for it arises out of the notion of the Creation of man as it appears in the Hebraic myth.

Scientifically peaking, this would point up the specific level of mutations that formed our particular species, and would simply designate "our kind" among the many varieties of *mammals*; e.g., there is a basis here for stressing common ground, common possibilities, common obligations and opportunities — by way of fulfilling or actualizing the evolutionary occasion visited upon us. In Havelock Ellis' words, "Our supreme business in life — not as we made it, but as it was made for us when the world began — is to carry and to pass on as we received it, or better, the sacred lamp of organic being that we bear within us.

This is an affirmation of universalism resting back upon ou primordial beginnings in nature that has motivated much of scientific idealism since the beginning of the modern era and continue to speak forth through modern scientists and publicists like Julian Huxley.

Metaphysically, this primordial universality of man is presented in terms of the process of creativity as it relates to the human structure. While metaphysics is less bound to the cultural idiom than religion, it is more expressive of it than science. For example, Whitehead, in canvassing the possibilities of imagery capable of conveying the metaphysical portrayal of our primordial beginnings, toys with the idea of adopting the Hebraic myth of creation, but rejects it on the grounds that it is too primitive for conveying sophisticated notions of metaphysics, and instead chooses to build upon the Platonic myth. Incidentally, my own variation from Whitehead stems from the fact that I have taken his basic notions and related them to (perhaps should say translated them in terms of) the Hebraic myth of Creation.

Despite this involvement in the cultural idiom, metaphysics generally provides an opening beyond its chosen idiom, thus enabling its structural meaning to be given a different or varied rendering in terms of other idioms, yet conveying much the same basic vision of intelligibility.

The language of religion, especially of theology, is least fitted to speak universally, except in terms that are available or meaningful to the cult or culture in which its particular witness of faith has taken form. This is because its initial focus has always been upon concrete

occasions, demanding release from suffering, frustration or failure; or giving expression to wonder, gratitude, ecstasy, or vital joy. The universal reference has taken the form of a projection beyond the particularizations of these occasions; it has not arisen out of a universal judgment or proposition. For example, the myths of Creation in Hebraic history follow upon the redemptive experiences of the Exodus. God acted in the particular events of Hebraic history, and from these mighty acts, generalizations presuming to be of a universal character were deduced.

The projected universalisms that thus arise from the various religions cannot be expected to yield a common vision of man; for they presuppose in each instance particularizations that may not be universally shared. Nor is it likely that the confrontation of one religion by another in terms of its religious witness will give rise to generalizations that can be readily shared. You will note that I said "readily" shared. I am not ruling out the possibility that they may in time come to be shared after other kinds of exchanges have occurred; but the point I am making is that the generalizations drawn from specific occurrences within a cultural history are not *prima facie* universal judgments that can be recognized as such outside the cultural imagery. When they are projected within any religious faith, they bear the imprint of the cultural history.

It is possible, however, that the act of bearing witness to experiences of religious import to a people, or of relating accounts of such religious acts of witness that have occurred within one's cultural history, can be heard and assimilated within another cultural history. Much will depend here upon the degree to which the bare human structure of response is conveyed — bare in the sense of being primordial, *i.e.,* a response expressive of the structural capacities of *any human being,* in contrast to a witness of faith that is laden with doctrinal interpretation and implications. If human capacities and their structural responses can be laid bare in such acts of witnessing, a genuine encounter at the primordial level of humanity can be supposed. Except as this takes place however, one can only assume that a barrage and clash of symbols has occurred.

Now if one asks, how may some measure of this genuine encounter between human beings be assured? I can only say that it can be facilitated by every effort to think beyond the cultural or cultic imagery in

the very act of thinking and speaking within this idiom. This is a way of saying that the more a cultic faith and its theology is informed by, or conversant with, the sciences and metaphysics, the more likely it is to be open to dimensions of meaning that carry the cultic speech beyond its cultural orbit into considerations that can recall or re-vivify its universal import as given in its primordial ground.

Science and metaphysics are not so much resources to be integrated with cultic speech, as counter irritants, or better still, reflectors, casting a beam of light upon particularized mythologies, or exposing its cultic claims that are sheer idiosyncrasies and thus releasing (or compelling) its mythos to look illimitably far.

To the extent, then, that theologies or religious witnesses partake of the criticism and challenge of the cultural disciplines, one can expect them to be summoned to a vision of the human reality in experience that is sharable by all religions without sacrificing what is definitive and decisive in its own faith.

SOME INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF MUSLIM HIGHER EDUCATION AND THEIR RELATION TO ISLAM

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It seems that religious education plays a capital role in the self-continuation of a religious tradition. If one conceives of it as the way in which that which is religiously valid is handed over from one generation to the next, it is radically different from the way in which other values are passed on. It would not be one particular sort of education besides others, but it would appear to shape or open that particular part or domain of the individual, which religion would call his "soul"; while all other educational processes aim at shaping aspects of the person, which in themselves have no religious quality. As a formative process, it is closely related to the forms of life of a given community, and of the individuals belonging to that community. More than the fact of these forms themselves, however, it is the particular way in which through these forms ultimates of life are sensed, which seems to determine how the particular "transfer" of what might be called a "meaning" of life takes place, and this could be called "religious education".

It appears, on the other hand, that religious knowledge forms an essential part of a religious tradition. Again, conceived of it as a knowledge which has to do with the ultimates of human life, which determine the way it should be lived, it is totally different from any other kind of knowledge. Once known, it would provide the starting point from which this life might obtain some meaning, and as such, it would be indispensable not only to the members of a given religious tradition, but to the life of the tradition itself as well. To elaborate and guard, and where necessary to communicate this particular knowledge, seems to be vital for the community concerned and a logical consequence of "religious knowledge" itself.

Both religious education and religious knowledge come into play when we deal with the history of Muslim institutions of higher education and learning. These establishments are meant to impart religious knowledge to the students, as well as to give them a religious education on the intellectual level, so that education and knowledge come to coincide. It is, however, Islam which determines both, and we shall try to make tentative inferences from the different institutional settings of Muslim higher education to the various shapes which Islam has taken up to this very day [1]).

I. *Until the Western Domination*

Since Mohammed is considered a prophet who brings a "knowable" revelation to earth, Islamic religious sciences aim at the correct understanding of this revelation and of its consequences for the community wanting to live according to it. The Qurʾān as *verbum dei* led to the arts of knowing and reciting the holy book, as well as to those philological and other studies which contribute to its understanding. The life of the prophet as the *example* for the life of the individual and community led to the collecting and interpreting of sayings and actions of Mohammed. The fact that there was an order to be realized in the community as *lex divina* led to the evaluation of any possible human act in the light of Qurʾān and Tradition; that is to say, the science of *fiqh* ("jurisprudence") became the backbone of the Islamic sciences. Rational theology *(kalām)* and mystical knowledge *(taṣawwuf)* may have been added in later time, but the Arabic language, *tafsīr*, *ʿilm al-hadīth* and *fiqh* form the corpus of Islamic knowledge. They are an elaboration and interpretation of those vital truths, to which the individual should adhere, and whose transmission is indispensable for the continuity of the Islamic community. The leaders who have studied these sciences are consequently the "heirs of the prophet": those who know what a Muslim should believe, how he should act, and what he should know. It is the institutional form in which this knowledge was transmitted, which is the subject of our inquiry; the assimilation of the

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1) A discussion on what should properly be called "religious" in religious learning and education falls outside our scope, as well its contents. The question of the sort and degree of freedom of scholar and student cannot be treated here either.

culture found by the Arabs in the conquered territories, the subsequent translations and the establishment of libraries is here left out of consideration [2]).

From the beginning, the *mosque* has been the center of the Islamic community. It is as well as a place of prayer and meditation, a center of religious instruction and political discussion, and it possesses other functions as well. Besides the usual recitation and explanation of the Qur²ān, instruction in the larger mosques is also given in the religious sciences. The "schools" of early Islam (Madīna, Baṣra, Kūfa) consisted of scholars teaching at the mosque, still without receiving a remuneration for it. When new territory was conquered, mosques were established and basic instruction in Islam was given. Once established as cathedral-mosques in larger towns, they could develop into well-known places of learning, often with hundreds, sometimes with thousands of students. Frequently they contained important libraries.

Besides the mosque, and often attached to it, there were the in general religious "elementary schools", widespread already under the Umayyads [3]). Higher instruction and discussion took place in the

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2) There is already a rich literature on the history of Muslim education, both in Arabic and in Western languages, considering the subject either from the point of view of history or of pedagogy. Apart from the sources, the following publications, from which direct use will be made, should be mentioned:
a. I. Goldziher, *Muslim Education*, Hastings' E.R.E., vol. V, 1925, pp. 198-207.
b. Johs. Pedersen, art. *Masdjid* in EI[1], vol. III; and *Some Aspects of the History of the Madrasa*, in Islamic Culture III, 4 (1929), 525-537.
c. Aḥmad Shalaby, *History of Muslim Education*, Beirut 1954.
d. A. S. Tritton, *Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages*, London 1957, and *Muslim Education in the Middle Ages*, in MW 43, 1953, 82-94.
e. Bayard Dodge, *Muslim Education in Medieval Times*, Washington 1962.
f. G. Makdisi, *Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh Century Baghdad*, in BSOS, XXIV, 1 (1961), 1-56.
g. A. L. Tibawi, *Origin and Character of Al-Madrasah*, in BSOS, XXV (1962), 225-238.
h. H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol. I, Part II, London 1957 (Ch. "Education", pp. 139-164).
i. G. E. von Grünebaum and T. M. Abel: tr. *az-Zarnūjī's* "Instruction of the Student: The Method of Learning," New York 1947 (esp. the Introduction).
j. G. E. von Grünebaum, Islam, *Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, Menasha and London, 1961 (esp. Ch. VI, "Muslim World View and Muslim Science," pp. 111-126). We have not yet been able to see Mehdi Nakosteen, *History of Islamic Origins of Western Education A.D. 800-1350*, Colorado 1964.
3) The elementary level of the *maktab* should well be distinguished from the higher level of the *majlis*, wherever the latter may be held.

copyist bazaar *(sūq al-warrāqīn)*, in palaces, houses of scholars, and also in literary salons. The more wealthy engaged a private instructor for the education of the children.

Centers for higher studies, not always connected with teaching, were founded where a higher cultural level was attained, or where a particular government had certain doctrines to be studied and spread. In Baghdad, the Bayt al-Ḥikmah, possibly founded by Hārūn al-Rashīd (786-809), was made famous by al-Maʾmūn's (813-833) establishment of a translation section, a library and an observatory. A Shīʿite Dār al-ʿIlm, founded by the Buyīd wazīr Sābūr b. Ardashīr in 993, was destroyed in 1059 by a Sunni mob, and replaced by the Suni Dār al-Kutub, in 1060. * In Cairo, a Dār al-ʿIlm was established in the Fāṭimid palace, and a rich Dār al-Ḥikmah founded in 1005, where the Ismāʿīli-Fāṭimid doctrines were taught, with one interruption, until the fall of this dynasty in 1171. A Sunni institution, established by al-Ḥākim (996-1021), had a short existence (1010-1013). ** As is known, the Azhar mosque was opened in 972; unorganized instruction took place in 975, while in 988 35 teachers were officially appointed; mainly, Shīʿite doctrine was taught. But from the year 1171 there was a century of neglect under the Sunni Ayyūbids. The first large Ṣūfi convent in Cairo, that of Saʿīd as-Suʿadāʾ, dates from 1173; a Dār al-Ḥadīth was opened in 1225. Also Damascus had a special Dār al-Ḥadīth, while in Aleppo there was a Dār al-Daʿwa (Shīʿite) at the beginning of the 11th century. A Dār al-Qurʾān was founded in Granada (13th c.), and in Aleppo (14th c.). All these institutions were centers of special research; scholars were engaged by the institution, most of which also gave instruction.

When, however, the caliph or a government offical had founded such a center and guaranteed the salaries, then learning came into a closer relationship with the state authority than had been the case in the mosque, although there too the caliph made the appointments. The pious scholar working at such a center had certainly to effect many a compromise in order to obtain and hold his position, especially if he was aware that the state was not implementing the social order ela-

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* According to A. S. Tritton, this Dār al-ʿIlm would have been established in 991 and destroyed in 1058 (A. S. Tritton, *Materials on Muslim education in the Middle Ages,* 1957, pp. 99/100).

** A. S. Tritton, *op. cit.,* p. 102.

borated by Muslim scholarship. It is certain that in the case of the Fāṭimid institutions, he simply had to elaborate and propagate the official doctrine.

An extremely important phase in the history of Islamic higher education and learning was the introduction of special *teaching centers:* religious schools of the "secondary" and "higher" level. The first *madrasas* had been founded in Khorasān, probably to defend Islamic doctrine against the Qarmatian teachings in that region. The wazīr Niẓām al-Mulk (in function 1063-1092) may have been the first who realized the importance of a system of religious higher education aimed at controlling the education of the religious leaders and so implementing a centrally-directed policy, also through them [4]). He founded nine Niẓāmīya madrasas, the most important of which was that in Baghdad (1067).

They all were endowed with *waqfs,* from which the teachers appointed by Niẓām were paid, and from which the students received support primarily by receiving lodgings in the madrasa itself. These students studied fiqh and became as qāḍīs, muftīs, etc., religious leaders who, in contrast to those other religious authorities who set themselves apart, were more favorable to the régime. Although the policies initiated by Niẓām failed because of subsequent circumstances, the idea of founding schools was successful.

In the same year as the Shāfiᶜite Niẓāmīya, 1067, the Ḥanafite Shrine College *(mashhad)* of Abū Ḥanīfa was inaugurated in Baghdad. Others followed, each for a particular *madhhab,* except the famous al-Mustanṣirīya (1234), in which every madhhab had its scholars. But this form is exceptional. As such, *mashhad* (shrine college), *masjid* (mosque college) and *madrasa* (law college) were institutions for special professional instruction of experts in the fiqh of one madhhab. Over and against these exclusive institutions, a *jāmiᶜ* (cathedral mosque) was common to all madhhabs, and also gave much attention to

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4) There may be several reasons which led to the founding of madrasas by Niẓām al-Mulk. Besides the one mentioned, one may think of the need of reorganized administration of the empire for personnel, and of Sunni competition with the contemporary Fāṭimid centers in Cairo. There will have been personal reasons too. Cf.: "The Niẓāmīya was meant as a public institution dedicated to *ahl al-ᶜilm* and the *maṣlaḥa,* for the study of religious science and the training of state functionaries." (A. L. Tibawi, disagreeing with G. Makdisi, in his *"Origin and Character of Al-Madrasah"*, p. 238).

other subjects (Tradition, Qur'ān, etc.). The difference between *masjid* and *madrasa* is still a subject of discussion; a point which may be made is that an endowment for a madrasa seems to provide for salaries as well as scholarships, while that of a masjid only provides for the salary of the teacher(s). The masjid represents more the religious, the madrasa more the cultural aspect; but Islam does not distinguish between these aspects. Nūr al-Dīn (1146-1163) is known for his foundation of many madrasas in Syria; Salāḥ al-Dīn (1174-1193) founded in Cairo alone five madrasas. In the Middle Ages, Damascus must have had up to 80 madrasas (perhaps 150 in the XVIth century), Jerusalem 40, like Baghdad and Aleppo, and Cairo more than 100. The first madrasa in Tunis dates from ca. 1250, in Fes around the same time. Teaching in Spain took place mostly in the mosques, starting with the Córdoba mosque of the 8th century. The first madrasa seems to have been established here in the 14th century. In the East, madrasas are especially numerous: Persia, India, Central Asia, etc., falling outside of the scope of this article. Once the central authority had broken down, local princes and governors took pride in the flowering of madrasas, and in attracting scholars as well as students from elsewhere. Everywhere, well-to-do-individuals, with or without an official position, established madrasa endowments in the same way as mosque endowments, shrine endowments, etc. This type of school provided the juridical religious leaders which that society needed. Teachers and students came, moreover, to form a certain community—students of the one being teachers of the others. Through these madrasas and the common background of their teaching, a coherent elite was formed; in the same way, the widespread Qur'ānic schools gave a common basic religious knowledge to all.

In this connection a third type of center of education should be mentioned: the school of a religious order or *"monastery college" (ribāṭ,* also *khānaqah* or *zāwiya).* Here it is not so much instruction in the divine law as the religious education of the person which is stressed, the basis being the mystical life and its particular sort of knowledge. Coming also from the East, side by side with the madrasas, the ribāṭs have had a less spectacular, but not less important, function in medieval Islamic society, for Ṣūfism has developed a spiritual force of which society by its own nature is deprived. Moreover, if the madrasas consolidated orthodox Islam, these ribāṭs appear to have contri-

buted to the spread of Islam in the East as well as in the West. Where
Islam took a mystical form, ribāṭs were the places of instruction;
where it remained orthodox, higher teaching took place in mosque
(masjid, jāmiᶜ) and madrasa.

In regard to study and life in madrasa and mosque in the Islamic
Middle Ages, educational treatises and general works of learning con-
tain elements which make possible the development of a certain picture.
Teaching starts at dawn, often in the sequence of Qurʾān, ḥadīth
and fiqh; Arabic language (especially grammar) is taught later; in
the afternoon follow subjects of less importance. The student can con-
tinue his studies as long as he wishes, as there is no yearly exami-
nation. He starts with some years of grammar and other introductory
disciplines representing a "secondary" level, while the central attention
of the higher level is given to fiqh (including some tawḥīd), to Tradi-
tion, and after these to other disciplines. For a discipline, one studies
with a shaykh who is chosen because of his reputation. Especially in
the first centuries, many students travel from place to place in order
to study under the most famous scholars and to obtain *ijāzahs* (as
formerly ḥadīths) from them. There is an intimate, patriarchal rela-
tionship between student and shaykh; but the student can also behave
rudely. Also, student fights may occur for various reasons. A student
may be of any age and may himself be a teacher at the same time.
When a scholar class comes into existence, a student class also arises,
with its particular dress, habits, etc. In the absence of enough copies
a teacher has to dictate the text, and a student learns by memorizing,
which does not exclude *a priori* preliminary understanding. With more
mature students discussions can take place, as an art of free discourse
and refined argumentation *(munāqashah)*; but this habit has declined
in later times. In the teaching, the accent may be laid on learning by
heart *(talqīn)*, dictation *(imlāʾ)* or reading *(qirāʾah)*.

The student is known on account of his teachers. They enjoy a
great reputation and often veneration, if they have a religious char-
acter, live a saintly life, etc. Indeed, especially at the beginning, there
were no great material interests—teaching of the sacred knowledge was
a religious action. Only later salaries were introduced, not without re-
sistance from pious circles. Payment was then made either from the
endowment of the mosque or madrasa, or from the public treasury.
Tenure was for life, except at the Niẓāmīya's where shaykhs could

be appointed and dismissed at will, the bad consequences of which are spoken of by al-Ghazzālī in his autobiography. Often a shaykh had, especially in the first centuries, a job beside his teaching. At the madrasa he received, besides money, also things in kind, e.g. bread, like the students. The teacher should be married.

In the mosque, each shaykh has his circle of students *(halqah)* at a particular place *(majlis)*; after his death, his successor will continue with the same ḥalqah at the same place. The teacher often has an assistant, either attached to the institution or to himself, who "drills" the students; in many cases there is also a substitute professor *(nāʾib)*. The teacher and not the institution gives the ijāzah; moreover, he may give punishments or prizes, according to circumstances; sometimes he is an educator in the best sense of the word. His task, however, is to hand down his knowledge as he received it himself, and lectures are on books rather than on subjects. The government, apart from "missionary" tasks assigned to scholars, often provides positions for scholars, like judicial posts and posts at the court, as tutors, secretaries, etc. When the habit of founding madrasas is established, there is a need of teachers. The government has some supervision in matters of appointments in the mosque; here, and often in madrasa appointments too, the judge *(qāḍī)* of the town has an important role. After the death of the founder of a mosque or madrasa endowment, the government may continue the direction of it. Directly or indirectly, there is state patronage and control of higher education.

Learning, in this time, is the acquisition of knowledge handed over on religious (revelation) and human (the predecessors and the transmitters) authority, the last aim of which is the preparation for felicity in the next world. Religious knowledge is incumbent upon the Muslim, in accordance with his station in life; knowledge of fiqh provides knowledge of one's religious, i.e., all-including, rights and duties on earth. Treatises on education always speak about the moral purpose in the acquisition of education, and indicate for it the right interest and the highest aspiration, suggesting a refusal to work for sustenance or to pay attention to worldly affairs "other than placing one's faith in God". In essence, the real study is that of "Islam"; this knowledge is sacred, and at all times the Islamic doctrine and way of life should be preserved. In a way, all learning is "learning in sacred precedent" [5]).

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5) G. E. von Grünebaum, Introduction *Az-Zarnūjī...etc.*, p. 14. Cf.: "It is

The learned person is the expert in Sacred Book, Sacred Tradition and Sacred Law.

It is true that the ethical value of learning depends on the object to which the investigation is directed, and on the particular intention of the scholar. Knowledge is either knowledge of revelation, or knowledge of the world in order to organize this world as the appropriate stage of the correct life [6]). This is the orthodox position. There had been an other, esoteric sort of instruction (Fāṭimids, Brethren of Purity, certain Shīʿite groups), but with the rejection of their doctrines, this instruction was also banned. On the other hand, there had been an intellectual movement owing its force to "foreign" studies like natural science, philosophy and music. However, they had been accepted mainly for some utilitarian reason with regard to the particular Islamic sciences, and notwithstanding some great thinkers and scientists, they declined and finally disappeared. It is doubtful if they ever had a place at the religious institutions of learning. We mentioned the mystical knowledge taught in the religious orders. A fifth type of knowledge was that of "magics": It was not banned until much later, but it was not taught at the schools; nevertheless it had its folkwisdom and practitioners. That knowledge, however, which is esteemed to be really Islamic is, as religious knowledge in its deepest intentions, different from rational knowledge in our scientific sense, although it is not less rational in its elaboration. It grows from an intimate acquaintance, if not assimilation, of the Qurʾān and a natural familiarity with ḥadīth, both by a particular religious quality attached to them, and consequently found in them. Only an analysis of this kind of religious consciousness and a similar analysis of the intentions of the Islamic sciences themselves could make clear the qualitative aspects of "Muslim learning" [7]).

It is interesting to note that in the course of time the learning and

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against this background that the singular appreciation of sheer knowledge in the Islamic world must be understood. The learned, that is, the experts in Sacred Tradition or Sacred Law, hold the keys to the kingdom of heaven. Without them, the community would be unable to live their lives conformable to divine injunction as demonstrated by the Prophet and the elect of his day". (op cit., p. 14). It would be necessary, in this context, to deal with the history of the Islamic sciences, but lack of space prevents this.

6) This is respectively *Offenbarungserkundung* and *Welterkundung*. G. E. von Grünebaum, *Islam*, p. 112.

7) Such an "analysis in depth" of religious consciousness has too seldom been made, and is yet indispensable for understanding any religious expression.

education of madrasa and mosque have not developed into broader horizons; rather, the limitation of the number of subjects taught has had a narrowing effect upon the minds of the educated Muslims. As to the madrasa system as such, where after some time a certain number of subjects were regularly taught—it did not develop into a university system. There may be several reasons for this: These subjects formed a closed circle believed to be the total of all essential knowledge. Furthermore, independent thought, after the manner of the Greek philosophers, had been rejected before the madrasa system developed; so that their role became reduced to defend and propagate an accepted corpus of "learning", and not to pursue knowledge as a valid activity in itself. The memorization methods, becoming habits, made independent thought impossible in practice. Another factor is that just that stream of theological thought has become "orthodox" which perpetuated itself by proclaiming, after a number of great thinkers of the past, basically new findings impossible, and thereby "closing the door" to any fundamental research. In this way the scholar could not but comment on preceding authorities, and what he had to seek was the true transmission from his predecessors. In the last instance, it was the theological basis of the Islamic sciences themselves which determined their intentions and limits. Indeed, one can say that the theologians had monopolized the control of thought and of education, if one recognizes that their thought was determined by the "theological basis" of Islam itself [8]).

Political history is indispensable to an understanding of any history of education, as it sets the limits to the forms in which a culture can express itself. It may be useful to mention the political situation of the Arabs when they came under non-Arab rule. The Mongol and Turkoman devastations in the East dealt an almost mortal blow to the existing cultural institutions, from Central Asia to present-day Syria. In the West, internal struggles contributed to the loss of Andalusia and to a lowering of the cultural level, about which Ibn Khaldūn already complains in his *Muqaddimah*. The Mamlūk reign in Egypt was

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8) See H. A. R. Gibb, *The University in the Arab-Moslem World,* in: Edward Bradby, ed., "The University Outside Europe. London, New York, Toronto, 1939, pp. 282-3. See also H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West,* vol. I, part II, p. 139. About the notion of "theological basis", compare Waardenburg, *L'Islam dans le miroir de l'Occident,* The Hague, Paris 1963, pp. 325-328 ("noyau religieux", "intention maîtresse", "essence").

not too bad for the institutions of learning in Cairo. In the Arab
world, during the Ottoman period, a further reduction of culture took
place. Only in India and Safavid Iran did a high standard of learning
remain [9]).

The situation of Muslim higher education in the Arab countries
in the XVIIIth century may then be summarized as follows:

Besides the orthodox doctrine, political decadence had for centuries
its influence on the decline of independent thought: tyrannical rulers
suppress possible internal opposition, and the scholars, in their own
interest, have to comply and form a "conservative" class. "Orthodox"
has been identified with "traditional", so that the old forms remain
intact, but without the inspiring forces of the first centuries; more-
over, the foreign sciences, insofar as they were not religiously useful,
have been eliminated. The "Bildung" of the Middle Ages has gone
and no new ideal of culture has developed. Mystical trends have gained
in importance, and it is indeed on this level that vital forces of Islam
maintain themselves, with a Ṣūfī type of education. There is an absence
of fruitful contact with the outside world. Within the institutions
abuses have become prevalent, such as the existence of nominal stu-
dents for the sake of material advantages, irresponsibilities in the ap-
pointments of shaykhs, and certain signs of decadence. "If the dead-
point of a society is reached when the educational forces are no longer
effective to influence or to direct its development, it must be admitted
that the dead-point was long since passed in Islamic society. Education
had ceased to set before itself even the hope of moulding society in
the direction of its ideals, and had sunk to the level of merely holding
society together by the inculcation of tradition" [10]).

II. *The Period of Western Domination*

With the exception of Arabia, the Arab countries have been for

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9) Since our subject must, unfortunately, be limited to the Arabicspeaking
countries, the interesting educational developments, in history and at the present
time, west of Mesopotamia (Iran, Pakistan, India and other countries further
east) cannot be discussed here. As to the decline of culture in the Arab world,
there is no reason to assume *a priori* that it was due to the Turks; actually,
the process must have started already before their assumption of power.

10) H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, vol.
I, part II, p. 160. "The real gravamen of the criticism to be brought against
Islamic intellectual culture in the eighteenth century, is that it had fallen so
far below even its own medieval standards, and appeared to be quite unconscious
of the decline." (Op. cit., p. 161).

several decades under direct non-Muslim political control, the form
and length of which varied, however, according to the country. In this
period, some accounts have been given by Western travellers and in-
vestigators of the situation in which they found the Muslim institu-
tions of learning, and some studies have been made by them on the
history of these institutions. In general, however, they could not parti-
cipate in the education itself [11]); moreover, their evaluation of the
viability and meaning of the Muslim institutions were closely corre-
lated with the evaluation of culture and religion in general and their
own in particular.

As for the colonizing powers themselves, they could not interfere
directly with the Muslim institutions, although in some places modern
Muslim schools were created by them in addition to the existing ma-
drasas and mosques [12]). However, they could not but encourage the
establishment of modern schools, Christian or secular. This had a
definite effect upon the old Muslim institutions, as many students
preferred the modern schools bcause of their up-to-date instruction.

Besides this direct influence of the West, there was the indirect in-
fluence through the local governments themselves which, even before the
actual colonization, have sometimes encouraged the creation of schools
an institutes of higher training on a modern basis, besides the Muslim
institutions [13]). So a double educational system developed, resulting in
practically a double culture—the "traditional Muslim" on the one
hand and the "modern Westernized" on the other. The last statement
already indicates that, in practice, the opposition Islamic-modern coin-
cided with Islamic-Western, and this is characteristic for this period.
Only when national consciousness becomes the common denominator
of all education in Arab countries this antagonism looses its force,
while other antagonisms gain in importance. Where the "modernizers"
leaned heavily upon the West, the religious institutions were forced
into a position of defense, and the meaning of religious education

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11) There have been exceptions: Although not Muslims, scholars like Gold-
ziher, Massignon and Pedersen studied at al-Azhar, Snouck Hurgronje in Mecca.
For the two last ones, see notes 19 and 20b. For Goldziher, see his Az Iszlám,
Budapest 1881, ch. V; cf. Georg Ebers, *Aegypten in Bild und Wort,* Stuttgart
1879, vol. I, p. 347 ff., vol. II, p. 71 ff. Compare note 26.

12) E.g., in Morocco, by Lyautey. In Tunis, at the end of the XIXth century,
the French had encouraged the foundation of the modern Muslim *Khaldūnīyah.*

13) The first Arab country accepting such a double educational system was
Egypt under Muḥammad ᶜAlī (walī of Egypt, 1806-1848).

became before everything else the preservation of the Islamic heritage against the storms awakened by the Western invasion. For a certain time they simply resisted any innovation. The reforms which finally took place in these institutions had either to be imposed upon them by the government, or were forced upon them by the pressure of concrete circumstances. We shall mention here the short history of three institutions, both before and during this period, whereby a reference will be made to two towns where Muslim higher education was hardly touched by the modern trends, which were originally inspired by the meeting with the West.

The *Qarawiyīn* mosque in Fes [14]) was founded in 859, and in 918 it was declared the official Friday mosque. Though like all mosques it gave religious instruction, it was under the Marīnids (1195-1470) that it became a center of learning. Their policy made Fes the intellectual and cultural center of the country, a bulwark of orthodoxy against spiritualistic extremes within, and Berber paganism outside the Muslim comunity. This was indeed the golden era of Fes, which possessed two other great mosques, each with its own madrasa used as living quarters. Afterwards the culture became stagnant and little new was produced; but in North Africa Fes remained (with Tunis) the intellectual center. The Qarawiyīn was reorganized in 1788/9 by Muḥammad III. In 1844 some reforms were promulgated but were not implemented. At the begining of this century the situation was as in the Middle Ages as regards the content and methods of teaching. However, the appointments were no longer made directly by the qāḍī of Fes, but through the makhzen (court) as a consequence of the centralizing policy of the Alawite dynasty (since 1664).

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14) The figures given in Parts II and III have been drawn from various sources, not always generally accessible. These figures as reproduced here are the entire responsibility of the author. About the *Qarawiyīn Mosque* especially:
a. G. Delphin, *Fas, son université et l'enseignement supérieur musulman,* Paris 1889.
b. Roger Le Tourneau, *Fès avant le protectorat,* Casablanca 1949 (pp. 453-471).
c. A. Pérétié, *Les medrasas de Fès (d'après les notes de G. Salmon),* Arch. Mar. XVIII (1912), 257-372.
d. J. Berque, *Ville et université. Aperçu sur l'histoire de l'école de Fès,* in Rev. Hist. Droit François et Etranger, 27e année (1949), 64-117.
e. Michaux Bellaire, *L'enseignement indigène au Maroc,* in RMM 15 (1911), 422-452.

There were no examinations except the giving of the ijāzah; in fact, studies could go on forever. Students did not pay fees and lived, when they came from outside Fes, in madrasas (existing since the end of the XIIIth century), of which six were still used. They received a certain allowance in kind from the endowment of the madrasa, and were sometimes helped by the Fes bourgeoisie. Those students who came from Fes itself formed a different group; their study was a part of the correct education of citizens of their class. Teaching took place in the mosque. The shaykhs were badly paid, but their wages were suplemented by gifts. They had no specialization. In 1912 the French protectorate was established. A reform was attempted in 1916, after the creation of a Redevelopment Council *(Majlis al-taḥsīni)* in 1914. While there were in 1906 41 teachers, around 1925, ten of the twenty chairs were not filled. The library, famous in the Middle Ages and still impressive in the 16th century when European scholars came there to consult books, was reduced to some 2000 books, of which 1600 were manuscripts. However, at that time there still must have been some 700 religiously educated persons in the town, performing all kinds of fuctions. They exerted much influence and formed a sort of religious council which could express its opinions to the sultan. There may have been then 350-400 students living in the madrasas, to whom should be added an unknown number of Fāsī students. The total number of students around 1888 may have been ca. 700; around 1900, ca. 600. Besides this higher level, the educational system of the Qarawiyīn provided also for elementary religious instruction. The attitude of a Qarawiyīn student has been nicely described by Le Tourneau:

Il en allait de même pour les études: point d'initiatives personnelles, point d'effort personnel: il ne s'agissait pas pour eux de découvrir une vérité perpétuellement instable, mais de recevoir, de ceux qui la détenaient à leur tour de plus anciens qu'eux, la vérité, révélée aux hommes dans toute sa plénitude par l'Envoyé le Dieu, et de se rendre digne de la transmettre telle quelle à leurs successeurs. Il fallait pour cela se bien pénétrer des connaissances et des méthodes des savants professeurs, se forger une mémoire sans défaillance, écouter et retenir. Ainsi les étudiants de Fès se modelaient-ils peu à peu sur leurs maîtres, à qui ils témoignaient le plus grand respect et rendaient tous les ser- vices qu'ils pouvaient pour mériter leur sollicitude. Ils ne cherchaient jamais à réagir, à douter par principe; rien ne leur était plus étranger qu'une attitude d'esprit révolutionnaire: ils ne la réprouvaient même

pas, car elle ne leur venait pas à l'idée. Dogmatisme et conformisme étaient les dominants de Karawiyin... [15]).

In 1932, then, the first regulations are given, containing, among other things, the curriculum and the introduced examinations, certain modern subjects, and specialization by the shaykhs. In 1947, the Qara-wiyīn becomes a State Institution.

The *Zaytūna* mosque in Tunis [16]) dates from 732. It must have known religious teaching since that time, and certainly in the period of the Hafsids (1228-1534). Under the Turkish domination, since 1575, it became the center of all religious teaching in Tunisia, for all ages. The first regulation on its teaching dates from 1842, when thirty paid teachers for the higher course were appointed by Beylical decree. In 1875 an important decree established details on the courses, subjects, etc. In 1881 the French arrived. In 1900 a catalogue was published of the library. 1912 saw a new decree with rulings about the teaching in Zaytūna, in which it is interesting to note that the subjects taught were more numerous and varied than at al-Azhar, at least since 1872. After the first World War, however, students demanded reforms of the Zaytūna, asking for other methods and books, and for the introduction of modern sciences. Of course French influence played a role. A reform took place in 1933, but appeared to be insufficient. The Zaytūna educational system included three stages of elementary schools (also outside of Tunis), secondary and higher education (in Tunis). These studies took, respectively, four, three and three years. In 1945 the construction of a Zaytūna university city was started. In 1949 student strikes began, which lasted a year, and resulted in the introduction of a modern section in addition to the traditional one at the secondary level. This became official in 1955 and meant a break in the closed system of the Zaytūna. In 1953 there were altogether over 11,000 students, of whom more than 650 at the higher level were

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15) R. Le Tourneau, *Fès avant le protectorat*, 1949, p. 470.

16) About the *Zaytuna Mosque* especially:

a. Al-Muchrif (= Léon Bercher), *La réforme de l'enseignement à la grande mosquée de Tunis,* in REI IV (1930), 441-515.

b. R. Brunschvig, art. *Tunisia-Muslim Religion-Education,* in EI[1], vol. IV.

c. Michel Lelong, *L'enseignement supérieur islamique,* in IBLA 25 (1962), 181-184.

d. A Louis, *La jeunesse tunisienne et les études,* in IBLA XVI (1953), 1-46 (esp. 30-37), and *La jeunesse tunisienne et les études traditionnelles,* in IBLA 19 (1956), 139-147.

studying either in the section of Arabic language and literature, or in that of jurisprudence. About twenty pursued their studies abroad, e.g., in Cairo. In 1956, immediately after independence, secondary education became separate from higher education, so that the Zaytūna teaching was reduced to higher education only. Later transformations were to follow.

It is interesting to note that in 1908 in *Baghdad,* just before World War I, nine madrasas were still open; moreover teaching took place in a mosque [17]). In *Najaf,* where the sanctuary of ᶜAlī is a center of Shīᶜite teaching (as in Kerbela, Hillah, Qāẓimayn and Aleppo), conditions had not changed much even in the nineteen fifties. Some thousands of students of all ages gather, mainly from Iraq, Iran and Syria, but also from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. They live in approximately twenty-five madrasas; but the main teaching is done at the mosque. Wanting to distinguish themselves from the Sunnis, the Shīᶜites keep very much to their special doctrines. It was only in 1914 that a partial list of the studied books was published [18]). *Mecca* [19]) in the eighties had not much madrasa teaching left, the main teaching being given in the Mosque al-Harām, and there was a sharp distinction between the shaykhs teaching there and those teaching elsewhere. Many scholars as well as students were foreigners, who remained for some time after having accomplished the *hajj.* They received some government allowance, plus gifts, etc., from pilgrims. Also, many were in business. There may have been at that time about fifty to sixty shaykhs, of whom the *shaykh al-ᶜulamāʾ* was the leader, admitting new teachers, taking care of practical matters, and acting as a representative to the outside. At this time the *tarīqas* still played an important role, but there was no rivalry between orthodox and mystical teaching.

The *Azhar* mosque in Cairo [20]) surpasses all other Sunni institutions

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17) According to Louis Massignon, *Les medresehs de Bagdâd,* BIFAO VII, 1909, 77-86.

18) *"Le programme des études chez les Chiites et principalement chez ceux de Nedjef",* (an.), RMM 23, 1913, 268-279.

19) C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka,* vol. II, 1889, ch. III.

20) About the *Azhar Mosque,* from many studies, also in Arabic, especially:
a. Bayard Dodge, *Al-Azhar. A Millennium of Muslim Learning,* Washington, 1961.
b. Johannes Pedersen, *Al-Azhar. Et Muhammedansk Universitet,* Kobenhavn, 1922.
c. A. Sékaly, *L'université d'el Azhar et ses transformations,* in REI 1 (1927), 95-116 and 465-529; II (1928), 47-165, 255-337, 401-471.

of higher learning. Moreover it may be called the oldest university, although this title can be contested by the Qarawiyīn and has no precise meaning. The building was completed in 972, and it is reported that there was teaching there at least four years later. However it was only in 988 that the government made grants available for paid appointments. During the Fāṭimid period (969-1171) this meant a Shīʿite teaching, but it was less esoteric than that given in the Bayt al-Hikmah founded about the same time (1005). There must have been a supervisor *(mushrif)*, while at the end of the eleventh century a scholar became the "first shaykh". The Azhar has always been in close connection with the ruling power. In this regard, the rule of the Sunni Ayyūbids (1171-1268) was not happy for the mosque. Not only were all its Fāṭimid books burnt, but also the Friday prayer took place elsewhere, and madrasas were founded in Cairo besides the mosques. The Mamlūk period (1250-1517), on the other hand, brought a great upheaval. Construction flourished, e.g., that made by the Sultan Baibars in 1267, and Cairo became the intellectual center of the Muslim world because of the devastations of the East (Asia) and the decline of the West (North Africa). In addition to the Azhar, there were many other centers of Muslim learning in Cairo at the time, but later only the Azhar survived. It is reported that in the Middle Ages and later, hundreds of people were actually living in the mosque, which also served as a refuge against military or natural calamities. In Ottoman times, from 1517 onwards, the old splendor pales, and the inspiring forces of learning make place for the traditional transmission of knowledge. The ribāṭs expand more and more and slowly replace the existing madrasas. There is a decay of education and scholarship. At the end of the XVIIIth century there must have been only about twenty

d. Pierre Arminjon, *L'enseignement, la doctrine et la vie dans les universités musulmanes d'Egypte,* Paris, 1907.
e. L. Bercher, *Nouvelle charte de l'université d'al-Azhar au Caire,* in REI 5 (1931), 241-275. Comp. *"Réorganisation de l'Université d'el-Azhar"* (an.), REI 10 (1936), 1-43.
f. J. Jomier, art. *Azhar,* in EI², vol. I (1960), and in MIDEO I (1954) 191-194, II (1955) 150 ff, III (1956) 387 ff.
g. K. Vollers, art. *Azhar,* in EI¹, vol. I (1913).
h. Jörg Kraemer, *Die Azhar-Universität in Kairo und ihre heutige geistige Bedeutung,* in Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 10 (1958) 364-385.
i. Jörg Kraemer, *Tradition and reform at al-Azhar university,* in MEA 7 (1956) 89-94.

madrasas and the same number of mosques, where teaching actually took place. Outside Cairo there was a similar number of college mosques in Egypt. At that same time, Damascus and Aleppo, more open to the outside world and also paying more attention to the study of Sufism, each had around forty-five madrasas, apart from the cathedral and college mosques. In the Ottoman period, a Shaykh al-Azhar was appointed by the governor from among the principal *ʿulamāʾ*.

Napoleon's arrival in Egypt (1798) meant the beginning of a new era. The number of shaykhs at that time directly connected with the Azhar mosque may have been between forty and seventy. It is interesting to note that Napoleon dealt on several occasions with the shaykhs as the representatives of the people, which indicates the prestige and the socio-political power which the Azharites had at that moment. The greater must have been the shame when the Azhar was fired at and stained by infidels. "They tore up the books and copies of the Qurʾān, throwing them on the ground and trampling on them with their feet and boots." [21]) When the French had left, it was the Azharites who called in Muḥammad ʿAlī in 1805. His reign (1806-1848) meant the nationalization of Azhar and other endowments (1913), and a closer control of Azhar affairs than before. The students whom he sent to Paris for their modern education were mainly Azharites; and so, paradoxically, his establishment of the dual educational system in Egypt was not yet considered by the Azhar as the catastrophe which it turned out to be.

In 1853 a catalogue appeared of the books in the various buildings and dependencies of the Azhar. There were about 18,500 in number, but they were scattered [22]). During the 1850's, the Azhar regained some waqfs, which again gave it financial independence. As in Lebanon, through the Western missionaries and in other ways, ideas from the West had started to penetrate into Egypt and influenced the higher classes even before the English occupation. The Azhar did not react, upholding its heritage. It was finally the khedive Ismāʿīl who, in his plans for Egypt as a modernized independent Arab country, started

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21) Bayard Dodge, *Al-Azhar,* p. 109. Quotation from Jabartī, *ʿAjāʾib al-Athār fī al-Tarājim wa ʾl-Akhbār,* 1879, III, p. 26.

22) This catalog makes mention of more than 8,000 works in almost 19,000 volumes. In 1816 J. L. Burkhardt had already published *"A catalogue of Books in the Mosque al-Azhar"*.

the series of unavoidable reforms of the Azhar mosque. In 1872 as-
pirant shaykhs had to submit to an examination. It was decided that
eleven fixed branches of religious science would be taught. The British
came in 1882. In 1885 the students had to enroll; prior to that year no
official figures were known. In 1890 the Shaykh al-Azhar took office
within the building, instead of residing at home. The general siuation
was such that shaykhs and students were not content with their siua-
tion; ideas of reform started. Muḥammad ᶜAbduh (1849-1905) made
his ideas known: introduction of new manuals, a fixed schedule of
courses, annual examinations, study of the original sources instead
of the series of commentaries, insertion of modern subjects into the
curriculum, a central library, and improvement of the poor sanitary
conditions, especially of the student housing, which was partly within
and partly outside the mosque. In 1895 new reform decrees started. An
Administrative Council *(majlis al-idārah)* was established. In 1896 all
the existing institutions of Muslim education were attached to the
Azhar, which eventually ruled a large network of schools all over Egypt
(but especially the north) on the primary, secondary and higher levels.
An important general charter was imposed, with a number of clauses,
one of which was the introduction of modern optional subjects taught
by government teachers. A central library was established in 1897.
After the cholera epidemic of 1896, in which shaykhs and students
who had refused to be innoculated had lost their lives, a medical doctor
was appointed in 1898. In the years that followed, however, a conserv-
ative reaction had the upper hand; so a disappainted Muḥammad
ᶜAbduh left the Administrative Council.

   1908 was an important year in several respects. A law was proclaimed
containing essential reforms, among which was the division of studies
into three cycles (primary, secondary and higher) of four years each;
three sections of higher studies were introduced; the optional subjects
of 1896 now became required. A storm rose among students and
shaykhs against this intervention in Azhar affairs. Blood flowed. The
result was that the law had to be suspended in February, 1909. Another
major event was the foundation of the modern Egyptian University
in December, 1908, still private but initiating a rivalry with the Azhar,
which was to become painful for the mosque. Not only within the
Azhar was there a struggle between modernizers and conservatives;
the Azhar itself, being a conservative fortress, became less and less

important in Egyptian society compared to the modern "Western" university. In the same way, the growing number of foreign Christian, and government modern primary schools broke the monopoly of the Azhar educational system. This system included in 1876 some 10,780 students of all ages (starting at the lowest level), with altogether 325 teachers *(shaykhs)*. In 1892 there were 8,437 students proper and 178 teachers. In 1902 the total number of students (all ages) was 10,403, that of the teachers, 251. Around the beginning of the century, there were still fifteen *ḥārahs* (groups of living rooms) and 38 *riwāqs* (student lodgings by nations). There have always been many foreign students. They were, in regard to endowments of *riwāqs,* etc., much better off than the Egyptians; at the end of the nineteenth century, there were seventeen *riwāqs* for some 650 foreigners, and twelve for more than 9,750 Egyptians, of which only 4,000 could actually be lodged in them.

In 1911 a new reform law was able to put into effect the ideas of 1908. Among the many "innovations" was the creation of a Council of Chief ᶜUlamāʾ *(al-majlis al-aᶜlā),* on which thirty important shaykhs were sitting. It is only in the early twenties, after the revolution of 1919, when Egypt obtains its independence (1922), that again new measures are imposed. The Administrative Council is reorganized, like the Council of the Chief ᶜUlamāʾ. In 1923 specialization courses are introduced in eight sections for those ᶜulamāʾ who want to specialize under a chief ᶜālim. Regulations are again made as to admission, examinations, and the position of the shaykhs; missions are sent to Europe. Nineteen twenty-five sees the Egyptian University become a State University which, with its idea of autonomous science and historical-critical methods, will be the antipode, and finally the victor, over the Azhar. In 1927 the old privilege of the Azhar of being directly responsible to the king, and thus also enjoying his immediate protection is attacked by both parliament and government; from then on the Government is responsible to the Parliament for the Azhar budget and appointments, especially to the highest offices.

The Azhar retains a great influence. Not only are some publications printed in Egypt and touching on established doctrines severely attacked, but the new *Shaykh al-Azhar,* Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī, appointed in 1927, also has to retreat in 1929 because of Azharites themselves having refused his too "reformistic' ideas, not only about

the Azhar but also about Islam [23]). Indeed, here, more than in other
Muslim institutions, the immediate link between education and inter-
pretation of Islam can be followed, and the reactions against orthodox
doctrine and teaching be studied one by one. In 1930 a new regu-
lation is set down, fixing the studies of the three levels as four, five,
and four years respectively; creating for the first time three faculties
for the highest level, plus a general section especially for the foreign
students, revising the curriculum and introducing modern subjects,
and, finally, putting the "religious institutions" *(al-maᶜāhid al-dīnīya)*
apart from the "university". 1933 brings an additional law, fixing
specialization as a six-year study with a thesis. The Azhar Law of
1936, finally, synthesizes the laws of 1930 and 1933. It should be
noted that in the early thirties, also practical innovations were made.
There came new buildings in which teaching took place outside the
mosque. Missions were sent to other Islamic countries, with preachers
and teachers. A printing press was established and a monthly magazine
distributed, also in countries outside of Egypt. These are signs of an-
other spirit than that of still twenty-five years ago, but the reforms
were a vital necessity, given the fact of the growing modern educational
institutions in Egypt, especially the Egyptian University. The core
of the program, however, remains the same: a number of years of
Arabic language, especially grammar; an extensive memorization of
Qurʾān and Traditions; and last, and most important—the study of
fiqh, including some theology (kalām) and the "fundamentals" (uṣūl)
of fiqh, which naturally leads to the judicial professions. All of the
materials, in the meantime, remain based on the knowledge of at least
half of the Qurʾān by heart.

During the period under review, the role of the Muslim institutions
of higher education in society is still important. They train the ᶜulamāʾ,
qāḍīs, muftīs, the mosque leaders and the religious teachers, and these
form an important class in society. They also uphold the Muslim
values: within the community (protest against introduction of coffee
and tobacco in the 16th century, against inoculation in the 19th cen-
tury, always against dangerous deviations of ideas, as is the case still
at the present time), and to the outside world (apologetics, missions).

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23) See Mohammed Mostafa al Maraghi: *"Note which he has the honour of
presenting to the King (a defense of reforms in Al-Azhar)"*, MW 19 (1929),
pp. 183-195.

They maintain the high esteem of scholarship, the Arabic language and religious knowledge as such. They are sanctities in contrast to the world: In them everything has its religious aura. And still a number of listeners may attend lectures without understanding, but just for the blessing inherent in the religious language and wisdom.

It is significant that an institution like the Azhar, in the crucial 19th century, did not respond to the new trends; the reactions to the new ideas were rather fear, apathy or passive resistance; no new branches of learning were created, no reform of organization or teaching took place from within; everything had to be imposed by government and parliament, as far as the latter was under Azhar control; even then the imposed reforms were not always executed because of latent passive resistance. No modern historical methods were applied, a broadening of oneself under the influence of modern thought did not take place; in fact, the "rigidly traditionalist spirit and the archaic methods of instruction" could not but be "obstacles to all progress in profane sciences and to any liberalism in religious matters." [24]) Personally, students and teachers may be humble and modest; when it comes to their institution and to Islam, one could and still can feel pride and even haughtiness. After all, it is for the sake of Islam that reforms have been admitted.

In the 20th century, the remaining Muslim institutions of higher education had to suffer serious blows. People went to listen to ideas coming from non-Muslims. Governments imposed reforms. It became difficult to obtain positions after study, because of the competition with graduates of modern institutions, better equipped for the world. Then, at last, the general transformation of society by nationalists, once power was in their hands, and revolutionaries, and also an opposition coming from atheists as well as modern Muslims, meant not only a reform, but a radical transformation of these institutions.

The period of foreign domination, be it British, French or Italian, had meant a westernization of the Arab leading class, and the rise of new, westernized classes, especially in the cities. Although each power had its own policy in the cultural field, it may safely be said that in nearly all cases a certain image of western culture was seducing the younger generations. This is especially true in regard to those who

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24) R. Brunschvig, referring here to the situation in the Zaytūna in art. *Tunisia-Muslim Religion-Education,* EI IV: 863 (English edition).

grew up in the cities and who wanted a change from the established tradition in which they had been nurtured and which, they felt, was suffocating them. By and large, only the West could offer inspiration and means for such a change. These people went to the modern, preferably foreign schools, and studied in France, England and Germany.

Those who went to the Muslim educational institutions came often from the countryside and had hardly had any contact with forms of Western culture. These institutions provided schools for a group which was untouched by Western influence and which represented certain social, often rural classes. The decline of such old classes, their total disappearance, or simply their losing ground with regard to the dominating westernized classes, is an important factor for the final decline of the Muslim institutions under consideration. Another reason, of course, was the lack of response of these institutions to the Western influence, which remained for them foreign, non-Muslim and religiously contemptible.

When reaction against the West becomes politically strong, Islam obtains a new symbolic importance. In order to give this Islam a function in the forming of a new self-consciousness, institutional transformations had to be made, allowing to form a new type of religious leaders. These transformations, which will be dealt with in the next section, were realized by the nationalists who had the power, together with the few religious leaders who had themselves enjoyed a western ducation, in addition to their Muslim education.

III. *The Present Period of National Independence*

The relatively short period of independence so far enjoyed by the Arab countries makes a conclusive interpretation of the changing situation of Muslim institutions of higher education and learning impossible. Some developments, however, can be noted.

The fact of independence itself meant the victory of an ideology which, although using and sometimes leaning upon Islam, is not identical with it and never can be. The majority of the nationalists may see in this religion an important contribution to national life, but their aim is not to realize the wishes of the religious leaders. However, they will back and support such reforms and transformations in Islam as will make it viable with the national state. On the other hand there are those for whom Islam is the supreme value on earth, and who

search for forms, ideas, inspiration for a "restoration" of Islamic values in society. There are diferent types of them, with different ideas of how these values should be realized; in the Arab countries, especially since the prohibition of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the revolution of 1952, orthodox groups do not show great militancy because there are no powerful Muslim parties.

It seems more and more that any claim of autonomous power on the side of the orthodox religious leaders, however legitimate their demands may seem to be from their point of view, has less chance in this period than ever to be acceptable to the national governments. In practice such a claim will be denied, although it theoretically may still be recognized by nationalists whose ideology becomes more and more linked with "Arab" or "Islamic" social ideals, and who cannot dispense with the Muslim masses. It is this theoretical recognition with its giving way to Islamic ideals ("Islamic state", etc.) and the different practice, which makes present day Arab policy with regard to Islam so confusing. Though the situation differs by country, it can safely be said that no leader in an Arab country could afford a public "secular" stand. Consequently, the present situation of Muslim higher education should be seen above all as a working compromise between government and religious leaders, whereby the latter have no organization of their own and cannot but rely on the Muslim feeling of the masses, the ideology and tradition of Islam nominally recognized by everyone, and on their own faith.

It is no accident that it was not during the period of foreign control but during the years of national independence that the institutions under consideration have been transformed; politically speaking, this was only now possible. When one compares the current transformations with the various previous reforms, the latter appear to have been rather adaptations; and as to contents—mainly formal. The real purposes of the recent transformations as well as their concrete and ideal implications are still difficult to discern. But three types of innovations of religious Muslim studies can be distinguished:

a. The *creation of a Faculty of Islamic Law (Sharīᶜa)* at a modern state university, incorporating an existing Muslim institution of higher education. The diploma of such a faculty, generally obtained in four years, usually leads to a judicial career, but may also lead to teaching.

Islamic Studies at Arab State Universities

	Year	Students	Girls*	Grad°	Total no. of Students in University	Total no. Teachers in University	Women*
1. The Faculty of Shariᶜa (of 1960) of the University of Rabat, or Muhammad V University (1957)	1961-62	28	2		4,480		
2. The Faculty of Shariᶜa (of 1954) of the University of Damascus (1923)	1960-61	317	42		13,785		
	1961-62	506	62		16,854		
	1962-63	731	77		20,515		
3. The Sunni Faculty of Shariᶜa (of 1958) of the University of Baghdad (1958) [independent of the graduate Institute of Islamic Studies, established in 1962 at the same University]	1960-61	176		41	12,261	728	4
	1961-62	273		32	13,158	792	9
	1962-63	391		12	14,329	517	18
4. In Tunisia, the Zaytūna higher studies have become the "Al-Zaytūna Faculty of Theology (Shariᶜa) and Religious Sciences" (of March 1961) of the University of Tunis (1960). In this Faculty there were in:	1960-61	300	0		2,495		
	1961-62	380	5		2,700		

* Included in total.
° Not included in total.

Both require the knowledge of Islamic Law and the principles of Islamic religion. A few examples follow (see page 120).

b. A *radical transformation of an existing old institution*, which loses thereby its former autonomy with regard to the state.

Two examples can be given:

1. The *Qarawiyīn Universiy* was formally established in February 1963 under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. It is at present comprised of three faculties:

(a) *Faculty of Sharīᶜa,* which had already been opened on October 22, 1960 in Fes, with an annex of the Faculty of Law of the *Muḥammad V University.* In 1961-62 the Sharīᶜa Faculty had 28 students, of whom two were girls. It is the successor of the old Qarawiyīn mosque college where, in 1957-58, including the University annex, 67 + 47 of the students were in higher studies. In June 1957 the first stone was placed for the Islamic University City of Sharrarda, with 800 places, including the secondary level. In time, teaching and lodging was transferred from the old mosque and madrasas. In 1959 the bread allowance was replaced by money. It should be noted that the total educational system of the Qarawiyīn in November 1956 still amounted to approximately 3,850 students at all levels. A restoration of the mosque building has taken place. Study at the Faculty is now for three years.

(b) *Faculty of Arabic Language* in Marrakesh, following up the old institution Ben Youssef, where in November 1956 the total educational system comprised 1,470 students; in 1957-58 there were 46 + 28 students for higher studies, including those studying at an annex of the Faculty of Law of the Muḥammad V University.

(c) *Faculty of "Uṣūl al-dīn" in Tetwān,* following up an existing center of Islamic studies which had, in 1957-58 1,090 students (primary and secondary levels). There were approximately ten other institutions of this type existing at that time.

2. The *Azhar University* was reorganized by law no. 103 of June 23, 1961 [25]). Because of the importance of this institution we should like to enter into some details.

The reforms of the early thirties had not really broadened the mentality of the teachers and students. On the contrary, the more Europe made itself felt, and the more the state university developed its modern studies, the more the Azhar retreated and kept to tradition and authority. A German scholar, studying here in the early fifties, gives an invaluable account of the spirit in which the teaching took place, not-

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25) Signed by the President on 5 July, 1961.

withstanding external innovations. He found there still the spirit of
the old madrasa mosque with its particular style and ideals of learning,
and illustrates this with examples of the basic presuppositions (place
of religion, law, Qur'ān, thought concepts, etc.), the form of the lecture
(which was basically a "lectio" of a given passage, with explanation),
the way in which old and new subjects (Qur'ānic exegesis, compara-
tive literature) were treated without a sense of self-criticism, the
"medieval" style in which discussions between teacher and listeners
take place, etc. He remarks then that students and some rectors indeed
wanted a fundamental change, but that many shaykhs and other re-
sponsible persons were opposed to it [26]). A fluid organism like al-
Azhar, in practice, seemed to be unreorganizable. As a matter of fact,
some personalities who attempted to do so have had to resign.

The events which followed made a transformation possible. In 1954,
after the revolution, there was slight alteration in the programs. On
January 1, 1956, the sharī'a courts were abolished; so the graduates
of the fiqh studies of al-Azhar needed supplementary instruction in
civil law in order to enter the judicial career. Politically speaking, the
presidential powers increased; a Union with Syria was established;
the first ideas of "Arab socialism" were launched. Within al-Azhar
itself, there were shaykhs calling for reorientation in a sometimes
revolutionary way (such voices could make themselves heard after
1952); some Azharites having studied abroad, particularly in Germany,
thinking about the role of Islam in modern society, came into leading
positions. The new Shaykh al-Azhar, Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt, acting
since 1957, and appointed in 1958, introduced some further reforms:
obligatory and more foreign languages, a statement against the abuse

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26) The late Professor Jörg Kraemer; see his two articles mentioned in note
20. So for instance: "Damit aber sieht sich der tiefer blickende Betrachter auch
in der gegenwärtigen Azhar der Macht eines Beharrungsvermögen gegenüber,
das angesichts der überall spürbaren Pression des Modernismus heute im isla-
mischen Orient einzig dastehen dürfte. In den Hörsaalen der Azhar weht in
der Tat noch immer die jahrhundertealte Luft der Moschee-Madrasa, die der
traditionellen Unterrichtspraxis des Islams wie seinem ursprünglichen, geistlich
bestimmten Bildungsideal überhaupt ihren Stempel von Anfang an unvertilgbar
aufgeprägt hat." (*Die Azhar-Universität in Kairo*, p. 377). Compare J. Jomier:
"There is as yet no question at Al-Azhar of studies profiting by modern histo-
rical methods or broadening themselves under the influence of modern trends
of thought. Learning by heart, and storing up pages of texts in the memory,
seems to be the essential requirement of students". (*Azhar* EI², English edition,
p. 821).

of repudiation *(talāq)* and the introduction of Shī⁽ite (Zaidite and Twelver) fiqh. Just before the summer recess of the National Union in 1961, the project of law was presented and adopted, after a night discussion, as the last act of the Union during the session of 1960-61. In other words, the state succeeded in imposing this important law— just as old reforms had to be imposed upon the Azhar.

The dichotomy between the religious and the modern institutions of learning, beginning with Muḥammad ⁽Alī, disappears. Not only are the Azhar programs adjusted so that a passing to and from the state universities becomes possible, and so that the secondary level schooling will not be basically different, but also the Azhar itself acquires new faculties, in which the students have only a few hours of Islamic instruction: the faculties for "Business and Administration," "Engineering and Industries," Agriculture and Medicine [27]). According to the law the Azhar is to retain its role as the greatest Islamic university, with its particular mission for Islam and science so that students should be acquainted with both.

The Azhar University is now only one of five different Azhar institutions. The other four are the Supreme Council of al-Azhar *(al-majlis al-a⁽lā)*, the Academy of Islamic Reseach *(majma⁽ al-buḥūth al-islāmiyya)*, the Direction of Culture and Islamic Missions *(idārat ath-thaqāfa wa'l-bu⁽ūth al-islāmiyya)*, and the (primary and secondary levels) Azhar institutions *(ma⁽āhid)*. The Azhar depends upon the Presidency, and the President nominates by decree a Minister of Azhar Affairs; at the moment he is also Minister of Waqfs [28]). The authority of the Shaykh al-Azhar, who presides over the Supreme Council, is mainly that of spiritual leadership [29]), but it is connected with all aspects of Islamic studies at the Azhar and its institutions.

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27) Article 34. The same article mentions the old faculties which are maintained: Faculties of Islamic studies "the number of which will be determined by executive order" (at this moment there are two: The Faculty of Islamic Law or *Sharī⁽a*, and the Faculty of the Fundamentals of Religion, or *Uṣūl al-Dīn*). Provisions are made for other faculties and institutes which can be created by presidential decree; at this moment there is one: The Islamic Faculty for Girls, with four modern departments, established in Ma⁽ādī.

28) The direct and the indirect influence of the President and the Minister of Azhar Affairs is probably very great. The Minister appoints the deans of the faculties, proposed by the Rector and approved by the *Shaykh Al-Azhar*. In the U.A.R., the deans of the faculties of the state universities are not elected. There are many ways of indirect influence too.

29) Hūwa al-imām al-akbaru (art. 4).

The late Shaykh Shaltut had been strongly opposed to this law and its consequences; after his death in 1963, Shaikh Ḥasan Maʾmūn became his successor (in 1964). The present rector of the University of al-Azhar is Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Bāqūrī, who was Minister of Waqfs and Azhar Affairs in 1953 and for a few years subsequently.

The enrollment figures of the Azhar for various years are as follows: [30])

							15 Dec.
	1945-6	1953	1959-60	1960-1	1961-2	1962-3	1963*
Fac. Arabic Language	1,162	1,655	2,265	2,416	1,982	2,490	2,201
Fac. Sharīʿa	873	1,603	1,483	1,787	1,969	2,023	1,899
Fac. Theology (Uṣūl al-Dīn)	538	707	1,222	1,550	1,823	2,140	1,798
Total	2,573	3,965	4,970	5,753	5,774	6,653	5,898
Fac. Business and Administration						622	751
Islamic Faculty for Girls						153	202
Total						7,428	6,851

Total of Azhar Educational system (all levels)	14,402	29,083	39,745	42,048

* Excluding foreign students.

The number of foreign students is important: Eight hundred fourteen in 1945-46 for all levels, 4,586 in 1953 for all levels, and about 2,500 in January 1959 for the higher levels in Cairo. At the university alone, there were more than 900 in 1962-63 [31]). In 1959 construction

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30) These figures do not include postgraduate students. In 1962-63, there were altogether 411: 171 in the Fac. Arabic Language, 116 in the Fac. Sharīʿa, and 124 in the Fac. Theology (Uṣūl al-Dīn). In this same year 1215 students graduated in these three Faculties, respectively 461, 349 and 405.

31) The figures for 1962-63 are the following:

Faculty	Undergraduate students			Postgraduate students		
	Total number	Foreign	Percentage of Foreigners	Total number	Foreign	Percentage of Foreigners
Arabic Language	2,490	369	14.8	171	3	1.7
Sharīʿa	2,023	373	18.4	116	12	7.2
Uṣūl al-Dīn	2,140	129	6.1	124	54	43.5
Business and Administration	622	30	4.8	—	—	—
Islamic Faculty for Girls	153	1	0.7	—	—	—
	7,428	902		411	69	

started on an immense University city for foreign students; at the moment, thousands of people from Africa and Asia can be lodged there and have special courses if they cannot follow the Azhar program as such. It is indeed possible that, especially for the Islamic studies, the Azhar will increase in importance as an international center [32]. On the other hand, each year preachers and teachers are sent abroad: These numbered 112 in 1953, about 180 in January 1959, and the number has increased since. A number of Azhar students are sent on study missions to the West. As an example, the projected figure for 1965-66 is 130 (of which 24 will be from the religious faculties); 1966-67, 148 (40—religious faculties); 1969-70, 129 (14—religious faculties). The teaching staff for all levels of Azhar instruction was 1,789 in 1957-58 for a total of 37,215 students, 1,496 in 1959-60 for a total of 39,745 students, and 1,974 in 1961-62 for a total of 42,048 students. Of these, there were 246 at the three Islamic faculties of the university in 1959-60, and 213 in 1961-62. The number of teachers will increase, according to the projections, by large percentages [33]. In 1919 the budget was LE 136,000. It increased consider-

32) During our visit to the *Madīna al-buᶜūth,* in December 1963, we found 41 large buildings lodging about 3,100 students from 64 countries at the time; about 700 of them followed courses at the Azhar University. This "City of Missions" was founded in 1954, and opened in 1959 (H. 1378) when the millennium of organized Azhar teaching (since H. 378 = 988 A.D.) was celebrated. It has cost two million LE, and constructions at the time of our visit were made at a cost of another half million LE. Its students receive ten to twelve LE per month, plus board and loging. There are restaurants, sport facilities, a mosque etc., plus a well-equipped dispensary with five doctors.

33) The number of teachers at the Azhar University at the end of December 1963 was the following:

Faculty	Professors	Assistant Professors	Lecturers	Active Demon-strators*	Total
Arabic Language	13	21	34	18	86
Sharīᶜa	17	23	56	18	114
Uṣūl al-Dīn	9	14	22	18	69
Business and Administration	5	9	13	21	48
Islamic Faculty for Girls	3	5	12	13	33
Education	1	2	2	10	15
Engineering and Industries	2	4	6	12	24
Agriculture	2	2	3	10	17
Medicine	2	3	5	13	23
	54	83	159	133	489

* About 60 demonstrators ware at that time on mission in Europe or America.

ably: in 1954 it was LE 1,617,200; in 1958 LE 2,125,100; in 1962-63 LE 3,826,600. There has been projected an impressive budget for the seven years 1963/64-1969/70. Only Muslim students are admitted to the university to study for degrees; only Muslims are on the staff [34]). Three degrees are conferred: the higher licence *(ijāzah ͨalīya)*, equivalent to the license or bachelor degree of other universities in the U.A.R.; the specialization degree *(takhaṣṣuṣ)*, equivalent to the master's degree; a *ͨālamīya* degree in either of the faculties of Islamic or Arabic studies, equivalent to a Ph. D. degree, or in other faculties which has there practically the same character as a Ph. D. degree [35]).

The new Azhar, with its five institutions, has the following functions, according to the explanatory note of the law: higher education, research related to or resulting from this higher education, and the imparting of the spiritual, intellectual and scientific heritage to Islamic and Arab peoples [36]).

c. Elsewhere, the *establishment of new religious institutions* was hardly connected with earlier existing teaching institutions. Two examples can be given: The new *King Saͨūd Islamic University* was founded in 1962 in Madīna, with 512 students in 1962-63. A College of Sharīͨa had been established in 1954 in Riyāḍ, and teaching also

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34) Implied in Articles 57, 58 and 59. It is a rule that only Muslim students can obtain Azhar degrees. Still, some fifty years ago, some non-Muslim students could be found at al-Azhar. The budget for constructions over 1963/64--1969/70 amounts to LE 9, 672, 290, not including the construction budget of the "City of Missions."

35) Article 75.

36) Al-azharu hūwa al-hayʾatu ʾl-ͨilmiyyatu ʾl-islāmiyyatu ʾl-kubra ʾlatī taqūmu ͨala ḥifẓi ʾt-turāthi ʾl-islāmiyyi wa-dirāsatihi wa-tajliyatihi wa-nashriri; wa-taḥmilu amānata ʾr-risālati ʾl-islāmiyyati ilā kulli ʾsh-shuͨūbi; wa-taͨmalu ͨala iẓhāri ḥaqīqati ʾl-islāmi wa-atharihi fī taqaddumi ʾl-bashari wa-ruqī ʾl-hadā-rati wa-kafālati ʾl-amni wa-t-tumaʾnīnati wa-rāhati ʾn-nafsi li-kulli ʾn-nāsi fī ʾl-dunya wa-fī ʾl-ākhirati (Article 2, beginning). What is said here about al-Azhar as such, can be compared with what is said about al-Azhar University in Article 33.

The authorized but not litteral French translation of the quoted text is: "L'Azhar est la plus grande Institution savante islamique, pour la conservation et la sauvegarde des traditions islamiques, l'étude, l'interprétation et la propagation des principes islamiques. Elle accomplit en toute conscience la mission de l'Islam auprès de tous les peuples. Elle travaille à faire ressortir la vérité de l'Islam et son influence sur le développement et le progrès de l'humanité ainsi que sur l'évolution de la civilisation. Elle garantit également le maintien de la sécurité, de la tranquillité et de la sérénité de l'âme à tout individu aussi bien sur la terre que dans l'au-delà."

takes place in the College of Sharīᶜa in Mecca, established after the war and reorganized in 1961, with 25 teachers and 250 students in 1962-63. A similar institution is the *University of Sayyed Muḥammad Ibn ᶜAlī Senussi* at Bayda in Libya, awarding degrees in religion, Qurʾānic studies and Arabic language. It is at the peak of the Libyan religious educational system, separate from the modern one—just as the Azhar has its own educational institutions in Egypt. A number of foreign students, especially from Africa, study at the Sanūsiyya institutions. The total budget of these institutions for 1964-65 is a million Libyan Pounds.

In all three cases, the transformations are in the first place institutional, but they go beyond the adaptive reforms of the previous period [37]. However, deeper consequences for the interpretation of Islam itself may be foreseen. The most striking fact, actually, is that the class of religious leaders is coming indirectly under government control, and it is precisely the governments which need reinterpretations of existing religious traditions, in view of their national policies. In a Shīᶜite place like *Najaf,* on the other hand, with its autonomous mosque colleges and madrasas, such a control is still far from realization. We visited Najaf twice (1960 and 1963) and could still find some ten institutions where in some form higher education takes place, and about twenty with education at a "secondary" level. However, in general the students live at the madrasas and have their courses at the mosque, especially for the higher levels. Only the *Kulliyyat al-Fiqh* has some official arrangement with the University of Baghdad. In this regard it should be remembered that the Shīᶜites never make such compromises with the government as do the Sunnis [38].

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37) A comparative study of the programs of these institutions would certainly be rewarding.

38) A study on the history of and the situation prevailing today in Najaf has not yet been published. Yet, apart from its interest for the sociology of a "holy city of learning", such a study would contribute to our knowledge of Shīᶜa Twelver learning and of Shīᶜite movements in general. Moreover, there are precious manuscripts in Najaf, besides other treasures.

Cf., on Najaf, Bayard Dodge: "Because of its sanctity, Shīᶜite rulers and philanthropists have established endowments and are constantly making new contributions, to support the mosques of the city, as well as the residence halls associated with them. About half of the scholars are married, living in their own homes, but the others are accomodated in 24 quadrangles similar to those at Fās." (*Muslim Education in Medieval Times,* 1962, p. 27). We should mention

Social science can help analyze the reasons (which are deeper than "political") behind the recent transformations. Economically, the old institutions were hardly viable. Culturally, they were no longer the expression of an elite. Starting out on the making of their own history, the new states try to create a new form of consciousness and need a new philosophy of education. Especially in the face of the forces which are unevenly, but gradually, pressing on contemporary Arab society—technological modernization, economic development, and a certain secularization—the time of the autonomous teaching of religion in mosque, madrasa and ribāṭ is definitely over.

IV. *Muslim Institutions of higher Education and Islam*

In drawing conclusions and questions from the foregoing materials, we confine ourselves to three aspects: 1) The historical role of the institutions under consideration, 2) Their meaning with regard to Islamic religion, 3) Inferences from both role and meaning about Islam in the further or recent past.

1) The role in history

The concrete task of Muslim institutions of Higher Education was to educate an elite corps well versed in Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy. This corps was a religious elite within a society impregnated by Islam.

The positive side of their activity was, first of all, the creation of a Sharīᶜa giving to the Islamic community, beyond all local differences, a common orientation [39]. Then, they defended this community in

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the Maktaba al-Imām Amīr al-Muᵓminīn as an important library. Although it is alleged that there are 10,000 students in Najaf, their number cannot exceed 5,000 and may not be more than 2000. There are about 25 madrasas, some ten to fifteen in Karbela, and not more than ten in Qazimayyin and Samarra combined. Besides the supreme head of Shīᶜa learning who possesses immense authority, there are in Najaf five ᶜālims (scholar-saints) and twenty-five *mujtahids* (authoritative thinkers). Under the mujtahids are the *muᶜallims* (either teaching or just studying); then the students follow. This hierarchy in learning corresponds with a hierarchy in authority, which is pertinent.

39) Comp. H. A. R. Gibb: "It is almost impossible to overestimate the influence on Muslim religious thought of this legal activity. Once the science and structure of law were established, they not only supplied a rigid frame for the Muslim ideals of ethical duty and human relations (with the slight element of flexibility allowed by the four schools), but the law itself, the Sharia, defined once and for all the constitution of the Muslim Community. The Sharia to the Muslim stands for all that the Constitution stands for the United States of

various ways. They could counterbalance an arbitrary exercise of power and defend to a certain extent the masses against unlimited despotism by making known certain norms of Islam to any Muslim ruler. Their nearly absolute upholding of classical Islamic values, at least in theory, made Islamic society continue to exist also in times of spiritual dryness when the religious leaders and mystics, at least, kept to the basic norms of this society. In the face of foreign conquerors and occupants, the religious institutions served as a refuge against threats from abroad, also from non-Muslims. A response to such threats was perhaps born elsewhere; but at least in the religious institutions, mosque and madrasa, the foreigner had no say. Within the institutions themselves, there was a great freedom both for teachers and students. Finally, the madrasas maintained the linguistic and literary tradition of Arabic.

The negative side of this kind of elite was first of all a religious self-sufficiency, which was the natural consequence of the type of education they had received. This education must also be held partly responsible for the split between the Norm and the Facts, the Ideal and the Real, which permeated Islamic society more and more. The upholding of the norms was actually often at the price of a lack of genuine interest, and consequently an ignorance as to the reality of the world, Muslim or non-Muslim. In the long run, in the course of history, the type of invariable knowledge and instruction given in these institutions could not but lead to a growing estrangement and a diminishing influence of this elite *).

America and more". (*The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam,* in Hamilton A. R. Gibb's "Studies on the Civilization of Islam" ed. by Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk, London 1962, p. 199-200).

* In this connection, some questions arise for further investigation. What has been the significance of the foreign sciences, firstly accepted but finally, for the most part, rejected because of a tendency to concentrate on the purely Islamic sciences only? What has been the significance of the monastic education, which arrived later and which practically disappeared only a short time ago? The two types of schooling—*madrasa* and *ribāṭ*—how have they been inter-related in Islamic history? What, then, has been the significance of the ma-drasas themselves? Was it a first sign of decadence, when this kind of insti-tutionalizing suggested a study not only by religious devotion but also for worldly positions? And, more important, have they not finally established the reign of traditional orthodoxy and its particular compromise with the worldly power? In detail, how has the traditional interpretation of what Islam is, was and ever will be, been transmitted in these madrasas? At what moment, and how, did the responsible elite turn from a class into a caste?

In more recent history—is it true that Muslim learning already found itself

2) The meaning with regard to Islam

The lack of appreciation which the Muslim institutions of learning often found among Western observers and scholars seems to have obscured the question of the meaning of these institutions from the Muslim point of view. An observer living in a secular culture may be tempted to judge an education proper to a religious culture, and be handicapped in understanding the religious intention of the phenomenon concerned. However, besides those scholars interested in the facts of "change" and emphasizing the gradual disappearance of certain expressions, there must be those who look for "permanences," emphasizing permanent mental structures under different expressions. In the latter case, there is a need both of a "historical" feeling for the deeper reality of a historical situation and its potentialities, and of a "phenomenological" transposition of the investigator's mind into the intentions of the studied facts. Under these conditions, the basic difference between religious and non-religious knowledge can be appreciated, with variations within each category [40]).

Evidently, the institutions provide a sort of knowledge, which may lead to ultimate felicity, but which also provides norms for the good society and for the right behavior of the individual. In other words, this knowledge contains the necessary "truth" for the world beyond, as well as here; this truth is "Islam". So, when providing the necessary knowledge of Islam and carrying it on over the generations, these

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in an impasse before the arrival of the West, and what was the deeper nature of this impasse? Still later, under the non-Muslim control, is it true that the reforms which were imposed were not correlated with a real intellectual, moral and spiritual revision, but were adjustments under the pressures of the moment, pressures which were themselves only outbursts of long existing tensions? What was, actually, the nature of the antagonism between the "conservative" and the "modernist" Muslim tendencies, and to what extent is it continued in an antagonism between the "religious" and the "nationalist" groups who have, respectively, had their education at religious and at modern institutions of learning?

40) Such a starting point could lead to a more adequate study of the Muslim institutions of higher learning and education. Besides the work of fact-finding, attention has to be given to subjects like the contents and classification of the Islamic sciences, and the prevailing ideals of *adīb* and *ᶜālim* (resp. litterarily cultivated and religiously learned person). Internal meaning patterns should be laid bare: Why the meditation of the Qurᵓān and with what effects (not rational)? Why the traditions learnt by heart as proverbs of wisdom (not "pseudo-historical")? Why the fiqh elaboration as a normative construction (not as "bad law")? In general: what could be said about the methods of memorizing and reproducing applied in religious teaching?

institutions followed the established orthodox interpretation of what this "Islam" is.

These places, although provided with a prayer hall or directly connected with a mosque, were not as such places of religious "education," understood as a sort of strengthening of individual faith and religious experience. This has not only to do with the discretion of orthodox Islam with regard to the individual conscience of the faithful, and with the absence of modern individualism in Muslim society. The cause is, in fact, intimately related to the meaning of religious knowledge in orthodox Islam, a knowledge which is independent of the "opinion" of the knower, for it is sacred in itself: It is meritorious to know Qurʾān, Tradition, Law, even if one would not understand. Exercises in piety, mysticism and spiritual "revivalist" movements were born outside of these institutions, except insofar as such movements claimed to return to Qurʾān and Sunnah in its pure form. What to the outsider seems to be dry, formal and abstract knowledge, may be to the "practitioner" ultimate joy of the knowledge of true Islam, to which the knower himself was subordinate.

Enough has been said already by Western and Muslim observers about the narrow horizon of the Muslim religious leaders. Much of it, by its very nature, is due to this particular form of education, concentrated on this special type of religious knowledge, whereby scientific knowledge and secular culture fall out of the scope. This elite of an Islamic society had only to know Islam as it "really" is. The best ones were devoted to such studies and were, apart from an immense "classical" knowledge, of a high morality, and often a great piety. Western objections to the stress on memory, the lack of originality, the traditionalism, etc., come from a culture with a different type and quality of knowledge, which hardly knows any more of an "inductive" pedagogy.

It is over and above this religious knowledge that, under Western influence, certain groups began to ask for a utilitarian, if not technical knowledge. Furthermore, there were people compelled by a real desire for knowledge, culture, and widening of horizon. The authentic drive for "education" in Arab countries seems indeed to have a secular undertone, as an indirect protest against religious cultural forms, and as a desire to change an established situation. The religious institutions became necessarily unsatisfactory for those who looked for a complete-

ly different type of knowledge and who wanted education for quite
different purposes. In this connection, it would be interesting to study
to what extent the rise of "modern" and the decline of "religious"
learning may be connected with a decline and, in some cases, a collapse
of traditional religion in the area. For not only has a given, more or
less closed, religious universe broken down in the mind and a separation
from existing religious forms and practices come about, but a "modern"
Arab mind describes and interprets reality in immanent terms, though
he may use a religious vocabulary, seeking earthly solutions for what
were previously considered to be religious questions. Certain types of
atheism prevail amongst the younger generations, though the idea of
Islam may be retained as one of the supreme ideas of society. Here,
at last, the split between Norm and Fact comes to its logical end [41]).

3) Muslim Institutions and Islam

As the essential task of Muslim institutions of higher education is
to communicate knowledge of and about Islam, there is a close inter-
relationship between, on the one hand, not only the contents of learning,
but also the institutional setting and, on the other hand, the various
shapes which Islam is taking in the course of its history [42]).

When Islam is conceived of as consisting of only Qurʾān and
Sunnah, as in its beginning and among the so called traditionalists,
then there is hardly need for specialized institutions. Teaching can
very well take place in the mosque; only when more room is needed
are special schools created, in which teaching remains confined to what
is considered to be the elementary religious truth, without much display
of the intellect, e.g., among the Ḥanbalites and, for that matter, the
Wahhābites.

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41) The present stress within Islam upon its being an "earthly" religion could
be considered as an indirect proof of this. It is significant that this idea was
born not so much in the circles of the religious leaders, but in those Muslim
milieux which had an immediate contact with the West.

42) Comp. what was said in Section I, pp. 8-10. An advantage of the so-
called phenomenological approach is that it enables the investigator to distinguish
various shades, levels and qualitative differences within an entity like Islam, which
is in general presented by its adherents as one massive block. It is, e.g., always
a certain ideal of religious knowledge and practice which is proclaimed to be
the "absolute" Islam; actually, several ideals existed and continue to exist one
beside the other. In our context, such an approach helps the appreciation of
different forms of religious education within Islam, as expressions of different
ideas of what Islam "is".

As soon as possible implications for the life of individual and community are deduced in a systematic way from the study of Qurʾān and Sunnah, the so called religious sciences arise. Although their main problems may have been heavily conditioned by the expansion of Islam in Hellenized and Christianized territories and by the political interests of the rulers, the development of these sciences had its own impetus. The fact that large parts of them have hardly had any practical effect is an indirect proof of this autonomous development. There is active discussion at the time when these religious sciences are in process of growth, and although the main place of religious learning remains the mosque, the instruction and discussion can take place in bookshops, saloons and palaces as well.

At the moment, however, that religious knowledge is considered enriched by schools of thought of non-Islamic origin, like Greek or Hellenistic philosophy (Aristotle, Plotinus) or Persian doctrines of initiation (in Ismāʿīlism), special institutions are created, either to translate foreign texts, or to initiate adepts to esoteric knowledge (Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ). Little is known about them (especially the latter), as they either disappeared rapidly, or had to lead a non-public existence. The very fact of their gradual disappearance not only reflects the course which Islam took, but also the more narrow idea which became prevalent of what true religious knowledge was.

Actually, the process of defining what became recognized religious knowledge can be followed step by step. First of all, the religious sciences themselves, even when supplemented by Kalām, came into their own fulfillment, where new developments could not but become rarer and rarer, and where the authorities of the past achieved ever increasing prestige. At this point, religious knowledge is no longer participation in the development of the religious sciences, but has become the acquisition of them as a body of knowledge, an objectively given thing which someone could "learn". In the second place, the struggle between various, sometimes very different, schools of thought, each with its own ways of teaching its particular doctrines, comes to an end when the rulers favor the one and neglect the other. In the third place, in connection with the public authority but not determined by it, an orthodoxy established itself, determining what the right practice and doctrine must be.

When religious knowledge reaches the point that, from the inside

as well as from the outside, it has become a fixed entity of correct learning, then the establishment of one pattern of schools in this matter has sense; the more so when there are definite social and political interests behind such an establishment. The madrasa educational system, both from the point of view of the state and from that of the religious leaders, was the type of education to be encouraged and maintained. "Islam" is there defined as the totality of the religious sciences, from which other sciences are excluded. This ideal Islam, where the intellectual aspects are all-dominant, becomes the current idea of what Islam is: a thing to be known, taught at the madrasa.

Only the mystical movements develop another idea of Islam, besides that of the madrasas. Here religious knowledge is experience rather than learning, and the ribāts are actually places of religious education, initiation and practice. The Islam taught here has a qualitatively different form from the Islam taught at the madrasas—a difference which could hardly be blurred by the magnanimous orthodox acceptance of a part of the Ṣūfī doctrines into the body of the "religious sciences," like Tafsīr, ᶜIlm al-Ḥadīth and Fiqh. In contrast to the ideal intellectual Islam of the sciences, Islam of Ṣūfism can well be called an ideal Islam of the heart.

Inasmuch as the madrasa represented the institution where orthodox Islam was taught, it is worthwhile to make some inferences from the institution of the madrasa about the characteristic traits of the established orthodox idea of what Islam is like.

a. Islamic religious consciousness, as fostered by these institutions, seems to have been exclusively concerned with the religious norms of life, a concern which was cherished by a basically otherworldly interest. In the course of time, this nearly absolute norm-consciousness could not but lead to a split between the knowledge of the ideal on the one hand, and of the real on the other hand, which became practically neglected.

b. Although deprived of an autonomous religious institution, Islam came more to have a special class of religious leaders: Those who had studied the religious sciences. They have certainly been in contact with the actual problems of society, but seem to have formed more and more a caste separated from it, especially when society began changing under the influence of the West. In fact, there may be a parallelism

between this caste-formation and the gradual decline of the educational institutions, although the latter is due mainly to other causes.

c. It may be submitted that the permanent character, the institutional setting, and contents and method of teaching at the madrasa are to a large extent responsible for the established, invariable, orthodox interpretation of Islam. Not only did there come to prevail a certain idea of what Islam unto eternity was, but also other interpretations of Islam were only accepted within the limits set by the orthodoxy with its madrasas. No need was felt, and even the possibility was not seen, of other interpretations which would differ from the Islam taught at the classical institutions.

d. The scholars teaching at the madrasas seem not to have been aware of the historical conditioning of all knowledge, including religious knowledge. This seems to be parallel to the idea of Islam itself as an ideal, eternal, unchangeable entity. The consequence is that to the extent that society began to change, the very learning of these establishments estranged the students from the changing reality and from the truth of the time. The minds were not only "narrow" from the humanistic point of view—they were also oriented exclusively to unchanging norms and ideals. One could submit that the teaching of such a religious knowledge becomes, in the course of time, automatically unreal, and untrue with regard to human life. So, indirectly, the elite educated at these institutions became also responsible for the stagnation of Muslim society; although this stagnation had other causes, the fact remains that this elite could not but fail to see what was going on, and was incapable of acting.

e. The original search for religiously relevant knowledge as the origin of the Islamic sciences seems to have become later a search for a certain dose of learning, giving the satisfaction of possessing the truth and leading to certain careers in society. When the quest for original knowledge *(ijtihād)* was declared to be impossible, the madrasa was born; from the beginning it was a place where knowledge was simply transferred from one generation to the other. From this point of view, Islam deprived itself of possible creative impulses from the inside through its ban on ijtihād, and its implementation in the religious system of education.

In the same way, inferences can be made from the most recent history

of Muslim institutions of higher education about certain developments
of Islam in modern times. Before enumerating some implications of
the transformations in the last decade, we must recall some implica-
tions of the fact that many Muslims are now educated at "modern"
institutions — universities or specialized higher institutes.

Since the coming of the West, Muslim institutions have lost their
educational monopoly. Missionary schools and schools of foreign
governments were established, while at the same time modern (mostly
governmental) schools were founded locally—both categories at the
primary, secondary, and also the higher levels. The Islam which was
in the minds of the students of these non-Muslim institutions could
not be the ideal Islam of the religious sciences, nor that of the ribāts.
It absorbed values taken from elsewhere, or it became reduced to a
strictly personal faith. Here the "modern" Muslim is born in his in-
finite number of variations, each with his own image of Islam, his
country and the West; each with his own hidden wishes and aspi-
rations with regard to religion in general and Islam in particular. Our
concern here, however, is the study at the transformed religious in-
stitutions. The following inferences may be made from the recent
transformations:

    1. The old autonomy of the madrasas is definitely at an end. Directly
or indirectly, the state controls the new institutions, the transformed
institutions and the Sharīᶜa Faculties through the budget, the appoint-
ments and the general implementation of the state policy. Consequently
it has a certain say in the way in which Islam is presented to the future
religious leaders and teachers. Even if the factual body of religious
knowledge would be taught as before, it can be put in a certain light
and with certain applications in accordance with what one expects
Islam to be. If, at the old Azhar, Islam could not be taught as a scienti-
fic, a peaceful, a socialistic religion, this is possible in the new insti-
tutional setting, whatever the motivations may be. The state, actually,
may need such presentations, in view of strengthening national con-
sciousness, sustaining an expensive policy towards less developed Mus-
lim countries, or presenting an acceptable Islam on the world scene.
There is, of course, a limit to the use of Islam for state interests only,
as the religious leaders will make valid the political pretensions of their
own religion and try to islamize the state. This may vary by country,

but the dialectical relation between state and religion in a Muslim country will always determine the limit of state interference in Muslim institutions.

2. Teachers and students of Islam have come much closer to the problems of their society than before. This is due, of course, to the changes of society itself, which brought about the disappearance of the madrasa seclusion, and which forced the inhabitants to pay attention to what was, and is, going on. Society is moving from a more or less integrated body, symbolized by Islam, to one in which the economic, political and other functions develop their own course in competition with each other; here Islam is one part, namely the ideological, among others. While the madrasa education was for the instruction of a certain elite, the education at a Shariᶜa Faculty serves to form certain types of specialists. Actually, present day society needs quite another type of elite than that of a century ago. So, on the one hand, the new institutions serve to educate future judges and lawyers and an increasing number of teachers of religion for the secondary and primary schools, as well as the officials connected with the mosques. On the other hand, there is a call for Islam to take the role of an integrating force in a changing society and national state. The ideal Islam of the religious sciences seems to give way, in one Arab country more than the other, to a social Islam which inculcates the inspiration of social integration and national development. It is a fact that Islam, in the Arab countries, shows more and more the features of what is commonly called an ideology, and becomes part of the battle in the worldly use of ideas.

3. In the recent transformations, it is striking how little the Islamic ultimate appears to have been a basic consideration. Only a few religious leaders seem to speak and act on what may be called religious grounds; the great majority rather adapt themselves simply to the circumstances. What is the role of the religious factor in these transformations? In the present circumstances it seems to be not possible to answer this essential question. One can only say that the traditional devotion inherent in the life at the madrasa is impossible in the overcrowded new institutions. To what extent the leaders in the new institutional setting will be able to develop original theological thinking, once the door of *ijtihād* is opened, will be an important element when

a conclusive judgment about the transformations will have to be made.

4. In a society which is secularizing in its own way, religious higher education is particularly important, not only because it moulds those who give religious education at the secondary schools, but also because it is an important element in the formation of Islamic thought itself.

The fundamental question is, of course, if Islamic higher *learning* has found a way out of the impasse at which it found itself. Only then will Muslim higher *education* be able to communicate relevant knowledge to the students. Their condition is a dramatic one, in a world lacerated by material and ideological tensions like the Arab world of today. For obvious reasons they adhere to those movements which promise more immediate justice and rehabilitation than either the classical Western or the classical Muslim institutions could give.

Regrettably, too little is known about their attitudes with regard to Islam; but whatever these may be, they will be a factor which determines the future forms of a changing Islam and, thereby, indirectly, the future of Muslim higher education [43]).

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43) The attention paid here to the *Muslim* institutions of higher education should not close the eyes to the tremendous development of *any* higher education in the Arab world. In Egypt, e.g., the rate of growth in the number of University students in the five years 1951/2 to 1956/7 has been in the order of 80%. That of elementary school students, on the other hand, has only been in the region of 30% for the same period (Mohamed Labib el-Negehi, *Towards a responsible elite. A study in Egyptian University Education,* New York 1958, p. 29). In Egypt again, for the academic year 1963-64, 21,788 new students were admitted to the four state universities. That year, the University of Cairo alone had 41,065 students enrolled; at the four state universities together, there were altogether 120,961 students. A study of the "modern" higher education in Arab countries should necessarily supplement any study on the typical "Muslim" higher education in these countries.

THE HERMENEUTICS OF THE MAYA CULT OF THE HOLY CROSS

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The Cult of the Holy Cross is a pre-Christian cosmological cult masquerading under Catholic symbolism and Christian forms. The central problem with which we will deal will be an hermeneutics of this Cult which goes beyond its classification and moves into the area of its meaning. An interpretation of meaning, however, is a many-sided problem but for the purposes of this article we will try to delimit it by the following discussion.

Meaning in relation to religion has two terms: authenticity and truth. Religion is a real relationship with divinity; therefore, all religion is authentic in so far as it establishes contact with divinity.

> "We affirm, then, that unless all existence is a medium of Revelation, no particular Revelation is possible." [1]

Authenticity, is, for our purposes, the central note of religion; that which is religion and not pseudo-religion is authentic. [2] Authenticity, however, is not truth. The truth of a religion, as the currently popular term 'encounter' suggests, is a question of the Truth of God and its reception by man. Since we must deal rationally with this problem, we cannot vouchsafe for the Truth of the Divine, although we can discuss it; we must deal mainly with the truth of the reception, and the truth of the reception by a people will depend on many factors. A religion, thus, may be genuine or authentic and at the same time of limited truth, full of distortions, whose symbols are impoverished and whose myths are vague, confused, and do not express a high level of understanding of divinity.

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1) William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1935), p. 306.

2) Joachim Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions* (New York: Morningside Heights, Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 37-38.

The truth of God may be one, but its reception by man historically has been many. This is so because the distinction between God and man is not the same type of distinction between man and other classes of beings. It is not, to use an example, the same as the distinction between man and animal. Man, it is true, shares the being of animal and plant, but the animal does not share the being of man. Hence, from the point of view of animal, the animal is nonrational in the sense that man is rational; there is a clear line—the animal is not man. The distinction between man and God, however, is different. From the point of view of God, man is not God; but from the point of view of man, there is no clear line between what is divine and what is human. When we pass the border between God and man, we find that it is not a clear boundary line, but a zone extending between God and man, and this amorphous zone is interpenetrated with both divinity and humanity. Secondly, reality *quo ad nos* is a paradox. All religious symbolism, and especially the myth, expresses this paradox. 3) Reality is both the one and the many; it is multi-leveled and it is complex. The history of all serious metaphysics testifies to these characters of reality. But the Divine, the Ultimate, which is the prototype of all reality, is to us a contradiction in terms—at once rational and at once beyond the limits of rationality. Hence, truth in terms of religious truth is an increasing, unceasing, struggle toward the truth; and this struggle, for reasons we do not know, has an historical structure, moving in ascending and descending curves through the time of humanity. 4)

Religion, in so far as it is a struggle toward truth, is only an approximation; in so far it deals with the paradox of reality and the limitations of human reason, it is a series of types of truth, some of which appear to be equal, many of which are not equal in any sense, but all of which, if they are religion, are authentic. Hence, authenticity

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3) See Eliade, "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism," in *History of Religions* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1959), and Eliade, *Images and Symbols* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), pp. 9-21 and 82-85.

4) See Eric Voegelin, *Order and History,* vol. I: *Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956-57), Introduction, where a discussion of this question will be found. See also Karl Rahner, "The Development of Dogma," in *Theological Investigations,* vol. I, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), for an analogous discussion of the problem of dogmatic development within Catholicism.

of religion or religion itself is not determined by one truth, nor mea-
sured by one set of criteria, but by many—any one of which will
establish the religion as authentic of its kind. Religion, therefore,
seems to be a genus with many species, and if a comparison with
animals does not carry us too far afield, a cow will be authentic as
a cow but not as a cat.

Certainly the idea of types of religious truth is not very new. There
has been preliminary agreement by comparative religionists and some
anthropologists for quite some time that there is both a type of religion,
known as primitive religion, which can be opposed to a "higher" type
of religion, in which is generally included the religions of the socio-
cultural structures called Civilizations. This recognition of a difference
between primitive religions and "higher" religions, however, while
moving in the right direction, is both too unrefined and uncritical to
be really useful. For these reasons, therefore, we introduce here Henri
Bergson's distinction between two types of religion and religious truth
—the difference between Christianity and all other religions—a diffe-
rence so profound that there could be no possibility of the reduction
or equalization of non-Christian religions with Christianity. [5]) Such
a distinction is both basic and refined enough to allow for a much
more critical understanding of how the Cult of the Holy Cross at once
prefigures, and is antithetical to, Christianity.

Bergson based his distinction between Christianity (supernatural
religion) and non-Christian religions (natural religons) on a difference
between natural man whose soul was closed and who lives, therefore,
in a closed society and Christian man whose soul was opened and who
lives in an open society. This difference was so radical that it almost
constituted, for Bergson, a difference in kind rather than degree. This
is so because between man of the closed soul and the tribal society

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5) Attempts at distinguishing Christianity from the non-Christian religions
have, of course, a history that goes back to the origins of Christianity itself,
and references for the Greek and Roman fathers and their pagan contesters,
many of whom probably made important contributions, can be found in various
places; for example, Voegelin, "The Struggle for Representation," in *The New
Science of Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 76-106.
St. Augustine, of course, is an early and important source of our understanding
of the distinction between Christianity and the pagan religions. However, as I
am not an expert in any of these fields, and because it appears that what Bergson
had to say goes beyond what was said, I cite him, with all the above qualifi-
cation, as the originator for our times at least of this important distinction.

and man of the open soul and the ecumenical society there is a radical chasm which, as Bergson stressed, can only be crossed by a "leap in being". There is, therefore, no possible way for tribal man to become Christian man by a series of gradual steps or openings from tribe to kingdom to nation to world. The man of the closed soul is thus constituted as so spiritually different from the man of the open soul that Bergson appears to be saying that mankind is not the genus man but is constructed into two different species, natural man and supernatural man. [6])

The brilliance of Bergson's construction, however, lies in the fact that he did not follow this line of development which ultimately culminates in radical historicism; but, at one and the same time, he stressed the spiritual, social, historical differences in human development, but did not deny that man also has a nature which transcends society and history. Bergson's discovery that man's radical difference from man lay not in ontological but *spiritual* differences opened the way for a whole new approach to man in terms of a typology of spiritual phenomena which, in a certain sense, is a return to the classic Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. [7])

If we accept the work of Bergson as substantially correct, we arrive at two types of truth, two types of religion which difffer radically the one from the other. "Unless all existence is a medium of revelation, no particular revelation is possible," because the reception and the truth of God is a socio-historical reception and the Truth *quo ad nos* is not one but many; for this reason there are types of truth and these types are embedded in the socio-historical conditions of man. But

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6) Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954).

7) In so far as we can categorize man's many receptions of the Truth of God into a series of paradigmatic types which have both a spiritual and historical structure transcending any particular religion and any particular society and moving into the problem of mankind as a meaningful unit in terms of an eschaton, we will have developed a hermeneutics of *religionwissenschaft* which leads into, and depends upon, a philosophy of history. Although this is both a central and crucial problem, it cannot be dealt with here beyond our preliminary treatment and use of Bergson's two basic spiritual and religious types. For a further discussion of this problem see Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History; The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), and "Methodological Remarks," op. cit., and Voegelin, *The New Science*, and *Order and History*, vol. II, pp. 1-24, and my forthcoming article on the hermeneutics of the history of religions as a philosophy of history.

these socio-historical grounds are not predeterminants of the response of man; they are only its conditions and its limitations. These conditions and limitations, however, are rarely transcended. Since this is so, man's response to God can be said to have an intelligible history. [8]) Thus, the problem of the hermeneutics of the Cult shifts from truth in general to the type of truth which the Cult represents and thence to the socio-historical grounds for the religious response.

The Cult of the Holy Cross began among the uprooted Maya Indians in the jungles of the Territory of Quintana Roo in 1850 in the middle of a war, the goal of which was the destruction of the Yucateco (Spanish-Creole upper class) society by the enserfed lower-caste Maya Indians, and the establishment of the power of the Maya *caciques* over the entire peninsula of Yucatan. [9]) By 1850 the remainder of the rebellious Indians had been driven into the jungles of Quintana Roo and their rebellion in other parts of the peninsula had been stamped out. It was at this moment that the Talking Cross appeared, and its general effect was the formation of a new military and religious cult which gave the Indians a new religious drive to continue the fighting. In other words, the Cult began in a situation of defeat and desperation —in a social crisis. With the appearance of a Talking Cross which claimed to speak for God, the Indians organized a theocratic military society around its Cult and carried the war on against great odds for fifty years longer. [10]) The Talking Cross had its historical precedents

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8) Whether the failure to transcend the socio-historical conditions which ground the understanding of man is his ultimate tragedy, his metaphysical sin, from the point of view of God—that is, whether all men could at all times have so transcended their limitations, so that there would be One Truth and one religion and no history of increasing struggle toward the Truth—is a point of discussion which is outside the boundary of this article and probably outside the rational limits of man's knowledge.

9) Eligio Ancona, *Historia de Yucatan desde la epoca mas remota hasta nuestros dias* (Merida, Yucatan: M. Heredia Arguelles, 1879), VI, 19; Gustavo Molina Font, *La Tragedia de Yucatan:* (Mexico, D.F.: Revista de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1941), pp. 47-60.

10) The rebellious Indians were, in fact, never conquered. The peace settlement itself was a recognition of this, since it gave the Indian leaders complete control over the East Central Territory of Quintana Roo. In addition they received neither aid nor arms from the British of Belize, British Honduras, after 1887. From this can be judged the strength of the rebellion and the new religious cult which gave it its motivation. See Alfonso Villa Rojas, *The Maya of East Central Quintana Roo* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1945).

among the Maya people in pre-conquest times; its most recent pre-
cedent had been the post conquest Talking Holy Ghost (1795) which
started a cult that was quickly stamped out by the authorities. [11])
Hence, the new element was not the new speaking idol, which became
the source of a cult, but the fact that the speaking source of divinity
was a Christian symbol—a cross—which, in addition claimed to be,
among other things, the True Christ. The Cross in its first appearance
reportedly told the Indians that it was "sent to earth by God the
Father to help the Indians in their struggle *against the whites* (Spanish
and creole upper class) and protect them from the bullets of their
enemies." [12]) The Cross, in its letters to the Indians titled itself as
the "True Christ" and made it clear that those who received its letters
were enjoying the "benefits of speaking with the True Christ." [13])

Furthermore, in a sermon preserved by the Indians of the subtribe
of X-cacal—a later division of the Cacicazgo of Chan Santa Cruz—
and treated by them as a sacred document, the Cross, speaking, in-
dicates rather clearly its militaristic and cosmological nature masque-
rading under Christian symbolism. In summary, the Cross says (1)
he was born into the world in 1850, (2) that he is suffering for his
sons the Christians, whom he created and redeemed with his precious
blood, (3) that he is sending commandments to all the people he created
which must be obeyed, (4) if they are obeyed, they will always have
his Holy Grace with them; if not they will suffer eternal punishment;
(5) that the first of these commandments and warnings is that the
whites have risen up against the *Indians* and defeated them because
the Cross "had no sons or people at my command to carry out my
orders"; (6) that the Indians *must rise up again* against the whites
of old and when they do, the bullets of the whites will not hurt them;
(7) because "I will be with you at all times; I shall be he that goeth
before you in the vanguard, confronting the enemy, so that no harm
may befall you." [14]) The Speaking Cross which appeared in 1850 and

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11) See Villa, pp. 21-22, ibid.

12) ibid., quoted from Baqueiro, 1878, 2: 207; my italics.

13) ibid., pp. 22-23, and Thomas Gann, *The Glories of the Maya* (London:
Duckworth Co., 1938), pp. 19-20. Gann includes a translation of a letter from
the talking Cross to the authorities of Belize, British Honduras.

14) Villa, op. cit., pp. 161-62. Villa includes in Appendix B a translation of
a "Sermon of the Talking Cross," a document he copied from a notebook which
his friend, the scribe Yum Pol of the subtribe of X-cacal lent him. Judging

was destroyed by government troops in 1851, reappeared again mira-
culously under the form of three daughter Crosses. The daughter
Crosses claimed the exact same authority as the first Cross and formed
a theocracy, which, although dominated by a triumvirate, was organized
on a military basis with its military and religious center in Chan Santa
Cruz. By 1860 the entire territory from Tulum in the northeast to
Bacalar in the south was organized into a *cacicazgo* in which the entire
body of men who were married or over sixteen years old were or-
ganized into a series of military companies, each of which had soldiers
and officers ranging from corporal to major or higher. Above all these
was the Commander of the Plaza, who in turn took his orders from
the Triumvirate which acted as interpreters and agents of the Cross
and transmitted its commands to the people. We can thus say that
the socio-political organization of the Maya Indians was a theocracy
organized hierarchically under the leadership of the Talking Cross.

Why had the social crisis of the Maya Indians expressed itself in
this hybridization of cosmological experience with Christian symbo-
lism? The social crisis had this time occurred to a people which has
been conquered for three centuries (1549) by Spanish Christian society
whose two avowed aims in regard to the Indians were both their
conversion to Catholicism and their education. [15]) In other words,
there had existed three centuries of proselytization by the Catholic
Church, which however badly interrupted or badly carried out, had
accomplished two things simultaneously: The destruction of the cos-
mological religion of the Maya civilization—its priesthood, astronomy-
astrology, ceremonies and idols—and the overcoating of the remains
of this civilizational religion with a thin veneer of Christianity. [16])

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from a preliminary translation of another Maya document received from the
scribe of the subtribe of Chumpon, there exist several of these "sermons"
guarded as sacred documents by the Indians of the three subtribes of the cult.

15) Robert S. Chamberlain, *The Conquest and Colonization of Yucatan, 1517-
1550* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1948), pp. 237-52.

16) For a more complete discussion of this see Charlotte Zimmerman, "The
Meaning of the Role of Women in a Transition from a Civilization to a
Fellaheen Social Order: A Study of Continuity and Change in the Maya
Culture," unpublished, but microfilmed, Doctor's Dissertation, Graduate Faculty
(Saint Louis University, 1960), and Charlotte Zimmerman, "The Cult of the
Holy Cross: An Analysis of Cosmology and Catholicism in Quintana Roo,"
History of Religions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Summer, 1963),
pp. 50-71.

This was particularly true in the Territory of Quintana Roo which was the most isolated territory on the Peninsula of Yucatan—partly because it is the tropical rain forest section and partly because historically it was always the center of rebellions against the dominant class, from the first rebellion against Francisco Montejo to the subsequent rebellions up to and including the War of the Castes. [17]) Historically therefore, the territory, especially the east-central part, remained on the periphery of the Spanish-Christian influence. For our purposes, in brief summary, this simply means that (1) Maya religious practices persisted widely, (2) that little missionary activity was brought to bear here, so that the Indians were the least Christianized, and (3) that a tradition of rebellion against the dominant society and subsequent rejection of any part of it was a real living tradition for these Indians. [18])

The fact that Catholicism was only a thin veneer and, hence, that the Cult of the Holy Cross is not a Christian Cult can be seen from the internal evidences of the Cult practices, its religious documents and the Talking Cross itself. The Christian symbol of crucifixion, the cross, becomes a cosmological hierophany, it possesses the power and sacredness of the god or gods; this sacredness dwells within it and hence it becomes a "santo", a holy being no longer an object, for it is a hierophany, and as a hierophany it is no longer itself. Its meaning and value lie in its revelation of power and sacredness of that which transcends it. It speaks, perhaps by the instrumentality of the voice of man, but this voice in turn is hierophanic of the power of the god. Around this cross grows a cult, a series of ritual acts which honor it. Included in the Cult is a Triumvirate who alone can interpret the meaning of the words of the Cross which are written and sent as letters and sermons. The power of the Cross is not destroyed with its

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17) Chamberlain, op. cit., pp. 237-52. Villa, op. cit., pp. 3-35.

18) This last point is substantiated by a reading of the documents and letters which Eligio Ancona includes in his work on the War of the Castes in which the Indians' hatred against the Yucateco society (the *Dzules*) can be seen. Redfield documents this attitude of the Indians in 1930 and Villa in 1940. The feeling of hatred or at least rejection and dislike still persists today, although it has become much less than it was. Informants who have traveled and taught in the territory over a period of thirty years say that ten and twenty years ago it was almost impossible to visit or live in certain of the villages of the Maya of the cult because of their complete hostility.

physical destruction in 1852, but reappears in a second hierophany of the three daughter Crosses, the three Santos, which born of the first are merely three receptacles of the same cosmological force or forces, which in turn go on speaking.

Since the reality which transcended these crosses was always immanent within them, wherever the Cross went so did the power; it was, hence, always localized power. Thus the presence of the Santo, the presence of the Cross made a place sacred, and protected the Indians by its power. The Cross, like the ark of the ancient Hebrews, was carried into battle. The hierophanic localization of the sacred within an object as its receptacle is the most important note of cosmology; this phenomenon is found everywhere today in Yucatan in the various Santos which the Indians possess—pictures, crucifixes, crosses, statues: all of them are hierophanic, only some possess the power. [19]

The pre-Christian, or what we shall call the cosmological, mentality of the Maya Indians had never been broken open by an understanding of transcendence. Hence, the Cult, despite its Catholic appearance, was a pre-Christian cosmological cult, and in this a direct, although impoverished, heir of the cosmological religion of the Maya civilization. Having classified the Cult as representative of cosmological truth, and therefore to be judged as authentic within this form, our problem is now to go beyond classification and enter into the deeper problem of the meaning of this religious out-pouring of cosmological mentality masquerading as Christianity in the jungles of Quintana Roo.

> "All authentic religious experience implies a desperate effort to disclose the foundations of things, the ultimate reality. But all expression or conceptualization of such religious experience is imbedded in a historical context." [20]

Authenticity and truth, as we have said, are separate terms, but both of them depend to a greater or lesser extent on the socio-historical context of the people who are the receivers of the contact with divinity.

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19) For a discussion of the meaning of cosmological religions and their characteristics see Eric Voegelin, *Order and History,* vols. I and II, op. cit.; and Mircea Eliade: *Cosmos and History,* op. cit.; *The Sacred and the Profane,* Harper Torchbook (New York, 1961); *Patterns in Comparative Religion,* Meridian Book, World Publishing Co. (Cleveland, Ohio, 1958); *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries* (London, 1960); *Images and Symbols,* trans. Philip Mairet, (London, 1961); *Myth and Reality,* Harper and Row (New York, 1963).

20) Eliade, "Methodological Remarks," op. cit., pp. 88-89.

Let us move now into the socio-historical limitations which surrounded the Maya people at the beginning of the Cult.

The closed soul of the Maya cosmological religion was broken open neither by the destruction of that religion, nor by three centuries of Catholicism, nor by a severe social crisis. Our problem is to explain the meaning of these three facts as preconditions for understanding the Cult's impoverished but cosmological response in 1850. In the first place, the first two facts indicate that the technical status of the society to which the Cult belongs is that of a fellaheen people, which means a people who remain *intrinsically* connected to their original civilization after it has been destroyed by conquest or by other means. [21]) The extrinsic continuity of the Maya people with the civilization—geographically, linguistically, and racially—is easy to establish, but this connection has little importance to the meaning of the society unless it is an indicator of a deeper cause-and-effect relationship which is intrinsic. [22]) Despite the thorough destruction of the Maya cosmological religion, the destruction or conversion of the entire priesthood and nobility—the only carriers of the Maya civilizational order, the calender and the time-counting system—and the period of three centuries in which there was further destruction of Maya traditions by active impact and domination of the Spanish upper class and by the passive effect of the abandonment of many ceremonies by disuse and lack of practice, the Maya people carried in themselves, deeply rooted, many of the religious practices and the mentality of the Maya civilization. [23])

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21) The technical term "Fellaheen" has been adopted from Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West,* 1-vol. edition (New York: Alfred Knopf & Sons, 1939), II, pp. 171 and 185.

22) For an analysis of these points see Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941).

23) For the destructon of the religion and the priesthood, see Alfred Tozzer (editor with notes), *De Landa's Relación de Las Cosas de Yucatán* (Cambridge: The Peabody Museum, 1941), pp. 168-169, and Robert S. Chamberlain, *The Conquest and Colonization of Yucatan,* op. cit. For preservation of culture and traditions, which go back to the Maya civilization see Redfield, op. cit., and Alfonso Villa Rojas, *The Maya,* op. cit., and "Dioses y Espiritus Paganos de Los Mayas de Quintana Roo," in *Los Mayas Antiguous* (Mexico, D.F.: El Colegion de Mexico, 1941), pp. 113-144. A comparison of Landa's first hand knowledge of the Maya Civilization as it was at his time with any of Redfield's or Villa Rojas's books will immediately show that rites, practices and customs which Landa observed were observed almost in identical form by

The phenomenon of this survival of an impoverished but genuine Maya cosmological mentality, now shrunken to fit the reduced world of a lower-caste agricultural people rather than the macrocosmos of a self-determining complicated civilization order, can be broken down into a number of different reasons: (1) the resistance of the cosmological (closed) mentality to Christianity, (2) the terrific persistence of a Maya people constituted by Maya cultural and religious practices, (3) the apparent irreplaceability of these practices for the Maya meaning and survival as a people.

It is this very phenomenon, as clarified explicitly by the above three points, that demonstrates the intrinsic relationship of the Maya agricultural people with their civilization and constitutes them as a fellaheen as opposed to a primitive people. Hence, the primary socio-historical condition for the understanding of the Cult is that this Cult occurred to a fellaheen people whose self-understanding was both cosmological and Maya.

> "Man is the only animal whose actions are uncertain, who hesitates, gropes about and lays plans in the hope of success and the fear of failure. He is alone in realizing that he is subject to illness, alone in knowing that he must die. The rest of nature goes on its expanding course in absolute tranquility. Although plants and animals are the sport of chance, they rely on the passing hour as they would on eternity." [24]

Natural religion (religion of the closed soul), says Bergson, is one of the responses of the myth-making faculty in men. "It is a defensive reaction of nature against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for the society in the exercise of intelligence. [25] Man's chief danger is his own intelligence. In this sense, man always lives in a kind of crisis exposed to his own foreknowledge and to his own socially destructive tendencies. Hence, natural religion is a response to the human condition. This continuing, submerged and underlying condition of man, however, is heightened and, perhaps, made unbearable when his society is threatened with physical destruction by a powerful enemy.

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these two anthropologists after a lapse of four centuries. For an analysis of why this survival took place as well as a lengthy discussion of the meaning of the Maya fellaheen society see Zimmerman, "The Meaning of the Role of Women," op. cit.

24) Bergson, *The Two Sources,* p. 204, op. cit.

25) ibid., p. 205.

The war of the Castes had started in 1847. It was a revolt of the
internal proletariat—a civil war on the part of the embittered lower-
caste Maya Indians, who had been kept in a state of serfdom for
three centuries and whose object was the destruction of the *Dzules*
(foreigners) and the return of the Yucatan peninsula to domination
by the Maya people. The primary cause was the condition of serfdom
and three centuries of political, social and cultural disenfranchisement;
but this sense of disenfranchisement was only as strong as the memory
of former Maya glory. In other words, the time span of the people's
memory stretched back three centuries to their former autonomy and
to their first revolt against Montejo in 1540 when they succeeded in
pushing him and his troops into the sea. [26]) Hence the War of the
Castes (so aptly named), which the Maya Indians had almost won
in 1840 and as rapidly and spectacularly lost between 1849-1850, was
an embittered violent Maya upheaval—a revolt of a disenfranchised
proletariat against its alien master. From this state of social crisis of
the unconquered but virtually defeated Indians which existed in 1850,
the Cult of the Holy Cross was born. This social crisis constitutes
the second socio-historical condition for the understanding of the Cult.

> "Every society is organized for survival in the world and, at the same time,
> for partnership in the order of being that has its origin in world transcen-
> dent divine Being; it has to cope with the problems of its pragmatic existence
> and, at the same time, it is concerned with the truth of its order." [27])

Man copes with the human condition by organizing and creating a
social order which is, at once, an attempt to answer the challenge of
survival and the problem of meaning. The situation which faced the
Maya was one in which its physical survival was threatened by a
powerful enemy and the belief in the truth of its order—the efficacy
of its gods, the rightness of the cause of the war, and, hence, the
belief in the meaning of its existence as a people—was shaken by what
appeared to be virtual defeat and annihilation. In answer to the two-
fold challenge of this crisis came a two-fold response. As a response
to the threat of physical survival, it was a successful one since it
resulted in a theocracy which carried the war on within the Territory
of Quintana Roo until 1902—approximately fifty years. As a response

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26) Chamberlain, op. cit., pp. 237-252.
27) Voegelin, Order and History, vol. II, *The World of the Polis* (Baton
Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1956-57), p. 2.

to the threat of loss of meaning, it was a brilliant one for the form
it took was a cosmological hierophany, in a cross which spoke in the
name of a tribal wargod named Jesus Christ, who told the people in
his letter which later became "sacred scripture" (Santo Almahthan):

> "That I shed my holy blood on account of you, that I pass at all hours
> on my rounds of the earth, at all hours it is necessary that I receive some
> suffering on account of you, I pardoned your souls, my dear Christians;
> begin to know that I shed my holy blood for your sakes. So also today I
> delivered to you your souls, I gave you your lands; you must not fall into
> the hands of the enemies."

He personally would both lead the war and defend them from all harm:

> "I have to see also that you come (end) without sorrow, ...You have to
> beseech the Lord. You have to beseech the Virgin; for if you beseech, never
> will I release you into the hands of the whites. At all times I must be on
> the go visiting Yucatan, while the thorns stick to me, enter into my mouth,
> so even I shed my blood for you. To every single place I am bound to
> refresh the souls of my families on earth. And so as I wander I buy a
> little water to drink as I am on the go visiting Yucatan...It will be necessary
> that you know that the whites are going to start a war: know that my
> holy order will be carried out. Never will I release you into their hands:
> that they do you harm. Only I will pass by to tell you all that I will defend
> you against the enemies and against evils. My dear spiritual creatures here
> on earth—my Lord will be favorable and good to you and satisfied wherever
> you undertake battle." 28)

The brilliance of this response can be stated in the following terms:
(1) it was a cosmological response, since the cross itself was hiero-
phanic, a manifestation of sacredness that exhibits every note of the
pre-immanent cosmological mentality, 29) and did not jar with or break
with the consistent, limited and closed Maya cosmological experience;
(2) it incorporated Christianity into a civil theology which conveniently
excluded all non-Maya—all enemies—from human consideration and
forced the transcendental God into the convenient mould as war-leader
and protector of the Maya people; (3) it turned the tables on three
centuries of Catholic proselytization and missionizing, stealing Catholic

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28) From a preliminary translation of an unpublished Santo Almahthan tape
recorded by the writer from the memory of Juan B. Vega of the shrine village
of Chumpon—used by them as Christians use the Bible—translated from the
Maya by Fr. Robert Lee, MM. of the Maryknoll Mission of Yucatan.

29) At the suggestion of Dr. Eric Voegelin we substitute the word "pre-
immanent" for the term "immanent" since it more clearly and critically expresses
the fact cosmological culture is pre-transcendent, and correlatively, therefore,
pre-immanent.

thunder without its substance and, thus, may have permanently immunized the Indians from becoming Christians. [30])

The response raises certain difficult issues which we have touched on before, but will deal with here. The first issue is the amazing persistence of the cosmological mentality in the face of, and despite, Christianity. The second issue, which is related to the first, is why had a social crisis elicited a hybrid response. What are the socio-historical conditions in which the only religious response to crisis is a hybrid one. [31]) To the first question we can suggest two answers. In the first place, a conquered people which is forced into lower-caste serfdom is liable to resist the conqueror's religion with great persistence for a long time. Furthermore, part of being a fellaheen people is to maintain, at least partially, the cultural and religious basis of the original civilization. Had the Maya people been genuinely converted—which would mean also genuinely acculterated into Spanish society—they might have persisted racially as a more or less distinct people, although this is doubtful; [32]) but their separate culture and way of life would

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30) As of 1962 the Cult Indians' resistance of "conversion" to Catholicism or Christianity was famous all over Yucatan. The few who are baptized by the Catholic Church show a habitual lack of understanding of the difference between the Cult and Catholicism by their dual and undisturbed practice of both religions. In addition to the fact that the Cult ceremonies themselves can be divided into two complexes, one completely Maya, and the other apparently Christian or Catholic such as their versions of the sacraments of Baptism, Marriage and the Mass, the Maya Indians of the Cult (and the Maya Indians in Yucatan in general) have invented a series of practices patterned after the pious practices of the Catholic Church which again are Christian only in name. To cite a few examples, these are some of their novenas and their burial ceremonies and their practices during the week of dead souls. Furthermore some of the Indians are baptized by Catholic priests and they attend and participate in the sacraments of the Catholic Mass whenever the missionaries venture out to their villages. Consequently they do not make any distinction between their own Cult and that of Catholicism, and the Cult Indians think of themselves and call themselves Catholic. To them the Catholic Church in Carrillo Puerto is only a bigger and wealthier version of their small shrine Churches.

31) A cosmological people's response to crisis in the face of Christianity brought by Western Civilization either through economic, social or political contacts or by conquest, may always be a hybrid religious cult such as the American Indians Ghost-Dance Cults, especially since the superior technology of Western Civilization is almost always completely destructive to the cosmological culture in question.

32) There are no racially pure Maya or Spanish in Yucatan today. They are all more or less intermixed.

have disappeared and they would be, perhaps, a peasant agricultural people, but not a fellaheen people. [33]) Secondly, Christianity has de-divinized the world and the situation of de-divinization is extraordinarily difficult to tolerate, but, especially, for an agricultural people whose source of life depends directly on the cosmos—particularly in waterless Yucatan—on the all important rain. This means that when livelihood depends upon the rain, an agricultural people is not going to abandon its particular time-honored rain god for the God of Christianity because, in graphic terms, the world transcendent Divine Being gives no guarantee that prayers or burnt-offerings will bring the rain to a drought-ridden, famine-threatened people. It is the function of the god of rain to bring rain or to make it understood why it does not come. "Suffering becomes intelligible and hence tolerable" because the priest will discover its cause. [34]) Suffering in Christian terms is very different; for, if it has a total meaning in the life of man, this is not discoverable in the same way. Man knows somehow that he must suffer, but suffering in its direct cause and effect relationship to man is not intelligible. This spiritual and psychological state of the Christian before suffering is brilliantly characterized by Eric Voegelin when he says:

> "Uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity. The feeling of security in a 'world filled with gods' is lost with the gods themselves; when the world is de-divinized, communication with the world-transcendent God is reduced to the tenuous bond of faith, in the sense of Heb. 11 : 1, as the substance of things hoped for and the proof of things unseen. Ontologically the substance of things hoped for is nowhere to be found but in faith itself; and, epistemologically, there is no proof for things unseen but again in this very faith." [35])

The movement from the security of a world full of gods to this diffi-

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33) Whether the destruction of the culture and society of the non-Christian people is a necessary result of Christian proselytization and conversion, or is only an effect of "westernization" of these people and, therefore, not intrinsic to Christianity, is a controversial issue into which we cannot enter in the confines of this article. We can only point here to the fact that the process of Spanish-Christian influence on the Maya culture has led, little by little, to its disappearance.

34) Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, op. cit., p. 98.

35) Voegelin, *New Science,* op. cit., p. 122. For a profound analysis of the cosmological or archaic ontology and its reaction to suffering, see Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, op. cit., especially chapters five and six where he deals with the differences between the archaic ontology and Christian ontology in the matter of reacting to and understanding suffering.

cult and dangerous spiritual state of being which requires almost in-
human will and courage is what Henri Bergson meant when he said
of the man who had accomplished it, "If all men, if any large number
of men could have soared as high as this priviledged man, nature would
not have stopped at the human species, for such a one is in fact more
than a man." 36) The Maya, however, stopped short of the truth—
hence the hybrid cult. Their movement beyond their gods was not a
movement in depth but merely a change of gods. Their response was
as impoverished as their socio-historical experiences, and the Maya
people's experience had shrunk from a civilizational order to the limits
of an agricultural village, revolving around the corn field *(milpa),*
the large water well *(cenote),* hunting and finally survival without
history—the zoological ups and downs of a peasant village life. In
summary, on the existential level, their hybrid response—exactly tailor-
ed to the needs of a band of desperate Indians—was limited and con-
ditioned by the following: (1) impoverishment of their cosmology
plus absorption of much of Catholicism including the various saints,
the Virgin, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 37) as cosmo-
logical gods; (2) the nature of the crisis itself which made it very

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36) Bergson, *Two Sources,* op. cit., p. 213.

37) Among the officially Catholic and non-Cult part of the Maya Indians,
the saints and the Triune God function, more often than not, as cosmological
gods and are considered and treated as hierophanic within the statues, pictures,
and other holy objects. There is quite a bit of prestige attached to the owner
of the most powerful "santo". This is prevalent all over Yucatan and Quintana
Roo.

Among the Maya of the Cult in the village of Kopchen, there is a four foot
statue of St. John the Baptist which is closely guarded in the Church (a thatched
hut) and which is famous for miles around for doing miracles. On the 24th of
July he has his feast. Several weeks before this date his "owner" goes around
to all the little villages in a wide circumference of Kopchen, even to Carrillo
Puerto, begging for money or for gifts for his saint. On the day itself the
people come bringing their promised gifts of chickens, pigs, fruit, tortillas, candles,
atole and what not, which they offer to him on his altar. After the Maya reli-
gious ceremony, all partake of the food within the church itself. I was told
by an informant in Kopchen that the santo is very powerful, that if one has
anything to ask him, any request, he will fulfill it, if the promise which one
makes to him is sincere and is fulfilled. If the promise is not made sincerely
and hence not fulfilled, great harm will befall the individual. There was a
Señora who was going to fulfill her promise of making him some atole in ex-
change for a favor he had done and then changed her mind. She immediately
became very sick with a fever. She was cured when she made the atole, and
brought it to the saint, asking pardon for her sin.

likely that the response would be a cult of a cosmological war-god.

A cosmological people in a severe social crisis, one which shakes the meaning of their old order, will seem to have two alternatives: to break with cosmology and move to a new self-understanding, or to stay where they are and find a new god. The second is the easier solution, especially for the Maya people whose new god was near-at-hand. Furthermore, the response to a war crisis—the creation of a war-god—is not an original response, but an age-old one. The weakness of this solution, of course, like other solutions which take the path of least resistance, is that in the long run it breaks down. A religion built on a war-cult only operates effectively as long as there is a war. Hence, this type of cult carries the seeds of its own destruction within it. In understanding a religion, an understanding of those causes which destroy it if they are intrinsic to it, is just as important as understanding its origins.

At present (1963) the Cult is dying a slow death. Signs of secularization, such as loss of belief, breakdown of the organization, and general apathy toward the religious practices, are to be found in the three Shrine villages and the villages which surround them. If we can judge the Cult by its state in the shrine village of Chan Cah, it looks like within a few years only lingering vestiges will survive. Chan Cah, which is within three miles of the new highway connecting Chetumal (the capital of Quintana Roo) with Merida (the capital of Yucatan), and only six or seven miles from Carrillo Puerto, one of the missionary centers of the American Maryknoll priests, has been the most exposed to outside influences. This has resulted in the near death of the Cult within Chan Cah [38]) and the surrounding villages upon

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38) The *guardia* is almost defunct in Chan Cah. In the last four years there has been a series of sacreligious robberies of the valuable, sacred, protected and venerated jewelry—which "belonged to" (decorated) the various saints on the altar in the church—in which the chief priest was implicated through his son-in-law. The jewelry was stolen for its monetary value and pawned. Since much of it is gold, it is quite valuable.

The two masses in the morning and many other ceremonies are not performed on a daily basis at all except in times of drought and, when performed, are very perfunctory and few people seem to attend the services at all. Finally, the Catholic priests have been welcomed and have baptized many of the people and their catechists have given many classes there in Chan Cah. A great many of the people go to Carrillo Puerto to be married in the Catholic Church and have their children baptized there, and then return home to participate in the ancient Cha-Chaac or rain-god ceremony. In short, the Cult is in its last stages of life.

which it depends for religious and financial support. Chumpon and X-cacal, being still isolated, have preserved their religion better, but even in those two villages there are definite signs of decay. The end of the Cult is thus imminent.

There are two extrinsic causes which have influenced the breakdown of the Cult, but they would not have had much effect had not the Cult already been thoroughly weakened from within. The first is the influence of the Catholic Church through its catechists and its missionaries, [39]) and the second is the influence of the secular culture brought by contact with the majority of outsiders who daily invade Quintana Roo—teachers, merchants, chicleros, government officials and various other itinerent traders. In discussing the internal causes of disintegration of the Cult, we touch its heart and meaning. It is disintegrating because: (1) the war ceased; (2) the wall between the Maya people as a separate human group in isolation from, and non-recognition of, the human status of all non-Maya (Dzules) started to crumble and began to lose its functions.

> "Between the tribe and Mankind there is a great gulf fixed, and on the terrestrial plane this chasm is utterly impassable, since the social bond which holds the tribe together is a solidarity for parochial self-defense against a world of human enemies beyond the tribal pale; and a complete removal of this external human pressure would threaten the tribe with dissolution by depriving it of the hostile environment on which it depends for its cohesion." [40])

The hostile environment upon which the Maya depended for its existence and meaning as a people, which gave the *raison d'être* to the Cult, began to dissolve in 1902 with the cessation of the fighting and

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39) In particular, the Catholic Church in all these years, and even within the last twenty years with the coming of the efficient, dedicated, American Mary-knoll priests, has had very little effect on the Maya Indians. It is secularism, the materialistic desire to possess money and goods—stealing sacred jewelry, offering to sell religious or any other secrets for money, and other things of this sort—which has filled the void left by the breakdown of the Cult. The baptized, catechized Catholic Indians, as we have said, remain hopelessly cosmological in their Catholicism. Obviously, they understand money better than they do Christianity, which in itself is an interesting problem.

40) Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. VI, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 12. For a good discussion of the problem of tribal humanity see ibid., pp. 1-19. For the original analysis from which Toynbee took his discussion see Bergson, *Two Sources,* op. cit., especially Chapters 2 and 3, pp. 181-235.

the truce which returned the Territory of Quintana Roo to the Maya people under their own chiefs. With the fighting over, however, the military organization of the Cult did not cease, since it is still operative, although very much diminished and changed in 1963. [41]) The real war, the war of the Maya people in its separate existence and non-recognition of others, against contact with or pollution by its enemies, continued. Probably what did the most to break down this wall of separation, after the cessation of the fighting, was the discovery that chicle —the latex of the sapodilla tree which grew in abundance in Quintana Roo—could be harvested and sold for a fortune. In the year 1917 the Maya chief General May contracted with the Mexican business men and began exploiting and selling chicle. [42]) It is from this date that we can mark the second stage of dissolution of the Cult and the people who participated in it, for chicle brought two things with it: (1) a growing desire for material goods, (2) and the knowledge that what they desired necessitated contact and negotiations with the enemy, who alone was in possession of what they wanted. The cessation of the war and the gradual breaking down of the hostile environment weakened the Cult internally, destroying both its basis for existence and its meaning and leaving a spiritual void which began to be filled with an avid materialism. Thus, surounded by an official Spanish Catholic Culture where cosmology and tribal humanity have little or no meaning, and in constant contact with an advanced technological culture whose principle driving force is materialism, the Cult, deprived of its reasons for existence, and, therefore, without internal force to resist, is disintegrating very rapidly.

> "Thus may arise a mixed religion, implying a new direction given to the old, a more or less marked aspiration for the ancient god who emanated from the myth-making function to be merged into the God Who effectively reveals Himself, Who illuminates and warms priviledged souls with His presence. Thus do we find interposed, as we were suggesting, transitions and differences, ostensibly of degree, between two things which are as a matter of fact radically different in nature and which, at first sight, we can hardly believe deserve the same name. The contrast is striking in many cases, as for instance when nations at war each declare that they have

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41) See Zimmerman, "The Cult of the Holy Cross," pp. 55-56, op. cit., for a discussion of how the military organization operated.

42) General May, Juan B. Vega and some of the other chieftains became very rich on chicle, but they wasted their fortunes. Now they are both very old and very poor. Also, see Villa Rojas, *The Maya,* op. cit., p. 31.

God on their side, the deity in question thus becoming the national god of paganism, whereas the God they imagine they are evoking is a God common to all mankind the mere vision of Whom, could all men but attain it, would mean the immediate abolition of war." [43])

The tribal god they imagined that they were evoking in their response to crisis was the "god common to all mankind," but their Cult is an authentic religion nonetheless, because they did not immanentize transcendental reality in the hope of possessing and thus manipulating the transcendental God. The closed soul of the closed society of the Maya fellaheen people had never been opened. They were, therefore, not moving from a higher truth to an untruth as the post-Christian does. As a cosmological people whose experience of reality had shrunken to the small agricultural village, they responded within their limitations to the crisis which threatened their existence. For these reasons, we judge that the Cult of the Holy Cross is an authentic religion; however, its truth is relative, not in the light of Christian revelation of which they were unaware, but in the light of its own impermanence. It was relative to the socio-historical and spiritual condition which caused it and, hence, when these conditions ceased to operate so did the truth of the Cult.

Although the Truth of God is one, its historical reception is many, because to us it is a paradox. Hence the history of religion is one of increasing struggle toward the Truth which has both historical conditions and an historical structure. The Maya contact with divinity was genuine, but the understanding of that contact was limited and impoverished. Nonetheless, the Maya in the impermanence and impoverishment of their Cult, had touched the truth without having grasped it. The division of the cosmos into tribal humanity and its enemies is an authentic prefiguration of the division of the world into the City of God and the City of Men, even if neither the terms of the real and final division, nor the relationships between the two, nor the protagonists themselves, can be known in time or history. Secondly, the cosmological God who walked through tropical Yucatan with the thorns entering into his mouth, buying water as he went and *suffering* for his Maya Christians, appears to be an authentic insight into the Incarnate Christ translated into the limited microcosmic Maya experience. Thus, like all cosmology which is authentic, it is true in

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43) Bergson, *Two Sources,* op. cit., pp. 214-15.

the sense that it *prefigures* and, in a certain sense, *contains* Christianity, and for these reasons is at once open and all the more closed to its influence.

Although in comparison with Christian revelation, the Cult of the Holy Cross appears unseemly, and in the light of its rapid disintegration, its value as truth appears impermanent and impoverished, dependent upon the socio-historical and spiritual conditions which engendered it, the Cult has its place as an authentic and interesting religious response in the increasing struggle toward the Truth which is the condition of man in time.

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LE PROBLÈME DES ORIGINES DU GNOSTICISME
ET L'HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS

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Le gnosticisme, sa définition, ses origines, ont constitué un problème depuis l'antiquité, dans le milieu chrétien aussi bien que chez les païens. L'Eglise, déjà à l'âge apostolique, a éprouvé le besoin de différencier sa foi, son attente eschatologique et sa morale par rapport à la „fausse gnose" (I Tim. 6,20) qui, dans le corps même des églises, ou au marge de celles-ci (ou, comme surtout dans le cas de Marcion, en concurrence), prétendait donner son interprétation du Message. Après les polémiques occasionnelles — mais déjà bien arrêtées — dans les écrits néotestamentaires, des polémistes et des théologiens comme Justin, Irénée, Hippolyte, Tertullien, et, dans un sens et avec des perspectives propres, Clément d'Alexandrie et Origène, spécifient souvent leur présentation des doctrines chrétiennes et de l'histoire du salut dans le sens d'une confrontation avec les doctrines du gnosticisme, dont certains d'entre eux dénoncent les connexions avec la pensée et la pratique religieuses païennes, s'agisse-t-il des cultes à mystère, s'agisse-t-il, plus souvent, des philosophies grecques.

On peut penser, à bon droit, que l'interprétation „hérésiologique" du gnosticisme, qui a précédé dans l'histoire moderne de ces études l'interprétation *religionsgeschichtlich,* ait été favorisée non seulement par l'aspect plus ou moins „chrétien" des courants gnostiques, mais bien par le fait que les sources disponibles sur le gnosticisme, avant les découvertes qui se sont succédé depuis 1904, étaient constituées justement par les textes polémiques des Pères. Mais il ne faudrait pas oublier que justement les Pères, tels Hippolyte ou Origène, ont posé, et plus clairement que les païens [1]), le thème des connexions païennes

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1) Qui, comme Celse, pouvaient parfois être accusés de confondre christianisme et gnosticisme (cfr. Origen., *contra Celsum,* VI, 22-31), et qui, en réalité, voyaient dans celui-ci une des formes de la pensée chrétienne (*ibid.* V, 61). Porphyre, *Vita Plotini,* 16, semble les distinguer mieux.

de la gnose, autrement dit: le problème historico-religieux du gnosticisme, ne fût-il qu'en fonction d'une différenciation gnosticisme-christianisme.

Il est évident d'ailleurs qu'une considération historico-religieuse du gnosticisme, telle qu'elle a été favorisée par les études modernes, n'aurait pu se produire qu'au moment où le milieu religieux hellénistique et proche-oriental aurait été mieux connu. La découverte des textes iraniens, mésopotamiens, égyptiens, la découverte ou l'étude ultérieure de la littérature judaïque tardive, et, évidemment, la découverte de textes gnostiques originaux, ont donné le cadre historico-religieux indispensable pour les nouvelles études. Le milieu géographique s'est élargi, depuis l'Egypte jusqu'à l'Iran, et le cadre chronologique aussi: on a remonté les siècles, jusqu'aux anciens mythes et doctrines de la Mésopotamie et de l'Iran; on n'a pas manqué de faire ressortir quelques consonances entre la pensée gnostique et des phénomènes grecs tels l'orphisme et le pythagorisme, bien qu'elles n'aient pas été valorisées pleinement, comme elles méritent.

Depuis le commencement de ce siècle la question historico-religieuse des origines du gnosticisme est donc posée, surtout dans les milieux de l'école *religionsgeschichtlich*. D'ailleurs, les études de cette école sur les origines du gnosticisme (et ses rapports avec le christianisme) ont puissamment relevé de la situation du milieu culturel allemand des trois premières décades de ce siècle; c'est pourquoi on a maintenant tout l'intérêt à ne pas identifier ces deux choses, historiquement liées mais distinctes: la problématique et les théories *religionsgeschichtlich* de Bousset, Reitzenstein, Dieterich, Norden, Clemen, si méritoires qu'elles aient pu s'avérer, et le problème tout court historico-religieux des origines du gnosticisme, tel qu'il est imposé par les connaissances d'aujourd'hui. Il est vrai que la discussion continue parfois à s'orienter dans d'autres directions aussi: ou bien on continue de rechercher les origines de la gnose dans le sillon de la tradition judaïque [2]) et chrétienne [3]), ou bien on se cantonne dans une hypothèse historico-religieuse

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2) Cfr. E. Peterson, *Frühkirche, Judentum und Gnosis,* Rome-Fribourg-Vienne 1859. R. M. Grant, *Gnosticism and early Christianity,* New York 1959, p. 37 (l'anticosmisme gnostique comme issue des attentes apocalyptiques juives déçues). Il faut d'ailleurs faire la part due au milieu syncrétiste samaritain (Simon, Dosithée, Ménandre).

3) Cfr. A. D. Nock, *Gnosticism* „Harvard Theological Review", 57 (1964), p. 256 ss., et, en partie, E. de Faye, *Gnostiques et gnosticisme*[2]*,* Paris 1925.

extrême, réduisant la gnose au „syncrétisme" 4). Mais il faut remarquer qu'une interprétation „judaïque" de la gnose, une fois qu'elle soit sensible aux problèmes posés par les connaissances actuelles sur le milieu judaïque, ne cesse pourtant pas d'être une recherche „historico-religieuse" (qui n'équivaut pas à dire *religionsgeschichtlich* au sens classique et historiquement conditionné du mot). La solution syncrétiste, à son tour, présente le danger de dissimuler et, pratiquement, nier le problème comparatif: justement le contraire d'une analyse historico-religieuse réelle; ce qui est pire, elle tend à vanifier trop hâtivement le contenu spécifique de la pensée et du mouvement gnostiques.

Reste la possibilité intermédiaire, celle des études tendant à poser le problème dans toute son ampleur et à valoriser de façon organique et critique les données du milieu grec et proche-oriental. Mais la difficulté subsiste — les préjugés toujours possibles ou les impressions trop subjectives mis à part — dans le fait que le problème des origines du gnosticisme ne peut être confondu avec le problème de l'histoire de certains éléments philosophiques ou mythologiques, qui ont pu été utilisés de façon ou d'autre par les systèmes gnostiques. La question reste confiée à la sensibilité historico-religieuse du savant, de savoir discerner entre les *éléments* qui ont eu une suite dans la pensée gnostique et, d'autre part, les conceptions qui intègrent déjà, éventuellement avant les systèmes gnostiques classiques, l'essentiel de la gnose et de son scénario idéologique. Naturellement, il n'est pas aisé de faire le triage entre ces deux classes de faits, étant donné qu'un phénomène historique, quel qu'il soit, n'existe pas avant son existence, et qu'il faut justement surprendre sa „genèse"; p. ex., un concept tel que celui de „prégnose" pourrait être légitime, mais il faudrait le justifier et le définir clairement. Or, il arrive que les études *religionsgeschichtlich* se soient parfois arrêtées à la recherche hautement spécialisée et méritoire, mais partielle, de thèmes spécifiques qui n'intègrent pourtant pas le cadre fondamental des scénarios gnostiques, ou qui l'intègrent

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4) Cfr. J. Munck, *The New Testament and Gnosticism,* in *Festschrift Piper,* 1962 — „Studia Theologica" XV, II (1961), p. 181 ss. Cfr. aussi R. McL. Wilson, *The gnostic Problem,* London (1958), p. 263 s. et déjà les *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* par W. Bousset (1907), dont le cadre assez syncrétiste ne concerne pourtant pas surtout l'„atmosphère" du monde hellénistico-romain, mais la formation du gnosticisme. La spécificité historique et typologique du gnosticisme y est en tout cas implicite. Elle ne résulte pas assez des recherches pareillement *religionsgeschichtlich* de R. Reitzenstein.

de façon purement hypothétique; ceci arrive lorsque on n'a pas le moyen ni l'on ne sent le bésoin de garantir suffisamment la perspective chronologique ou le contexte idéologique des textes en question [5]).

Nous nous permettons dans la suite de faire état de nos recherches précédentes pour esquisser notre vue du problème historico- religieux des origines (et de l'essence) du gnosticisme. A notre sens, une recherche sur les origines de la gnose ne saurait se passer de faire état d'un complexe idéologique qui, à la différence des *thèmes* égyptiens, iraniens, judaïques évoqués pour expliquer les croyances gnostiques, prête à une comparaison organique avec celles-ci. Il s'agit de ce qu'on appelle l'„orphisme". En effet, quand on étudie les présupposées grecques de la pensée gnostique, on s'arrête d'ordinaire à la pensée hellénistique, aux écoles philosophiques, à Platon, ou à des concepts assez généraux comme le „pythagorisme" ou „les mystères" [6]). Or, les textes grecs des siècles VI-IV concernant l'orphisme, y comprenant les témoignages plus ou moins contigus du pythagorisme et de la pensée d'Empédocle (comparés avec certaines parties de la spéculation mystique ou métaphysique des autres présocratiques), intègrent un complexe typiquement anticosmique et dualiste, qui, par ses présupposées anthroposophiques et ses conséquences dogmatiques (âme prisonnière dans le corps, âme „démonique" exilée et jetée dans le monde à la suite d'une faute, et revêtue de „l'étrangère tunique de la chair" [Empédocl. B. 115 et 126], *syngeneia* divine de l'âme, métensomatose, cathartique dualiste, abstentionnisme à type dualiste, anticosmisme, critique du mariage. réintégration finale parmi les dieux ou en tant que *theos,* idée moniste intégrée dans la formule dualiste, qui implique la scission douloureuse de l'Un primordial, aspirant a être réintégré) constituent un véritable scénario „gnostique" [7]). Même l'idée de la gnose en tant que conscience

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5) C'est l'objection classique (qui n'est pas la seule) aux hypothèses et aux conclusions de Reitzenstein. D'ailleurs Jonas (*The gnostic Religion*[2], p. XV) a bien remarqué l'arbitraire de l'assomption d'une „philosophie orientale" mal identifiée, pour expliquer le gnosticisme, celui-ci constituant en réalité la source pour la prétendue identification de cette philosophie.

6) V. l'article de Nock, cité, qui ne mentionne pas même l'orphisme. Cfr. aussi H. Leisegang, *Die Gnosis*[4], Stuttgart 1955 (éd. franç. Paris 1951).

7) Cfr. l'âme démonique empédocléenne (exilée loin des Bienheureux, pour avoir cru à la folie furieuse de la Discorde), et son état de *Geworfenheit* parmi les éléments cosmiques, qui la haïssent et la rejettent l'un à l'autre. Les commentateurs tardifs (Hippolyte) n'ont pas hésité à interpréter ce lieu du mystique d'Agrigente par l'image du démiurge qui — en tant que Neikos (Discorde) — façonne les âmes en les arrachant de l'Un primordial et les *jette* (et les „trempe")

(ou réminiscence) de l'appartenance et de l'origine divine de l'élément supérieur dans l'homme, ou de l'âme divine, appartient en propre à ce contexte: selon Empédocle, qui partage ou représente presque toutes les conceptions orphiques que nous venons d'énumérer, nous regardons la Terre par la terre (qui est en nous), l'Air divin par l'air, le Feu par le feu, l'Amour par l'amour, la Discorde par la discorde (ces deux derniers étant les Principes métaphysiques de sa cosmologie mystique) [8]). Il y a donc en nous une partie supérieure et divine *par laquelle* se réalise, à travers la connaissance (qui est une vision du connaturel par le connaturel), une conjonction d'*elle-même* avec *son* élément et son principe: voilà justement qui, dans la gnose, est la conception, somme toute assez impersonnaliste, du *pneuma* qui est en même temps *moyen, sujet* et *terme* de sa libération.

Il est vrai que l'„orphisme" a eu, dans les études historico-religieuses, un sort analogue à celui du gnosticisme: on a contesté qu'il intègre un phénomène spécifique, et on a voulu affirmer qu'il ne résulte que de la juxtaposition artificielle d'éléments disparates: mais nous croyons que les arguments ne manquent pas pour écarter cette vue extrême, et que d'autre part, une fois écarté l'extrême contraire, selon lequel l'orphisme aurait constitué une secte, une église ou une religion bien arrêtée, la conclusion s'impose que l'orphisme, tout comme le phénomène du gnosticisme des siècles Ier et suivants, a le caractère d'un mouvement religieux multiple, mais foncièrement cohérent, fondé sur une interprétation „sophique" des données religieuses contemporaines [9]). Il n'est pas jusqu'à certains aspects de la tradition gnostique

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dans la mer (c'est-à-dire les eaux inférieures), tandis que Philia (le principe de l'union) a compassion de leur lamentation (Diels, *Fragm. d. Vorsokr.*[7], B. 115). On peut rappeler aussi l'„étrangère tunique de la chair" (B. 126), avec laquelle [la Naissance]révêt (περιστέλλουσα) [les âmes divines] (si le frg. doit être intégré de la sorte, comme le texte de Porphyre invite à le faire). L'affinité avec une image gnostique bien connue est évidente. La nature „sanguinaire" ou alimentaire des infractions commises par l'homme coupable sont d'ailleurs conditionnées — pour Empédocle — par les accointances mystico-naturistes de l'*orphikòs bios,* plus proche de la religiosité mystérique (v. *infra*). Elles ne sont pourtant pas si éloignées d'un gnosticisme comme celui des manichéens et de leur idée cosmologique du processus métempsichotique et de son méchanisme alimentaire.

8) Cfr., dernièrement, U. Bianchi, *Le dualisme en l'histoire des religions,* in „Rev. de l'hist. des relig.", 159 (1961) p. 1 ss. et *La religione greca,* in *Storia delle religioni,* fondata da P. Tacchi Venturi, 5e édit., Torino 1962, II, p. 510 s.

9) „Studi e mater. di storia delle relig.", XXVIII, 2 (1957), p. 151 ss.; v. aussi l'article cité à la n. 8.

en tant que littérature pseudépigraphique qui ne se retrouvent dans l'orphisme en tant que „littérature"; il n'est pas jusqu'à la propension à la spéculation cosmogonique et théogonique fantastique et complexe, aux approches „philosophiques", à la coexistence de courants „philosophiques" et de courants magiques, à l'attitude parasitaire par rapport au milieu religieux contemporain, à la mythologie et à ses crudités, en opposition paradoxale à la sublimité réelle ou prétendue de son exégèse allégorique et symbolique, au caractère esotérique, à l'éparpillements en communautés assez anarchiques, à la dialectique profondité-charlatanisme, spéculation-fantaisie, esprit d'élite et de finesse — vie vagabonde adonnée à la diffusion souvent intéressée de révélations, purifications et prodiges, qui ne constituent autant de *loci communes* idéologiques, structuraux, sociologiques des phénomènes gnostique et orphique; ils ne font qu'ajouter aux *topoi* plus proprement religieux dont il était question plus haut [9a]).

Mais le problème historico-religieux des origines de certains aspects fondamentaux du sentiment gnostique du monde, et en particulier de son dualisme anticosmique, qui constitue sa marque distinctive et, de quelque façon, son point de départ, ne saurait s'arrêter aujourd'hui aux frontières du monde grec et proche-oriental. L'histoire des religions et l'ethnologie religieuse ont mis en lumière toute une série de conceptions, de mythologies et de références cultuelles dont le caractère dualiste et, au moins partiellement, anticosmique ne fait que rappeler, parfois même par les particuliers, les conceptions, les mythologies, le sentiment gnostiques. La figure gnostique du démiurge-archonte a des connexions typologiques indéniables avec des figures démiurgiques d'adversaires ou de rivaux-collaborateurs de l'Etre suprême, depuis le Prométhée grec [10]), le Erlik de telle cosmogonie altaïque (pour lequel — comme pour tant de figures assez analogues du folklore dualiste de l'Europe orientale — on pourrait encore penser à une influence gnostique ou iranienne) [11]) jusqu'aux démiurges plus primitifs que l'ethno-

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9a) Cfr. la n. 23.

10) Por une interprétation comparative de Prométhée en fonction démiurgique et dualiste, v. *Prometheus, der titanische Trickster,* „Paideuma" VII (1961) p. 414 ss., où l'on touche aussi à l'interprétation platonicienne de cette fonction (v. aussi RHR, cit., p. 12 s).

11) Mais cfr. nos remarques dans *Il dualismo, infra* cit., p. 26 ss., *Zamān i Ohrmazd, infra* cit., p. 142 ss. et „Rev. de l'hist. des relig." 159 (1961), p. 10 ss., où nous soulignons que les systèmes gnostiques et les récits iraniens ne sont pas

logie sibérienne, nord-américaine, australienne etc. on mis en lumière
(les personnages du Corbeau, du Coyote et d'autres figures, d'aspect
humain, mais typiquement „archontiques", tel le Nih'asa des mythes
algonkins etc.) [12]). Il ne s'agit donc pas seulement de remarquer la
présence dans la gnose d'une attitude dualiste, qui a sa *Weltgeschichte*,
jusque chez les peuples ethnologiques (le prof. Nock a récemment sou-
ligné l'importance de cet aspect) [13]), mais bien plus spécifiquement,

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toujours la source des récits dualistes de l'ethnologie et du folklore de l'Asie et
de l'Europe orientale, mais que, au contraire, il arrive aussi que des récits
gnostiques *tardifs* (p. ex. ceux des Bogomiles) et iraniens (p. ex. ceux du cycle
„zurvanite") trahissent souvent des affinités ethnologiques (v. aussi J. Duchesne-
Guillemin, *La religion de l'Iran ancien,* Paris 1962, p. 192 s.). Pour ce qui est
du gnosticisme *classique*, on peut rappeler dans nombre de récits dualistes ethno-
logiques le thème de la vanterie du démiurge-rival (*infra* n. 21), de sa volonté
de puissance et d'action créatrice partiellement frustrée, de sa jalousie, de son
régime cruel, d'où résulte le culte, typiquement „archontique", nourri de détestation
et de peur, qui est voué à des figures type Erlik ou kérémet dans l'ethnographie
de l'Asie russe ou le folklore de l'Europe orientale: *Il dualismo,* pp. 38, 180, 184,
190 ss. (Au point de vue caractériologique, le Ahriman du Bundahishn, igno-
rant, jaloux et sanguinaire, impuissant à imiter Ohrmazd, n'est pas loin, bien
qu'encadré dans le schéma, tout différent, du dualisme absolu et symétrique,
qui est typique du mazdéisme depuis les deux esprits des Gāthās).

12) U. Bianchi, *Il dualismo religioso. Saggio storico ed etnologico,* Roma,
L'Erma di Bretschneider, 1958. Cfr. aussi la contrib. de l'A. à la *Festschrift
Baetke,* à paraître. Le caractère et les exploits des démiurges-rivaux du type du
Coyote ont un aspect cosmique, vitaliste, désordonné, „mondain", égocentrique,
lié avec les particularités du scénario cosmique et de la vie, avec ses passions essen-
tielles et son destin. C'est pour cette raison et dans ces limites qu'ils intègrent
parfois le caractère de héros culturels, mais dans le contexte du *trickster* (pour
cette typologie v. „Paideuma" VII, 1961, p. 335 ss.). Il est vrai que leur emprise
sur le monde ne se réalise désormais que par la validité actuelle des „lois" qu'ils
ont introduit au commencement, étant donné qu'ils ne sont plus là (et qu'ils ne
sont pas l'objet du culte). Au contraire, le rival type Erlik, qui n'est pas un
trickster, bien qu'il soit passablement trompeur, et qui a ses aspects démiurgi-
ques, surtout en thème de création antagoniste, continue d'exercer sur cette terre
(et sur les morts) son régime cruel et sombre. Le Nih'asa algonkin (*Il dua-
lismo,* p. 108 ss.) semble réaliser, à certain égards, un type intermédiaire; il est
l'„homme amer", qui bien qu'à certains égards rappelle l'ethos du Coyote,
par son style, son caractère et ses prétentions (il demande trompeusement pour
lui une partie de la terre créée et une capacité démiurgique, qui se réalise par
son bâton) rappelle plutôt l'Erlik asiatique, qui — se fondant sur une tromperie
initiale — crée ses cieux en concurrence avec l'Etre suprême (*Il dualismo,*
p. 183 s.). Ce Nih'asa (ailleurs Napiwa) est intéressant pour cette raison aussi,
qu'il est lié avec des histoires concernant une race pré-humaine (ou plusieurs,
dont l'une composée de cannibales).

13) *Gnosticism,* „The Harvard Theol. Review", 57 (1964), p. 256.

il s'agit de faire l'histoire mondiale d'une idée *qui est le point de départ de l'Empfinden gnostique:* l'idée que ce monde a été conditionné pendant sa création, et donc pour toute sa durée successive, par l'action et le régime d'un démiurge, éthiquement et caractériologiquement équivoque, prométheique-épiméthéique, qui agit selon un esprit tout différent de celui de l'Etre suprême et établit certains aspects, souvent désagréables, de la vie, de la civilisation et de la destinée humaines — p. ex. la mort [14]).

Le gnosticisme connaît aussi cette situation, qu'il acutise en drame. Mais il lui donne une issue: l'eschatologie gnostique, *l'ascensus* des âmes au de là des sphères planétaires régies par le démiurge, l'évasion de la géôle de ce monde et de ce corps; voilà la nouvelle perspective,

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14) Cfr. n. 12. Parfois, dans ces récits ethnologiques, c'est le démiurge qui a façonné les êtres humains, mais ne réussit pas à les vivifier, et il s'adresse pour cela à l'Etre suprême (RHR, cit. p. 13. Le bogomilisme connaît aussi ce thème: *ibid.* p. 6, n. 1). On racontait pareillement de Prométhée qu'il n'avait façonné que le corps humain, mais que l'âme avait été infusée par Athéna, donc par un être étroitement lié à l'Etre suprême, à laquelle il avait dû s'adresser; ou bien que Prométhée n'avait pas fait les hommes immortels. Il s'agit bien entendu de textes tardifs, mais le mythe du Protagoras platonicien, selon lequel Prométhée n'avait infusé aux hommes que le savoir faire de la pratique et de la versatilité (ἔντεχνος σοφία, περὶ τὸν βίον σοφία, δημιουργικὴ τέχνη), tandis que le don supérieur de la sagesse politique n'avait été communiqué que par Hermès, *sur l'initiative de Zeus,* confirme le rôle et le niveau démiurgiques de Prométhée: supra, n. 10. Comme nous croyons l'avoir démontré (*ibid.*), le Prométhée eschyléen qui se vante (*Prom. V.,* 250) d'avoir donné aux hommes les „aveugles espoirs" (ce don ambivalent dont déjà le célèbre mythe hésiodique) rentre dans la même caractériologie du démiurge et de son horizont „mondain". Les dieux inférieurs du Timée platonicien réalisent une typologie analogue (ils donnent les passions de l'âme inférieure, parmi lesquelles l'„espoir prompt à tromper"), bien qu'encadrée dans le monisme optimiste et cosmique de cet ouvrage (*ibid.*). Dans quelques récits de l'ethnographie de l'Europe nord-orientale extrême et de l'Asie russe, le rival infuse aux hommes (ou aux femmes) sa propre âme maligne, qui se double avec l'âme infusée par Dieu (*Il dualismo,* p. 188).

Les allusions platoniciennes à la τιτανικὴ φύσις, qui peut se manifester dans l'homme, ne font qu'élargir le dossier grec relatif à ces conceptions démiurgiques-dualistes et, de façon potentielle, anthroposophiques. Elles sont reprises par les néoplatoniciens, dans le contexte du mythe des races se succédant sur la terre, ou du mythe du démembrement de Dionysos: „Studi e mater. di storia delle relig." XXXIV (1963), 2, p. 172 s.

Finalement, les connexions du démiurge avec l'élément féminin, depuis le démiurge de quelqu'un des récits ethnographiques cités jusqu'au Prométhée de certains textes tardifs, auquel on reproche d'avoir créé la femme (v. aussi, pour les spéculations et la mythologie des mages, RHR, cité, p. 42 s., n. 3).

qui est conditionnée par une idée originale: la connaturalité divine de l'âme, ou de la *mens* [15]).

Quand et comment cette perspective a pu être ouverte? On peut s'adresser à ce monde complexe qui est constitué par les cultes à mystères des pays de la Méditerranée orientale [16]). Dans la mesure où ces cultes ont eu pour but, au de là du renouveau saisonnier, une perspective ultramondaine de l'homme, mieux: de son âme, ils ont constitué, dans ces pays, le présupposé d'une eschatologie de l'âme [17]). Or, dans une élaboration ultérieure de la théologie des mystères (élaboration dont nous trouvons le type justement dans l'orphisme grec du VIe siècle) [18]), la vicissitude de la vie divine féconde, qui sombre chaque année (par un cycle somme toute bénéfique) dans les ténèbres des enfers, tend à disparaître au bénéfice d'une vicissitude mystique et "sophique" de l'âme *divine* engagée dans le cycle de la naissance, assujettie au destin et à ses dieux, perdue dans ce monde (parifié maintenant à une géôle et aux enfers), et aspirant à la libération dans un milieu divin, dans des Champs Elysées souterrains ou éthériques. En d'autres termes, tandis que dans les mystères classiques la référence naturiste (qu'ils partagent d'ailleurs avec les cultes de fertilité, type Tammuz-Adonis) continue de s'accompagner d'une perspective sotériologique individuelle, qui ne suppose pourtant pas une „libération" de l'âme, mais plutôt une garantie pour celle-ci dans l'autre monde, la

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15) V. notre *Initiation, mystères et gnose,* dans les *Actes* (à paraître) du Colloque de Strasbourg sur les initiations (septembre 1964).

16) Dans l'art. cité à la n. 15, nous distinguons *les cultes de fertilité,* type Tammuz, où le renouveau saisonnier et l'intérét „sotériologique" collectif sont au premier plan (bien que les morts et les vivants singuliers y soient intéressés aussi), et les *mystères,* type Eleusis, où le moment sotériologique individuel est fondamental, bien que la perspective naturiste et politique existe aussi. Nous n'impliquons nullement que les perspectives sotériologiques individuelles, concernant aussi l'audelà, ne soient dans les cultes initiatiques que récentes et secondaires : on n'a qu'a rappeler les „mystères" des peuplades ethnologiques de chasseurs et d'agriculteurs primitifs. D'ailleurs, c'est justement le côté initiatique qui fait défaut dans les rites type Tammuz. Les rites osiriens semblent constituer un trait intermédiaire (qui ne signifie pas secondaire ni postérieur) entre les mystères et les rites de fertilité.

17) Il n'est pas exclu que l'Orient ait été intéressé à son tour à cette évolution: que l'on pense à la perspective, mystique en tout cas, sinon clairement ultramondaine, qui s'ouvre dans le texte assyrien du VIIIe siècle publié par Ebeling, *Tod und Leben,* 1, pour un roi qui a célébré la fête du Nouvel An.

18) V. *supra.*

sotériologie anticosmique s'avère plutôt le fait d'une interprétation „sophique" de la théologie des mystères.

L'exemple le plus éclatant de cette „mystériosophie", c'est-à-dire d'une interprétation sophique, eschatologique, anticosmique et dualiste-„spiritualiste" [19]) d'une vieille sotériologie mystérique, est donné justement par l'orphisme (cette réinterprétation sophique et „spiritualiste" des „mystères" dionisiaques), ou par les courants sophico-mystiques qui portèrent (quand?) les grecs et les orientaux à donner parfois un nouveau sens, mystique-animologique, plus que simplement allégorique et symbolique, aux mythes et aux rites de Koré ou d'Adonis. Cette mystériosophie se présente alors comme une véritable annonce de la théologie, mieux: de la théosophie et de l'anthroposophie gnostiques: la vicissitude de l'âme divine perdue dans ce monde, dans le cycle (ou la roue) des naissances, et aspirant à sa libération finale [20]).

Voilà, à notre sens, qui constitue aujourd'hui le noyau du problème historico-religieux de la gnose. Les *topoi* ne manquent pas pour faire l'objet de toute une série de recherches: depuis ce thème du „pride of the demiurge", que Jonas souligne justement comme typique des systèmes gnostiques, et qui se retrouve, dans un scénario psychologique assez analogue, dans les mythes ethnologiques sur le démiurge, le „second", le rival de l'Etre suprême, qui détourne à son intention le processus créateur et révendique un peu à tort un peu à raison son caractère d'„autocrée" [21]) —, jusqu'à ces entités aïoniques féminines

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19) Il s'agit d'un type particulier et extrême de spiritualisme anticosmique.

20) Il est évident que nous ne rattachons pas toute sotériologie à la mystériosophie anticosmique; il y a aussi une sotériologie biblique et une sotériologie du mazdéisme. Seul parmi les gnostiques, Marcion, pour souligner à l'extrême le concept du saveur étranger à ce monde et à tout ce qui est en lui, ne semble pas admettre la *syngeneia* divine de l'âme (ni, à plus forte raison, la métempsychose, qui d'ailleurs n'appartient pas à tous les gnostiques). Mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il faille l'exclûre, avec Harnack, *Marcion* (Leipzig 1921), p. 4 s., 17-19, du groupe des gnostiques (cfr. Jonas, *Gnostic Rel.*[2] p. 137; Rudolph, *Stand u. Aufgaben, infra* cit., p. 98).

21) Cfr. p. ex. le mythe chukchee cité *Il dualismo,* p. 58 s. (cfr. p. 52), et repris par H. Rousseau, *Le dieu du mal,* Paris 1963, p. 8 s. Bien des autres démiurges (ou figures analogues) se vantent sur ce sujet, soit dans les mythes ethnologiques soit dans ceux du gnosticisme (cf. supra, n. 3, et, pour la gnose, Jonas, *The gnostic Religion*[2], p. 295), sauf à être finalement humiliés. L'oscillation typique des systèmes dualistes entre une forme „absolue" et une „mitigée" s'explique foncièrement avec ce motif du démiurge en tant que partiellement „autonome" dans son essence et dans son origine. („Rev. hist. des rel.", 159, pp.

et fécondes, qui, émanées du Premier Principe, ou couplées en *syzygia*
avec les Etres premiers [22]), sont évidemment en fonction d'une per-
spective théogonique et parfois cosmogonique [23]) ultérieure, qui pro-
longe *ad infra* le monde divin par la théogamie; elles soulignent, bien
qu'à l'intérieur d'un scénario „spirituel" et foncièrement anticosmique,
les connexions de la mythologie gnostique avec la vieille pensée naturiste
théogonique et cosmogonique, qui n'ignore pas, à son tour, le procédé
par hypostases, systématiques et „abstraites" (bien qu'en fonction très
cosmique: les listes mésopotamiennes des „pères et des mères" d'Anu
et d'Enlil; les couples primordiaux [tel Anshar-Kishar] de l'*Enūma
elīsh*) [24]). Le moment anticosmique n'y sera introduit que par le thème

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6-8). Ailleurs, le démiurge rival des récits ethnographiques se vante d'être un
„chef" (*Il dualismo*, p. 113).

22) La distinction entre un Etre suprême (et premier) au sens monothéiste,
et un Etre premier (au sens de l'ἀρχή) explique bien le caractère ambivalent
et paradoxal du dieu suprême de la gnose (qu'il s'appelle Proarché, Propator,
Bythos ets.), où les aspects monothéiste et moniste (chaotique-théogonique) se
composent de façon instable mais typique. Le thème du démiurge rival consti-
tue une spécification et une complication dualiste de la croyance à l'Etre suprême
créateur; le thème de l'hypostase féminine et féconde se rattache au contraire
au dieu ἀρχή dans le cadre du couple divin; parfois — dans l'intérêt du système —
le couple le plus significatif constitue la dernière des *syzygiai* du plérôme.

23) Cfr. la Μεγάλη ἀπόφασις (dont Hippol., *Refutat.* IV, 13): ... καλεῖ τὴν
πρώτην συζυγίαν νοῦν καὶ ἐπίνοιαν, οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν..., les autres se référant aussi
bien à d'autres entités abstraites et cosmiques. Bien que l'appartenance simo-
nienne de ce traité soit contestée, il est indéniable que l'aspect naturiste de la
pensée simonienne n'est que souligné par certaines des connexions mythologiques
d'Hélène, c'est-à-dire par son rapport avec Lune (qui avait un rôle aussi dans
la mythologie orphique) et, peut-être, avec Koré (Vincent, *Le culte d'Hélène à
Samarie*, „Rev. Biblique", XLV (1936), p. 221 ss.; Chapoutier, *Les Dioscures
au service d'une déesse* [assimilation iconographique Hélène/Koré-Perséphone];
Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, p. 62; R. M. Grant, op. cit., p. 75). Ce dernier
fait est intéressant aussi pour l'*affinité entre une interprétation à type mystério-
sophique* (v. *supra*) *et une interprétation „gnostique"*, fondées l'une et l'autre sur
le caractère „pneumatique" — „cosmique" de la protagoniste de la „vicissitude".
L'aspect cosmogonique de l'Hélène simonienne est implicite aussi dans le té-
moignage d'Irénée, *adv. haer.* I, 23, 2, qui l'appelle *mater omnium*.

24) La „généalogie d'Enlil", qui dans un de ces textes jouit d'une place privi-
légiée (se trouvant au commencement), étale les origines de l'univers sur quinze
couples divins, représentant une analyse des principes de l'être réalisée par hypo-
stases couplées, dont chacune est caractérisée par les deux aspects, „abstrait"
et cosmique: p. ex., le „seigneur terre" et „madame terre", le „seigneur ciel" et
„madame ciel", le „seigneur jours de vie" et „madame jours de vie"; au com-
mencement, ᵈEn-me-šár-ra et ᵈNin-me-šar-ra, resp. „seigneur et madame *modus
operandi* de l'universe". (Th. Jacobsen, „Journ. of Near Eastern Studies", V, 1946,
p. 138 s.; *me* étant plutôt les *moduli* ou les types célestes des réalités visibles:

d'une rupture qui se produit a un certain moment, pour troubler et
interrompre, par une *chûte,* ce qui était le mouvement d'émanation
harmoniquement „descendant", mais toujours théocentrique, des en-
tités du plérôme [25]).

Castellino „Analecta Bibl.", 12, p. 25). Des spéculations de ce type — on peut citer
aussi les théo-cosmogonies phéniciennes de Sanchuniathon — sont typiques aussi
de certaines théo-cosmogonies ethnologiques, p. ex. en Polynésie.

25) Pour ce qui est des origines de cet horizont anticosmique, et de la possi-
bilité d'une étude comparative sur les origines du gnosticisme, qui tienne compte
de la mythologie d'Ishtar et de Tammuz et du sentiment de la vie qui a pu y
être implicite — tel qu'il résulte déjà par *Gilgam.* VI, 44, où ce héros se refuse
au mariage avec Inanna —, voir l'article cité à la n. 15.

La tendance à une certaine affinité démonique et „archontique" du monde divin
mésopotamien pourrait déjà résulter (sans attendre les Mandéens, pour lesquels
tant de problémes se posent, v. *infra*) par la littérature cunéiforme. Il faut y
considérer : I) un sentiment vague de méfiance ou d'ambivalence à l'égard des
dieux qui régissent la vie et le destin des mortels (bien que cela n'implique
nullement l'anticosmisme, la vie étant recherchée comme le souverain bien) et II)
le sentiment d'une rupture dans le monde divin, dans le sens *a*) que les démons
sont parfois assez proches des dieux, et *b*) qu'ils ont une activité agressive sur
échelle cosmique. Il est évident que ces trois thèmes peuvent intéresser la com-
paraison avec la *Weltanschauung* gnostique. Il faut ajouter — bien que cela
soit plus général — le sentiment d'une „inférisation" de cette vie, à l'occasion
d'expériences de malheur (p. ex. dans le „psaume" Dhorme, *Choix de textes
religieux assyro-bab.,* Paris 1907, p. 337).

Pour les points I et II, on peut rappeler les „Sept dieux", qui se réfèrent
parfois aux Igigi (les „forts"), et qui ont parfois l'aspect de dieu inférieurs et
subalternes, au caractère fort et cruel, plutôt ennemis que bienveillants à l'égard
des hommes (Jastrow, *Die Rel. Bab. u. Ass.,* I, p. 197-199) : ils ont donc un
aspect assez „archontique" (nous faisons abstraction de leur nombre, qui ne serait
que conventionnel, bien que dans le mandéisme la référence soit désormais spéci-
fique aux sept planètes, les maléfiques par excellence). Ailleurs, dans les textes
cunéiformes, les Sept sont franchement les démons, presque exclusivement dans
les textes magiques (*ibid.,* p. 200). Les sept mauvais dieux (pour cette expression
v. le texte *ibid.* p. 361) ont exercé la violence sur le héros Shamash et sur le
guerrier Adad, dieux des niveaux cosmiques supérieurs ; ils sont les ennemis
d'Ea (le dieu bienveillant et secourable) ; ils ne connaissent ni pitié ni miseri-
corde, et endommagent le pays. Ils sont aussi les „puissants parmi les dieux"
(p. 282) ; en effet, les démons partagent l'attribut de „forts" et le déterminatif
divin avec les dieux, avec lesquels ils exercent leur puissance sur la condition
humaine, et dont il n'est pas toujours possible de les distinguer clairement (p.
283, 360-363, 386). Il faut finalement ajouter à cette galerie le dieu „Sept"
(Sibitti, *ibid.* p. 173 s., p. 386), assez instable comme entité individuelle, et peut-
être proche de Nergal, dont il partage le caractère dur et cruel (on sait d'ailleurs
que ce dernier dieu, parifié à un dragon, est tyrannique et violent, bien qu'ambi-
valent, lié de plus en plus aux enfers — et même sujet d'une vicissitude cosmique).
Pour revenir aux „Sept" démoniques, bien que leur situation soit chthonienne
et cata-chthonienne (*ap.* Contenau, *La magie chez les Ass. et les Bab.,* p. 88),

Qu'il nous soit permis de faire allusion à propos de ce dernier aspect de la pensée gnostique, avec son penchant pour la multiplication systématique des hypostases spirituelles — dans un cadre modaliste, émanationniste et subordinationniste —, à un autre problème historico-religieux concernant les origines de la gnose : ses rapports possibles (peut-être médiatisés) avec la pensée iranienne. Il n'est pas question de la problématique passablement vieillie relative à l'*Anthropos,* au Sauveur à venir ou au *Erlöster Erlöser:* il s'agit surtout de faire la part due à la tendance à l'élaboration d'entités abstraites-concrètes, spirituelles-universelles mais liées avec les catégories visibles de la nature, qui caractérise depuis le commencement la pensée mazdéenne et qui se rattache, peut-être, à certaines aspects de la pensée religieuse aryenne. Il s'agit aussi de considérer (bien qu'il soit plus tardif) le thème mazdéen d'une création „descendante", réalisée par une entité de lumière qui crée des êtres appartenant foncièrement à son monde (et jouissant d'une sorte de connaturalité lumineuse avec elle) 26):

ils sont aussi le suppôt du trône des dieux, et, parmi eux, le mauvais Utukku descend d'Anu et de Bel, il est le „crachat amer" des dieux. Ailleurs ils sont associés au ciel, aux vents destructeurs, parfois en figure animale ; une de leurs gestes a eu le ciel pour théâtre ; ils ont capturé Shamash et Adad (*supra*), ils ont affronté Sin (éclipse ! chez les Mandéens, au contraire, étant donnée la nature partiellement malfaisante des grandes astres, l'éclipse est un moyen pour les modérer). Un autre texte témoigne de leur présence effrayante : „Himmel und Erde hingen sie in ihre Gewalt und schonen selbst die Götter nicht, auf Erde sind sie schonungslos..., zum hohen Himmel begeben sie sich, zum unerreichbaren Himmel..." (cit. par Jastrow, I, p. 363). Le problème du rapport des Sept avec les *šibiahia* mandéens est discuté. Dans la question des rapports de base Babylone-Mandéens, la position de K. Rudolph, *Die Mandäer,* I, p. 195 ss. est plutôt négative, étant donné les connexions occidentales de ces sectaires ; tout en faisant abstraction d'une identification des Sept babyloniens avec les planètes, il me semble qu'elle doive être intégrée par la considération des conceptions babyloniennes sus-citées. Il faut aussi considérer [Furlani, „Memorie Accad. Naz. dei Lincei" VIII, II, 3, p. 122] que les *šibiahia,* restant les démons, sont aussi les „soldats de Ptahil", et que celui-ci obéit aux ordres du Soleil, qui n'est pas tout entier mauvais ni haïssable pour les Mandéens, et qui transmet à son tour des ordres supérieurs. Cela peut rappeler la situation parfois ambivalente et intermédiaire-subalterne des Sept babyloniens, ou même l'ambivalence de Nergal (v. *supra*). Naturellement, le problème s'élargit quand il s'agit d'évaluer les rapports de ces conceptions avec la religion astrale, et quand il s'agit des vicissitudes de celle-ci dans l'histoire religieuse mésopotamienne.

26) U. Bianchi, *Zamān i Ohrmazd.* Torino, 1958, p. 18 ss. ; cfr. „Studi e mater. di storia d. relig.". XXXIII, 2 (1963), p. 308-310. V. aussi G. Gnoli, „Annali d. Istituto Univ. Orientale di Napoli" (AION), N.S. XII (1962), p. 105 ss. et XIII (1963), p. 163 ss. (cosmogonie de la lumière ; aspect archétypal et séminal du *ménok*).

une création qui traverse un stade *ménokien,* dans le cadre de spécu-
lations (portant sur le retour du cosmos à ses origines „spirituelles")
qui frôlent parfois l'acosmisme, au moins en perspective eschatologi-
que [27]). Ces spéculations restent à étudier, à côté des perspectives plus
proprement mondaines et charnelles auxquelles le mazdéisme classique
nous a accoutumés [28]). En tout cas, ce n'est pas *spécifiquement* le
dualisme, qui semble avoir constitué l'apport de l'Iran à la gnose (le
dualisme mazdéen, qui suppose l'origine extérieure du mal, constituant
un type à lui) [29]).

Evidemment, ces indications sont d'une haleine trop longue pour
satisfaire l'historien, au moins celui d'entre les historiens des religions
qui n'aimerait pas à encourir les reproches, adressées non sans raison
à l'école *religionsgeschichtlich,* de mépriser la chronologie et le tissu
du processus historique. Il ne faudra jamais oublier — Wilson le dit
très bien [30]) — que la pensée gnostique classique se déploie dans
une période hautement syncrétiste, où certaines idées, comme celle
de l'âme hôte et prisonnière dans le corps et le monde, étaient le bien
commun de la „philosophie"; ni l'on ne saura oublier que le judaïsme,
mieux: la référénce, surtout critique, au judaïsme semble conditionner
historiquement et idéologiquement bien des systèmes et de l'*Empfinden*
gnostique (d'autant plus que le judaïsme était, de façon ou autre,
part essentielle du milieu philosophique et culturel tardo-antique). Mais
l'exigence subsiste de saisir le problème de plus près, la typologie venant
ici au secours de l'histoire. Car, si le gnosticisme, malgré la possibilité

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27) Et, parfois, d'aspect anticosmique. Voilà la discussion de M. Molé (d'ail-
leurs sceptique à ce sujet), *Un ascétisme moral dans les livres pehlevis?,* „Rev.
de l'hist. d. rel." 155 (1959), p. 145 ss.

28) C'est dans ces limites, nous semble-t-il — et non selon les formules de
Reitzenstein — que l'hypothèse iranienne peut s'avérer fructueuse. Elle est re-
prise — dans le sillon de la tradition *religionsgeschichtlich,* bien qu'avec un
souci nouveau pour l'établissement concret du tissu historique — par G. Widen-
gren, *The great Vohu Manah and the Apostle of God,* Uppsala 1945, *Der
iranische Hintergrund der Gnosis,* in „Zeitschr. f. Rel. u. Geistesgesch. IV, 1952,
p. 97 ss.; *Iranisch-semitische Kulturbegegnung in parthischer Zeit,* Köln-Opladen
1960: Pour quelques remarques au sujet de cet aspect de la théorie du savant
suédois cfr. notre *Zamān i Ohrmazd,* cit., p. 218 s., n. 75).

29) Seul le manichéisme, pour l'affinité de son fondateur avec le milieu iranien,
a hérité de ce dualisme symétrique, tout en le dénaturant par l'anticosmisme
gnostique.

30) *The gnostic Problem,* cit., p. 258 ss.

de références multiples, reste *un* quant à son idée fondamentale [31]),
il s'en suit que la recherche de ses origines n'est que légitime, au de
là de tout *ignorabimus* syncrétiste; le syncrétisme gnostique étant d'ail-
leurs assez spécifique par rapport au syncrétisme *sensu lato* de la basse
antiquité.

Pour ce qui est de la part du judaïsme, la chose est plus sérieuse,
étant donné qu'il ne saurait être trop facilement question de l'éliminer
du cadre. Bien au contraire..., si peu que l'on réfléchit aux milieux

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[31] Wilson, qui pourtant avait souligné l'idée de l'être divin prisonnier dans
le corps, concède trop à l'hypothèse syncrétiste quand il dit que „Gnosticism is
an atmosphere, not a system; it is the general atmosphere of the period and
affects to some extent all the religions and philosophies of the time" (p. 261).
Cette dernière phrase ne saurait en tout cas être acceptée par l'historien des
religions, ni par le bibliste. C'est justement cette latitude qui constitue la fai-
blesse de l'hypothèse extrême de Jonas, qui dans son *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist*
(1934-1954) englobe dans la gnose *sensu lato* Plotin et Origène (bien qu'il soit
très légitime d'étudier dans ces auteurs quelques aspects de la thématique et de
la sensibilité qui fut de la gnose, et qui s'explique avec Platon et avec l'„atmos-
phère" du temps). Au contraire, dans *The gnostic Religion* (2e édit. 1963), Jonas
(bien qu'il professe n'avoir pas renoncé à sa gnose *sensu lato*) donne une très
claire typologie (qui est avant tout une „imagerie") de la gnose, qui ajoute la
vie à sa définition du gnosticisme comme dualisme anticosmique et eschatologique.
Bien que les intérêts philosophiques de Jonas aient pu aider ce savant dans sa
recherche du propre du gnosticisme (et le dernier chapitre du livre de 1963 en
est une dernière épreuve), ils ont pu lui faciliter (avec ses accointances bult-
maniennes) quelques excès de généralité dans le champ historico-comparatif.
Pour une typologie du gnosticisme et de son esprit on pourra s'adresser aussi
aux comptes-rendus des leçons de H.-Ch. Puech au Collège de France („An-
nuaire du C. de F.", 1953, p. 163-172, 1954, p. 191-199, 1955, p. 165-183, 1956,
p. 186-209, 1957, p. 231-246). La typologie de la gnose donnée par Quispel, *Gnosis
als Weltreligion*, Zürich 1951, tend au contraire à se résoudre dans le psycho-
logisme et à se détruire elle-même, au moins en tant que phénomène historique
concret et spécifique; le problème génétique en est évidemment compromis.
L'unité du phénomène gnosticisme est reconnue aussi par K. Rudolph, *Stand
und Aufgaben in der Erforschung des Gnostizismus* [Tagung f. allgem. Rel.-
gesch. 1963, als Manuskript], p. 97) selon lequel la gnose est une *Weltreligion*
qui ne se pose pas consciemment comme telle; elle transcend le syncrétisme. Les
théories de Simone Pètrement sur l'essence du gnosticisme (*Le dualisme chez
Platon, les gnostiques et les manichéens*, Paris 1947; *La notion de gnosticisme*,
„Rev. de métaphysique et de morale" LXX, 1960, p. 385 ss.) sont compromises
par l'extension excessive qu'elle donne au concept de dualisme, y résolvant pra-
tiquement l'idée de la transcendance. Cette acception du terme est légitime dans
la terminologie philosophique, la signification de dualisme en histoire des religions
étant autre (*Il dualismo*, p. 7 ss.). Au delà de toute question terminologique, le
fait reste d'une confusion inutile entre gnosticisme et christianisme dans les inter-
prétations, d'ailleurs sensibles, de cet A. (v. aussi *Il dualismo*, p. 203 n. 3).

ethniques, au style, à la littérature, aux *topoi* qui font l'histoire des courants gnostiques les plus anciens (et tout en faisant abstraction des questions posées spécifiquement par les ouvrages apocalyptiques judaïques et leurs partielles accointances gnostiques ou paragnostiques): et surtout, si l'on réfléchit au fait que la structure du scénario cosmique et cosmogonique des systèmes gnostiques ne saurait se concevoir hors de toute référence judaïque (v. *infra*).

Pour nous résumer, il nous semble que dans l'étude de l'histoire du gnosticisme trois points de référence ne sauraient être néligés: 1) L'antiquité presque primordiale d'une conception spéciale de ce monde, un monde qui relève par constitution de l'activité primordiale d'un être inquiétant et trouble, le démiurge; 2) l'antiquité sensible, au moins depuis l'orphisme grec du VIe s., du dualisme antisomatique, anticosmique et eschatologique, greffé sur une interprétation anthroposophique de l'ancienne „sotériologie" implicite dans la vicissitude naturiste célébrée par les cultes de fertilité et les mystères, et héritant de certaines très anciennes méfiances pour ce monde de douleur et pour ses „démiurges" [32]); 3) le fait que le judaïsme joue le rôle du pivot autour duquel, fût-il dans le sens le plus acharnement critique et antithétique, se meut, se spécifie et se „déchaîne" le mouvement gnostique de la basse antiquité.

Si l'on résume le gnosticisme dans ces trois idées: *a*) l'âme (divine) prisonnière du monde, du corps, du destin et de ses dieux, de la mort, qui se reconnaît elle-même, en attendant sa libération dans le cadre d'une *apocatastasis* et dans une morale abstentionniste à type dualiste [33]), *b*) le démiurge-rival auteur de *ce* monde, *c*) l'émanation, la chûte et la réintegration d'entités d'origine „pléromatique" [34]), —

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32) Pour les tendances (d'ailleurs assez fluides) à la critique et à la méfiance à l'égard de ce monde et de ses dieux dans le milieu mésopotamien, cfr. n. 15 et 25.

33) Impliquant d'ailleurs, on le sait l'antinomisme et parfois le libertinisme.

34) Peut-être, le „sauveur" et l'„envoyé" constituent aussi un élément du cadre gnostique normal (comme le veut K. Rudolph, op. cit.) mais il sont implicites dans le concept des émanations pléromatiques. Ils se distinguent par là d'autres sauveurs et envoyés du type Messie et du type Saoshyant. De plus, la référence anthroposophique du thème gnostique de l'Homme en tant que substance spirituelle préexistante et divine se recoupe avec l'appartenance de l'Anthropos au plérôme, dans le cadre final de l'élément divin qui sauve lui-même. Mais cfr. la n. suivante. Il est a remarquer que l'hermétisme ne connaît pas de rédempteur personnel ni de conclusion finale réparant la chûte (Nock, op. ct., p. 276) tandis que le dualisme anthropologique des oracles chaldaïques (l'âme assujettie par

on tiendra pour hautement vraisemblable *a*) que le gnosticisme est né *ante litteram* quand les vieilles mythologies théogoniques et anthropogoniques ont été assujetties à l'eschatologisme „spiritualiste" du type dualiste, anthroposophique et anticosmique — comme il arrive déjà avec l'orphisme, au moins en Grèce; *b*) qu'il s'est concrétisé en système quand la figure du démiurge de ce monde a pu être mieux établie par le recours à cet unique dieu qui, au de là du panorama polythéiste et théogonique vague et mouvant du paganisme ancien, pouvait seul jouer de plein droit — dans l'antiquité tardive — le rôle complet et indiscutible du „créateur" de ce monde: le Dieu de l'Ancien Testament.

Mais ce n'est pas seulement l'idée juive du créateur, qui a pu finalement contribuer à concrétiser et à déchaîner les systèmes gnostiques. Le messianisme, l'attente de la libération du peuple d'Israel, l'universalisme, le révanchisme oriental tout dirigé sur les périodisations de la grande histoire, le pessimisme historique et cosmique; voilà bien des éléments qui, accrochés à tort ou à raison, selon les cas, à un judaïsme qui va donner un nouveau tour à l'histoire, et souvent retournés contre lui, ont dû contribuer puissamment, sur le sillon dynamique du message chrétien adressé au gentils, et par le charme du nom de Jésus, le Sauveur, à l'origine du gnosticisme. Le vieux dualisme anthroposophique et anticosmique païen, caractérisé par le manque de perspective historique (le *daimon* empedocléen, exilé pour „trente mille ans", et l'éternel retour du Sphairos, selon le philosophe d'Agrigente!) cède alors au *nouveau* anticosmisme, qui *connaît* l'histoire et son dieu (le judaïsme était là), mais les *condamne* et les prend à rebours, aspirant à la restauration de l'unité originelle du plérôme, blessée par la fatuité ou la superbe de l'Ennoia divine et oblitérée par l'ignorance et la présomption du démiurge, le puissant de ce monde [35]).

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son oblivion à la destinée et aux pouvoirs démoniques) ne connaît pas même l'épisode d'une chûte *(ibid.,* p. 268).

35) Il nous semble que Nock a bien le droit de chercher les origines du gnosticisme dans le milieu chrétien et judaïque (aussi bien que dans l'antijudaïsme), et peut-être aussi d'admettre „the traditional view of Gnosticism as Christian heresy with roots in speculative thought" (p. 276), mais il avance trop quand il voit dans le gnosticisme un „aggregate of a series of individualistic responses to the religious situation", au dehors d'une volonté hétérodoxe (l'orthodoxie ayant crystallisé progressivement, selon Nock) (p. 273). Nock rejoint par là, la rendant plus radicale, l'explication „philosophique" des gnosticismes par de Faye. D'ailleurs, la spéculation hermétique, les oracles chaldaïques avec leur dualisme implicite, la religion mandéenne, nous semblent confirmer que le judaïsme

Il est évident que, dans cette situation, les hommes de l'Eglise (pas même ceux de la synagogue) n'avaient pas à se méprendre: les racines païennes, „philosophiques", du gnosticisme ne pouvaient leur échapper. Car l'identité du Dieu de la Bible et du Dieu de Jésus; l'unité du dessin qui rattache la création et la primitive histoire à la rédemption et à la restauration; l'unité du créateur du corps et de l'esprit; la sainteté immaculée du Rédempteur envoyé par Dieu et son Fils depuis l'éternité; la corporéité concrète de sa passion, n'ont jamais fait de doute pour les hommes du Message; ils y ont vu depuis le commencement le *test* de l'orthodoxie chrétienne.

Nous ajoutons, en concluant, que bien des questions ultérieures existent, au sujet des origines du gnosticisme et de ses rapports avec le judaïsme apocalyptique et apocryphe. L'angélologie astrale, les spéculations sur le *descensus* astral des âmes, les spéculations sur les entités, l'*Urzeit* et l'*Endzeit*, le thème de la fornication des anges, l'encratisme: autant de thèmes qui engagent les savants des différentes spécialités.

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et le christianisme ont pu conférer à la gnose des structures, mais il ne lui ont pas conféré son inspiration essentielle.

COMMENTS ON MAX MÜLLER'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE BUDDHIST
NIRVĀṆA

BY

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Close, analytical study of ancient Indian religious terminology is a demanding discipline today engaged in by only a few scholars [1]. Compounding the impressive difficulties encountered in such investigations, it will be noticed, some of the terms have become incorporated into the vocabulary of contemporary non-Indians. Sanctified by several decades of inclusion in dictionaries of the various Western European languages, they have acquired an uncritical significance which makes it all the more difficult to assess their "original" and contextual significations in the Indian thought schemata.

Among the terms most bedeviling in its complexity of nuance is that of *nirvāṇa* according to Buddhist usage. Recently, the distinguished Belgian scholars, Ludo and Rosane Rocher, have expressed some of the frustrations shared by many who have tried to analyse that term:

> Qu'on conçoive les bouddhistes comme les antagonistes conscients de l'hindouisme ou comme les „frères des brahmanes des Upanishads", il n'en reste pas moins que le concept bouddhiste de *nirvāna* a été construit sur ou a réagi contre des éléments de l'hindouisme plus ancien, et qu'à son tour l'hindouisme plus récent s'est enrichi de ou a réagi contre des éléments du *nirvāna*. Nous ne traiterons pas du *nirvāna* dans la présente étude, tout d'abord, parce que le concept hindouiste de *mokṣa* pose déjà, à lui seul, un tel nombre de problèmes qu'ils ne pourront être discutés dans leur totalité, et ensuite parce que les bouddhologues, eux-mêmes, n'en ont résolu les problèmes fondamen-

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1) Among the most distinguished must be mentioned Louis Renou and Jan Gonda. See especially the latter's suggestive article, "Some Notes on the Study of Ancient-Indian Religious Terminology," *History of Religions,* vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter, 1962), pp. 243-273.

2) Ludo and Rosane Rocher, "Mokṣa: le concept hindou de la délivrance," *Religions de Salut* (Bruxelles: Université libre de Bruxelles, Institut de sociologie, 1962), pp. 186-187.

taux. Pour ne citer qu'un seul exemple. on ne sait pas trop si le Bouddha lui-même envisageait le *nirvāna* comme une véritable extinction, un anéantissement complet, ou bien simplement comme le bonheur suprême et la délivrance en dehors de tout notion d'anéantissement. [2])

Now, the term *nirvāna* has been under examination and discussion for nearly a century and a half — a period which has witnessed the birth and development of scientific (= text-based) Buddhist studies in Western Europe. Most Sanskrit scholars (and many "laymen") have wrestled with the term; and it is a truism to insist that any conception of Buddhism is intimately involved with the meaning or meanings which one assigns to the Buddhist *nirvāna*.

The present essay will not solve the puzzling Buddhist *nirvāna* nor, indeed, even approach the questions directly. Rather is it my intention to review the opinions and conclusions reached concerning Buddhism and its *nirvāna* by one of the foremost Western European Sanskritists, one of the founders of comparative philological, religious, and mythological studies: F. Max Müller. Buddhist *nirvāna* is thickly encrusted with interpretations of various sorts, and it is hoped that an examination of some of the more influential and cogent of those judgments may assist in the recovery of the term itself.

> It was in the *Times* of April 17 and 20 of this year [1857] that a review appeared by Max Müller of Stanislas Julien's *Voyages des Pèlerins Bouddhistes*. It was afterwards published as a pamphlet, together with a letter on Nirvāna called forth by a protest printed in the *Times* of April 24, against Max Müller's view of Nirvāna as *utter annihilation,* whereas the writer of the protest maintained that Nirvāna meant *union and communion with God* ... The article on Stanislas Julien's book was almost Max Müller's first introduction to Buddhism. Pali he had studied at Berlin. [3])

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3) *The Life and Letters of the Right Honorable Friederich Max Müller,* ed. His wife (2 vols.; London: Longman's Green, and Co., 1902), I, 202-203. Cited hereafter as *Life and Letters.*

The articles mentioned — "Buddhist Pilgrims" and "The Meaning of Nirvāna" — appeared originally in the *Times.* They are available in the following three sources:

i. *Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims: A Review of M. Stanislas Julien's "Voyages des Pèlerins Bouddhiques" Together with A Letter on the Original Meaning of "Nirvāna"* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1857).

ii. *Chips from a German Workshop* (various editions; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1867-1894).

iii. *Selected Essays on Language, Mythology, and Religion* (2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1881). Vol. II of this work contains all the essays on Buddhism and complete notes which are lacking in other editions. The most convenient reference, it will be cited hereafter as *Selected Essays, II.*

Five years later, in 1862, Müller published an extended essay, "Bud-
dhism," in the *Edinburgh Review.* [4]) And in 1869 at the general meeting
of the Association of German Philologists in Kiel he presented a "Lec-
ture on Buddhist Nihilism" (*Buddhistischer Nihilismus*). [5]) That is
the extent of Müller's published statements on Buddhism and nirvāṇa:
only four short works in a voluminous bibliography which spans more
than half a century. [6]) Still, the authority of Müller's statements can-
not be measured merely in fixed ratio to their quantity.

Max Müller was the singularly dominating figure in the history of
Indic studies in Europe through the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. And before discussing his views a propos of nirvāṇa in Bud-
dhism, it will be worthwhile to mention some details about the man.
Eugène Burnouf was perhaps the first mature European Sanskrit
scholar. His early death, however, denied him deserved recognition.
Not so with Müller who lived a long and extremely productive life.
He was a giant; and if one is to understand the development of San-
skritic and general Indic studies west of Athens, he must know the
story of Max Müller.

Friederich Max ("Max" after the principle in Weber's *Freischütz*)
Müller was born 6 December 1823, in Dessau, then capital of the
Duchy of Anhalt-Dessau. His father, Wilhelm Müller, was a poet —
"second in stature only to Goethe as a lyricist," said Heine —
librarian to the Duke, and master at the Dessau Gymnasium. Max's
mother, Adelheid, daughter of the Prime Minister, President von
Basedow, was an extremely attractive woman and an accomplished
musician. Wilhelm Müller's death in 1827 hurled young Max, his
sister, and especially his mother into a melancholia for many years —
a sadness from which not even the serene beauty of the countryside and
the warm, creative companionship of such artist-friends as Felix Men-
delsohn could rouse them.

Max attended the local Gymnasium from his sixth to twelfth year
and then entered the famous Nicolai School (Leibniz's alma mater)
of Leipzig at Easter, 1836. He matriculated at the University of Leip-

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4) *Selected Essays, II,* 160-223.

5) *Ibid.,* pp. 292-312.

6) There are, of course, numerous references to Buddhism in Müller's many
essays on language, mythology, and religion; and his introductions to several
translations. For the purposes of this study, however, they may be considered as
peripheral.

zig for the summer term, 1841. It was during the term following, winter 1841-1842, that he began to study Sanskrit with Wilhelm Brockhaus. Müller received his doctorate from Leipzig, 1 September 1843. He then went to Berlin for additional Sanskrit studies under Franz Bopp, [7] "but more especially philosophy under Schelling." [8] There he also took instruction in Pāli, Hindī, and Persian.

Müller left Berlin in late winter, 1845, and arrived in Paris on 10 March. Ten days later he met Eugène Burnouf.

> Went to Burnouf, spiritual, amiable, thoroughly French. He received me in the most friendly way, talked a great deal, and all he said valuable, not on ordinary topics but on special. I managed better in French than I expected. "I am a Brahman, a Buddhist, a Zoroastrian; I hate the Jesuits" — that is the sort of man. I am looking forward to his lectures. [9]

And for a little more than a year Müller attended those lectures, studying in a small class among whose members were Abbé Bardelli, Jules Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, and Thomas Goldstücker. By all odds, Burnouf exercised the decisive influence on Müller's career. Again Müller's journal captures Burnouf's magnetism and Max's own enthusiasm:

> Small, his face decidedly German, only lighted up with a constant sparkle which is distinctively French. I must have seemed very stupid to him when I tried to explain what I really wanted to do in Paris. He told me afterwards that he could not make me out at first. His lectures were on the *Rig-veda,* and opened a new world to me. He explained to us his own researches, he showed us new MSS which he had received from India, in fact he did all he could to make us his fellow-workers. [10]

I am not sure that I know what "decidedly German faces" or "distinctively French sparkles" are — but young Müller's excitement is unmistakeable. The *Ṛgveda was* a new world, and Müller was eager to explore. "'Either study Indian philosophy or study Indian religion and copy the Hymns and Sāyaṇa,' said Burnouf." [11] Müller chose

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7) On the significance of Franz Bopp (1791-1867) in the history of comparative linguistics and Sanskrit studies see Holger Pederson, *The Discovery of Language: Linguistic Science in the 19th Century,* trans. John Webster Spargo (reprint; Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 254-258; and also John T. Waterman, *Perspectives in Linguistics: An Account of the Background of Modern Linguistics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), especially pp. 30-31.

8) *Life and Letters,* I, 21. The reference, of course, to F. W. Schelling (1775-1859).

9) *Life and Letters,* I, 36.   10) *Ibid.*   11) *Ibid.,* p. 11.

the latter—a task it was to take him more than 25 years to complete![12])

Unfortunately, I can take no time here to retell the story of Müller's work on the Veda, even though his struggles with various manuscripts and the difficulties which he encountred while trying to find a publisher outline a fascinating chapter in the history of European Indology. Max Müller left Paris and Burnouf in late spring, 1846, and arrived in London on 11 June. It was to have been a brief stay. His trip to Oxford later in the summer was to have been for only a few days. Max Müller remained in England, at Oxford, until his death on 28 October 1900.

Now, we must look at Müller's Buddhist studies. In all probability (sources are mute on this point) his first serious contact with Buddhist texts came in Berlin when he first studied Pāli. One may presume that this was done with Franz Bopp, but I have found no details concerning the texts which Müller read. In 1844, at the same time that young Max was learning the language of the Theravāda Buddhist Canon, Eugène Burnouf published his pioneering *Introduction à la histoire du Buddhisme indien.* Certainly Müller read this work no later than his stay in Paris although he does not refer to the text until later.

In the preface to his translation of the Dhammapada Müller freely acknowledges his indebtedness to a number of Buddhist scholars. I think it should be remembered that Müller himself did not pretend to be a full savant in Buddhist studies. As he candidly — if over-modestly — admits, he was a humble gleaner.[13]) It was to the Veda and the Vedānta that he devoted his most assiduous labours. Let no one imagine, on the other hand, that Müller's Buddhist studies were trivial. But it is well to keep in mind the fact that some of his failings are directly attributable to the fact that he was never a specialist in Buddhism.

Slightly more than twelve years separate Müller's articles for the *Times* from his paper at Kiel. All the studies were reprinted several times during his life. Because of this latter fact it might be supposed that any difference of emphasis in the first paper *vis-à-vis* the fourth would have disappeared during the course of successive revisions. This, how-

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12) Müller copied from several manuscripts, collated variant readings and presented a full, annotated text of the famous classical commentary by Sāyaṇa.

13) *Lectures on the Science of Religion* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1893), p. 152.

ever, does not appear to be the case. Only an occasional note or two differentiates a first edition from subsequent ones. Consequently, the papers may be analysed in chronological order with some profit.

The essays constitute a single fabric. To borrow from the terminology of musical composition, one could liken the four to the movements of a scherzo-less symphony. The first two papers state the thematic material and establish a mood which is maintained throughout. The third essay expands on the initial themes and develops them in moderate variations. Finally, the *Buddhistischer Nihilismus* restates the themes boldly and resolves them in a conclusion which Müller did not recast though he worked actively for another 30 years. There is progress and dialectic in the four papers, and it may appear that there is a radical change of opinion manifested in the final essay. But, in fact, this is not the case, and the harmony of all four is not disturbed.

Max Müller's interest in Buddhism centered on the following four aspects:

1. Buddhism as a system of ethics. It was this concern which led him to ask and re-ask questions about coincidences and historical connections between Buddhism and Christianity.

2. Buddhism in its socio-historical context; that is to say, in its relation to *Brāhman*-ism.

3. Buddhist atheism.

4. Nirvāṇa: Buddhism and nihilism.

To understand both *what* Müller comprehended in the term nirvāṇa and *how* he worked with that knowledge, one must assess his interest in Buddhism as an historical actuality. In such an evaluation it will be enlightening to underscore his attitude toward Buddhist phenomena generally. Or, to put it another way, we want to observe what Müller expected from Buddhism: what he would let Buddhism mean.

Early in "Buddhist Pilgrims" Müller gives a capsule account of his "definition of religion" which may be quoted in full here because of the illumination which it provides for understanding his work.

> No doubt there existed in the human mind, from the very beginning, something, whether we call it a suspicion, an innate idea, an intuition, or a sense of the Divine. What distinguishes man from the rest of the animal creation is chiefly that ineradicable feeling of dependence upon some higher power, a consciousness of bondage from which the very name 'religion' was derived. 'It is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves.' The presence of that power was felt everywhere, and nowhere more clearly and strongly than in the rising and setting of the sun, in the change of day and night, of spring

and winter, of birth and death. But although the Divine presence was felt everywhere, it was impossible in that early period of thought, and with a language incapable of expressing anything but material objects, to conceive the idea of God in its purity and fullness, or to assign to it an adequate and worthy expression. Children cannot think the thoughts of men, and the poets of the Veda could not speak the language of Aristotle. It was by a slow process that the human mind elaborated the idea of one absolute and supreme Godhead: and by a still slower process that the human language matured a word to express that idea. [14])

It seems never to have occurred to Müller that the poets of the Veda might very well have found Aristotle's language incapable of expressing their intent. He was convinced in 1857—and remained so throughout his life—that the history of religion was inextricably bound up with the history of language. Conceptual thought structures could only develop, so he believed, as language modifies and becomes capable, under the pressure of thought, of expressing such thought forms with greater precision. The process is envisioned as a reciprocal one in which thought struggles to expression and language on its part provides new forms (or in certain instances thwarts thought processes by providing shadow-existences which obfuscate realities).

The term "idea" in the above passage is elusive, but what Müller is suggesting is clear enough. The history of religion in this view, is a process in which ever more perfect expressions of the idea of God are formulated by means of the complex interplay of thought and language. Here is evolutionism in an unmistakeable form. From his own enlightened vantage point, Müller depicts the struggles of men, their efforts to articulate religious experience. It would be just to paraphrase his notion by saying that man has never been satisfied with the conception and articulation of his own awareness of Divine Reality. Further, that this is the motive force to the history of religions. And this history is a history of *real progress*, according to Müller; for truth lies in the comprehension of one God. Here a teleological formulation unites with the evolutionism.

The basic content of religious experience is a constant which is grounded in what Müller was to call later a "perception of the infinite." [15]) The experiential content is explored and elucidated in

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14) *Selected Essays, II*, 237-238.
15) *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* (London: Longman's Green, and Co., 1880), pp. 1-51, esp. pp. 22-27.

human history. Apparently, Müller thought that men have always been dissatisfied with their idea of God, but — and this is the significant point — at each stage their ideas and expressions tend to be more satisfactory, to do greater justice to the underlying experience. When the expressions themselves become the object of attention, however, this process is inhibited. Language is prone to a disease, and that disease is myth.

I dwell on these points at length because they provide certain clues as to the way in which Müller will approach Buddhism and Buddhist terminology. Where we should be inclined to say that religious language as such, within its own particular historical and spiritual context, *is always adequate and adequate absolutely*; Müller insists that it is adequate only because the particular religious society, like a child, has no other means through which to express its perceptions and experience. That religious significations ossify and often disappear under the rationalization which seeks ostensibly to give them more perfect articulation is nowhere suggested by Müller.

He says quite rightly that Buddhism emerged from a definite cultural situation and consequently is explicable — at least in certain measure — in terms of that particular *Zeitgeist*. That Buddhism was a reaction to and a consequence of *Brāhman*-ism is true to some extent also. However, Müller could not imagine and would not accept the significance of Buddhism as an independently existent phenomenon.

He emphasizes that the rise of Buddhism was a social and political event of the first importance. It is the ethics of Buddhism which he finds attractive. Siddhārtha Gotama, the Buddha, cut through the Brahmanic noose which was strangling the moral and spiritual life of India. That action is what Müller found to be of true and lasting value in the Buddha's "reform." The precepts of the Buddha and the disregard of class barrier and privilege — these constituted the Buddhist achievement.

All the essentials of Buddhism except two were facilely assimilated into Müller's view. But the problems of atheism and the vexing question of nirvāṇa annoyed him greatly. In *Buddhistischer Nihilismus* (to leave the chronological frame of my presentation for a moment) he reviews the conclusions reached concerning Buddhism by various scholars and travellers. The consensus was high praise for the ideals and prescriptions of the Buddha. "But then," he continues,

on the other hand, it appears as if people had only permitted themselves to be so liberal in their praise of Buddha and Buddhism, because they could, in the end, condemn a religion which, in spite of all its merits, culminated in Atheism and Nihilism. Thus we are told by Bishop Bigandet: 'It may be said in favor of Buddhism, that no philosophico-religious system has ever upheld, to an equal degree, the notions of a savior and deliverer, and the necessity of his mission, for procuring the salvation of man, in a Buddhist sense. The role of Buddha, from beginning to end, is that of a deliverer, who preaches a law designed te secure to man the deliverance from all the miseries he is laboring under. But by an inexplicable and deplorable eccentricity, the pretended savior, after having taught man the way to deliver himself from the tyranny of his passions, leads him after all, into the bottomless gulf of total annihilation.' [16])

Müller freely admits that "this language may have a slightly episcopal tinge,

yet we find the same judgement, in almost identical words by the most eminent scholars who have written on Buddhism. The warm discussions on this subject, which have recently take place at the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres of Paris, are probably known to many of those who are here present; but better still, the work of the man whose place has not yet been filled, either in the French Academy, or on the Council Board of German Science — the work of Eugène Burnouf, the true founder of a scientific study of Buddhism. Burnouf, too, in his researches arrives at the same result, namely that Buddhism, as known to us from its canonical books, in spite of its great qualities, ends in Atheism and Nihilism. [17])

And Müller's distinguished classmate under Burnouf, Jules Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, had underlined — almost screamed — Burnouf's tentative conclusions. This statement by B. Saint-Hilaire caught Müller's attention while he was reading the *Journal des savants:*

Buddhism has no God; it has not even the confused and vague notion of a Universal Spirit in which the human soul, according to the orthodox doctrine of Brahmanism, and the Sankhya philosophy, may be absorbed. Nor does it admit nature, in the proper sense of the word, and it ignores that profound division between spirit and matter which forms the system and the glory of Kapila. It confounds man with all that surrounds him, all the while preaching to him the laws of virtue. Buddhism, therefore, cannot unite the human soul, which it does not even mention, with a God, whom it ignores; nor with nature, which it does not know better. Nothing remained but to annihilate the soul; and in order to be quite sure that the soul may not reappear under some new form in this world, which has been cursed as the abode of illusion and misery, Buddhism destroys its very elements, and never gets tired of glorying in this achievement. What more is wanted? If this is not the absolute nothing, what is Nirvāṇa? [18])

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16) *Selected Essays, II,* 294-295.
17) *Ibid.*
18) *Ibid.,* pp. 252-253.

Buddhism was a many-faceted problem for Müller. It presented an ethical system in which mercy and compassion were the key attitudes. And it set forth a code of behavior rich in its implications for social welfare even though austere in its asceticism.

> And yet, all this self-sacrificing charity, all this self-sacrificing humility, by which the life of Buddha was distinguished throughout, and which he preached to the multitudes that came to listen to him, had, we are told, but one object, and that object was final annihilation. It is impossible almost to believe it, and yet when we turn away our eyes from the pleasing picture of that high morality which Buddha preached for the first time to all classes of men, and look into the dark pages of his code of religious meta-physics, we can hardly find another explanation. Fortunately, the millions who embraced the doctrines of Buddha, and were saved by it from the depths of barbarism, brutality, and selfishness, were unable to fathom the meaning of his metaphysical doctrines. With them the Nirvana to which they aspired, became only a relative deliverance from the miseries of human life; nay, it soon took the bright colours of a paradise to be regained by the pious wor-shipper of Buddha. But was this the meaning of Buddha himself? [19]

That final question was the important one for Müller. In 1857 it appeared to him that the popular beliefs of Buddhist millions did not correspond to the doctrine of the Buddha himself. Müller declared that the so-called "four verities" [20] enunciated by the Buddha do not directly "define Nirvāṇa, except by cessation of all pain." But as he probed to understand the Buddha's teaching with regard to the elimina-tion of pain and the cause of pain, he espied darker aspects of nirvāṇa. The "eightfold path" [21] he took to be a simple moral code. It could, he ventured, be followed without necessarily abandoning a belief in a higher being.

Buddhists, however, trace the cause of suffering through the "twelve-linked chain of interdependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*)." [22] As Müller understood this notion, the key link was ignorance. The evil of pain

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19) *Ibid.*, pp. 249-250.

20) Found in the so-called "Sermon of the Turning of the Wheel of the Law" (*Dharmacakrapravartanasūtram*, Pāli: *Dhammacakkapavattanasutta*). They are: "...die edle Wahrheit vom Leiden...die edle Wahrheit von der Entstehung des Leidens...die edle Wahrheit von der Aufhebung des Leidens...die edle Wahr-heit von dem zur Aufhebung des Leidens führenden Weg." Erich Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958), S. 11.

21) "Es ist der edle achtgliedrige Weg, nämlich rechte Ansicht, rechtes Denken, rechtes Reden, rechtes Handeln, rechtes Leben, rechtes Streben, rechte Wachsam-keit und rechte Sammlung." *Ibid.*

22) Translated as "conditioned co-production" by Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), pp. 156-58.

lies with existence, and the root of existence is ignorance. Eradicate ignorance, and existence and pain will disappear. According to Müller, this was history's most tragic instance of throwing out the baby with the bath water.

> Such a religion, we should say, was made for a madhouse. But Buddhism was an advance, if compared with Brahmanism; it has stood its ground for centuries, and if truth could be decided by majorities, the show of hands, even at the present day, would be in favour of Buddha. The metaphysics of Buddhism, like the metaphysics of most religions, not excluding our own Gnosticism and Mysticism, were beyond the reach of all except a few hardened philosophers or ecstatic dreamers. Human nature could not be changed. Out of the very nothing it made a new paradise; and he who had left no place in the whole universe for a Divine Being, was deified himself by the multitudes ... [23])

Somehow, right thinking and the inclinations of mankind triumphed over the madness of metaphysics. This, then, was Max Müller's purview of Buddhism. He acknowledged and warmly accepted the Buddhist ethic. He praised the tolerance implicit in Buddhism through its equal treatment of all men. But nirvāṇa mystified him. The understanding he had attained about it came principally from Burnouf: nirvāṇa is apparently annihilation. Very few Buddhists, Müller was convinced, understood that fact; but, though uneasy, he was prepared to defend Burnouf's interpretation.

The opportunity for such a defense came immediately after the publication of the first essay. A Mr. Francis Barham of Bath vigourously opposed Müller's interpretation. In a letter printed in the *Times* four days after the second part of Müller's review article had appeared, Barham adduced the judgments of Néander, Creuzer, and the Abbé Huc [24]) to show, in Müller's words,

> that the Nirvāṇa in which the Buddhists believe, and which they represent as the highest goal of their religion and philosophy, means union and communion with God, or absorption of the individual soul by the divine essence, and not, as I tried to show in my articles on the 'Buddhist Pilgrims,' utter annihilation. [25])

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23) *Selected Essays, II,* 249-250.

24) On the Church historian August Néander, see a brief account in G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (new ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), pp. 491-493. For Georg Friedrich Creuzer (1771-1858), classicist and philosopher, see Raymond Schwab, *La renaissance orientale* (Paris: Payot, 1950), pp. 234-239 *et passim.*

25) *Selected Essays, II,* 280.

"The Meaning of Nirvana" was published also as a letter to the *Times'* editor. Müller begins by challenging the authority of the three "experts" Barham had called on to substantiate his position.

> Now with regard to Néander and Creuzer, I must observe that their works were written before the canonical books of the Buddhists composed in Sanskrit had been discovered, or at least before they had been sent to Europe and analysed by European scholars. Besides, neither Néander nor Creuzer was an Oriental scholar, and their knowledge of the subject could only be second-hand. [26]

With regard to Abbé Huc, Müller remained silent. [27] The point was that he would not allow amateurs to cloud the issues in Oriental studies. However much he was in sympathy with Barham's or Creuzer's or Néander's view of nirvāṇa, he did not know of a single Buddhist text which supported them. (Keep in mind, however, that Müller himself had, during this period, practically no direct knowledge of Buddhist texts). It was Burnouf's conclusion which he repeated, although he would have preferred to renounce it. Personal preference was to take secondary status to the facts.

Nonetheless, I am reminded of a statement which Müller made earlier in 1857. In a letter to his close friend, Baren Bunsen, Müller insists,

> ...I do not yet despair of discovering the chord by which the dissonance of the *Veda* and the *Zendavesta* and the Chinese *Kings* will be brought into unison with the key-note of the Bible. There can be nothing inharmonious on earth and in history; the unresolved discords in the East must find their solution, and we dare not leave off till we have discovered the why and the wherefore. [28]

Beyond doubt the Buddhist nirvāṇa was the most strident of those dissonances, and Müller took heart from the fact that the meaning of nirvāṇa was not troublesome merely to the Europeans of his day. Beginning almost with the so-called *parinirvāṇa* of Gautama Buddha the precise signification of the nirvāṇa had been disputed.

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26) *Ibid.,* p. 281.

27) Later he was to observe, "The late Abbé Huc pointed out the similarities between Buddhist and Roman Catholic ceremonials with such *naïveté* that, to his surprise, he found his delightful *Travels in Tibet* placed on the *Index* ..." Ibid., p. 168.

28) *Life and Letters,* I, 198.

> ... The discussions on the true meaning of Nirvāṇa are not of modern date,
> and ... at an early period different philosophical schools among the Bud-
> dhists of India, and different teachers who spread the doctrine of Buddhism
> abroad, propounded every conceivable opinion as to the orthodox explanation
> of this term. Even in one and the same school we find different parties
> maintaining different views on the meaning of Nirvāṇa. [29])

The best place to start if one is interested in the meaning of nirvāṇa
— even if only as a technical term — Müller suggests, is with its ety-
mology.

> Every Sanskrit scholar knows that Nirvāṇa means originally the blowing
> out, the extinction of light, and not absorption. The human soul, when it
> arrives at perfection, is blown out, [Here Müller adds a note: "'Calm,'
> 'without wind,' as Nirvāṇa is sometimes explained, is expressed in Sanskrit
> by Nirvāta..."] if we use the phraseology of the Buddhists, like a lamp; it
> is not absorbed, as the Brahmins say, like a drop in the ocean. [30])

Now Müller's argument turns somewhat cloudy. He doubts that "the
term Nirvāṇa was coined by Buddha." Nirvāṇa, he asserts, appears
also in the Brahmanic literature and there in the general sense of
mokṣa.

> Unless, however, we succeed in tracing this term in works which can be
> proved to be anterior to Buddha, we may admit that it was invented by him
> to express that meaning of the *summum bonum* which he was the first to
> preach, and which some of his disciples explained in the sense of absolute
> annihilation. [31])

Müller could well have stated this more felicitously. He stresses that
it is impossible for us to be absolutely sure that nirvāṇa as a technical
term was first used by the Buddha. But to be at all systematic while
conducting an inquiry from this standpoint about the signification of
nirvāṇa, three distinct problems must be solved:

   A.   Was the term itself in use prior to Gautama's time?

   B.   What was the specific content which the Buddha assigned to
nirvāṇa? How arbitrary or idiosyncratic was this usage if one assumes
that the term itself was borrowed from other contexts?

   C. Finally, if it is possible, the meaning which nirvāṇa had for the
Buddha should be compared with the explanations and modifications
propounded by later Buddhists.

   At this juncture in his Buddhist studies, in 1857, Müller realized
that the answer to "A" above should be a qualified yes. That is to

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29) *Selected Essays*, II, 282.
30) *Ibid.*, p. 283.
31) *Ibid.*, p. 284.

say, in all probability the word nirvāṇa *was* used prior to the Buddha's
time. Yet Müller also realized that strict proof of this would be im-
possible in the absence of texts which could be proved to have preceded
the earliest Buddhist documents. In the passages I have quoted it seems
obvious that Müller would like to assume that the Buddha was the
first to use nirvāṇa in a technical sense. This assumption would allow
us to maintain that the varying interpretations of the term in the later
literature — from *mokṣa*-use in Brahmanic texts to the sense of
complete annihilation in certain Buddhist speculations — indicate that
either the Buddha's use of the term was not at all radical or, on the
other hand, that it was so radical as to be incomprehensible. Whatever
the intrinsic worth of such a disjunctive proposition may be, it may
illustrate the fascination which a search for the original words of the
Buddha can have.

Materials which we possess for a study of the content of the term
nirvāṇa in Buddhist thought are no more to be considered transcripts
of the Buddha's "sermons" than are the Gospel accounts those words
of Jesus. The so-called canonical collections in Pāli and Sanskrit Bud-
dhism would not permit a clear distinction between actual words of
the Buddha and later interpretations without making extensive use of
the most recent methods of *Formsgeschichte,* for the most part methods
which are still inaccessible to Buddhist scholars. Müller insisted that
the original teaching of the Buddha, in the absence of earlier or more
authentic documents, must be seen through the refractory of the
Canon. "Nirvāṇa, as taught both in the metaphysics of Kaśyapa and
in the Prajñā-pāramitā of the Northern Buddhists, is annihilation, not
absorption." Thus Müller's conclusion in 1857 is merely a less fluid
version of Burnouf's view expounded 13 years earlier. In fact, the
words themselves are almost those of Burnouf:

> Buddhism, therefore, if tested by its own canonical books, cannot be freed
> from the charge of Nihilism, whatever may have been its character in the
> mind of its founder, and whatever changes it may have undergone in later
> times, and among races less inured to metaphysical discussions than the
> Hindus. [32])

And in Müller's mind, of course, the Buddha's very denial of the
"divinity of the gods" means that nirvāṇa could not possibly mean ab-
sorption into a divine essence.

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32) *Ibid.,* pp. 284-285.

> Therefore, if Nirvāṇa in his mind was not yet complete annihilation, still less could it have been absorption into a Divine essence. It was nothing but self-ness, in the metaphysical sense of the word — a relapse into that being which is nothing but itself. This is the most charitable view which we can take of the Nirvāṇa, even as conceived by Buddha himself, and it is this view which Burnouf derived from the canonical books of the Northern Buddhists. Mr. Spence Hardy, who in his works follows exclusively the authority of the Southern Buddhists, ... arrives at the same result. [33])

When, in 1862, the third of Müller's essays on Buddhism was published, his views had changed only slightly. The fact that nirvāṇa meant annihilation he still believed, and the fact itself was one he would not dispute — despite its repulsiveness. His concern at this time centered on the importance which should be assigned to this "established meaning." Metaphysically, nirvāṇa was annihilation or, at best, "self-ness." But what was the importance of metaphysics after all?

> The most important element of the Buddhist reform has always been its social and moral code, not its metaphysical theories. That moral code, taken by itself, is one of the most perfect which the world has ever known. On this point all testimonies from hostile and from friendly quarters agree. [34])

If not directly, at least in spirit Müller contributed greatly to the Ritschlian anti-metaphysical outlook which was to root itself in the European scholarly world during his lifetime. (What else could be expected from this translator of Kant's *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft?*) Unfortunately, Müller never defines *metaphysics* as he uses the term. The exact sense, of course, must be solidly grounded in Kant. But because Müller's own view is rather vague and simplistic, one is well advised to conclude that — for him — metaphysics merely meant something which, in the case of Buddhism or religion generally, was pernicious and untrue.

> According to the metaphysical tenets, if not of Buddha himself, at least of his sect, there is no reality anywhere, neither in the past nor in the future. True wisdom consists in perceiving the nothingness of all things, and in a desire to become nothing, to be blown out, to enter into the state of Nirvāṇa. [35])

Just this appalled Müller. Again he returned to the point which truly concerned him: the exploration of the meaning which a nirvāṇa qua utter annihilation would have for practicing Buddhists.

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33) *Ibid.*, p. 289.
34) *Ibid.*, p. 207.
35) *Ibid.*, p. 219.

> Whether the belief in this kind of Nirvāṇa — *i.e.* in a total extinction of
> being, personality, and consciousness — was at any time shared by the large
> masses of the people, is difficult either to assert or deny. We know nothing
> in ancient times of the religious convictions of the millions. We only know
> what a few leading spirits believed or professed to believe. That certain
> people in modern and ancient times have spoken and written of total ex-
> tinction as the highest aim of man cannot be denied. ... Under clouds of
> madness, such language is intelligible : but to believe, as we are asked to
> believe, that one half of mankind had yearned for total annihilation would
> be tantamount to a belief that there is a difference in kind between man
> and man. [36])

Different interpretations of nirvāṇa abounded in the various Buddhist
schools, and again Müller took solace. "With the modern Buddhists of
Burmah, for instance, Nigban, as they call it, is defined simply as
freedom from old age, disease, and death." [37]) That perturbing ques-
tion — what was Gautama's intention with regard to nirvāṇa? — trou-
bled Müller less. True, "in one portion of the Buddhist Canon the most
extreme views of nihilism are put into his mouth." [38]) But Müller
relies more and more heavily on the fact that the Canon itself is later
than Gautama. He suggested this particular truism in 1857, of course,
but his stress is greater in 1862 — he is prepared to show an instance
of inconsistency in the canonical accounts. "After" — or so the Canon
chronology would have it — speaking in nihilistic terms the Buddha
"speaks" of sending miracles after he has attained to the highest nir-
vāṇa and manifests a luminous form.

In order to obtain the reference for this seeming contradiction, how-
ever, Müller jumps from a very cursory examination of the Pāli
traditions and the statements in the Abhidharma texts to the Saddhar-
mapuṇḍarīkam of the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition. [39] A closer examina-
tion of the Pāli texts (which was to come with his translation of the
Dhammapada) would have shown Müller the shadings of meaning
which nirvāṇa assumed. And he could have cited profitably the in-
stances of the Buddha's refusal to discuss nirvāṇa at all. Instead of
devoting himself to a closer textual analysis, however, Müller con-
cludes his article with an appeal to another and more questionable
standpoint.

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36) *Ibid.*, pp. 220-221.
37) *Ibid.*, p. 221.
38) *Ibid.*
39) *Ibid.*, p. 286. James D'Alwis, *The Nirvana of the Buddhists* [*Buddhist
Nirvāṇa*] (Colombo: 1871).

If we may argue from human nature, such as we find it at all times and in all countries, we confess that we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the reformer of India, the teacher of so perfect a code of morality, the young prince who gave up all he had in order to help those whom he saw afflicted in mind, body, or estate, should have cared much about speculations which he knew would either be misunderstood, or not understood at all, by those whom he wished to benefit; that he should have thrown away one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of every religious teacher, the belief in a future life, and should not have seen that, if this life was sooner or later to end in nothing, it was hardly worth the trouble which he took himself, or the sacrifices which he imposed on his disciples. [40]

That mighty sentence echoes Müller's conviction that the Buddha could not have preached a *summum bonum* which was utter annihilation. Müller was unnerved by the institution, the structure that was Buddhism, just as he was dissatisfied with the institutional development of the Church. Max Weber and Adolf von Harnack were to approach the discussion of continuity between religious innovator and the structure which crystallizes following his "death" in a manner which would have been most congenial to Müller. [41]

In 1869 Müller asked directly if it were "possible to distinguish between Buddhism and the personal teaching of Buddha." He assured his readers that the same question was asked as early as the reign of Aśoka. "The question is only whether such a separation is still possible for us." The answer which circumstances forced him to give was less than pleasant:

My belief is that all honest inquirers must oppose a No to this question. Burnouf never ventured to cast a glance beyond the boundaries of the Buddhist canon. What he finds in the canonical books, in the so-called "Three Baskets," is to him the doctrine of the Buddha. Similarly as we must accept, as the doctrine of Christ, what is contained in the four Gospels.
Still the question ought to be asked again, and again, whether, at least with regard to certain doctrines or facts, it may not be possible to make a step further in advance, even with the conviction that it cannot lead us to results of apodictic certainty. [42]

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40) *Selected Essays, II*, 222-223.

41) On 26 July 1895, in a letter to a Mr. Dharmapala, Müller wrote: "You should endeavour to do for Buddhism what the more enlightened students of Christianity have long been doing in the different countries of Europe: you should free your religion from its latter excrescences, and bring it back to its earliest, simplest, and purest form, as taught by Buddha and his immediate disciples. If that is done, you will be surprised to see how little difference there is in essentials between the great religions of the world. And this must be done with perfect honesty." *Life and Letters, II*, 350-351.

42) *Selected Essays, II*, 300.

Müller ventures to say, then, that we should not give up hope. The question should be asked repeatedly and always a propos of specific details. He adds the proviso that there is only a limited exactitude to be expected in any event. Certainly, Müller here grapples with a problem which greatly upsets him. Still I would emphasize that he approaches his subject with considerable caution and reserve. There is no reason to reject his preliminary line of reasoning a priori merely because it is a priori with him. Here is his justification for his own questions:

> If, as happens frequently, we find in the different parts of the canon, views not only differing from. but even contradictory to each other, it follows, I think, that one only of them can belong to Buddha personally, and I believe that in such a case we have the right to choose, and the liberty to accept *that* view as the original one, the one peculiar to Buddha, which least harmonizes with the later system of orthodox Buddhism. [43])

That statement may be criticized on a number of grounds. In the first place, when confronting a phenomenon as puzzling as nirvāṇa, it is all too easy to conclude that various statements about it are contradictory. And secondly, should it be shown that two statements are in contradiction strictly so-called (a proof which would require probing examination of their textual relationships), this should not at all convince us that only one of them actually belongs to the Buddha himself. Also, what could be the justification for establishing a single criterion to separate authentic statements from contributions made by Buddhist traditionalists?

Rights and liberties are quite beside the point. What is directly to the point is that Müller's suggestion — despite its flaws — is a solid advance over Burnouf's position. To substantiate that claim one has only to consider similar problems which occur in the study of the earliest Christian Church.

Maurice Goguel, for example, in his work *Jesus and the Origins of Christianity* noted that "critics of the nineteenth century, who were not greatly concerned with the problem of tradition, had too much confidence in a purely literary type of criticism; they were too ready to believe that the most ancient records were the most historical." [44]) Both Burnouf and B. Saint-Hilaire were critics of that kind. Indeed,

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43) *Ibid.*
44) trans. Olive Wyon (2 vols.; New York: MacMillan, 1933), I, 204.

it is hard to find a scholar in the history of Buddhist studies who does not fall prey to this historico-critical trap. Now, in discussing criteria which can assist the historian in determining the authenticity of statements attributed to Jesus, Goguel offers one which bears a striking resemblance to Müller's criterion.

> Every time we find, attributed to Jesus or recommended by him, an attitude which is contrary to that which is current in the very earliest form of the Church, there is room to suppose that we are in the presence of an historical fact. [45]

Sixty years of scholarship separate Müller and Goguel, and the latter is much more tentative—consequently making the reader more comfortable—than Müller. Perhaps we would not go astray in suggesting that Müller be credited with holding a critical technique which was somewhat in advance of his era. Still, there are no guarantees that the method will provide true answers rather than preferred ones. The principal difficulties involve the essential differences between statements about nirvāṇa, on the one hand, and those concerning Parousia, Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church, on the other. Phenomena which do not accommodate themselves to the categories of discursive reason inspire ambiguous and diverse statements. In such a situation paradox will assume all the characteristics of actual contradiction.

Müller, to continue, asks his question of two special topics in Buddhism. First: On atheism. His response is immediate and brief. There are no contradictory statements concerning the gods. He notes metaphors and other poetic images which refer to the gods; but those are to be taken for what they are and not interpreted literally. He concludes that the Buddha was an atheist insofar as this may be determined from the Buddhist texts. Whatever existence the Buddha allowed the gods was merely a shadow existence. They were less than divine—not proper gods at all.

> But whilst we have no ground for exonerating the Buddha from the accusation of Atheism, the matter stands very differently as regards the charge of Nihilism. Buddhist Nihilism has always been much more incomprehensible than mere Atheism. A kind of religion is still conceivable when there is something firm somewhere, when a something, eternal and self-dependent, is recognized, if not *without* and *above* man, at least *within* him. But if, as Buddhism teaches, the soul after having passed through all the phases of

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existence, all the worlds of the gods and of the higher spirits, attains finally
Nirvāna as its highest aim and last reward, *i.e.* becomes quite extinct, then
religion is not any more what it ought to be — a bridge from the finite to
the infinite, but a trap-bridge hurling man into the abyss, at the very moment
when he thought he had arrived at the stronghold of the Eternal. [46])

The metaphysical portions of the Buddhist Canon, Müller insists
once again, explain nirvāna as the absolute nothing.

Burnouf adds, however, that this doctrine, in its crude form, appears only
in the third part of the canon, the so-called Abhidharma, but not in the first
and second parts, in the Sutras, the Sermons, and the Vinaya, the ethics,
which together bear the name of Dharma or Law. He next points out that,
according to some ancient authorities, this entire part of the canon was
designated as "not pronounced by Buddha." These are, at once, two important
limitations. I add a third, and maintain that sayings of the Buddha occur
in the first and second parts of the canon, which are in open contradiction
to this Metaphysical Nihilism. [47])

Müller supports that assertion with quotations from the Dhamma-
pada. Eighteen passages from that work are adduced to show positions
which would be untenable were one to assume that the Buddha believed
that nirvāna equalled annihilation. [48]) Müller emphasizes quite as
strongly as before that nirvāna means extinction — a signification sup-
ported by its etymology. But

Nirvāna may mean the extinction of many things — of selfishness, desire,
and sin, without going so far as the extinction of subjective consciousness.
Further, if we consider that Buddha himself, after he had already seen
Nirvāna, still remains on earth until his body falls a prey to death; that
Buddha appears to his disciples even after his death; it seems to me that
all these circumstances are hardly reconcilable with the orthodox metaphysical
doctrine of Nirvāna. [49])

In the preface to his translation of the Dhammapada — revised in
the summer of 1869 — Müller declares that

if we look in the Dhammapada at every passage where Nirvāna is men-
tioned, there is not one which would require that its meaning should be
annihilation, while most, if not all, would become perfectly unintelligible if
we assigned to the word Nirvāna the meaning which it has in the Abhidhar-
ma or the metaphysical portions of the canon. [50]).

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46) *Selected Essays, II,* 301-302.

47) *Ibid.,* pp. 302-303.

48) In order of citation: Vss. 160, 323, 21, 23, 134, 184, 369, 203, 285, 225, 368,
381, 114, 374, 411, 97, 383, and 218.

49) *Selected Essays, II,* 303.

50) *Lectures on the Science of Religion,* pp. 180-181.

In verse 21 of the Dhammapada, reflection is called the path of immortality (*amṛta*; Pāli: *amata*) and heedlessness the way of death. The medieval Pāli commentator, Buddhaghosa, Müller notes, equates amṛta and nirvāṇa. According to Müller, verse 23 indicates that "this was also the Buddha's thought." Müller refuses to believe that the Buddha could have meant nirvāṇa as nothingness in the strict sense. "Would such expressions have been used by the founder of this new religion, if what he called immortality had, in his own idea, been annihilation?" In fact, Müller insists, "Nirvāṇa occurs even in the purely moral sense of quietness and absence of passion." [51])

His summary judgment concerning the statements in the Dhammapada *vis-à-vis* others in the Abhidhammapiṭaka is that the former represent "a conception of Nirvāṇa, altogether irreconciliable with the third part of the Buddhist canon." Then he goes still further to suggest that nirvāṇa must be seen at three different levels of interpretation.

I. The understanding of nirvāṇa as "the entrance of the soul into rest, a subduing of all wishes and desires, indifference to joy and pain, to good and evil, and absorption of the soul in itself and a freedom from the circle of existences from birth to death, and from death to a new birth." [52]) This, Müller states, is the general view of Buddhists today, and it is *also the view of the Buddha and his disciples.*

II. A considerable mass of Buddhist devotees think of nirvāṇa in terms of a gross paradise.

III. And finally

> Only in the hands of the philosophers, to whom Buddhism owes it metaphysics, the Nirvāṇa, through constant negations, carried to an indefinite degree, through the excluding and abstracting of all that is not Nirvāṇa, at last became an empty Nothing, a philosophical myth. [53])

Ernst Cassirer has encapsulated Müller's views on language and myth in the following manner:

> For him, myth is neither a transformation of history into fabulous legend nor is it fable accepted as history; and just as certainly it does not spring directly from the contemplation of the great forms and powers of nature. What we call myth is, for him, something conditioned and negotiated by

51) *Selected Essays, II,* 304.
52) *Ibid.,* pp. 305-306. Cf. *Lectures on the Science of Religion,* p. 184.
53) *Selected Essays, II,* 306.

the agency of language; it is, in fact, the product of a basic shortcoming,
an inherent weakness of language. All linguistic denotation is essentially
ambiguous — and in this ambiguity, this 'paronymia' of words lies the source
of all myths. [54])

In this sense, then, that Buddhist nirvāṇa which is conceived as the
absolute annihilation of all modes of existence for an individual per-
sonality is a myth. It is a myth grounded in the ambiguity (and that
ambiguity viewed from the etymologist's standpoint) of the very word,
nirvāṇa.

So, the problem of nirvāṇa — ineffable, indescribable experience —
is solved by Müller. One must, he concludes, either believe that the
Buddha taught both an exoteric and an esoteric doctrine or one must
accept that view of nirvāṇa as the original which "corresponds best
with the simple, clear, and practical character of Buddha." Reacting
against the negative statements of his beloved teacher, Burnouf, and
the more emphatic tirades of his respected colleague and former class-
mate, B. Saint-Hilaire, Müller struggled and finally proved to his own
satisfaction that the simple declaration, "Nirvāṇa is annihilation,"
cannot be advanced categorically. In that, he has convinced many others
as well.

Father Henri de Lubac insists that Müller's approach is not "scholar-
ly" in the strict sense.

Par une sorte d'intuition, Max Müller émettait ... l'avis que le Bouddha
n'avait pas pu prêcher le néant: si les livres canoniques le font, c'est qu'ils
ne représentent pas la doctrine primitive. Hypothèse hardie, fondée sur des
vraisemblances psychologiques, mais dont l'auteur devait reconnaître qu'elle
n'avait pas l'appui des textes tels qu'il les comprenait lui-même. [55])

In large measure that criticism is just. It is not so serious an objection
as the additional comment which de Lubac reserves for a footnote:

L'opinion de Max Müller est d'ailleurs un peu flottante. Il avait commencé
par tenir pour déviation populaire ce qu'il interpréta ensuite comme une
revendication de l'âme humain et comme l'enseignement du Bouddha. [56])

It seems to me that the structure of Müller's Buddhist essays reveals
a continuity and integrity to his thinking which cannot be dismissed
quite so lightly.

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54) Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth,* trans. Susanne K. Langer (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), pp. 3-4.

55) Henri de Lubac, *La rencontre du bouddhisme et de l'Occident* (Paris:
Aubier, Editions montaigne, 1952), p. 177.

56) *Ibid.,* footnote 95.

REMARKS ON THE EGYPTIAN RITUAL OF 'OPENING THE MOUTH' AND ITS INTERPRETATION

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The ritual of 'Opening the Mouth' (wp.t-rꝫ) is one of the two more full and detailed ritual texts that have come down to us from the New Kingdom period (1570-1085 B.C.). Together with the other text which gives us the daily temple ritual for the god Amon in Karnak, it furnishes us with a valuable insight into the ritual idiom of ancient Egyptian religion.

Parts of the textual material relevant to the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth' have been known for many years from notes taken by Champollion and Rosellini. In 1881 and 1890 a collection of these texts was published by Schiaparelli and some years later, in 1906, they were republished by Wallis Budge. The latest edition was made by Eberhard Otto in 1960, thereby incorporating some new material previously unknown. The body of texts included in these publications will in this paper be called 'the Theban texts'. This will make it easier to separate the ritual they represent from those hinted at in another body of texts of a more residual character. This latter category will be treated later on.

The oldest of the texts in Otto's edition is the one found in the tomb belonging to the vezier Rekhmire, at Thebes (Davies, 1943). This official lived during the reigns of king Thutmosis III and king Amenhotep II, both belonging to the 18th dynasty (1570-1345). This text and the one in the tomb of king Sethi I belong to the more valuable specimen of these ritual texts. In most cases these are inscribed and painted on one or more walls in the cult chamber or in the passage leading to that room.

Otto has compiled a list which includes more than eighty tombs, the majority situated at Thebes, where the ritual is found represented (1960, II: 173-83). Only in a few instances, however, they give a

comparatively full representation of the ritual. The majority of the
tombs contain an extremely curtailed representation, often consen-
trated in one picture only, mostly without an accompanying text. Only
seven of the great number of texts and pictorial representations give
us a more complete and satisfactory picture of the ritual. In return
these are distributed over a great span of time, approximately 1500
years. The oldest of these I have already mentioned, i.e. the text in
the tomb of Rekhmire. Then follows the text from king Sethi I's tomb,
thereafter the text of queen Tausret, the consort of two kings, Siptha
and Sethi II belonging to the same dynasty. The next one in chrono-
logical sequence is the text of Butehai-Amon of the 20th dynasty
(1200-1085). This text is not inscribed on the walls of the tomb, but
written in a clear hieratic writing on the lids of his two anthropoid
coffins. From the 25th dynasty (715-663) the text on the walls of
a chapel built by the 'god's wife' Amenerdis in Medinet Habu near
Thebes, has been transmitted. The two latest texts date from the 26th
dynasty (663-525) and from late Ptolemaic or early Roman time,
respectively. The first can be seen in Peduamenap's tomb in Thebes,
the other, which is written on a scroll of papyrus, belonged to a lady
named Sais. With the exception of the texts of Butehai-Amon and
Sais, these texts are all illustrated.

There can be no doubt that the texts are actual ritual texts. A
description of one of them is sufficient to show that this is the case.
The representation from the tomb of Rekhmire thus comprises 51
'scenes'. A 'scene' is the smallest unit in the representation of the
ritual. Such a scene includes a picture of the object of the ritual, various
ritual objects, and one or more acting priests. The text belonging to
a scene is usually arranged in columns beside the illustration. The
belonging together of text and picture is clearly expressed in that the
whole is usually encompassed by a frame. The text to each scene is
arranged in the following way: after the introduction consisting of
a note stating the actions which the priest, or priests, are supposed to
carry out, the recitation mark 'to recite' (ḏd mdw) follows. This mark
introduces the text, the oral rite, which one priest, usually the 'lector-
priest' (ẖrj-ḥb)) recites as an accompaniment to the actions which
another priest, very often the sem-priest (śm) performs. One scene
often comprises several 'stage directions' and recitations.

The text as a whole is built up on scenes of this kind, but as is

the case with the Pyramid Texts, none of our ritual texts comprises the same number of scenes or an identical selection of such units. The sequence of single scenes that are comprised by several texts is, however, in most instances identical. Otto has on this basis reconstructed a complete text which comprises 75 scenes. The variation shown in each individual text, apart from the number of scenes, is relatively slight. The individual scenes show very little formal variation, and their relative positions in the reconstructed text can therefore be assumed to be fairly certain. Any essential systematic variation over time cannot be shown to have taken place in spite of the considerable span of time, approximately 1500 years, which separates the oldest from the youngest text. What can be shown to have taken place is a certain expansion in certain scenes in the more recent texts, not so much in content as in the formulations to be recited.

None of the extant texts are actual "ritual books", all of them are copies which comprise a selection of scenes from such a putative book.

We do not know the factors which in a given case have determined a certain selection, I want however, to emphasize the fact that a given selection is concerned primarily with scenes taken as a whole than with a regrouping of the content of several scenes.

The type of representation characterized above, using the text of Rekhmire as an example, is the most satisfactory one in this context. Only on texts of this type can we have any hope to achieve a relatively precise reconstruction of the ritual. This type is also the one which is of the most frequent occurrence in the material, but the number of scenes depicted is subjected to a great variation. Otto calls this type, 'type no. 1'. In the other main form which we must consider, i.e. 'type no. 2', the sequence of scenes is epitomized in only one picture. In addition to these two main forms of representation, we must include pictures that show the man entombed depicted as being alive, sitting vis-a-vis the acting priests. Otto names this form 'type no. 3'. The fourth form of representation in which Otto has classified the material, shows us an extremely curtailed representation. In this type the object of the ritual and one acting priest only, are depicted (Otto, 1960 II: 29-30).

The object of the ritual depicted in types nos. 1 and 2 is either the statue of the dead man or the mummy in its anthropoid coffin. The cases are evenly distributed. In representations of type no. 3 the dead

man is depicted in festal attire, i.e. as if he were alive, sitting face
to face with the priests and often his wife is shown beside him. This
is a representation of the same general type as those we meet with in
pictures of the dead man at his offering table, a representation that
is of frequent occurrence in tombs and on stela in connection with
the presentation of food offerings to the dead man. In reproductions
of this latter type sometimes the statue, sometimes the anthropoid
coffin, and sometimes the man depicted as alive, clothed in festal
attire, are shown as the object of the ritual. The text of queen Tausret
is altogether atypical in this respect in that it shows the royal cartouche
as the object of the ritual.

   In most cases, however, either the statue or the anthropoid coffin is
depicted. Both of them, it would seem, represent real objects of the
ritual in contradistinction to the representations of the type 'the dead
man at the offering table'. I do not believe it is possible on the basis
of the extant material, to isolate the factors that have determined the
selection of the kind of object depicted in a given case. Neither is it
possible in these two types to find variations that are correlated with
the type of object of ritual. It is a fact, however, that the fuller re-
presentations (type no. 1) in those cases where the coffin is shown
as the object of the ritual, comprise fewer scenes than those represen-
tations that depict the statue of the dead as object. The most compre-
hensive representation that shows the coffin as depicted object of the
ritual actions, is to be found in the tomb of the scribe Amenemhat
(Davies & Gardiner, 1915: 59-61; pl. xvii). A comparison of this
text and, let us say, that of Rekhmire, shows that it is not possible
to point out any formal ritual variation dependent on the character
of depicted object. The difference in the object of ritual represented
thus does not seem to imply any difference in the performance of the
ritual actions.

   These considerations lead us on to a discussion concerning the rela-
tionship between the representations of the ritual and the ritual as
actually performed. As regards the question of the object of the ritual,
it would seem difficult to reach a final conclusion as to whether the
statue was the only actual object, or whether the statue and the mummy
might be alternative objects, at least on the basis of external characte-
ristics of the texts. As we have seen the coffin as object is absent in
the fuller texts. But of what significance is this connection? If we look

at the vignettes in the first chapter of the Book of the Dead, a different picture emerges. These vignettes show representations of the funeral procession and the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth'. All the variants which Naville collected and published show us the anthropoid coffin as the object of the ritual, and never the statue of the dead man (Naville, 1886, 1: II, IV). The most important thing, I consider, is that we cannot show that the ritual actions have varied in accordance with the object depicted. The aim and meaning of the ritual would seem to be identical in both cases. This discussion will rather have a bearing on type of depicted object, and the determination of it as being 'realistic', i.e. whether this object is identical with the actual object of the ritual actions. No mythological elements are to be found in the representations, these are through and through 'realistic', they show actual objects handled by the priests, and the actors themselves are always shown and identified as priests. In the accompanying texts, on the other hand, the priests and the ritual objects are often identified with mythical entities. The officiating priest is often called Horus, the objects presented to the statue, 'The eye of Horus' (ˇır.t-Ḥr), and statue (or mummy, as the case may be) is sometimes called Osiris. This mythologization has only affected the texts and not the pictorial representation of the ritual. As already mentioned the object of the ritual is also depicted in festal attire, sometimes sitting in front of the offering table, i.e. as a live man. In the text of Tausret the royal cartouche is shown as object. Representations of this kind are apparently not 'realistic', they do not intend to give an impression of the ritual as actually performed. This applies to the curtailed versions as well.

As regards the longer texts built up on scenes, that is, type no. 1, the case is quite different. These texts show a fair degree of conformity with each other, and this applies equally to the succession of the particular scenes and their contents. As I have already mentioned all of these comprise a different selection of scenes selected from a common ritual book, that Otto has reconstructed on the basis of the extant texts. None the less Otto seems inclined to assert that the representations often give a trustworthy picture of the ritual as actually performed in a given case. He says: "Praktisch wird in den selteneren Fällen das gesamte Ritual aufgeführt worden sein; meist wird man sich mit einer Auswahl der wichtigsten Szenen begnügt haben, nach

ihrer Häufigkeit in den Texten vor allem mit den Reinigungsszenen 2-7 und den Mundöffnungsszenen 26/27" (1960, II: 28).

The selection of the few scenes found in nearly all the representations can, however, be understood in a different way. In the fuller representations it does not appear from the texts which parts of the ritual the Egyptians themselves considered the most significant. The more summary texts, on the other hand, show only a small selection of scenes or ritual incidents. I suppose that this selection was not altogether fortuitous, and as Otto says, the rites of purification (scene nos. 2-7) and the 'Opening of the Mouth' 'proper' (scenes 26-27) are almost invariably represented, either in isolation or supplemented by a varying number of other scenes. We may assume that these selected scenes represented the substance of the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth' as a whole, and that these scenes consequently could serve to represent the total ritual. In an indirect way the Egyptians have thus given us a valuable clue to our understanding of this ritual. Consistent with this line of reasoning I shall assume that an analysis of those scenes mentioned above will give us the fundamental meaning of the ritual.

The Theban texts are not, however, the only sources to the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth'. In various categories of texts, and from most periods of Egyptian history, a ritual called 'Opening the Mouth' is met with. A ritual of this designation was evidently performed in a great variety of situations. The oldest case is to be found in the tomb of Meten dating from the earlier part of the fourth dynasty. The ritual is only mentioned by name, and we get no further information (Otto, 1960 II: 6-7). It is also mentioned in the temple of Snefru (4th dynasty), in the sun temple of Neuserre of the 5th dynasty, and in the temple of Pepi II of the 6th dynasty. The ritual is further mentioned in private tombs (like that of Meten) from the Old Kingdom, and the designation 'Opening the Mouth' is also mentioned in official annals from that time (Urk. I: 114; 243; 247; 248). Here the place for the performance is stated as 'The House of Gold' (ḥ.t-nb). This circumstance seems to indicate that a statue, probably a royal statue, was the object of the ritual actions. In the Pyramid Texts passages that are identical with formulations in the Theban texts occur. They are, however, dispersed throughout the whole corpus and cannot therefore be considered as a consecutive ritual (Sethe, 1908-22; Mercer, 1952). Neither do we know the ritual actions that accompanied these texts,

or the Pyramid Texts as a whole. It is not possible to reconstruct the ritual actions on the basis of the oral ritual, the recited texts. As Otto has demonstrated, the relation between the oral ritual and the ritual actions is variable, i.e. the same text can be recited in several ritual contexts (Otto, 1958: 5). And as the situation in which the ritual is enacted is of fundamental significance for our understanding, the Pyramid Texts therefore do not give us any adequate basis for an interpretation of the meaning of the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth'.

The material from the Middle Kingdom is extremely meager. In the Coffin Texts we meet with several allusions to the 'Opening the Mouth' (de Buck, 1935 ff. I: 265; III: 312; 325; 339), but these passages are not ritual texts, as is the case with this collection of texts generally. What we find here is a description of parts of the ritual couched in mythological terms, the whole ritual situation is transferred to the world of the gods. From this period we have altogether no tradition concerning the ritual apart from the mythologized Coffin Texts. To be sure, we meet with purification rituals in some of the private tombs from this period, but they do not unequivocally refer to the 'Opening the Mouth', as isolated ritual idioms they are an inadequate basis for an identification of rituals (Blackman, 1921: 53 ff.).

The above characterization of the Coffin Texts applies equally to the Book of the Dead, dating from the New Kingdom, nor does this 'book' consist of ritual texts. From this period on, however, we get more insight into the various situations in which a ritual called 'Opening the Mouth' was performed. We have thus evidence that it was performed on empty anthropoid coffins in the joiner's workshop (Otto, 1960, II: 26-7), on ushebti-figures, on heart-scarabs (Davies & Gardiner, 1915: 112-13; 117), on magical figures (Lexa, 1925, II: 53). It was also performed in connection with the interment of Apis the bull, at all events from the Ptolemaic period, if not earlier (Spiegelberg, 1921; Otto, 1960 II: 30). In temples dating from the Ptolemaic period the ritual is also mentioned in connection with the newborn god-child in the so-called mammisi (Otto, 1960, II: 32). This evidence seems to suggest that an 'Opening the Mouth' was performed on newborn children, the ritual performed on the god-child being the mythological model. Explicit evidence is, however, lacking. From this period we have material from Edfu that shows that the ritual was performed on the reliefs covering the walls of the temple and even on the temple

itself. A number of scenes known from the Theban texts are here mentioned, i.e. the scenes are alluded to through their titles but we are not given the content of these scenes (Blackman & Fairman, 1946).

In this connection I consider it sufficient just to mention these facts because the diffused and meager character of the data cannot give us an adequate picture of the ritual. This state of affairs makes it extremely difficult to compare, with any high degree of success, the ritual, or rituals, hinted at in this material, with the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth' as it emerges from the Theban texts.

On the basis of our material we can conclude that a series of different things have served as objects of a ritual called 'Opening the Mouth'. Even if we assume that the form of the ritual was modified in accordance with the kind of object it was associated with, the common name shows that the Egyptians saw an overriding similarity, in spite of the probable variations of form and the various uses to which it was put. In other words, it must be a legitimate contention to maintain that the rituals have a common semantic core in all the cases mentioned above.

There can be no reasonable doubt about the situation to which the ritual represented in the Theban texts refers; it forms part of the extended ritual complex surrounding a man's burial. That it further forms a significant part of the mortuary institutions is a likely conclusion from the fact that the representation of this ritual in the tombs is of frequent occurrence. It is extremely tempting to hold that it is not accidental that this specific ritual is so often depicted and given space on the tomb walls, and not one of the other rituals which is included in the mortuary ritual complex. This ritual is, in fact, the only full ritual text forming part of the mortuary rituals that has come down to us from the New Kingdom period. Only in the Hellenistic period do we get one more of these ritual texts, a fragment of the ritual of mummification (Sauneron, 1952). On the tomb walls several rituals are generally depicted, such as the mortuary procession, the ritual crossing of the Nile, the dance of the Muu. These rituals are depicted very summarily, and it is not known in all cases whether they depict ritual or mythological events. Only the 'Opening the Mouth' is depicted as a continual flow of actions accompanied by the actual texts recited.

I shall not attempt here to give an account of the mortuary institutions in all their complexity. It must suffice to note that the actions

performed filled a rather wide span of time, approximately seventy days. And not only was the dead himself in this period the object of technical and ritual acts, but other people too, especially his family and household, had to perform specific rituals, songs of lamentation and processions (Bonnet, 1952: 95-100), and, being in a state of impurity, they were bound to observe a number of ritual prohibitions.

Neither shall I give a detailed account of the ritual actions in the 'Opening the Mouth'. An excellent summary is to be found in Maspero (1887), and in Otto (1960) the complete text is translated and commented upon. The synopsis given by Otto of the scenes constituting the 'Opening the Mouth' and the grouping of these scenes has obviously partly emerged from considerations of a historical nature, i.e. in terms of a common origin, and partly they are grouped in series of scenes which Otto judges have a semantically related content. His grouping of the scenes suffers from the weakness that it is not derived from an analysis of the ritual. The problem is, how are we to arrive at meaningful ritual sequences building up the ritual as a whole? How might the ritual be broken up in the best possible way for purposes of analysis? If Otto's reconstruction of the ritual is correct, or approximately so, I think it can be shown that the ritual itself gives a criterion that shows at which points in the ritual actions the Egyptians saw important semantic changes. The criterion I allude to is a change in the persons performing the ritual, or a change of role in the same person, expressed through clothes or outfit that can serve as role symbols. If we use this criterion the ritual falls apart in six ritual sequences: A, scene 2-7; B, scene 9-10; C, scene 12-18; D, scene 23-30; E, scene 31-42; F, scene 43-75. Between the sequences A-B, B-C, C-D, are found scenes where the actors change dress.

A thorough analysis of the ritual should ideally begin with establishing the meaning of each single scene within one sequence, then the sequence as a whole, and finally the whole ritual as built up by the meaning of the sequences. The next step would then be to examine carefully the position of the ritual in the mortuary ritual complex. Such an analysis would demand a larger treatise rather than a brief paper. I therefore can do no more than to suggest a kind of analysis which, I think, will prove fruitful. The rites of purification (scene 2-7) are not unique, they occur in a similar form in a series of different ritual situations; there is probably no Egyptian ritual where rites of

purification do not enter as an essential component. A larger ritual includes, as a rule, a series of rites of purification, in the 'Opening the Mouth' the first sequence consists of such rites. The object of the ritual is purified with various kinds of purifying substances. In the two first scenes it is sprinkled with water, in the following two scenes presented with balls of natron (ntr), and in the two last scenes it is purified through incense (sntr), — in scene no. 6 the incense is presented as a solid substance, and in the last it is burning. This sequence of purification rites has no parallels in other Egyptian rituals. In the daily ritual for Amon (Moret, 1902) we meet with rites of purification that are very similar to those in the 'Opening the Mouth' but they have a different distribution in the ritual, and they do not form any connected sequence of ritual acts. Circumstances such as this seem to suggest that in an analysis of rituals we have to take into account, only the isolated rites, but also their distribution in the ritual as a whole. A comparison of similar rites in terms of their meaning will thus give the best result if we analyse the whole ritual structure. In any religion there is a limited number of forms, or ritual idioms; these are combined in different ways in the different ritual contexts, and they are given meaning on the basis of each single kind of combination. What I allude to is the assumption that it is possible to make a 'grammatical' analysis of rituals. Blackman once asserted that a certain series of Egyptian rituals were identical in all essential aspects. His model was the daily temple ritual for the sun-god which took place in the conjectural prehistoric "Heliopolitan" kingdom. On this ritual was based the ritual morning toilet of the king, the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth', the ritual treatment of the dead body, and the funerary offerings. This similarity he conceived as of historical origin in that the four last mentioned rituals all were derived from the "Heliopolitan" temple ritual (1921: 44 ff.). In this connection we can waive the pseudo-historical speculations, but Blackman was undoubtedly right in his assertion that the rituals mentioned are similar on many points, or that a series of the same ritual idioms are applied in all of them. What he did not do was to analyse the ritual so as to bring out the points on which they differed, that is, the way in which the same idioms are distributed in the different rituals. To give an example from the ritual here under consideration. In the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth' purification rites as a direct operation on the object occur

in two different places, in sequence A, which is fully constituted by rites of this kind, and in sequence F, that is in the first and in the last sequence. Anointing, usually classified as a purifiation ritual (Bonnet, 1952: 647-49), is a sacramental action that conveys to the object the kind of holiness we call ritual purity. But why is this anointing performed in the last sequence and not in association with the remaining purification rites in the first one? This is of course just one of the many problems of this kind that it is possible to raise in this connection, but I think it brings out clearly the necessity of analysing the structure of the ritual. In brief, I believe that the meaning of the ritual actions can be described as follows. The rites of purification in sequence A give "life" to the object of the ritual, they put the object in a state which is a necessary condition for the ensuing operations, the 'Opening the Mouth' 'proper' (sequence D, E) which through the resuscitation of the senses and organs of the object confer upon him the benefits of the condition in which he has been put by the purification rites. In sequence F the object is 'clothed' and adorned and he is handed ruler's insignia. It is in this sequence that the anointing occurs, and on the assumption that the idioms occurring in the same sequence have a similar meaning, it is to be expected that this action has some connection with the other actions whose meaning seem clear, that they express the instalment in an office. Anointing can thus be seen to be a part of the actions that enable the object of the ritual to hold a new office, and this office can hardly be other than the position as king in the country of the dead. It is now evident why the anointing is not associated with the rites in sequence A. These are only creating the capacity to hold office, the anointing, on the other hand, is part of the ritual which installs the object in his office.

In the preceding paragraph I have repeatedly touched on, and anticipated, the discussion of the problem surrounding the interpretation of the ritual. To continue the thread given in the beginning of this paper I shall concentrate on a problem that seem to be fundamental significance in this connection, i.e. the determination of the object of the ritual.

The basis for the kind of interpretation which later by and large has been followed was given by Maspero in his paper 'Le rituel du sacrifice funéraire' published in 1887: "...on *ouvrait la bouche et les yeux* du mort pour lui permettre de recevoir et de manger le repas

funéraires" (1887: 164). The texts analyzed by Maspero are those
that I here have called the Theban texts, and he makes it clear that
these texts represent a ritual that belongs to the mortuary ceremonial
complex. One will note in the quotation that Maspero says it is the
dead man who is the object of the ritual, but it is the dead man con-
ceived in his bodily existence, as mummy. Therefore, the statue of
the dead man can also be the object of the ritual, like the mummy,
the statue represents the spiritualized man in the other world. The
mummy or the statue, as the case may be, is animated in order that
the dead man — Maspero does not say what kind of existence he
supposes the dead man enjoys in this connection — shall be able to
receive the food offerings. In this article one does not receive any clear
expression of what Maspero conceives as the object 'proper' of the
ritual, but sometimes it would seem possible that he is thinking of the
more spiritual forms of existence, the dead man in the other world.

After Maspero's paper no one has tried to make a serious and syste-
matic attempt at an analysis of the meaning of the ritual. What is to
be found in the literature is limited to brief descriptions of the ritual
actions and to summary characteristics of the aim and meaning of the
ritual. I shall here only give a few examples. Černy characterizes the
ritual thus: "These ceremonies were supposed to open the mouth and
the eyes of the statue and to give it the faculties of a living person"
(1952: 103-4). Morenz says that the ritual was performed in the sculp-
tor's studio, and the object of the ritual was the statue, a ritual that
"das Werk menschlicher Hände erst lebendig machte. Wir kennen
es unter den Namen "Mundöffnung"; tatsächlich hat es aber den Zweck,
alle Organe gebrauchsfähig und damit das Bild lebendig zu machen"
(1960: 163). Blackman interprets the ritual as follows: "These acts
were supposed to open not only the mouth of the statue, but the eyes
and ears as well, indeed endow it with the faculties of a living person"
(1924: 55). That it is the statue that is mentioned in these examples
is understandable, as it is the statue of the dead man that is mentioned
most often in the fuller Theban texts, but Morenz says that the ritual
could also be performed on the mummy (1960: 163). Bonnet has given
us a somewhat more extended analysis of the ritual. Concerning the
artist and his making of the statue he says: "Freilich kann seine Kunst
allein jenes Leben nicht schaffen; sie prägt nur die Form. Um diese
zu beleben, bedarf es noch eines anderen magisches Aktes. M(und-

offnung) nennt ihn der Ägypter; denn sein nächstes Ziel ist, die Bilder der Götter und Toten zur Aufnahme der Opfer fähig zu machen." The meaning is clear, the object of the ritual is to be put in such a condition that it can be able to receive offerings. He continues: "Natürlich greift aber seine Wirkung weit darüber hinaus; er erweckt alle Sinne und schafft volles Leben". He is still referring to the statue, and it is in the statue that the ritual creates "volles Leben". Bonnet then quotes a text from the tomb of Tutanchamon: " 'Ich öffne deinen Mund, damit du mit ihm redest, deine Augen dass du Re siehst, deine Ohren, dass du die Verklärungen hörst, dass du deine Beine habest zum Gehen, dein Herz und deine Arme, um deine Feinde abzuwehren' so kann man dem Toten dank der M(undöffnung) zurufen. Nicht nur Bilder von Toten und Göttern, ..., bedürfen solcher Belebung, überall, wo wirkende Kräfte walten sollen, wird sie gefordert" (1952: 487). It seems to emerge rather clearly from this quotation from the tomb of Tutanchamon, that the effects of the ritual do not refer to the statue, but to the dead man in his otherworldly existence. But Bonnet adheres to his view according to which it is the statue that is given 'life'.

Without being in any real danger of unduly simplifying the facts, it can be said that the most common interpretation of the ritual is the one that sees the aim of the ritual actions as a transformation of the statue (or mummy) in such a way that it can serve as a medium for cultic communication. Without the ritual the statue remains a dead block of stone and the soul of the dead man cannot partake of the food offerings which are a necessary condition for all existence, thisworldly as well as otherworldly. In the ritual text this metamorphosis is expressed as a resuscitation of life and senses.

In the brief review of the situations in which a ritual called 'Opening the Mouth' is applied, I mentioned 'god children', empty anthropoid coffins, heart scarabs, ushebtifigures, reliefs on temple walls, temples as such, magical figures, as known objects of a ritual with this denomination. In a number of these situations it would seem probable that the thing in itself is the 'real' object of the ritual, in that the alterations which the ritual conditions, are referring to the thing itself and not to an entity represented by this thing. When all the situations in which a ritual called the 'Opening the Mouth' are compared, it is possible to isolate a somewhat vague common semantic core, perhaps as "sacralization", or "endowment with life".

As already mentioned we do not know the form of this ritual in
other contexts than the mortuary one, i.e. the ritual represented in
the Theban texts. And we have to take into consideration two factors
of essential significance, the form of the ritual in a given case, and
the situation in which the ritual was performed. As the actual form
of the ritual is unknown in all except one case, I will not hold that
the interpretation of the ritual here given is meant to be valid for every
ritual called the 'Opening the Mouth', but only for the ritual represent-
ed by the Theban texts.

The interpretation which I am to suggest is neither new nor original.
It is to be found scattered throughout the literature, but is limited to
brief and often rather vague characterizations (Zandee, 1960: 62;
Sander-Hansen, 1942: 4, n. 3; Vandier, 1949: 113-14). I have not
however, found a single case in which the incompatibility of the two
interpretations is expressed. The understanding of the ritual that I
am alluding to is the one that would see the dead man qua spiritual
being as the actual receiver of the alterations which the ritual effects.
This interpretation is, of course, implicit in the brief account of the
rites of purification given above.

A series of external traits of the texts suggest that this view is the
correct one. The form of representation which I have characterized
as 'the dead man at the offeringtable-type', shows the dead man de-
picted as object of the ritual. Now, if the statue (or the mummy) was
conceived as the real object, one should not expect a representation of
this kind. The picture refers to the dead man (though he is pictured
as if being alive), not to the statue or to the mummy. And in the text
of queen Tausret the royal cartouche is depicted as object. It would
seem a reasonable inference that the name refers to the dead queen,
and not to her cult statue. Furthermore we have texts describing the
various actions performed by the dead in the otherworldly realm and
which mentions that an 'Opening the Mouth' has been performed for
the benefit of the dead man. The text from the tomb of Tutanchamon,
cited by Bonnet, falls into this category. The mythologized texts con-
cerning the 'Opening the Mouth' in the Coffin Texts and in the Book
of the Dead apparently have some significance for our understanding
of the ritual, in that it is the dead man in the beyond who is the object
of the ritual here performed by the gods.

The ritual does moreover include a series of rites which does not

give much sense if we suppose that the statue and not the dead man is the object. I am thinking in particular on the rites in sequence F that has the character of an instalment in office, probably the kingly office.

Against this background it is not difficult to understand the variation in depicted objects of the ritual in the texts. What is common to all of them is that they refer to the dead man, not to the statue or the mummy. Seen from this point of view it does not matter which, statue or mummy, is selected as object, they both refer to the dead man.

As is well known, a central dogma in Egyptian eschatology was that every Egyptian, provided he had been properly buried, i.e. in accordance with the complex burial ceremonial, was identified with the god Osiris, the king of the dead. This 'osirianization' is extremely weakly expressed in the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth' but I believe the well-known painting on the wall in king Tutanchamon's tomb chamber gives a concise expression of the significance of the 'Opening the Mouth' and the 'osirianization'. The picture shows the dead king, depicted as Osiris(!), as the object of the ritual which is performed by his successor, king Eye. This picture represents a 'real' ritual situation. The next scene shows how he is received by the goddess Nut, "mistress of the sky", who gives the dead king "health and life". We now have to do with a mythological, not a ritual situation, the king is welcomed to the world of the gods. In the last picture of the series the dead king and the god Osiris embrace each other, an action which transfers vital power from the god to the king, and his vital power is depicted behind him as his *ka* (Steindorff, 1938, pl. cxvi). This series of pictures can be read as a resumé of the meaning of the 'Opening the Mouth'. As a consequence of this ritual the dead man, in this case the king, is enabled to enter into the world beyond. The mortuary ritual complex as a whole is a large *rite de passage,* and the 'Opening the Mouth' can be interpreted as forming the final ritual of incorporation. As a result of this ritual complex the dead man is separated from his position in this world and during the ritual actions he is leading a marginal existence, he does not belong anywhere, not fully on the earth, neither does he fully belong in the world beyond. Only when the ritual of 'Opening the Mouth' has been performed has his position ultimately been fixed in the beyond.

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ΔΑΙΜΩΝ IN HOMER

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Δαίμων is a word with a long history and its meaning is hard to define, particularly as a definition seemingly valid for one period of Greek thought might not hold good for another. For instance, in Homer the word is mostly held to refer to some vaguely personal, usually hostile and always uncanny force at large in the world, alien and external to the human personality; while in later writers it is often used in a very different sense, that of a divine being, not a major god, in a special and often beneficial relation to the individual, so that a man could speak of "his δαίμων". So strange a shift of meaning calls for investigation, and in what follows I wish to examine the Homeric usages of the word in order to see if the possibility of this development was already latent in the Homeric poems themselves.

Three preliminary difficulties must first be touched upon. Firstly, there would be disagreement among modern authorities even within the terms of a definition as wide as that given above for the meaning of δαίμων in the Homeric poems. Nilsson [1]) would object to the use of the word "personal", preferring to compare δαίμων with some impersonal force such as mana. Rose [2]) on the other hand sees it as personal, on the strength of the suffix -μων, which always implies a personal agent; and Dodds [3]) inclines to Rose's view. Here then is a clear difference of opinion, but one perhaps in which neither side is wholly right, being based on what is for this age a false distinction. A purely impersonal force could only be a mechanical force, and this is a concept which implies a mode of thought inappropriate at this period. At a much later date Empedocles, for example, is still found to be using the terms Love and Strife to apply to forces which we

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1) Geschichte der Griechischen Religion Bd. 1, 2nd Ed. 1955, p. 218.
2) Fondation Hardt, Entretiens Tome 1 1952, p. 81; see also Harvard Theological Review 28, 1935, p. 247.
3) The Greeks and the Irrational, 1951, p. 23 (n. 65).

should distinguish as being at one time mechanical, at another personal. But for him no such distinction was possible. His view was still comprehensive enough to demand that the forces at work in the macrocosm should be in essence no different from those at work in man; and this at a time when Parmenides had already implicitly raised the problem of the cause of motion. Still less should such a distinction be imputed to Homer. If therefore we do not allow that Homer's δαίμων was felt to represent an impersonal force, it is yet equally difficult to regard it as personal either, for no trace of personality attaches to it. It simply acts, with no "I" or "he" discernible as the author of the action. Perhaps the relevant aspects of both sides of the false antithesis personal/impersonal could best be summed up in the word "living". When one of Homer's men spoke of δαίμων, he meant a living unknown, alive as he was alive, but unrestricted by the limitations of personality.

Thus to accept δαίμων as a living supernatural agency leads to the second difficulty, one which poses a question which could at once dispose of the whole problem: namely to ask whether δαίμων does not after all simply mean any god not named, and so act as a vague synonym for θεός; its use being due to a desire for variety, to metrical convenience, or to the mere repetition of a formula. There are two objections to this. Firstly, if ever δαίμων should seem to mean θεός, it is surprisingly difficult to say which god is being referred to. François [4]) lists seven cases in which δαίμων might refer to a particular deity; and of these only one in my opinion is at all certain, that at Iliad 3, 420, where δαίμων refers back to Aphrodite just mentioned (though François oddly thinks that the reference is to Athena). On this passage Snell [5]) agrees that δαίμων is indeed synonymous with Aphrodite, and was used to emphasise the baleful and uncanny power exercised by this goddess, whose infatuation of Helen caused so much suffering. Secondly, δαίμων is a word much used by the characters, but rarely by the poet himself. [6]) It occurs in the singular 59 times in all, but only 11 times in the unspoken narrative; and of these 11 instances, 7 are accounted for by the use of a single formula. Other-

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4) G. François, Le Polytheism et l'Emploi au Singulier des Mots θεός, δαίμων. Paris, 1957, pp. 334 f. This is a work full of useful source material.
5) Fondation Hardt, Entretiens Tome 1, p. 82.
6) First pointed out by O. Jorgensen, Hermes 39 (1904) pp. 357 ff.

wise it is the poet who knows the gods and their functions, while his characters, though on occasion sharing the poet's knowledge, often have to fall back on a vague reference to δαίμων. This after all is natural, if we broadly accept Herodotus' remark that it was Homer and Hesiod who assigned the gods their names and stations. The poet's knowledge of divine affairs is wider than that of men of earlier times, whose story he tells. This implies that the use of δαίμων with an indefinite reference is older than the use of θεός with a definite reference; whence it follows that the words are not merely synonyms.

The difference in meaning between the two words leads to the conclusion that δαίμων had reference to the early experience of the undifferentiatedly "numinous". To put the matter broadly and even naively, the poets whom we in general call Homer took this area of the numinous and carved bits out of it gradually, labelling each piece with the ancient name of a god with particular functions; but there were so to speak some bits left over, and to these the old name of δαίμων was still indiscriminately applied; and it was historically appropriate that the areas covered by δαίμων should be wider for the characters than for the poet. Further, since the area of the gods was anthropomorphised, it was naturally less uncanny and inhuman than the so far unoccupied territory of δαίμων, and this is what we find.

As the Homeric poems are the result of slow elaboration by many poets, there is naturally a good deal of overlapping between the two "areas" described. For example, there is a famous passage in the Iliad (15, 458 ff.) in which Teucer aims an arrow at Hector with the intention of finishing off the whole war at one blow, only to find that his bowstring breaks at the crucial moment. Responsibility for this misfortune is variously allocated. The poet and Hector attribute it to Zeus himself, Ajax to some angry god. These however are at some distance from the immediate action. Teucer, on whom the blow chiefly falls, in haste and exasperation unreflectingly lays the whole blame on δαίμων· This one passage contains three levels of religious apprehension, moving from that of the merely supernatural to that of some god who cannot be named, and thence to a god who can be named.

One further preliminary difficulty remains. Should one refer to the subject of this enquiry simply as δαίμων without the article — the method so far used — or as "the" or "a δαίμων" as occasion might require? Obviously the implications in each case are very different.

The Greek is of little help here, as ὁ δαίμων is not found in Homer [7])
and of course there is no indefinite article, so that one is left with the
question of whether, in translation or in general reference, to supply
an article on one's own initiative. If the definite article is supplied,
the implication is that a particular deity is being referred to, but this,
as already noted, does not seem to be the poet's intention. Dodds [8])
quotes Nilsson on this point: "By using the word δαίμων he 'expresses
the fact that a higher power has made something happen', and this fact
is all he knows". The only exception to this is the above quoted passage
from the Iliad, 3, 420, where the best translation would be "the
δαίμων", i.e. Aphrodite. In all other cases the use of the indefinite
article seems much more attractive. But unfortunately even this could
be misleading, as the phrase "a δαίμων " might imply "some particular
spirit, one out of many, who could in principle be named". This how-
ever does not seem to be the implication in actual usage. For example,
when in Od. 12, 169, Odysseus says that δαίμων stilled the sea, the
tenor of the passage does not lead one to suppose that if pressed he
would have said that in fact he meant Amphitrite or Nereus or some
other. All he had in mind was the general notion of supernatural
power. In this case one might maintain that the difference between
δαίμων and "a δαίμων " is that between generalised supernatural power
and such power in a particular manifestation. But for Homer this
distinction has no force, since he is always describing events, and so
for him δαίμων always appears in a particular manifestation; (whence
Usener [9]) called δαίμων an "Augenblicksgott"). Indeed, this whole
question may ultimately be irrelevant.

δαίμων is a homogeneous reservoir of power, and it makes little dif-
ference whether in any one instance one refers to all (δαίμων) or some
("a, the δαίμων") of it, since the essential attribute of uncanny power
is preserved either way. The effect is the same and it is the effect
that matters for Homer.

These effects may now be considered in less general terms, and may

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7) W. C. Greene (Moira, Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought, Harvard
U.P. 1944, App. 3 p. 401) states that ὁ δαίμων is found three times in Iliad 7
alone; but this appears to rest on a misreading of the formula "εἰς ὁ κε δαίμων".
8) Op. cit. p. 12. Nilsson repeats this view op. cit. p. 220.
9) Gotternamen, 1896, pp. 290 ff.

for convenience be divided into three main classes, which in practice
tend to merge.

The first class is characterised by the formula δαίμονι ἴσος, which
is found nine times in the Iliad, though never in the Odyssey. It al-
ways occurs at the end of the line following the bucolic diaeresis —
whence it appears to belong to the most primitive level of the Epic. [10])
One example is typical of them all. At Iliad 5, 431 ff. Diomedes makes
three desperate attacks upon Aeneas, who is defended by Apollo. But
when he makes a fourth assault δαίμονι ἴσος, Apollo himself has to
warm him off and remind him that men are not the equals of gods. The
formula then is used of a man who has gone beserk, and is persisting,
usually for the fourth time, in some desperate action which will destroy
him. Such a man is clearly not acting in his own best interests, or even
of his own volition. He cannot attend to his preservation, or even
know what he is doing. He has ceased to be his normal self, and is
said to resemble some supernatural power — and is indeed fully in
the grip of that power.

The second class of instances, by far the best represented of the
three, shows δαίμων still affecting the individual as it were from the
outside, but in a much less wholesale manner. In these cases δαίμων
is blamed for some external physical event which directly affects the
individual, usually adversely. For example, as already cited, Teucer
blames it for breaking his bowstring. At Il. 21, 93, Lycaon complains
that δαίμων has driven him back to face Achilles for the second time.
At Od. 16, 370, Alcinous complains that δαίμων brought Telemachus
back just at the wrong moment, and at Od. 19, 201 Odysseus says that
it raised a storm against him. One of the rare cases in which the action
of δαίμων is beneficial is the opposite of the last cited, when at Od. 12,
169 δαίμων puts the waves to rest as Odysseus approaches the Sirens.

The third class, confined mainly to the Odyssey, is comparatively
small but most interesting. In this, the power of δαίμων operates inter-
nally upon the individual's thoughts or feelings. In Od. 19, 138, δαίμων
suggests to Penelope the stratagem of the web, in Od. 20, 87, it sends
her evil dreams. When Odysseus' men are about to blind Polyphemus,
it sends them an access of courage (Od. 9, 381). At Il. 11, 792, Nestor
tells Patroclus that he might persuade Achilles to fight, with the help

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10) François, op. cit. p. 328. Fully treated in Witte's article Homeros in P.W.K.
VIII, 2244 ff.

of δαίμων —where the latter seems to act as a sort of hidden per-
suader.

Such a classification has to be to some extent arbitrary, since there
are, mostly in the Iliad, a few instances which do not fit into any of
these categories. In the Odyssey the meaning of δαίμων seems to have
crystallised out a little more, particularly in the third class mostly found
therein. This points ahead to later uses of the word, for instance that
found in Plato's myth of Er, where δαίμων has become *the* daimon
which accompanies a man throughout life.

It should now be clear that already in Homer δαίμων was a word
of manifold significance. It is therefore of some interest to try to see
if the word has any underlying meaning, unexpressed and at the time
perhaps inexpressible, which would account both for the varieties of
Homeric usage and also for the ambiguities and perplexities which
beset its subsequent development. Briefly and in modern terms, I wish
to suggest that the operation of δαίμων represents the working of what
we should call the unconscious mind, with its necessarily accompanying
mechanism of projection. To suggest this is to run the risk of ex-
plaining an ignotum by an ignotius, and it must remain an hypothesis
incapable of final proof; the best that can be done is to test it out
against the facts.

The most relevant aspect of the theory of the unconscious is, for the
present purpose, the axiom that all that is unconscious is projected : [11])
experienced not directly, but as if reflected back from the environment.
As any psychic element is unconscious only because the conscious mind
cannot accept it, these reflections are felt as somehow disturbing. A
person can feel that in certain situations there resides a hostile force
directed uniquely at himself, and if this experience is persistent enough
he can claim that he is in the grip of fate. In fact he is receiving from
experience what he has already unwittingly put into it; and in prin-
ciple can come to understand that when he saw hostility in certain
persons and situations he was all the time seeing himself. What at one
time seemed entirely external has been shown to be quite internal.

If such unconscious activity is a permanent aspect of our nature,
we can look for evidence of its effects in ancient times as well as in
our own and it seems that just these effects are to be observed in the

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11) C. G. Jung, Collected Works Vol. VII, p. 195; also J. Jacobi, The Psy-
chology of C. G. Jung, p. 109.

sort of experience attributed to the activity of δαίμων. It is an un-
defined external power, with, on its first appearance in the phrase
δαίμονι ἶσος , strongly irrational associations. It can manipulate events
in a hostile manner, so that the individual feels powerless against it.
In this sense it can almost be equated with fate, as indeed it was. It
can also work internally, so as to affect the mind without the indivi-
dual's conscious intention, and even — as in Od. 5, 396 — send sick-
ness on the body. Yet it has also a curiously double aspect. As already
noted, it acts internally as well as externally. On occasion, it can send
good as well as ill; and though by the most probable derivation a power
that apportions,[12]) it can also be that which is apportioned — as in
Hector's phrase πάρος τοι δαίμονα δώσω (Il. 8, 166), where δαίμονα
can only mean "what you are fated to receive", i.e., death. This is an
ambiguity it shares with the word μοῖρα and with our word "fate". All
this is Homeric. If we look to later times, we find, as before mentioned,
that Plato gives the name δαίμων to the spirit that a man before birth,
and for no very good reason, chooses as his guide for life. In non-
mythical terms, δαίμων here is the unconscious determinant of all ac-
tion, persisting throughout life.

The term "unconscious" should not of course be used as a sort of
blanket that can explain everything simply because it means nothing in
particular. Yet if in modern times a man claimed to have had an ex-
perience that was uncanny, ambiguous and of unique significance for
himself, we should justifiably feel that a projection of his own was
responsible. In similar circumstances one of Homer's men would have
laid the responsibility on δαίμων. The areas of experience covered by
the words δαίμων and "unconscious" seem to be broadly similar. If
this is really the case, it should be possible to find evidence of it in the
three classes outlined above.

In the case of δαίμονι ἶσος, the process of going berserk may be
described as follows. A man has in himself forces that are usually re-
pressed, i.e., kept unconscious. In the stress of battle this repression
is lifted, and the forces have their way. Since they are such as the man
would not normally acknowledge, they appear to him as an outside
force that grips him: they are projected, and he is possessed by them.
But to the spectators, who see only the man's actions and not his state

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12) Nilsson, op. cit., p. 218.

of mind, he appears as the embodiment of them. He is said to be
δαίμονι ἴσος, coequal with δαίμων, and no longer a normal rational
being. Lack of rationality, in fact, is what this phrase always implies,
as may be seen if we compare similar phrases involving θεός. Fran-
çois points out [13]) that in these phrases, such as θεῷ ἐναλίγκιος, the
point of the comparison is the subject's honour or beauty, not his
strength. There is however one phrase in which the comparison addu-
ced is in respect of martial prowess, when at Il. 16, 784, Patroclus is
compared to Ares. But when he goes on to make an even more reckless
assault he is no longer compared to a god, not even to the most sub-
human of the Olympians, Ares, but this time said to be δαίμονι ἴσος·
Hence François concludes that this phrase is meant to be an "improve-
ment" on the earlier one, and that therefore comparison with δαίμων
cannot be quite the same as comparison with θεός. It is more to the
present purpose however to add that comparison with δαίμων is only
found in contexts describing a reckless and irresistible use of physical
strength. If strength alone of any degree were in question, surely com-
parison with θεός would aways be adequate, since superhuman strength
is a common divine prerogative. It is only when the use of that strength
passes all reason that δαίμων is invoked. It is not therefore strength
alone, but irrationality, the peculiar property of the unconscious, that
marks off δαίμων from θεός. [14])

In this first class, the unconscious power of δαίμων has been so
strongly projected on to the situation, that the normal personality is
almost entirely superseded. Such a case is as rare as the events that
provoke it. More often the projection is only partial, so that while the
conscious personality is left intact, odd effects are observed in the en-
vironment. This is the sort of mechanism responsible for the second
and larger class of instances. When Alcinous finds that Telemachus
has returned home in spite of an ambush, he can only say that δαίμων
brought him back. (There are many other cases in which the formula
ἤγαγε δαίμων is used for a similar purpose). This at first sight seems
little more than an alternative method of describing events. Alcinous

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13) Op. cit., p. 327.
14) In seven of the nine instances of this phrase the object of the attack is a
god, or has the support of a god. On five occasions the god is Apollo, destined
to be the god of light and reason, the natural opposite of δαίμων.

might just as well have said, "Unluckily for me, Telemachus returned".
But he did not put the matter in this way, nor did many others in
similar circumstances, and that is what has to be explained.

What we are dealing with is in fact a different method not of de-
scription, but of perception. When δαίμων is thus projected, the out-
side world is so saturated with the man's unconscious psyche that he
never sees events objectively. Alcinous cannot say that Telemachus
returned and that this fact, as it so happened, did not fit in with his
plans; he can only say that he returned through the machinations of
some unknown power. Similarly Teucer cannot say simply that his
bowstring broke, or Odysseus that a storm happened to arise; respon-
sibility for these events has to be laid at the door of some unknown
living agency. This ascription incidentally adds nothing to our factual
knowledge of the event, as might be the case with the intervention of
a named god. We know no more than before how or why the event
took place; it has merely been presented in an uncanny light.

In these two classes the action of δαίμων is such as to suggest that
the unconscious is being projected in a fairly uninhibited manner. But
the environment has to be cleansed of such interference if it is ever to
be objectively understood and civilised life made more possible. In
other words, such projections must sooner or later be withdrawn; and
there are, even within the Epic, hints that this process was under way.
These are to be found in the third class of examples, and in the whole
"divine apparatus".

In the third class, the term δαίμων is still in use, but with a markedly
interior reference. That is, the event referred to is no longer external
and physical, but internal and psychological, and could be described
wholly in such terms. Here the task of judging the relevance of δαίμων
is more than usually delicate, and as a decision in any one case re-
quires the support of all the rest, I shall quote all the examples which
clearly belong to this class. 15)

Firstly, three simple examples which may conveniently be grouped
together: At Od. 14, 488, δαίμων induces Odysseus to leave his cloak
behind on a cold night; at Od. 19, 10, it gives him the notion that the

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15) M. Untersteiner, (Il Concetto di Δαίμων in Omero, Atene e Roma 7, 1939,
pp. 99-134) cites a much larger number of examples in which he sees δαίμων re-
ferring to the personality. I cannot follow his example, nor, on occasion, his
reasoning.

sight of weapons might provoke a quarrel; and at Od. 19, 138 it puts
the idea of the stratagem of the web into Penelope's mind. The first
case is equivalent to "I forgot", the second two to "I had the idea that".
In all three the scale of events is so petty that supernatural intervention
seems uncalled for; and so it would be, but for the fact that the use
of δαίμων here might suggest the intervention of the unconscious,
which has, so to speak, no sense of proportion. It can indifferently
cause a slip of the tongue or affect a whole life.

Secondly, some related examples on a larger scale: — In the example
last quoted, δαίμων was made the subject of the verb ἐμπνεῖν. It is
also so used at Od. 9, 381, where δαίμων "breathes might" into Odys-
seus' men as they prepare to blind Polyphemus. Comparison with the
former case here suggests a sudden inexplicable access of strength from
inner sources. At Il. 9, 600, Phoenix has been telling how Meleager
saved the Aetolians, but only by giving way to his own feelings, and
not at their entreaty. He warns Achilles not to think like that, and not
to let δαίμων turn him that way. In this context the phrase μηδέ σε
δαίμων ἐνταῦθα τρέψειε could well mean "Then let not *your* feelings
drive you to act likewise", making δαίμων equivalent to Achilles'
natural impulsiveness. Again, in the already quoted example Il. 3, 420,
it has been said that δαίμων is there used simply as a substitute for
the name Aphrodite; but in the light of the other examples now under
consideration, could one add that the use of δαίμων suggest that Aphro-
dite in turn is to some extent the personification of Helen's obsessive
love for Paris — which was not consciously determined?

In the two following examples, the use of δαίμων may point in the
same "interiorised" direction. At Il. 11, 792, Nestor tells Patroclus that
with the help of δαίμων he might persuade Achilles to fight. Here, as
in the Phoenix passage cited above, δαίμων is used in conjunction with
θυμός, and suggests that Achilles' warlike feelings may be aroused if
his natural impulsiveness could be provoked into action. [16] Secondly,
at Od. 2, 134 ff., Telemachus says that if he sends his mother away
he will be made to suffer by her father, by δαίμων, by his mother's
Erinys, and by his fellows. In this fairly comprehensive list, the place
of an external supernatural power is filled by the Erinys, making

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16) The same phrase recurs at Il. 15, 104, but only as a formulaic repetition.

Δαίμων either redundant or internal — in which case it would play the part of a guilty conscience.

One final example could well sum up the whole trend of meaning which I have been suggesting for δαίμων. At Od. 3, 26 f. Athene tells Telemachus that he will think some things in his φρένες, and that δαίμων will suggest others. In other words Telemachus is being told that some plans will take shape as the result of conscious thought, others from inspiration. If this a true interpretation, δαίμων here is being opposed to φρένες as the unconscious to the conscious mind. The examples of the last class show that δαίμων was on the way to being felt as in some sense belonging to the individual. If my earlier assumptions are allowed, this is another way of saying that projections were being withdrawn from the screen of inanimate nature, and put back where they belonged. This was a necessary stage on the road to self-awareness. In its day, the concept of δαίμων had had great usefulness, as it enabled the speaker to account for the unaccountable without much thought, but at the same time it was an uncomfortable neighbour. Its action was always sporadic, mysterious and irrational, and since it was neither circumscribed by cult nor accessible to prayer, no one ever made sacrifice to it or gave it a myth. [17] Such a state of things might be congenial to the atmosphere of mainland Greece, where magic was still at home, but it was not likely to be tolerated for long in the clearer air of Ionia.

The process which gave birth to the fully anthropomorphised gods we meet in Homer, and whose powers steadily encroached upon those of δαίμων, is a much earlier and wider, but even less conscious manifestation of the movement seen in the examples last discussed. Logically the whole vast complex of the divine apparatus may be regarded as a phase of development linking class two of my examples with class three. (This incidentally would support the view that the Olympians were originally "powers of nature", if nature is understood as an environment inevitably contaminated by human projections. The alternative view, that they were a reflection of baronial society on earth, would imply a slightly more conscious process, and one less likely therefore to compel belief. But the "origin of the gods"

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17) Nilsson, op. cit. p. 217, remarks that in the case of δαίμων "man nicht an einen Kultgott denkt".

is hard to find, and no doubt both factors played their part).
The intervention of the gods, as opposed to that of δαίμων, seemed to
bring with it a better understanding of events. For example, when
Lycaon found himself before Achilles for a second time, all he could
say was that some external supernatural power had brought him there.
When Priam was brought before Achilles, he could say much more:
that Zeus had sent Iris with a message, that Hermes had escorted him,
etc. Action ascribed to an external inhuman power has been replaced
by action ascribed to external superhuman powers, depicted as the gods
on Olympus. [18]) The old unitary δαίμων, of necessity regarded as
singular because it was not differentiated, has been anthropomorphised
and split up into a number of clearly defined δαίμονες. [19]) This step
had enormous advantages. The human character granted to the gods
was an acknowledgement [20]) of the fact that the apparently uncanny
in nature is in origin human, being a displaced part of ourselves. The
gods therefore were no longer uncanny or magical, and no longer the
object of superstitious dread. They were bright and approachable be-
cause, so to speak, their shadows still lay in the residual areas of
δαίμων. But the main thing for our present purpose is the fact that
their human shape betokens a withdrawal of projections comparable
to that suggested for class three. In both cases δαίμων is on the way
to being humanised: in the one, fashioned a man but still left "out
there", like a huge image projected on the clouds; in the other, brought
within the orbit of the human personality. There were indeed times
when both types of example united. When Athena prevented Achilles
from slaying Agamemnon, being visible to him alone, she functioned
both as an internal monition and as an external divinity. [21])

The Olympian stage of the process of withdrawal had of course
much more appeal than what I may call the "inner δαίμων" stage, per-

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18) Dodds, loc. cit. p. 14: "The indeterminate daimon has to be made concrete
as some particular god".

19) The plural form occurs only three times in Homer: Il 1, 222, 6, 115 and
23, 595. In the first two cases the reference is obviously to the Olympians; in
the third it is more vague, and the meaning differs little from that of the singular.

20) I do not of course mean a conscious acknowledgement, any more than I
would say that the Olympians were a conscious creation. It would be absurd to
attribute any explicit theory of the unconscious to Homer. But the "invention"
of the Olympians, with all its implications, was the result of an effort of creative
imagination, apt to be half involuntary, as true art is.

21) Il. 1. 193 ff.

haps because a great burden of self-responsibility was thus avoided. The gods were still the ultimately responsible They, and could be treated as in fact Homer's nobles do treat them — they could be bribed, blamed, entreated, argued with and even threatened. All this was preferable to the bleak realisation that man was merely expostulating with himself. No doubt also the literary advantages of this incomparable puppet-show were so great as to prolong its life beyond its term. Yet it was not to be expected that this half-way stage could last. In being humanised at all the gods had already lost some of their divinity, and it could not be long before a Xenophanes would rob them of all that remained. The power of δαίμων was for them a steadily diminishing asset. Yet in view of its origins this power was indestructible, and as it drained away from Olympus it had to find a home somewhere else. It could either find its true home in the mind of man, or abandon its advance and return to the physical world, whence the genius of Homer had dislodged it. Both courses were in fact followed.

The first of these has already been described. It consisted in granting δαίμων an internal function. The second was adopted by the early philosophers of Ionia. Being dissatisfied with the gods of Homer, they dispensed with all specific notions of divinity, and tried to account for the world on a purely naturalistic basis. Herein lay a kind of ὕβρις, for in dismissing the gods, they ignored the reality of δαίμων on which they were founded. This was a mistake most likely to appeal to the new scientists. A man of truly religious temperament would not find permanent satisfaction in the Olympians, but in that case he would naturally revert to older sources, as did the Pythagoreans and Orphics, or like Xenophanes formulate a god of his own.

The Milesian scientists took the rationalism implicit in Homer to its logical conclusion, and in denying or ignoring his gods they lost the benefits of his anthropomorphism. His divinities had provided a handy cloak under cover of which δαίμων had begun to infiltrate into man. But the Milesians had made it homeless, and being a power not to be trifled with it took an instant revenge. If any unconscious element is allowed the possibility of conscious expression and then suddenly repressed, it will regress to a more archaic level than before, and express itself accordingly. Such was the case with δαίμων. While still engaged in finding its own way to the surface via the anthropomorphic gods, it was denied the prospect of further development along those

lines. It therefore reverted to its archaic form and, for these philosophers as for an earlier generation, infected the material environment. Matter for the Milesians was alive, and all nature daimonic; hence Thales could say that all was full of gods. [22]) Paradoxically, the old daimonistic world-view that Homer had largely destroyed came alive again in the stronghold of his intellectual heirs.

It may seem odd to suggest that the first philosophers, so far ahead of their time in many ways, were in this respect unwittingly behind it. Yet the concept of δαίμων and that of hylozoism are in many ways strangely parallel. I have already said that δαίμων could best be described as a power neither personal nor impersonal, but living. If Odysseus says that an event such as a storm at sea is caused by such a power, but without further defining that power, he is for all practical purposes describing an event that caused itself — what might be called an animate event. The life inherent in that event is thus analogous to that in animate matter that moves itself; whence the concepts both of δαίμων and of hylozoism both appear to refer to the same mode of appreciating phenomena. Both in fact are relics of animism, itself a wholesale consequence of the mechanism of projection.

Homer and his fellows took the life out of animate events and transformed it into the gods who caused the events. This was an advance in imaginative understanding. To say that a storm is caused by an otherwise unknown δαίμων is little more than to say that a storm is a storm. To say that it is caused by a god with human attributes, and with whom one can come to terms, is to make an adequate response to the event, for one can then do something about the storm; and on my own interpretation of δαίμων this is a round-about way of coming to terms with and doing something about one's own nature, whence the storm-daimon was projected. On this view Homer's transformation of the animistic into the anthropomorphic was an advance, if only because it held the possibility of the further transformation of the anthropomorphic. But the hylozoists in their sphere had regressed to the animistic level. [23]) Such was the price which the daring Milesian intellect paid

22) Aristotle de An. A5, 411a 7; Aetius' version (1, 7, 11) is τό δὲ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλῆρες.

23) F. M. Cornford (Greek Religious Thought, p. xxl) puts the matter thus: — "It is perhaps not commonly recognised that, in reducing "the divine" to this impersonal living substance, the philosophers were, without knowing it, reverting to a conception of divinity immensely older than the Homeric anthropomorphism.

for abrogating the gods and putting nothing comparable in their place.

There is however one small hint that the "transformation of the anthropomorphic" was pursued, with the result that manlike gods were replaced by man himself. It emerges from Heraclitus' well known Fr. 119, ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. As with all else in Heraclitus, this has been variously interpreted. The most recent interpretation known to me is that of Professor Guthrie, "A man's character is the immortal and potentially divine part of him." [24]) This would fit well with the meaning I have suggested for δαίμων, provided that one remembers that the "potentially divine" part of man has its representative in Dionysus as well as in Apollo. In Homer the word δαίμων shows its dark side more often than not, and this line of its pedigree should not be ignored. On my interpretation of δαίμων, I should be inclined to restate the fragment as follows: a man's ἦθος, that individual cast of behaviour which differentiates him from all others, derives from unconscious sources. (Here one may recall the sense given to the Platonic δαίμων mentioned a little earlier.) This too would be in keeping with the rest of what we know of Heraclitus' thought, for it suggest an intuition, well ahead of its time, parallel to that expressed in his theory of the λόγος; — just as the manifest content of the world rests on the hidden foundations of the λόγος, so the manifest content of a man's behaviour rests on the unconscious foundations of δαίμων. The humanising of the daimonic, initiated by Homer, here reaches its rightful end, and the projected δαίμων has been recalled to its true home in man as part of the total personality. [25])

From this viewpoint it is possible to see the successive generations who elaborated and expanded the use of the word δαίμων as analogous to a single personality in which originally unconscious contents (as represented by δαίμονι ἴσος) can sometimes reach a conscious maturity (as represented by ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων); and this, as often happens, without or even in spite of the will of the individual. Such an event

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They were undoing all the work of the poets and plastic artists, and rediscovering the raw material out of which the humanised gods had been built up."

24) Hist. of Gk. Phil., Vol. I, p. 482. (I am much indebted to Prof. Guthrie for valuable criticisms made while this article was in preparation).

25) Once again, I am not attributing any explicit theory of this sort to Heraclitus, any more than in a similar case to Homer. It is a question of an intuitive utterance capable of restatement in modern terms.

can happen at any time, though the mode of expressing it will vary with the age. Indeed, this whole enquiry boils down to an examination of different methods of describing the same phenomena, and the simplest conclusion would be merely this, that if Homer describes one event in terms of δαίμων, and we another in terms of the unconscious, then the two events belong to the same class.

MEMORIAL MINUTE

BY

MORTON SMITH

ERWIN RAMSDELL GOODENOUGH was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1893. After attending Hamilton College he went for two years to Drew Theological Seminary and then to Garrett Biblical Institute, from which he received the bachelor's degree in theology in 1917. He then studied for three years at Harvard, where he was much influenced by the teaching of George Foot Moore, and for three years at Oxford, from which he received the D. Phil. in 1923. In that year he returned to the United States as instructor in history at Yale, where he remained, becoming Assistant Professor of History in 1926 and Associate Professor in 1931, then Professor of the History of Religion in 1934, and John A. Hoober Professor of Religion in 1959. On his retirement from Yale in 1962 he spent a year at Brandeis University as Jacob Ziskind Professor of Mediterranean Studies, and settled in Cambridge, where Harvard placed at his disposal an office in Widener Library. Here he continued his research until his final illness.

During his work for his first published book, *The Theology of Justin Martyr*, 1923, he came to the conclusion that many hellenistic elements of early Christianity were probably derived, not directly from the pagan world, but from the already hellenized Judaism through which Christianity first spread abroad. Almost all the rest of his scholarly work was devoted to the study of this hellenized Judaism, which figured largely in all his works and was the primary concern of *The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt*, 1929, *By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism*, 1935, *The Politics of Philo Judaeus, with a General Bibliography of Philo*, 1938, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus*, 1940, and the monumental *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, of which the publication has continued since 1953 and which will be completed, by publication of the twelfth volume, this year. In these works Goodenough set forth a picture of hellenized Judaism which may be seen as completment, and counterpart to Moore's

classic picture of rabbinic Judaism. But while Moore's work was the careful analysis and description of a well-recognized body of written sources, Goodenough's work required the collection of a vast body of archaeological material hitherto scattered through thousands of publications, museums and private collections, some of it unrecognized, most of it neglected, and almost all of it misinterpreted. With the presentation of this material, the volumes of *Jewish Symbols* necessitated a profound revision of previous notions of hellenistic, and also of rabbinic, Judaism. From now on, wherever the Judaism of the Greco-Roman world is seriously studied, Goodenough's work must be used as one of the primary sources.

This great scholarly achievement was recognized by grants from the Bollingen Foundation (whose magnificent publication of *Jewish Symbols* is a credit to our country), by degrees from Garrett, Yale, the Hebrew Union College, and the University of Uppsala, and by membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. It was, however, only one aspect of Goodenough's career. He was always an active participant in many scholarly organizations in this country and abroad. From 1934-42 he edited the Journal of Biblical Literature and he was long the representative of the Society of Biblical Literature to the American Council of Learned Societies; from 1947-58 he was President of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences; he was a member of the councils of the I.A.H.R. and the World Union for Jewish Studies, and of the Committee on the History of Religion of the A.C.L.S. In this last role he played a large part in the organization of The American Society for the Study of Religion and was its first President. He was also deeply concerned with contemporary religious problems, a concern which derived from his upbringing in a household of intense Protestant piety. Because of this he was always anxious to determine the valid and enduring elements of religion and to redefine the religious life in the light of scientific discoveries, particularly in the fields of physics, psychoanalysis, anthropology and sociology. He was much involved in the Institute for Religion in an Age of Science, and was a member of its advisory board from 1956 on. At Yale he gave generously of his time in counseling students with religious problems, his home was always a center for discussion of religious questions, and his own beliefs were summed up in his book, *Toward a Mature Faith,* 1955.

All these achievements live on. What is lost to us, and what we mourn, is the personality — the wide learning, the extraordinary combination of clarity and profundity, the candid recognition of the limitations of his learning and of the suppositions required for his theories, the warmth and intensity of his life.

BULLETIN

COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL SUR "LES ORIGINES DU GNOSTICISME" (MESSINE, ITALIE, 13-18 AVRIL 1966)

L'Université de Messine et la chaire d'histoire des religions de l'Université de Messine, en collaboration avec la I.A.H.R., organisent un colloque international sur le thème "Les origines du gnosticisme".

Le colloque aura pour but de tracer le *status quaestionis,* d'examiner la légitimité historique du problème et la méthodologie relative, de situer le gnosticisme dans la phénoménologie et dans l'histoire des religions. La possibilité même d'une définition du gnosticisme fera l'objet de la discussion, tout comme les différentes alternatives concernant les rapports historiques entre les mouvements gnostiques (diffusion, parallélisme, convergence). Seules les contributions qui touchent explicitement au problème des origines et de la définition du gnosticisme seront acceptées, ne fût-il que pour contester la légitimité historique de ce problème.

Organisation du Colloque et ordre des travaux

Le Colloque aura lieu du 13 (le mercredi après Pâques) au 18 avril 1966; son siège sera la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Messine. Deux demi-journées, le samedi et le dimanche, seront dédiées à des visites dans la Sicile orientale. Les travaux seront en section unique. La durée des conférences ne pourra donc dépasser les 30 minutes, ou les 45 minutes dans des cas particuliers signalés préalablement au Comité par les rapporteurs intéressés. Pour ce qui excéderait ces temps, les rapporteurs pourront se référer aux textes préalablement lithographiés et diffusés. On rappelle que, dans l'intérêt scientifique du Colloque et pour préparer la discussion, le texte complet des exposés, avec leur apparat érudit, devra être envoyé au Comité d'organisation: ces textes seront communiqués à tous les autres rapporteurs. Ceux-ci auront alors la possibilité d'ajouter des *post-scripta* à leurs exposés et d'envoyer des remarques générales ou spéciales concernant les autres. Les *post-scripta* et les remarques seront pareillement diffusés avant le Colloque.

La première circulaire a été envoyée en plusieurs copies à tous les groupes nationaux adhérant à la I.A.H.R. La deuxième vient d'être diffusée. Tous les rapporteurs annoncés jusqu'ici peuvent compter sur une subvention financière de la part de l'Université de Messine, en proportion avec leurs frais de voyage. Pour ceux qui seront annoncés dans la suite, la subvention sera conditionnée par les disponibilités existantes au moment de leur adhésion.

Plus de quarante savants ont donné jusqu'ici leur adhésion au Col-

loque. Leurs contributions concerneront les thèmes généraux suivants :

    I) *Le problème et les textes.*
   II) *Qu'est-ce que le gnosticisme?*
  III) *Le gnosticisme, l'Iran, la Mésopotamie et l'Egypte.*
  IV) *Gnosticisme et judaïsme* (I)
   V) *Gnosticisme et judaïsme* (II)
  VI) *Gnosticisme, judaïsme et christianisme.*
 VII) *Gnosticisme et christianisme.*
VIII) *La Grèce, l'hellénisme et la gnose.*
  IX) *Problèmes comparatifs.*
   X) *Confrontation rétrospective et perspectives de la recherche.*

Toute suggestion concernant l'ordre des travaux et les thèmes à traiter, sera la bienvenue.

Le siège du Comité d'organisation du Colloque est le suivant : Istituto di storia delle religioni, Facoltà di Lettere, Università, Messina (Italia).

<div style="text-align: right">

Pour le Comité messinois
Prof. Dr. Ugo Bianchi

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